一、多个时空


《纯粹理性批判》中的第一经验类比（Analogies of Experience）要求在现象中有一个恒定且唯一之物来表象意识中的时间本身。恒定，或永恒，因为作为总体的时间本身是始终在那的；惟一，因为只有一个时间。这个惟一且永恒的东西，即现象中的实体（Substance）。康德明确把这个实体与洛克的托子（Substratum）区分开来，认为实体是以各种方式显现于人的，而不是像托子那样不可知，也不显现。

我要说，洛克的托子的作用是保证物的个体化与同一性。这个作用在康德那儿，似乎是由物自体和先验范畴共同完成。先验范畴组织现象，在使意识对现象的认识成为可能的同时，也使同一的意识本身成为可能——对先验对象的构成即对自我的构成。而物自体在这个过程中究竟如何起作用，不详。康德的物自体与洛克的托子一样，是个让理论显得尴尬，却又不得不进行的假设。

尽管康德反复说现象中的实体不是洛克的托子，但这个实体究竟是什么，他又语焉不详。出于他对牛顿力学的接受，有人尝试将其理解为牛顿意义上的质量。我论证过，这样的解读将面临一个两难困境：如果实体是个体化了的质量，时间便不是惟一的；如果实体是现象世界中的总质量，基于二律背反的理由——这个总体无法成为经验对象——我们便无法经验到它。（详细论述见篇末附录）

若是跳出康德阐释，取前一个困境：时间不是惟一的，每个作为现象的物都意味着一个独立的时间体系，我们就科幻了：空间中的一个一个的物，奠基着意识中的一个又一个时间系，我们可以生活在不同的时空中，当我们经验不同的物。甚至，对应地说，我们总在成为另一个人，当我们来到不同的时空。

于是，我情愿把亨利的生活看作对康德的一次失败却有趣的解读。与其说他是一位时间旅行者，一位不停地穿越时空的超人或可怜人，不如说，他的意识中并没有一个绝对惟一的时间，他所来到并离开的每一个时空，都是一个独立自在的世界，尽管这些世界看上去很像，但哪个都不依赖于另一个——从理念的意义上说。


二、沉默，或消失


影片的前半部分，亨利的突然消失被解释为一种不治的遗传疾病。没有理由地，他时不时就去了另一个时空，赤身裸体地寻找可以穿上的衣服。仿佛常人来到一个新的环境，总是迫不及待地寻找一个身份，穿到自己身上。
亨利总会在一个无从预料的时刻消失，克莱尔生活在一个不确定的世界中。她的爱情是确定的，但她爱的人不确定地存在着。她的生活中弥漫着不确定性，而这恰好让她格外珍惜亨利在她身边的每一分钟。

克莱尔一次次怀孕又一次次流产，因为胎儿也有穿越症，莫名其妙地，便在某个时刻，出离了子宫。但克莱尔最后一次怀孕时，对亨利说，你每次消失都是因为感觉到了压力。所以，从现在开始，我要保持绝对地平静，这样胎儿就可以顺利出生了。
看到这里，我恍然大悟，原来亨利的穿越症是个隐喻，关于男人的隐喻：面对压力，便会沉默与回避，这不正是男人的本能反应么——而这在女人看来，仿佛爱人去了另一个时空，不知何时才能回来，甚至，会不会回来。

我查了查，电影改编自一位女造型艺术家的首部小说，写于一段失败的恋情之后。原来如此。

很多年前听到过一个说法：爱情，对男人来说，是挂在墙上的一幅画，你并不总是去看它；但对女人来说，则是房间里音乐，你想不听都不行。所以，男人需要时不时地呆在纯然属于自我的世界里，在沉默中成为自己。女人却要认为这是对她的疏远、对亲密的疏离，并因此而坐立不安，想方设法闯进那份铁一般的沉默。结果，要么把自己撞疼，要么把爱情撞碎。
这是对小儿女情态的描述。若成年点，便会更同情于另一个说法：人生在世，无非是男人讨慰藉，女人讨生活。人并不总是需要慰藉，尤其在得意之时。人却总在生活，就算你不想。


