这篇影评可能有剧透 主演演技颜值双在线，让人很惊喜，男女主哭戏真的没话说（除了最后男主探望去世前女友时的哭戏有点用力过猛，不过感觉是导演的精心安排）。部分画面也很有美感，精致的光线和构图，再配上背景音乐，还是有点氛围的。 但这个抓马的剧情，真就无话可说。离谱！离谱！！离大谱！！...  (展开)

最近我看了<会>
尹堂曜（越看越耐看啦）
米　爱（不说啦）
彭优/裴翌（这个改编的也太……）
郑浩扬　（真的被雷到啦）
戚果果（挺可爱的）
牧　洋（没啥好说的）
那　露（造型有点奇怪）
袁冶　（这个哈,各位知道的，眉毛）
成 媛 （TV版她怎么去喜欢曜啦啊）
艾　仲（和果果约会的，那吃相啊……）
小瑜（就是那个小护士啦）
学姐（范冰冰演的，名字不详啦）
金泽（金桢勋演的帅阿帅)

结局大致概括：
天使不在了.
青蛙和恐龙在一起了.
解释一下!
曜去天堂了.小米一个人.
剩下的人成对了.

李承铉的配音也太不行了吧
听起来有些结巴
还有
小米不是一头毛茸茸的短发吗？
小米不喜欢最喜欢穿白裙子吗?
裴优怎么变成了彭优
还有她的那女朋友是怎么冒出来的？
请剧主尊重原著好吗？
校花简直就是一个农民
我能体谅剧组的难处
但是你们添加的那些情节也要符合事实好不好
我都不知道怎么说了
我真的不知道李承铉是怀着什么样的心情去演的
结局也变了样``

我完全被雷打了...

看了四五集，挺不错的新剧。

第一集节凑很快，撕逼得很厉害，TVB的即视感。但是后面慢慢舒缓下来，尤其是Cookie，慢慢从一个充满戾气的泼妇慢慢展现出自己的个性，特别有魅力。为了家人，甘愿在监狱里呆了十七年，这本身就是伟大的，性格泼辣、直爽、有音乐才华、对家庭忠诚，当从监狱里出来，看见丈夫把公司发展的这么好，其实我觉得她应该是很惭愧又无奈的。她一直自恃是丈夫的制造人，一手打造了丈夫的音乐道路，但是发现离开自己之后的他，事业依然如日中天，心里要说没有点失落，怎么可能。

作为圈内人，从他跟Jamal的谈话中，可以看出她是洞悉娱乐圈规则的人，并不是什么圣母，所以她能理解她在监狱的这些年过的辛苦，丈夫在外面打拼也不轻松。都是成年人，自然明白其情感选择，总不能让这样一位事业如日中天的黑人大哥守活寡吧，又不是我大中华的鸳鸯忠相守的感情路子。但看着曾经的挚爱，如今美人拥怀，同为女人，哪里能不生一胸口恶气呢。但觉得这部剧好的地方，就是新人跟旧人站在一起，也不拿道德来彼此压谁，Cookie没觉得她多被欺负了，山寨瑞哈娜也并没有小三的惭愧感，无论什么原因，是结束婚姻关系的前妻与现任之间，即便是撕逼也并不狗血，大大方方的都想争一口气，都是漂亮潇洒的女人。

当生命被划了明细的终点，当死亡开始倒计时，为了达成目标自然是不惜一切，兄弟反目，把儿子逼得紧，把前妻看成眼中钉，在第一目标面前，心必须要很强硬。但是，看着前妻回来，总是忍不住怀念起以前种种，这就是人最美好的地方，最好的莫过于往日时光。有些东西是忘不掉的，如果不去刻意伤害它毁掉它的话，Cookie在这方面干得最漂亮，因为还爱他，更懂他，了解他。他们两夫妻之间那种秉直又温馨的小细节，很生动，因为很生活。生活中的人们并不是那么喜剧性的撕逼大战的，反目成仇你死我活，不是的，是吵架了闹矛盾了，但冷静下来又忍不住想起对方的好，想想我们自己就能感受得到了。所以当在电梯里看见那个蠢歌手欺负前妻的时候，虽然不想以前那么热血沸腾的暴力了，但是依然能为前妻出一口气。

辣妈出狱后看家人的顺序，先是老二，再是丈夫，其次才是老幺，跟老二拥抱的母子重逢很开心，跟丈夫冷漠谈判新人笑旧人哭的暗自伤感在心头，把从未见过面的小儿子打了一顿，亲妈很辣，但是辣妈也柔情，支持老二做自己，对老大愧疚的都不敢去看他。二儿子像半个闺女，窝心的小棉袄。小儿子缺失母爱，对母亲又怕又恨，但其实心里面很需要，搞个小三玩扮演都叫对方妈咪，天真幼稚，被爸爸的“玩具”哄着肯定会站在爸爸这边。我们都有小时候爸妈吵架的经验，但爸妈如果真的战斗升级到要自己选择站队来跟谁的地步呢，黑人兄弟们就面临这个选择题。其实一般家庭争家产的戏，咱们我们儒家影响长大的孩子们，兄弟之间撕逼的话往往要搭配个蛇蝎女人调剂一下，不然把亲情伤害的太难看了，兄弟是不愿意反目的，都是被枕边风吹的，没想到我黑人大哥也是要酱紫。辣妈骂老二“蠢娘炮”的时候，天性使然，泼辣敢爱敢恨敢说，也表达了她对儿子无法掌控的无奈的气愤，第一集丈夫说的“你知道我有多想念你的坦率”这个坦率跟泼辣的结合，辣与柔情。老二明明心底最需要的是父亲的认可，那是他的心理缺乏，也才因此父亲对他才华的无视而取答应老妈想自己干出一方惊艳来震惊一下老爸。看过很多音乐剧，但是辣妈冲到公司跟丈夫谈判弹钢琴表达自己的那段，跟剧情的配合，是让我惊艳到了。

黑人小姑娘提不错的，却是个拉拉，贵圈真乱。我刚开始看见黑人小姑娘去找cookie的时候，以为是名媛派她去当间谍的呢，结果居然真是自己去的，而且名媛居然也不给她穿小鞋，这让习惯狗血剧的我略不适应。开始看的时候，中国人思维看这剧简直就不能忍老幺那智商，去泡妞居然直接给姑娘讲，跟我在一起对你有各种好处哟。后来仔细想想，可不就是这直来直去的呢，都像我们话中有话玩暗示，多累，也傻。老大明明最适合管理公司，也是为了公司付出最多的，跟着他的白人老婆为了管理权操碎了心，但其父作为技术出身的老板，就是偏爱技术，啥公司都一样哟，技术出身的偏爱技术，美名其曰为了公司发展好。Jamal情商高，又敏感，有才华，就是太迫切的需要父亲的认可了。

看了几集，写几句感触，我猜看完感觉全得推到吧，就像看见小姑娘喜欢姑娘时我的心情一样。

/ s1e5

首先强调，我们通常将King Kong音译为金刚，其实这种叫法是不准确的。在金刚电影观中，金刚在骷髅岛上的本名为刚（Kong），而King这个称呼是金刚被带到纽约为了演出而强行加的，所以King Kong的意思是“最强王者Kong”，翻译成中文应该是“王刚”。。。。。。关于金刚名字，下...  (展开)

一、多个时空


《纯粹理性批判》中的第一经验类比（Analogies of Experience）要求在现象中有一个恒定且唯一之物来表象意识中的时间本身。恒定，或永恒，因为作为总体的时间本身是始终在那的；惟一，因为只有一个时间。这个惟一且永恒的东西，即现象中的实体（Substance）。康德明确把这个实体与洛克的托子（Substratum）区分开来，认为实体是以各种方式显现于人的，而不是像托子那样不可知，也不显现。

我要说，洛克的托子的作用是保证物的个体化与同一性。这个作用在康德那儿，似乎是由物自体和先验范畴共同完成。先验范畴组织现象，在使意识对现象的认识成为可能的同时，也使同一的意识本身成为可能——对先验对象的构成即对自我的构成。而物自体在这个过程中究竟如何起作用，不详。康德的物自体与洛克的托子一样，是个让理论显得尴尬，却又不得不进行的假设。

尽管康德反复说现象中的实体不是洛克的托子，但这个实体究竟是什么，他又语焉不详。出于他对牛顿力学的接受，有人尝试将其理解为牛顿意义上的质量。我论证过，这样的解读将面临一个两难困境：如果实体是个体化了的质量，时间便不是惟一的；如果实体是现象世界中的总质量，基于二律背反的理由——这个总体无法成为经验对象——我们便无法经验到它。（详细论述见篇末附录）

若是跳出康德阐释，取前一个困境：时间不是惟一的，每个作为现象的物都意味着一个独立的时间体系，我们就科幻了：空间中的一个一个的物，奠基着意识中的一个又一个时间系，我们可以生活在不同的时空中，当我们经验不同的物。甚至，对应地说，我们总在成为另一个人，当我们来到不同的时空。

于是，我情愿把亨利的生活看作对康德的一次失败却有趣的解读。与其说他是一位时间旅行者，一位不停地穿越时空的超人或可怜人，不如说，他的意识中并没有一个绝对惟一的时间，他所来到并离开的每一个时空，都是一个独立自在的世界，尽管这些世界看上去很像，但哪个都不依赖于另一个——从理念的意义上说。


二、沉默，或消失


影片的前半部分，亨利的突然消失被解释为一种不治的遗传疾病。没有理由地，他时不时就去了另一个时空，赤身裸体地寻找可以穿上的衣服。仿佛常人来到一个新的环境，总是迫不及待地寻找一个身份，穿到自己身上。
亨利总会在一个无从预料的时刻消失，克莱尔生活在一个不确定的世界中。她的爱情是确定的，但她爱的人不确定地存在着。她的生活中弥漫着不确定性，而这恰好让她格外珍惜亨利在她身边的每一分钟。

克莱尔一次次怀孕又一次次流产，因为胎儿也有穿越症，莫名其妙地，便在某个时刻，出离了子宫。但克莱尔最后一次怀孕时，对亨利说，你每次消失都是因为感觉到了压力。所以，从现在开始，我要保持绝对地平静，这样胎儿就可以顺利出生了。
看到这里，我恍然大悟，原来亨利的穿越症是个隐喻，关于男人的隐喻：面对压力，便会沉默与回避，这不正是男人的本能反应么——而这在女人看来，仿佛爱人去了另一个时空，不知何时才能回来，甚至，会不会回来。

我查了查，电影改编自一位女造型艺术家的首部小说，写于一段失败的恋情之后。原来如此。

很多年前听到过一个说法：爱情，对男人来说，是挂在墙上的一幅画，你并不总是去看它；但对女人来说，则是房间里音乐，你想不听都不行。所以，男人需要时不时地呆在纯然属于自我的世界里，在沉默中成为自己。女人却要认为这是对她的疏远、对亲密的疏离，并因此而坐立不安，想方设法闯进那份铁一般的沉默。结果，要么把自己撞疼，要么把爱情撞碎。
这是对小儿女情态的描述。若成年点，便会更同情于另一个说法：人生在世，无非是男人讨慰藉，女人讨生活。人并不总是需要慰藉，尤其在得意之时。人却总在生活，就算你不想。


三、看着，却无法改变


在一次穿越中，亨利来到母亲身边，在地铁里，母亲在看报，他们作为陌生人简短却亲切的交谈了一会儿。亨利告诉母亲，他要结婚了，这个女孩让他感到安全。
克莱尔问他：你什么不去阻止那场车祸，既然你可以回到车祸发生之前。“我无法阻止。无数次我回到过去，回到母亲还在的时候，但每次我都无法改变发生着的一切。”——这话让人特别难过。我们并不能改变过去，就像不能重新雕刻一座已然完成的塑像。

不是么？很多时候，我们从自己当下的境遇中抽身而出，试图站在一个更开阔的角度，超脱地看现在的纠结、焦虑，或苦闷，并自嘲这些都没什么的。但当你身在当下，你知道未来的自己就坐在对面，笑着，看着自己，慈悲地。但你还是无法因此脱身而出。你仍然只能呆在你当下的处境中，无论是过分的快乐，还是仿佛无法挣脱的哀伤。

每一个时刻都是三维的，它包含着过去、现在，和未来这三个维度。我们在回忆中编辑时间，编辑自己，有意无意地遗忘一些，并把另一些反复摩挲。过往明明灭灭，像晴天里，随风晃动的百叶窗投在墙上的影子。每次回忆之后，我们都成为另一个人。
未来也是。未来无数次作为想象呈现于当下，各式各样地，仿佛清晰的回忆。回忆与憧憬，如同天平的两臂，对称着，平衡着，在现在这个支点上。所以，现在这个时刻，最重。


四、期限


有天聚会时，亨利中枪后痛苦挣扎的裸体突然出现在他们的门厅里。又消失了。克莱尔说，我从没见过四十岁之后的你。我见过的你总是很年轻。从这个时候起，死亡就成了他们中的另一个在场者，尽管它总是沉默着。

亨利穿越到未来，遇见了自己的已经十岁的女儿。女儿告诉他，他死于自己五岁那年。她们一直很想念他。那时他们的女儿还没出生。那时克莱尔还一如既往地希望与亨利白头偕老，就像她还没长大时那样，就像她长大之后第一次遇到亨利时那样，就像亨利死后，她仍然留着亨利所有的衣服，等着亨利回来那样。

于她而言，亨利是不会死的。他无非是走远了一下子回不来，他无非是在时空中迷了路，找不到一件让他温暖的衣服。

女儿五岁那年，亨利和克莱尔都已知道，亨利即将死去，中弹而死。期限降至，可能在任何一天，任何一个时刻。在它到来之前，所有相聚的时光都是铭刻，都是用最日常的方式来进行的一次祭奠，一次追忆。当这个期限还不确定，他们相爱着，仿佛一对最平凡的恋人；当这个期限已然确定，他们相爱着，装作不知道他们即将分离。