三、看着，却无法改变


在一次穿越中，亨利来到母亲身边，在地铁里，母亲在看报，他们作为陌生人简短却亲切的交谈了一会儿。亨利告诉母亲，他要结婚了，这个女孩让他感到安全。
克莱尔问他：你什么不去阻止那场车祸，既然你可以回到车祸发生之前。“我无法阻止。无数次我回到过去，回到母亲还在的时候，但每次我都无法改变发生着的一切。”——这话让人特别难过。我们并不能改变过去，就像不能重新雕刻一座已然完成的塑像。

不是么？很多时候，我们从自己当下的境遇中抽身而出，试图站在一个更开阔的角度，超脱地看现在的纠结、焦虑，或苦闷，并自嘲这些都没什么的。但当你身在当下，你知道未来的自己就坐在对面，笑着，看着自己，慈悲地。但你还是无法因此脱身而出。你仍然只能呆在你当下的处境中，无论是过分的快乐，还是仿佛无法挣脱的哀伤。

每一个时刻都是三维的，它包含着过去、现在，和未来这三个维度。我们在回忆中编辑时间，编辑自己，有意无意地遗忘一些，并把另一些反复摩挲。过往明明灭灭，像晴天里，随风晃动的百叶窗投在墙上的影子。每次回忆之后，我们都成为另一个人。
未来也是。未来无数次作为想象呈现于当下，各式各样地，仿佛清晰的回忆。回忆与憧憬，如同天平的两臂，对称着，平衡着，在现在这个支点上。所以，现在这个时刻，最重。


四、期限


有天聚会时，亨利中枪后痛苦挣扎的裸体突然出现在他们的门厅里。又消失了。克莱尔说，我从没见过四十岁之后的你。我见过的你总是很年轻。从这个时候起，死亡就成了他们中的另一个在场者，尽管它总是沉默着。

亨利穿越到未来，遇见了自己的已经十岁的女儿。女儿告诉他，他死于自己五岁那年。她们一直很想念他。那时他们的女儿还没出生。那时克莱尔还一如既往地希望与亨利白头偕老，就像她还没长大时那样，就像她长大之后第一次遇到亨利时那样，就像亨利死后，她仍然留着亨利所有的衣服，等着亨利回来那样。

于她而言，亨利是不会死的。他无非是走远了一下子回不来，他无非是在时空中迷了路，找不到一件让他温暖的衣服。

女儿五岁那年，亨利和克莱尔都已知道，亨利即将死去，中弹而死。期限降至，可能在任何一天，任何一个时刻。在它到来之前，所有相聚的时光都是铭刻，都是用最日常的方式来进行的一次祭奠，一次追忆。当这个期限还不确定，他们相爱着，仿佛一对最平凡的恋人；当这个期限已然确定，他们相爱着，装作不知道他们即将分离。

一个期限并不见得让期限到来之前的一切都显得美好。但，美好的东西都有一个期限。确定的期限，或不确定的期限。你不能试图挽留，那会犹如握紧手中的细沙，握得越紧，便流失得越快，宛如时间，从指缝间悄然流走。
这个期限是否到来，何时到来，都不是你能选择的。你能做的，仅仅是在它到来之前的每一刻，不让自己在未来后悔——克莱尔明白这些，并且，她做到了。

而，这不正是人生么。


——————
附录：On Understanding Substance as Mass

Introduction

In the First Analogy of Experience, Kant argues that there must be some permanently persistent substance in the appearances which represents the persistence of time. Given Kant’s endorsement of Newtonian physics, commentators such as Eric Watkins suggest that such permanently persistent substance can be understood as Newtonian mass. In this paper, however, I argue that we face a dilemma when we try to cash out the notion of substance in terms of Newtonian mass.
The paper proceeds in three steps. In the first section, I present the reason why there needs to be a permanently persistent substance in the appearances, and discuss why it seems to be compelling to conceive of the permanently persistent substance as Newtonian Mass. Then, in the second section, I argue that there are (only) two ways of conceiving of the permanently persistent substance as Newtonian mass, namely, to conceive of substance as individuated mass and to conceive of substance as the sum total of mass in the world of appearances. I show that there are textual indications as well as philosophical reasons to support each option. In the third section, however, I argue that both ways suffer from inescapable problems. Thus, conceiving of the permanently persistent substance in terms of Newtonian mass is not viable.