一个期限并不见得让期限到来之前的一切都显得美好。但，美好的东西都有一个期限。确定的期限，或不确定的期限。你不能试图挽留，那会犹如握紧手中的细沙，握得越紧，便流失得越快，宛如时间，从指缝间悄然流走。
这个期限是否到来，何时到来，都不是你能选择的。你能做的，仅仅是在它到来之前的每一刻，不让自己在未来后悔——克莱尔明白这些，并且，她做到了。

而，这不正是人生么。


——————
附录：On Understanding Substance as Mass

Introduction

In the First Analogy of Experience, Kant argues that there must be some permanently persistent substance in the appearances which represents the persistence of time. Given Kant’s endorsement of Newtonian physics, commentators such as Eric Watkins suggest that such permanently persistent substance can be understood as Newtonian mass. In this paper, however, I argue that we face a dilemma when we try to cash out the notion of substance in terms of Newtonian mass.
The paper proceeds in three steps. In the first section, I present the reason why there needs to be a permanently persistent substance in the appearances, and discuss why it seems to be compelling to conceive of the permanently persistent substance as Newtonian Mass. Then, in the second section, I argue that there are (only) two ways of conceiving of the permanently persistent substance as Newtonian mass, namely, to conceive of substance as individuated mass and to conceive of substance as the sum total of mass in the world of appearances. I show that there are textual indications as well as philosophical reasons to support each option. In the third section, however, I argue that both ways suffer from inescapable problems. Thus, conceiving of the permanently persistent substance in terms of Newtonian mass is not viable.

    
Section I. The Permanently Persistent Substance

In this section, I shall first present the reason why Kant thinks that there must be a permanently persistent substance in the appearances. I then discuss why it is compelling to conceive of such substance as Newtonian mass.
In the chapter “System of all principles of pure understanding,” Kant discusses what makes possible the applications of the categories, i.e. the pure concepts of understanding, to objects, i.e. appearances that are given to sensible intuitions. That is, he discusses what it is that makes the categories have objective validity. Kant’s claim is that the applications of the categories are only possible under certain conditions, and these conditions are spelled out by the principles. For instance, the applications of the relational categories (substance-accidents, cause and effect, and mutual interactions) are possible if they are applied to objects according to the principles of Analogies of Experience. In addition to the three specific principles that correspond to each of the three relational categories, Kant also provides a general principle overarching all three Analogies. The general principle is stated in the second edition as follows: “Experience is possible only through the representations of a necessary connection of perceptions” (B 218). Watkins provides a helpful interpretation of this general principle:
“The general idea is that each of the three relational categories represents a necessary connection that is required for experience of a single time and of objects existing and being temporally related to each other within a single time to be possible.” (My emphasis)
Since this paper is focused on the notion of substance in the first Analogy, I shall ignore the second and third Analogies. So I now turn to a close examination of the first Analogy.
The first Analogy, i.e. the principle of the persistence of substance, is stated in the second edition as follows: “In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.” (B 224) Watkins summarizes Kant’s argument for the first Analogy as follows (which I take to be a correct interpretation):
Premise 1: Appearances, i.e. objects of experience, are made possible by time’s persistence.
Premise 2: We do not perceive time itself.
Therefore, In order to have experience of appearances, there must be some permanent substance in the appearances which can represent time or time’s persistence.
While the appearances, as the objects given to our intuitions, are changing, the substance in appearances always stays the same and is permanent. So, Kant calls the permanent substance “the substratum of everything real” (B 225). But, some clarifications about Kant’s use of the term “substratum” are needed to prevent potential confusions. Substratum in Kant’s text does not mean what Locke uses this term to mean, namely, the bearer of properties which is unchanging and about which we can have no knowledge. For, according to Locke, we can only know what is given to our senses, but since the underlying substratum cannot be given to our senses, we have no access to it and therefore cannot know it.
Kant, by constrast, does not think that there is any Lockean substratum in the world of appearances. For Kant, the fact that the states of the substance are changing and the substance stays the same does not mean the states are separable from the substance. Rather, the changing states of the substance are simply the ways in which the substance is given to us. Thus, we can know the substance, that is, we know the substance through its states. In order to avoid the Lockean implication of the term “substratum,” I shall only use “substance” to refer to the permanently persistent thing in the appearances despite Kant’s own use of “substratum” to talk about what is permanent in the appearances.
Since I have argued that Kant’s notion of substance is not the Lockean substratum, then what is the Kantian notion of substance? We need a positive account of what the substance is. It is obvious that such a permanently persistent thing cannot be captured by ordinary physical objects, no matter whether they are natural objects (say, rocks) or artifacts (say, ships), for neither artifacts nor natural objects always stay the same such that in principle they can never suffer changes. So, it seems no ordinarily construed physical things can be qualified as substance that is permanently persistent. On the other hand, it is very hard to imagine that anything non-physical could play the role the substance is supposed to play. For it is hard to imagine how a non-physical being could be given to our sensible intuition or could be spatiotemporally organized by our a priori intuitions. So, it is unlikely that Kant means something non-physical by “substance.” Thus, there are two constraints on spelling out what substance is. First, it is something physical. Second, as I have shown, the physical being that can be understood as substance cannot be ordinarily individuated physical things such as planet or rock.
In order to meet the above two conditions, Watkins suggests that, given Kant’s commitment to Newtonian science, it is likely that Kant has Newtonian mass in mind when he talks about the substance, since no matter how a physical object changes, its mass always stays the same. Since Newtonian mass is physical and is not an ordinarily individuated object, it seems quite compelling that the substance, which is permanently persistent, just is Newtonian mass. According to common sense, Newtonian mass is understood to be underlying objects such that we cannot directly perceive mass but can only perceive mass through the way it is given to our intuition, namely, through the perception of the objects that have mass. Thus, mass is neither unknowable nor directly perceivable, which seems to fit the description of the substance perfectly.
Moreover, there are many textual indications that suggest the identification of substance with mass. Let me note two examples. First, recall the general principle overarching the three specific Analogies, namely, “In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.” (B 224) It seems that “quantum” is most naturally to be understood as mass, for mass seems to be the only thing in nature that is neither increased nor diminished on Newtonian physics.
The other indication is Kant’s example to illustrate his claim that “he <a philosopher> thus assumed that as incontrovertible that even in fire the matter (substance) never disappears but rather only suffers an alteration in its form.” (B 288, my emphasis):
“A philosopher was asked: How much does the smoke weigh? He replied: If you take away from the weight of the wood that was burnt the weight of the ashes that are left over, you will have the weight of the smoke.” (B 288)
We can see that here Kant explicitly identifies substance with matter. And it is quite plausible to think that “matter” is just another way of saying “mass”. That is, “mass” seems to be the theoretical analog of the term “matter.” This hypothesis is supported by the example of the weight of smoke. For, in the example, the way to calculate the weight of smoke just is to calculate the mass (multiplies the gravitational constant).
However, despite the compelling reasons for the identification of substance with mass, in the next sections, I shall argue that the substance cannot be understood as Newtonian mass, for when we try to work out the details of understanding the substance as mass, we face an unavoidable dilemma.


Section II. Some Mass or the Sum Total of Mass

In this section, I shall argue that there are two ways of conceiving of substance as Newtonian mass, and then show that both ways have some support from the text and are to some extent philosophically plausible. So, both ways deserve detailed considerations. But, in the next section, I shall argue that both ways face insurmountable problems.
In identifying substance with mass, we need to settle an ambiguity: Is the mass meant to be some mass, say the mass of a rock which is 7 kilograms (a randomly chosen weight), or to be the sum total of mass in the world of appearances which is a very large but nonetheless definite amount? Since both some mass and the sum total of mass are permanently persistent, we cannot tell which way of identifying is more plausible with respect to the permanent persistence of substance. So, we must appeal to some other philosophically and/or textually interesting points to ground a preference in choosing one over the other.
Let us first consider identifying the substance with some or individuated mass. First, the first Analogy is the principle according to which the relational category substance-accident is to be applied. Kant defines accidents to be “the determinations of a substance that are nothing other than particular ways for it to exist.”(B 229) Many commentators interpret the relation to be between object and its properties or states. Thus it makes more sense to think that the mass, which is the underlying bearer of properties, is the individuated mass of some object, instead of the sum total of mass in the world of appearances. For instance, in the example of the weight of smoke, Kant seems to conceive of substance as the matter, i.e. mass, of an individual object. Moreover, if we conceive of substance as the sum total of mass in the world of appearances, it is very hard to imagine how substance can be the bearer of properties or what kind of properties of which substance is the bearer.
One might argue that, on the interpretation according to which substance is the sum total of mass, even though we could imagine no properties of which substance is the bearer, we can still conceive of substance as the bearer of (changing) states, i.e. the successive states of the world of appearances. I reply that Kant cannot accept such an idea because the states of the world are not objects of possible experience, for it is at least empirically true that no one could have the whole world of appearances as his object of experience. I will return to this point later on in the paper and use it to argue that conceiving of substance as the sum total of mass is untenable given Kant’s theoretic commitments.
The above discussion is about reasons to prefer the identification of substance with some mass. I now turn to the reasons to prefer the identifications of substance with the sum total of mass. There are some textual evidences in the first Analogy that suggest this latter identification. For instance, the following passage:
“…here the issue is only appearances in the field of experience, the unity of which would never be possible if we were to allow new things (as far as their substance is concerned) to arise. For then everything would disappear that alone can represent the unity of time, namely the identity of the substratum in which alone all change has its thoroughgoing unity. This persistence is therefore nothing more than the way in which we represent the existence of things (in appearances).” (B 229/A186, my emphasis)
In this passage, Kant seems to identify the permanent persistent substance that represents the persistence of time with the unity of appearances, which seems to be the sum total of mass in the whole world of appearances. Let me argue for my understanding of this passage that it indicates that Kant identifies substance with the sum total of mass. I shall argue by reductio: Suppose Kant identified substance with individuated mass in the above passage. Then, it would make no sense to think that the arising of new substance could make the representation of the unity of time impossible. For the arising of new substance in no sense affects the substance, i.e. the mass, of the original objects. Let me use an example to illustrate. Suppose there is a rock whose mass is 7 kilograms and there arises a new object out of nothing, whose mass is 5 kilograms. Insofar as the rock’s mass remains the same, whether or not there are new masses arising out of nothing does not affect the unity of the rock’s mass, which is 7 kilograms. Therefore, in this passage, Kant conceives of substance as the sum total of mass in the whole world of appearances.
So far I have shown that there are compelling reasons to identify substance with some mass or with the sum total of mass respectively. In the next section, I shall argue that there are also devastating reasons to each identification such that either way we go, we face unsolvable problems.