    
Section I. The Permanently Persistent Substance

In this section, I shall first present the reason why Kant thinks that there must be a permanently persistent substance in the appearances. I then discuss why it is compelling to conceive of such substance as Newtonian mass.
In the chapter “System of all principles of pure understanding,” Kant discusses what makes possible the applications of the categories, i.e. the pure concepts of understanding, to objects, i.e. appearances that are given to sensible intuitions. That is, he discusses what it is that makes the categories have objective validity. Kant’s claim is that the applications of the categories are only possible under certain conditions, and these conditions are spelled out by the principles. For instance, the applications of the relational categories (substance-accidents, cause and effect, and mutual interactions) are possible if they are applied to objects according to the principles of Analogies of Experience. In addition to the three specific principles that correspond to each of the three relational categories, Kant also provides a general principle overarching all three Analogies. The general principle is stated in the second edition as follows: “Experience is possible only through the representations of a necessary connection of perceptions” (B 218). Watkins provides a helpful interpretation of this general principle:
“The general idea is that each of the three relational categories represents a necessary connection that is required for experience of a single time and of objects existing and being temporally related to each other within a single time to be possible.” (My emphasis)
Since this paper is focused on the notion of substance in the first Analogy, I shall ignore the second and third Analogies. So I now turn to a close examination of the first Analogy.
The first Analogy, i.e. the principle of the persistence of substance, is stated in the second edition as follows: “In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.” (B 224) Watkins summarizes Kant’s argument for the first Analogy as follows (which I take to be a correct interpretation):
Premise 1: Appearances, i.e. objects of experience, are made possible by time’s persistence.
Premise 2: We do not perceive time itself.
Therefore, In order to have experience of appearances, there must be some permanent substance in the appearances which can represent time or time’s persistence.
While the appearances, as the objects given to our intuitions, are changing, the substance in appearances always stays the same and is permanent. So, Kant calls the permanent substance “the substratum of everything real” (B 225). But, some clarifications about Kant’s use of the term “substratum” are needed to prevent potential confusions. Substratum in Kant’s text does not mean what Locke uses this term to mean, namely, the bearer of properties which is unchanging and about which we can have no knowledge. For, according to Locke, we can only know what is given to our senses, but since the underlying substratum cannot be given to our senses, we have no access to it and therefore cannot know it.
Kant, by constrast, does not think that there is any Lockean substratum in the world of appearances. For Kant, the fact that the states of the substance are changing and the substance stays the same does not mean the states are separable from the substance. Rather, the changing states of the substance are simply the ways in which the substance is given to us. Thus, we can know the substance, that is, we know the substance through its states. In order to avoid the Lockean implication of the term “substratum,” I shall only use “substance” to refer to the permanently persistent thing in the appearances despite Kant’s own use of “substratum” to talk about what is permanent in the appearances.
Since I have argued that Kant’s notion of substance is not the Lockean substratum, then what is the Kantian notion of substance? We need a positive account of what the substance is. It is obvious that such a permanently persistent thing cannot be captured by ordinary physical objects, no matter whether they are natural objects (say, rocks) or artifacts (say, ships), for neither artifacts nor natural objects always stay the same such that in principle they can never suffer changes. So, it seems no ordinarily construed physical things can be qualified as substance that is permanently persistent. On the other hand, it is very hard to imagine that anything non-physical could play the role the substance is supposed to play. For it is hard to imagine how a non-physical being could be given to our sensible intuition or could be spatiotemporally organized by our a priori intuitions. So, it is unlikely that Kant means something non-physical by “substance.” Thus, there are two constraints on spelling out what substance is. First, it is something physical. Second, as I have shown, the physical being that can be understood as substance cannot be ordinarily individuated physical things such as planet or rock.
In order to meet the above two conditions, Watkins suggests that, given Kant’s commitment to Newtonian science, it is likely that Kant has Newtonian mass in mind when he talks about the substance, since no matter how a physical object changes, its mass always stays the same. Since Newtonian mass is physical and is not an ordinarily individuated object, it seems quite compelling that the substance, which is permanently persistent, just is Newtonian mass. According to common sense, Newtonian mass is understood to be underlying objects such that we cannot directly perceive mass but can only perceive mass through the way it is given to our intuition, namely, through the perception of the objects that have mass. Thus, mass is neither unknowable nor directly perceivable, which seems to fit the description of the substance perfectly.
Moreover, there are many textual indications that suggest the identification of substance with mass. Let me note two examples. First, recall the general principle overarching the three specific Analogies, namely, “In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.” (B 224) It seems that “quantum” is most naturally to be understood as mass, for mass seems to be the only thing in nature that is neither increased nor diminished on Newtonian physics.
The other indication is Kant’s example to illustrate his claim that “he <a philosopher> thus assumed that as incontrovertible that even in fire the matter (substance) never disappears but rather only suffers an alteration in its form.” (B 288, my emphasis):
“A philosopher was asked: How much does the smoke weigh? He replied: If you take away from the weight of the wood that was burnt the weight of the ashes that are left over, you will have the weight of the smoke.” (B 288)
We can see that here Kant explicitly identifies substance with matter. And it is quite plausible to think that “matter” is just another way of saying “mass”. That is, “mass” seems to be the theoretical analog of the term “matter.” This hypothesis is supported by the example of the weight of smoke. For, in the example, the way to calculate the weight of smoke just is to calculate the mass (multiplies the gravitational constant).
However, despite the compelling reasons for the identification of substance with mass, in the next sections, I shall argue that the substance cannot be understood as Newtonian mass, for when we try to work out the details of understanding the substance as mass, we face an unavoidable dilemma.