Section III. One Single Time and the Limit of Possible Experience

I now turn to the problems from which the each identification suffers. In this section, I shall argue that these problems make both identifications untenable. Let us first consider the identification of substance with individuated mass (i.e. some mass). I argue that the reason why individuated mass cannot be identified with substance is that individuated mass cannot represent the oneness of time. Recall Kant’s argument for the principle of the first Analogy: in order to have experiences of objects as temporal, we must identify a permanently persistent substance that can represent time in objects. While the states of the substance change, the substance persists so that the substance can represent time that persists. It is important to notice that time, which is supposed to be represented by substance in appearances, is one single time. But, individuated mass cannot represent one single time. For there are many individuated masses, for instance, the mass of a rock which is 7 kilograms, the mass of a cup which is 0.5 kilogram, and the mass of a table which is 3 kilograms, each of which is permanently persistent and undergoes changes. If one of them can represent time, any other also can. In that case, we do not have one single time. Rather, we have many times or time-series, each of which is persistent.
Let me explain in details why multiply individuated masses cannot represent on single time. If these individuated masses can represent one single time, there must be some one single thing that is shared by these individuated masses that serves to represent the singularity of time. Whatever this shared thing is, it is not any of these individuated masses. Therefore, individuated mass cannot present one single time. However, on the other hand, time has be to singular. Here is a passage in the first Analogy which explains why time has to be one single time rather than a plurality of times:
“Substances (in appearances) are the substrata of all time-determinations. The arising of some of them and the perishing of others would itself remove the sole condition of the empirical unity of time, and the appearances would then be related to two different times, in which existence flowed side by side, which is absurd. For there is only one time, in which all different times must not be placed simultaneously but only one after another.” (B 232/A189)
One might argue that it does not matter how many individuated masses can represent time, it only matters that there is an individuated mass that represents time. Insofar as there is such a substance, which is permanently persistent, it suffices to represent one single time. I reply that, in that case, we still do not know which individuated mass is suppose to be the representer of the one single time in appearances. For there is not reason to think that the mass of one object is more suitable to represent time than the mass of another object is, insofar as both of the individuated masses are permanently persistent. Any choice of one over the other is arbitrary. But the unity or singularity of time is not arbitrary, for there can only be one time-series which persists, and any other time-series or temporal relations are just temporal parts of this unique time-series. Thus, I conclude that individuated mass cannot be the representer of time in appearances.
I now turn to argue that the sum total of mass cannot represent time either. The idea of my argument is to make use of Kant’s solution to the Antinomies to show that the permanently persistent substance that represents time in the appearances cannot be the sum total of mass because the sum total of mass is not an object of possible experience. Let me lay out my argument in detail.
In “The Antinomy of Pure Reason” chapter, Kant presents four pairs of arguments concerning four cosmological ideas about the world-whole, namely, whether there is a beginning of time, whether there is indivisibly simple substance, whether there is a first cause, and whether there is a necessary existent. As Allen W. Wood argues, the four antinomies share a general form, namely, the thesis of each antinomy claims that there must be a first member of the conditioning-conditioned chain, while the antithesis of each antinomy claims that there is no first member of such a chain and that the chain goes back into infinity. Kant argues that there are valid arguments for each of the four theses as well as valid arguments for each of the four antitheses, so we need a solution to such contradictions.
Kant’s solution to the contradictions, as Wood argues, relies on his doctrine of transcendental idealism. As for the first two antinomies, Wood argues
The mathematical antinomies are generated by mathematical principles that apply to things only insofar as they are given in sensible intuition…But these [the first two] series of conditions are never given to intuition as a whole...The theses are false because the principles of possible experience make it impossible for objects corresponding to the cosmological ideas of a first event, a largest extent of the world or a simple substance, ever to be given to intuition.”
Thus, the reason why Kant thinks that the claims made by the theses of the first and second antinomies are false is that neither the beginning of time nor the spatial boundary of the world or an indivisible substance can ever be given to our sensible intuition. If something cannot be given to our sensible intuition, according to Kant, we cannot have experience of it. Let me call this principle the object-of-sensible-intuition principle, namely, if something cannot be given to our sensible intuitions, then it cannot be object of our possible experience. And we can apply this principle to an object to determine whether that object can be object of possible experience. That is, if the object in question can be given to our sensible intuition, then the object can be object of our possible experience, but if the object cannot be given to our sensible intuition, then it cannot be object of our possible experience.
Now, let me apply the object-of-sensible-intuition principle to the idea of the sum total of mass. We can see that the sum total of mass cannot be given to our sensible intuition, so, the sum total of mass cannot be object of our possible experience. For the world of appearances seems to mean the whole universe or cosmos (because everything in the universe stands in causal relations to each other), there is no way for all of the mass in the whole universe to be given to our sensible intuition. Actually, we do not even know whether there are spatial boundaries of the universe, so we do not even know whether the sum total of mass in the all universe is finite. Thus, the sum total of mass cannot be object of possible experience. So, the sum total of mass cannot be that which represents time in appearances. For the reason there must be a permanently persistent substance in appearances which represents time is to make our temporally connected representations of objects possible. But, if the sum total of mass cannot be object of experience, it cannot make our experience of object possible. Thus, the permanently persistent substance in appearances cannot be the sum total of mass.
One might object that in the antinomies, the cosmological ideas at issue are condition-condition series. (B 436/A410) But the sum total of mass is not a series. Rather, it is an aggregate about which the question of conditioning and conditioned does not arise at all. Thus, Kant’s remarks on the antinomies have no bearing on whether the idea of the sum total of mass has any objective validity or significance. Moreover, the first two antinomies concern whether the conditioning-conditioned series go on into infinities. And it seems that it is impossible for us to experience infinity, for no matter what we experience it is finite insofar as we have experienced it. But, the quantum of the sum total of mass seems to be a definite and finite amount. By virtues of what can we claim that the sum total of mass cannot be object of experience? Is this “cannot” an empirical cannot, or an In-Principle cannot? If the answer is the former, the empirical “cannot” does not seem to be strong enough to show that the sum total of mass cannot be experienced, because we cannot know or predict whether in the future empirical sciences and technologies will make the sum total of mass possible object of experience. If the answer is the latter, at least further explanations of why the sum total of mass, which is a finite and definite amount, cannot be object of possible experience in principle are needed.
To the first objection I have two replies. First, in the first antinomy, Kant also discusses whether there is boundary or the largest extent of space. It is not obvious that there is a spatial series in the sense that it is obvious that there is a temporal series in which one moment succeeds its previous moments. However, according to Kant, we can think of the space acquiring its quantum through repeatedly or successively adding spatial units to the previous spatial units. (A 428/B 456) That is, the way of conceiving of space as a spatial series depends on the way of conceiving of time as a temporal series, which is naturally serial. Then, by the same token, we can also think of the sum total of mass acquiring its quantum by successively adding massive units to previous massive units. Thus, if the object-of-sensible-intuition principle applies to the idea of the boundary of space, it should also apply to the idea of the sum total of mass of the whole world of appearances.
Second, the fact that Kant applies the object-of-sensible-intuition-principle to the first two (or three) cosmological ideas to solve the contradictions does not mean that the principle can only be employed to deal with the antinomies. If the principle is applicable to other ideas, we can also use the principle to deal with other ideas. Since the object-of-sensible-intuition principle is derived from transcendental idealism, which is an important element in the whole Critique, there is no reason why the principle cannot be applied to other ideas than cosmological ideas. Thus, it is legitimate to use the object-of-sensible-intuition principle to show that the sum total of mass of whole world of appearances cannot be object of possible experience. So, the sum total of mass cannot be what represents time in appearances.
My reply to the second objection has two steps. First, it needs to be clarified that, although the first two antinomies concern whether the conditioning-conditioned series are infinite, Kant’s solution by the object-of-sensible-intuition principle does not rely on the whether the series are infinite. The principle only concerns whether the things to which the cosmological ideas refer can be given to our sensible intuition. It does not concern whether the things are infinite. It seems true that infinity cannot be object of sensible intuition. But this does not mean that all finite things can be given to our sensible intuition. Actually Kant rejects the claim that all finite things can be given to our sensible intuition. For Kant thinks the thesis of the first antinomy is false, because the beginning of time or the boundary of space cannot be given to our sensible intuition so that it cannot be object of possible experience.
The second step of my reply is to spell out in which sense of “cannot,” the sum total of mass cannot be object of possible experience. It seems to me that the distinction between empirical “cannot” and In-Principle “cannot” is hard to cash out in the context of Critique. For, in the Critique, any legitimate claim to knowledge entails that the object of which the knowledge is can be experienced. Thus, it seems that the empiricality of the “cannot” entails the In-Principality of the “cannot”.
However, concerning the claim that we cannot predict whether in the future empirical sciences and technologies will make the sum total of mass possible object of experience, what would Kant say? Would Kant agree that future sciences and technologies might or could transform a transcendent idea into an idea which refers to object of possible experience? I do not think he would. For Kant thinks his Critique settles metaphysical questions once and for all by theoretical reason, which is static or a-historical. Future discoveries made by sciences and technologies should be able to do no damage to the doctrines in Critique. Moreover, it should be odd to Kant’s ear that progresses made by empirical sciences could have any bearings on the doctrines in the Critique, which he builds up from scratch employing only pure reason, which is absolutely a-historical.
Thus, I conclude that the above arguments show that identifying substance with the sum total of mass in the world of appearance is not tenable. Since I showed earlier in this section that identifying substance with individuated mass is not tenable either, I conclude that the general strategy of identifying substance with mass is untenable.


Section IV. Concluding Remarks

In this paper, I showed that a seemingly very promising way of understanding the permanently persistent substance discussed in the first Analogy, namely, conceiving of substance as Newtonian mass, is untenable. Then, I wonder whether there are other promising ways of providing a positive account of substance or actually it is the case that the notion of substance in the first Analogy is itself untenable. At this stage, maybe I could follow Kant’s stance on the things of themselves, namely, they exist, but we can have no knowledge about the way of their existence. But, at the same time, we need to have this minimal conviction that they exist. Similarly, concerning substance, we can have no knowledge about what the permanently persistent substance is, but we need to have the minimal conviction that it exists in the world of appearances and it serves to represent time.

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《凶宅怪谈》 改编自寻找凶宅租住的艺人松原田螺根据真实经历创作的同名小说 ，小说作者松原田螺， 是在日本“凶宅体验节目”中爆红的“凶宅艺人” 。 松原タニシ（松原田螺），1982年生，日本松竹艺能旗下综艺人。他的综艺活动主要是探访日本全国各地的“问题房间”，亲身验...  (展开)

看之前没搞明白冯小刚为啥要拍70年前河南大灾的题材，看了我发现：灾民说，现在说啥我也不信了；政府不作为，皇军给灾民发粮食，灾民就帮着皇军打政府，还有借人头的反腐，要面子的外交，哪里是1942年，此种细节甚多，从现实意义的观影角度，《1942》比李安的小老虎与小少年的内心纠结强甚。

我很怀念北伐的时候，那时候没有负担，大可以毫无顾忌的和人民站在一起，这是《1942》里先总统蒋公说的，露骨点了，呵呵

1．科学的问题

诺兰的《星际空间》有两个细节非常打动我。一是Endurance太空站到达木星后准备进入虫洞，这个只在理论上存在的高维空间在银幕上的视觉展示是球体而不是一个平面化的隧道洞口。在“进入”的镜头系列中，Endurance并非抽象地“嗖”一下没入球体，而是缓步接近虫洞，眼看球的体积越变越大，球形表面反射出宇宙里无数遥远星系的斑斓投影。太空站不断接近，球体表面不断扩张，变得巨大，充满了Vmax巨幕，之后才是库珀那个壮士赴死般的“我们进来了”。相比宇宙的庞大的未知和虫洞的无限细节，人类最先进的太空站是那么渺小，尤其在Endurance到达未知星系之后飞向巨大的黑洞 "Gargantua"，在明亮的黑洞辐射对比之下不过是一个几乎可被忽略的小黑点。宇宙之壮阔，人之弱小却无知无畏，这在视觉和心理上都无比震撼，充满悲怆的诗意。

二是库珀和布兰德博士在Endurance事故之后在高速旋转中实现飞船和太空站的对接，事件演变的速度、剪辑的紧凑、配乐节奏的紧张度和细节展示的不厌其烦都让人目不转睛。我特别欣赏这一节里大环境镜头和对接细节以及宇航员们表情的反复穿插剪接，简直没有一秒废镜头，没有一刻不看得人呼吸急促心跳加速的。

科幻小说《三体》作者刘慈欣在采访中说他读罢克拉克的科幻小说《2001：太空漫游》，“突然感到周围的一切都消失了”，“孤独地面对着这人类头脑无法把握的巨大的神秘”。“真正的科幻应该是人们感受到宇宙的宏大，应该让他们终于有一天在下夜班的路上停下来，长久地仰望星空。”

这样的仰望，就是科幻的终极魅力。

但只靠“幻想”，科幻作品是立不起来的。没有足够坚实的科学细节来支撑、呈现想象力，作品只能是“悬幻”、“胡幻”。科幻作品里的科学细节越扎实，幻想部分的魅力就越强大。评价一部科幻电影的魅力，最根本的标杆我认为必须是科学细节，是科学的视觉表现。情节则处于第二位，为科学的推导和想象力的推进服务。

如果和2014年的其他科幻作品比较，单从视觉效果出发，《星际穿越》的摄影其实不如早些时候阿方索卡隆的《地心引力》。但《星际穿越》的独特性在于它要视觉展示的是人类不曾探索过的未知领域。在表现未知，缺乏参照系或评价标准时，对科学细节的精心度反映出的是创作者的诚意。尽管不是所有的细节都经得住推敲，但《星际穿越》中的以下元素为其硬科幻的地位打下了坚实基础：

?人类走向灭亡的设置——环境恶化的现实主义
?太空站的设计方案及旋转产生人造重力
?高维空间在低维空间里的投影形式
?相对论对时空扭曲的猜想（包含极大的夸张，比如在外星一小时，人间已七年的情况下重力只有1.3G）
?黑洞的外部视觉形态
?黑洞潮汐力
?黑洞内部的时空奇点的幻想

这其中虫洞的球体展示在科幻电影中是里程碑式的，将永载影史。就连向库布里克的电影《2001太空漫游》中代表宇宙终极秘密的黑色方石致敬的机器人，都因脱离了人的形态，设计巧妙新颖而将成为经典。

当然，《星际穿越》的体系并未能完全解决它所提出的科学问题。这其中我个人最不能释怀的是事件的因果循环（“母子怪圈”）。当然，这是一切时间旅行科幻作品都面对的一个根本问题，而《星际穿越》并不是严格意义上的时间旅行题材。但既然电影提出了这个终极问题（谁把虫洞放在那），却没有试图在“改变历史”和“创造未来”之间达成和解，在我看来这始终是个不小的遗憾。


2．价值观的问题

诺兰在《星际穿越》里展示了面对死亡人类对保存文明火种的两种态度，他让人类在经历高维空间、时间扭曲、黑洞，以及科技发展一路狂奔之后终于回归到了唯一的价值尺度——爱。这样的设置很难不让一名中国科幻迷联想起《三体》。

就如同《三体》因为这个最终选择所受到的最大批评，《星际穿越》也因这种近乎言情电影的设置得到了两极分化的评论。《纽约》杂志和NPR的影评人David Edelstein在极大赞扬了《星际穿越》的视觉效果后说电影的后1/3简直“俗不可耐”，把一个了不起的科幻故事降格成了庸俗的滥情剧。“煽情”，基本上是对《星际穿越》最普遍的批评。

我个人对“煽情”这件事的“情”看法中立——毕竟一部作品终归要努力调动人心，我甚至还相当欣赏“爱”是解决人类生存问题的最终钥匙这个结论。造成煽情结果的关键不在情本身，而是这个“情”的表现方式，尤其在一部严肃的硬科幻电影里，“怎么煽”才是关键。一个好的科幻作品其实很像我们在科学研究里建立模型：“幻”的部分在于建立假设——目前技术水平达不到的科技发展已成现实, 目前还不能证实的猜想已被证实等等；“科”的部分则是假设之后的一切事件演变、情节走向，一切都在假设的基础上严格遵循逻辑关系，呈现合理的证据和论证过程。科幻可以在设立前提假设上天马行空，这之后却不能胡乱推导，不能在逻辑关联上掉链子。哪怕结果指向的是超越逻辑的情感信仰，推导过程也必须严格遵守思维逻辑，偶然却终必然地呈现系列事件的前后关联，一步步推向那个终于无可避免的终极真相。

在分析《星际穿越》之前，我们先来简短回顾一下刘慈欣是怎么在《三体》里让宇宙的命运导向爱的。

《三体》里有两个关键人物，一是“面壁人”罗辑，二是“圣母”程心”。前者由一个玩世不恭的混混终于走出个人小天地，直到承担起全人类命运，其契机是为了在“末日之战”中拯救妻儿。 虽然爱的最后落脚点是罗辑这一个家庭，但情感驱动的人类文明和纯逻辑驱动的三体文明的较量却是贯穿《三体》系列整体的。换句话说，“爱”的出现在整个故事里有非常充分的铺垫，它从最开始就被设计并紧密渗透至人物的行为选择以及最后的故事走向里，尤其在《三体II》的结尾，刘慈欣甚至特别安排了三体文明观察员来强调爱对人类文明发展的重大意义。人物罗辑从始至终对爱的选择都是合理统一的，并不需要超越逻辑思考的信仰的僭越。这个层次上的爱的归总，不是煽情。