Section II. Some Mass or the Sum Total of Mass

In this section, I shall argue that there are two ways of conceiving of substance as Newtonian mass, and then show that both ways have some support from the text and are to some extent philosophically plausible. So, both ways deserve detailed considerations. But, in the next section, I shall argue that both ways face insurmountable problems.
In identifying substance with mass, we need to settle an ambiguity: Is the mass meant to be some mass, say the mass of a rock which is 7 kilograms (a randomly chosen weight), or to be the sum total of mass in the world of appearances which is a very large but nonetheless definite amount? Since both some mass and the sum total of mass are permanently persistent, we cannot tell which way of identifying is more plausible with respect to the permanent persistence of substance. So, we must appeal to some other philosophically and/or textually interesting points to ground a preference in choosing one over the other.
Let us first consider identifying the substance with some or individuated mass. First, the first Analogy is the principle according to which the relational category substance-accident is to be applied. Kant defines accidents to be “the determinations of a substance that are nothing other than particular ways for it to exist.”(B 229) Many commentators interpret the relation to be between object and its properties or states. Thus it makes more sense to think that the mass, which is the underlying bearer of properties, is the individuated mass of some object, instead of the sum total of mass in the world of appearances. For instance, in the example of the weight of smoke, Kant seems to conceive of substance as the matter, i.e. mass, of an individual object. Moreover, if we conceive of substance as the sum total of mass in the world of appearances, it is very hard to imagine how substance can be the bearer of properties or what kind of properties of which substance is the bearer.
One might argue that, on the interpretation according to which substance is the sum total of mass, even though we could imagine no properties of which substance is the bearer, we can still conceive of substance as the bearer of (changing) states, i.e. the successive states of the world of appearances. I reply that Kant cannot accept such an idea because the states of the world are not objects of possible experience, for it is at least empirically true that no one could have the whole world of appearances as his object of experience. I will return to this point later on in the paper and use it to argue that conceiving of substance as the sum total of mass is untenable given Kant’s theoretic commitments.
The above discussion is about reasons to prefer the identification of substance with some mass. I now turn to the reasons to prefer the identifications of substance with the sum total of mass. There are some textual evidences in the first Analogy that suggest this latter identification. For instance, the following passage:
“…here the issue is only appearances in the field of experience, the unity of which would never be possible if we were to allow new things (as far as their substance is concerned) to arise. For then everything would disappear that alone can represent the unity of time, namely the identity of the substratum in which alone all change has its thoroughgoing unity. This persistence is therefore nothing more than the way in which we represent the existence of things (in appearances).” (B 229/A186, my emphasis)
In this passage, Kant seems to identify the permanent persistent substance that represents the persistence of time with the unity of appearances, which seems to be the sum total of mass in the whole world of appearances. Let me argue for my understanding of this passage that it indicates that Kant identifies substance with the sum total of mass. I shall argue by reductio: Suppose Kant identified substance with individuated mass in the above passage. Then, it would make no sense to think that the arising of new substance could make the representation of the unity of time impossible. For the arising of new substance in no sense affects the substance, i.e. the mass, of the original objects. Let me use an example to illustrate. Suppose there is a rock whose mass is 7 kilograms and there arises a new object out of nothing, whose mass is 5 kilograms. Insofar as the rock’s mass remains the same, whether or not there are new masses arising out of nothing does not affect the unity of the rock’s mass, which is 7 kilograms. Therefore, in this passage, Kant conceives of substance as the sum total of mass in the whole world of appearances.
So far I have shown that there are compelling reasons to identify substance with some mass or with the sum total of mass respectively. In the next section, I shall argue that there are also devastating reasons to each identification such that either way we go, we face unsolvable problems.