再看程心，在《三体III》中，这个学识出众，因“阶梯计划”而为整篇宇宙史诗埋下契机的人物是个十分蹩脚的“拯救者”，她与罗辑最初的玩世不恭正相反，几乎是沉醉于同情心与泛爱的泥沼中不愿自拔，毫无领导能力，每每在涉及全人类生死命运的重大选择前掉链子、犯错误。然而刘慈欣偏偏一次又一次把这样一个人物推到命运的十字路口，让她代表全人类说话。在这个巨大的不合理面前，故事的终端指向了信仰，因为无论谁作领袖，在全宇宙的黑暗森林中，不论人类文明再怎样技术爆炸，再怎样选择采纳最正确的科技进步之路，面对宇宙终极真相，死亡只是早晚问题。除了献祭之爱，其他一切统统不值一提。

《三体》在程心这个层次上爱的归总是有逻辑断层的，需要价值观的飞跃，是为煽情。然而这样的煽情是通过一个庞大的科技进化、历史推导、宇宙命运终端走向的系列过程才终于实现的，它严密、缓慢、步步渗透，直到最终变为哲学性的思想升华。哪怕读者的看法根本不同，不买账这个“爱是永恒”的终极结论，那也还得是佩服大刘指引整个宇宙走向爱的叙述过程。

那么对比一下，《星际穿越》里，诺兰是怎么煽情的呢？

他其实也有充分铺垫，无论是地球上长长的看似无关大体的家庭生活，还是太空站里库珀看孩子们一点点长大的视频电话，都是在为后面爱的回归铺路。Ann Hathaway的角色布兰德博士凭借直感要求去勘探另一个星球，并点名爱有可能是一整人类尚不理解的却真实存在宇宙力，就更是情节安排上的关键一笔，看似不经意，却是打开整个电影谜题的钥匙。

但《星际穿越》最大的问题在于：库珀的女儿墨菲作为人类命运的拯救者，是怎么推断出小时候家里的“鬼”就是库珀的呢？

电影里唯一给出的论据是库珀临行前送给墨菲的手表，却没有什么推导论证过程。或者说，这个信息如果不是库珀传输的，或者墨菲不认为是库珀传输而是其他一些他们当初理解的高维生物，人类也照样可被拯救。墨菲对库珀之爱从而解读出了数据信息这一节，要求观众必须跳离逻辑推理选择“信”。

这种要求逻辑断裂的情感推导，我认为是造成David Edlestein所说的“俗滥戏码”的关键原因。墨菲这条线的薄弱（一方面也是为篇幅所囿）是《星际穿越》的最大问题，也是导致煽情结果的关键。这条线在对爱的表现方式上，《星际穿越》远逊于《三体》。

但另一方面，库珀对墨菲的爱传达出了关键性的数据信息这条线却是前后贯通的，其对“爱”的科幻表现形式上甚至超越了《三体》。

在黑洞里，库珀终于恍然大悟后，向机器人Tars解释为什么他存在的这个小小的高维空间的三维投影恰好是他离开地球之前的那一天时，他说爱，作为一种力，指引他来到了这个方位——就好象重力决定了三维世界里物体在空间中的位置，爱，作为一种高维的“量子力”，可以决定人在高维空间里的位置，也就是人将出现在低维空间投影中的何时何地。后来库珀在失去意识之前看到了Endurance空间站他们通过虫洞时的布兰德博士，有了那个神秘莫测的握手，这也同样是爱的力量。

在《三体》（和大多数的科幻作品）里，爱作为超越物理规律的信仰，是脱离物理空间的人类精神世界的力量，人类对爱的回归是确认自身存在价值的坐标，这个回归是抽象的，哲学性的；但在《星际穿越》中，爱不再是一种抽象的精神力，而被描绘成了高维空间量子态的一种具体的、实际存在的力，就跟重力、电磁力、强相互作用和弱相互作用力相类似，实际参与了宇宙的物质组成，甚至很可能是高维空间的某种基本力形态。《星际穿越》试图对爱进行的这个具体的、物理态的力学解说方式，是极具突破性的，非常惊艳。

我不能确认《星际穿越》对爱的这种力学解说在科幻史上是否绝无仅有的，但不管你是否接受他的这个猜想，我认为这都是让它最终区别于其他科幻作品的价值关键。


3．哲学的问题

说完了“爱”的问题，再说说黑洞的问题。

电影史上最著名的银幕黑洞是库布里克的《2001太空漫游》。电影中宇航员大卫在经历了一些列和飞船电脑斗智斗勇之后，进入了一个神奇的隧道一样的空间。这个进入空间的镜头有近乎十分钟之长，没有对话和任何情节发展，就是光影在银幕上不断变幻。大卫通过的这个隧道式的空间被普遍认为是进入黑洞。在这个漫长的视觉隧道结束之后，大卫来到了一个房间，他发现自己迅速变老，代表宇宙终极奥秘的黑石再次出现，还有一名星孩。

和《2001太空漫游》比较，诺兰对黑洞的展示是具体的，从无边无际的飞沙到以三维形态投影存在的高维时空都触目可见，可逐一逻辑分析。在黑洞时空扭曲的内部，库珀的行为依然和之前拯救人类命运的大设定息息相关，黑洞之外的故事在黑洞之内延续、发展，终于完满闭合。库布里克则完全相反，在宇航员大卫在通过黑洞之后，库布里克完全是以超逻辑的视觉象征合集的方式来终结电影的。大卫的变老、黑石的出现和星孩的诞生彼此之间没有叙事上的逻辑关联，甚至任何一种试图把黑洞边界之后的内容和之前进行叙述性上逻辑关联的尝试都将失败。换一种说法，诺兰的黑洞之旅是以已知推测未知，是给出答案，是闭合的；库布里克的则是以未知表现未知，是提出问题，是开放性的。

在我看来，随着科技发展，维度变幻，任何以肯定状态存在试图给出答案的方法有可能被证伪；而提问题则是老实的（或狡猾的，取决于你的判断视角），精准地以视觉符号表现全部的未知也比提出某种形态的答案更加困难。库布里克用具象的视觉符号来表达一种抽象的哲学概念，对宇宙的未知进行了同样抽象的诗一般的视觉猜想，这是我认为为什么《2001太空漫游》能由科幻终于上升到哲学，至今依然是无法被超越的最伟大的科幻电影。

对比之下，《星际穿越》对黑洞的视觉展示是无比壮丽的，而既然我们现在谁都不理解黑洞，都在猜想，都不确定，那么诺兰在电影中所进行的“爱”的猜想也便未尝不可。然而一旦提出解说，就难免落于巢臼，尤其这个解说只作为完整故事的结尾匆匆出现，不再进一步被逻辑拆解分析研究。在这一点上，《星际穿越》的确更类似于《超时空接触》，充满了科幻的激情和热忱，却还没能站到哲学的高度，由科幻终于走向严肃的信仰。

所以《星际穿越》最终解决的并不是科幻最终极的哲学问题，它解决的还是好莱坞的问题。

男神抱抱是一部典型的小成本喜剧 ，这一点可以一眼就能感觉到, 但是我觉的这部片子很有意思 ，这部电影的最吸引人的地方就是看着非常轻松愉快不点都不累，也许正因是小成本的原因片子没有想背着太多诉求可能也没有能力表现太多这样反而更轻松了，片子带给大家的东西不多，只有简单的愉悦，面对时下并不轻松的生活，这样的风格的电影对很多观众来说这就够了。

西门仁本质就是有过高政治理想的地方豪强，就是临清的王莽，仰望太高，力有不逮（在电影中是不幸遇上了有主角光环的罗通一行）。 人的言论、思想和行为三者是相对分裂的，如果以道德来评分的话，排序往往是：言论&gt;思想&gt;行为 就西门仁来说： 西门仁满口黎民苍生，声称要追...  (展开)

全程老梗，强行搞笑。槽点太多，也许这就是成龙式的动作片？为了打而打，剧情毫无逻辑。开头的古代剧情是用的日本的CG技术？动作生硬。全剧分了好几段的情节，各种生硬反转。还有最后的歌舞简直瞎了。最后，打1星是因为最低1星。 我总觉得，一部电影最基础的不管什么类型，你得...  (展开)

      假期闲着翻到了这部电影，就着核桃酥和巧克力打发了下午时光。说实话，悬疑片不适合搭配零食，但是原谅我这个吃货吧。

      作为一部悬疑片，虽然刚开始的各种讲述都将嫌疑指向美姬，但我们都知道，罪犯另有其人。悬疑片不会如此直白地告诉我们结果，所以我们只是在等待，答案将在何时揭晓。而且影片不急不缓的情节里，实在是埋下了太多小伏笔，告诉我们，罪犯另有其人。

      美姬的大学室友给电视台写信，抗议节目在没有论据的时候无端怀疑美姬。她是一个善良的女孩，如果舆论继续将她作为罪犯指责，她最终肯定会躲在一个地方自杀的，我恳请你们尽快把她找出来。朋友的担心，铺垫了剧情。最终美姬果然泪流满面地准备用绳索了结自己的生命。

      美姬儿时的好友夕子说，当时年少的自己被欺负时，是美姬陪伴着自己，给自己鼓舞。“当全世界都与你为敌时，还有我支持你。”美姬无数次在黑夜点亮烛光，隔空告诉夕子，你不是一个人。“当你难过时，就进入幻想世界吧。”
     
      不知道观众会不会有疑惑，如此乐观给人鼓励的美姬，最终为何决定自杀。影片没有写案件是如何破解的，与其说它是一部悬疑推理片，不如说，它是一部社会纪实片。日本职场人的压力巨大，这在十年前看《东京爱情故事》时就已知，所以罪犯里沙子因为工作压力大而盗窃，最终因为害怕罪行揭露而将白雪公主典子杀掉也不足为奇。可是想想，这是一个多么微不足道的理由。一边是沉甸甸的人命，而另外一边，并不是深仇大恨，而只是职场积累的点滴情绪。再联想到最近的新闻，说深圳南山区一个职员砍死几个同事后跳楼身亡，真是细思恐极。

      而影片里歪曲事实的报道和网络舆论才是把所谓的犯罪嫌疑人美姬逼得自杀的真凶。电视媒体通过剪辑和采访片段，在没有真凭实据的情况下，将怀疑的手指向美姬。网络暴力更是将嫌疑人人肉出来，连多年前的同学都指出，她似乎从小就是如此阴暗而记仇的一个人。可实际上，她嘴上说不原谅那个把抹布丢在她头上的少年，只不过是少女为了吸引心仪对象的一个小伎俩啊。

      新闻报道可以将罪犯描述成英雄，也可以将英雄描述成罪犯。而网民的狂欢，不过是对热点话题的一个追捧。这个时候，跟风似乎才是正确的，逻辑，理智，都退到了一边。当大家觉得美姬是罪犯时，“好残忍”、“判死刑都不为过”等等喧嚣的呼声，和真相大白后，稀疏的“美姬好可怜”、“媒体该道歉吧”形成了鲜明的对比。这让我想起现实，每当有新闻发生，网友一哄而上发表评论，大肆转发，而真相出来时，转发和关注的人数却寥寥。就如前段时间，北京地铁涨价，一条“北京人民喜迎地铁票价上涨”的横幅图片在微博被疯狂转发，最终有网友证实，此图其实是PS的，真正的横幅不过是写的“和谐、民主”之类的字眼。可真相又有多少人关注？

      当美姬的父母都不相信她时，她儿时的同伴夕子告诉来访的记者，美姬不是罪犯，她相信美姬。当真相大白后，疲倦的美姬回到家里，她隔空默默点亮烛光，告诉那个曾无数次温暖自己的儿时伙伴，“你不是一个人”。

      影片的结尾，美姬一脸阳光，对差点被撞倒的记者道歉。她不知道，这个记者，是宣扬她是凶手的始作俑者，她告诉记者，“一切都会变好。”一个对陌生人都如此友善的人，却差点被留言打倒，由此可见舆论暴力是多么可怖。而整个影片的基调，将美姬塑造为一个阴暗，带着诡异笑容的女人，在最后结尾，清纯、阳光、友善的形象与之前形成强烈对比，不由让我想到一句话，“你心中有佛，便看到佛。”同样的一个人，同样一个微笑，是不是就因为我们个人的主观影响而形成了完全不同的印象呢？

      无论怎样，愿友善的人都被世界善待，愿全世界都与你为敌时，还有人为你点亮烛光。

完全是李力持风格，太能搞了。故事跟着灵感走，完全庸俗化，四两拨千斤，逻辑简单，笑料十足。其中最让人喷饭的是一些政治影射。
比如，革命志士钟镇涛在汉奸黄秋生面前大唱颂歌：“你是我们广大人民大海中的明灯，航行中的舵手，是我们中国人民的大救星。”然后双手高举开始演唱：“东方红，太阳升，中国出了个……”四周的士兵全吐血了，黄秋生捂住钟镇涛的嘴巴问梁家仁：“力王，你顶得住吗？”梁家仁七窍流血地说：“顶得住！”

     近年看港产片都是经过挑选的，毫无疑问那个港片的黄金时代留下的只有心中的回忆。当初看剧情时，是抱满希望的，因为演员都有一定的演技，也被香港文化浸淫过，可是这部电影却不受好评。原因很简单，导演的拍摄功力不够，把悬疑变成疑问，明显是香港的新晋导演，也像参加香港微电影大赛的学生拍摄手法。现在每位香港导演都想把香港电影的光辉重现，除了演员、资金，更大的不足是在信心。导演肯定知道每一场次他想要的效果，我相信他也能拍出，但没了信心，他的不足都在告诉我们他努力着，但出来的东西好像并不是那么回事，所以我们要陪他探索。可是别忘了我们是消费者，给钱看的不是过程，如果没有信心拍好，那请有了再来。