Section III. One Single Time and the Limit of Possible Experience

I now turn to the problems from which the each identification suffers. In this section, I shall argue that these problems make both identifications untenable. Let us first consider the identification of substance with individuated mass (i.e. some mass). I argue that the reason why individuated mass cannot be identified with substance is that individuated mass cannot represent the oneness of time. Recall Kant’s argument for the principle of the first Analogy: in order to have experiences of objects as temporal, we must identify a permanently persistent substance that can represent time in objects. While the states of the substance change, the substance persists so that the substance can represent time that persists. It is important to notice that time, which is supposed to be represented by substance in appearances, is one single time. But, individuated mass cannot represent one single time. For there are many individuated masses, for instance, the mass of a rock which is 7 kilograms, the mass of a cup which is 0.5 kilogram, and the mass of a table which is 3 kilograms, each of which is permanently persistent and undergoes changes. If one of them can represent time, any other also can. In that case, we do not have one single time. Rather, we have many times or time-series, each of which is persistent.
Let me explain in details why multiply individuated masses cannot represent on single time. If these individuated masses can represent one single time, there must be some one single thing that is shared by these individuated masses that serves to represent the singularity of time. Whatever this shared thing is, it is not any of these individuated masses. Therefore, individuated mass cannot present one single time. However, on the other hand, time has be to singular. Here is a passage in the first Analogy which explains why time has to be one single time rather than a plurality of times:
“Substances (in appearances) are the substrata of all time-determinations. The arising of some of them and the perishing of others would itself remove the sole condition of the empirical unity of time, and the appearances would then be related to two different times, in which existence flowed side by side, which is absurd. For there is only one time, in which all different times must not be placed simultaneously but only one after another.” (B 232/A189)
One might argue that it does not matter how many individuated masses can represent time, it only matters that there is an individuated mass that represents time. Insofar as there is such a substance, which is permanently persistent, it suffices to represent one single time. I reply that, in that case, we still do not know which individuated mass is suppose to be the representer of the one single time in appearances. For there is not reason to think that the mass of one object is more suitable to represent time than the mass of another object is, insofar as both of the individuated masses are permanently persistent. Any choice of one over the other is arbitrary. But the unity or singularity of time is not arbitrary, for there can only be one time-series which persists, and any other time-series or temporal relations are just temporal parts of this unique time-series. Thus, I conclude that individuated mass cannot be the representer of time in appearances.
I now turn to argue that the sum total of mass cannot represent time either. The idea of my argument is to make use of Kant’s solution to the Antinomies to show that the permanently persistent substance that represents time in the appearances cannot be the sum total of mass because the sum total of mass is not an object of possible experience. Let me lay out my argument in detail.
In “The Antinomy of Pure Reason” chapter, Kant presents four pairs of arguments concerning four cosmological ideas about the world-whole, namely, whether there is a beginning of time, whether there is indivisibly simple substance, whether there is a first cause, and whether there is a necessary existent. As Allen W. Wood argues, the four antinomies share a general form, namely, the thesis of each antinomy claims that there must be a first member of the conditioning-conditioned chain, while the antithesis of each antinomy claims that there is no first member of such a chain and that the chain goes back into infinity. Kant argues that there are valid arguments for each of the four theses as well as valid arguments for each of the four antitheses, so we need a solution to such contradictions.
Kant’s solution to the contradictions, as Wood argues, relies on his doctrine of transcendental idealism. As for the first two antinomies, Wood argues
The mathematical antinomies are generated by mathematical principles that apply to things only insofar as they are given in sensible intuition…But these [the first two] series of conditions are never given to intuition as a whole...The theses are false because the principles of possible experience make it impossible for objects corresponding to the cosmological ideas of a first event, a largest extent of the world or a simple substance, ever to be given to intuition.”
Thus, the reason why Kant thinks that the claims made by the theses of the first and second antinomies are false is that neither the beginning of time nor the spatial boundary of the world or an indivisible substance can ever be given to our sensible intuition. If something cannot be given to our sensible intuition, according to Kant, we cannot have experience of it. Let me call this principle the object-of-sensible-intuition principle, namely, if something cannot be given to our sensible intuitions, then it cannot be object of our possible experience. And we can apply this principle to an object to determine whether that object can be object of possible experience. That is, if the object in question can be given to our sensible intuition, then the object can be object of our possible experience, but if the object cannot be given to our sensible intuition, then it cannot be object of our possible experience.
Now, let me apply the object-of-sensible-intuition principle to the idea of the sum total of mass. We can see that the sum total of mass cannot be given to our sensible intuition, so, the sum total of mass cannot be object of our possible experience. For the world of appearances seems to mean the whole universe or cosmos (because everything in the universe stands in causal relations to each other), there is no way for all of the mass in the whole universe to be given to our sensible intuition. Actually, we do not even know whether there are spatial boundaries of the universe, so we do not even know whether the sum total of mass in the all universe is finite. Thus, the sum total of mass cannot be object of possible experience. So, the sum total of mass cannot be that which represents time in appearances. For the reason there must be a permanently persistent substance in appearances which represents time is to make our temporally connected representations of objects possible. But, if the sum total of mass cannot be object of experience, it cannot make our experience of object possible. Thus, the permanently persistent substance in appearances cannot be the sum total of mass.
One might object that in the antinomies, the cosmological ideas at issue are condition-condition series. (B 436/A410) But the sum total of mass is not a series. Rather, it is an aggregate about which the question of conditioning and conditioned does not arise at all. Thus, Kant’s remarks on the antinomies have no bearing on whether the idea of the sum total of mass has any objective validity or significance. Moreover, the first two antinomies concern whether the conditioning-conditioned series go on into infinities. And it seems that it is impossible for us to experience infinity, for no matter what we experience it is finite insofar as we have experienced it. But, the quantum of the sum total of mass seems to be a definite and finite amount. By virtues of what can we claim that the sum total of mass cannot be object of experience? Is this “cannot” an empirical cannot, or an In-Principle cannot? If the answer is the former, the empirical “cannot” does not seem to be strong enough to show that the sum total of mass cannot be experienced, because we cannot know or predict whether in the future empirical sciences and technologies will make the sum total of mass possible object of experience. If the answer is the latter, at least further explanations of why the sum total of mass, which is a finite and definite amount, cannot be object of possible experience in principle are needed.
To the first objection I have two replies. First, in the first antinomy, Kant also discusses whether there is boundary or the largest extent of space. It is not obvious that there is a spatial series in the sense that it is obvious that there is a temporal series in which one moment succeeds its previous moments. However, according to Kant, we can think of the space acquiring its quantum through repeatedly or successively adding spatial units to the previous spatial units. (A 428/B 456) That is, the way of conceiving of space as a spatial series depends on the way of conceiving of time as a temporal series, which is naturally serial. Then, by the same token, we can also think of the sum total of mass acquiring its quantum by successively adding massive units to previous massive units. Thus, if the object-of-sensible-intuition principle applies to the idea of the boundary of space, it should also apply to the idea of the sum total of mass of the whole world of appearances.
Second, the fact that Kant applies the object-of-sensible-intuition-principle to the first two (or three) cosmological ideas to solve the contradictions does not mean that the principle can only be employed to deal with the antinomies. If the principle is applicable to other ideas, we can also use the principle to deal with other ideas. Since the object-of-sensible-intuition principle is derived from transcendental idealism, which is an important element in the whole Critique, there is no reason why the principle cannot be applied to other ideas than cosmological ideas. Thus, it is legitimate to use the object-of-sensible-intuition principle to show that the sum total of mass of whole world of appearances cannot be object of possible experience. So, the sum total of mass cannot be what represents time in appearances.
My reply to the second objection has two steps. First, it needs to be clarified that, although the first two antinomies concern whether the conditioning-conditioned series are infinite, Kant’s solution by the object-of-sensible-intuition principle does not rely on the whether the series are infinite. The principle only concerns whether the things to which the cosmological ideas refer can be given to our sensible intuition. It does not concern whether the things are infinite. It seems true that infinity cannot be object of sensible intuition. But this does not mean that all finite things can be given to our sensible intuition. Actually Kant rejects the claim that all finite things can be given to our sensible intuition. For Kant thinks the thesis of the first antinomy is false, because the beginning of time or the boundary of space cannot be given to our sensible intuition so that it cannot be object of possible experience.
The second step of my reply is to spell out in which sense of “cannot,” the sum total of mass cannot be object of possible experience. It seems to me that the distinction between empirical “cannot” and In-Principle “cannot” is hard to cash out in the context of Critique. For, in the Critique, any legitimate claim to knowledge entails that the object of which the knowledge is can be experienced. Thus, it seems that the empiricality of the “cannot” entails the In-Principality of the “cannot”.
However, concerning the claim that we cannot predict whether in the future empirical sciences and technologies will make the sum total of mass possible object of experience, what would Kant say? Would Kant agree that future sciences and technologies might or could transform a transcendent idea into an idea which refers to object of possible experience? I do not think he would. For Kant thinks his Critique settles metaphysical questions once and for all by theoretical reason, which is static or a-historical. Future discoveries made by sciences and technologies should be able to do no damage to the doctrines in Critique. Moreover, it should be odd to Kant’s ear that progresses made by empirical sciences could have any bearings on the doctrines in the Critique, which he builds up from scratch employing only pure reason, which is absolutely a-historical.
Thus, I conclude that the above arguments show that identifying substance with the sum total of mass in the world of appearance is not tenable. Since I showed earlier in this section that identifying substance with individuated mass is not tenable either, I conclude that the general strategy of identifying substance with mass is untenable.


Section IV. Concluding Remarks

In this paper, I showed that a seemingly very promising way of understanding the permanently persistent substance discussed in the first Analogy, namely, conceiving of substance as Newtonian mass, is untenable. Then, I wonder whether there are other promising ways of providing a positive account of substance or actually it is the case that the notion of substance in the first Analogy is itself untenable. At this stage, maybe I could follow Kant’s stance on the things of themselves, namely, they exist, but we can have no knowledge about the way of their existence. But, at the same time, we need to have this minimal conviction that they exist. Similarly, concerning substance, we can have no knowledge about what the permanently persistent substance is, but we need to have the minimal conviction that it exists in the world of appearances and it serves to represent time.

这篇影评可能有剧透 平淡到没大看懂在写什么。所以翻了下新闻。导演对观众认为这是部爱情片而遗憾，并说它是一部反抗制度的片子，通过组织、老师、女人来表现。 关于爱情：虽然最后一幕感觉像是对爱情的总结，但我同意不是爱情片这一观点。女主身处动荡中缥缈不知方向，把柄过多，在哪都只能跟着他...  (展开)

【熊出没——被啪啪啪的好爽啊！】
    。。。这里的啪啪啪指的是打脸。。。

    在大银幕上看一部央视动画片是一种怎样的体验？
能卖出票不算本事，只要你家有个熊孩子，整天捧着电视看熊大熊二，吵着要去沈阳方特玩。估计你想不买票都难。
    把非低龄向的观众留在座位上——这特么叫本事！

    片子一开场，玻璃飞溅水花四起的3d效果让我着实眼前一亮。制片方很聪明，他们花了钱，就毫不低调的满世界宣扬“快看啊老子花大价钱了！！”。这是一部纯粹给孩子看得动画片，没必要弄出人生哲理或者追求意境，只要让坐在位子上的熊孩崽子们兴奋乱抓并拽着身边的爸爸妈妈大喊大叫影响其他小朋友的观影秩序就好了。说实话片中的3d特效场面并不算完美制作，镜头转移的部分甚至还会模糊眩晕，但绝对上乘。相比之下同样标榜“3d巨作”的《3d肉蒲团》真该被拖出去斩了。(欸奇怪我为什么会想到这部。。。)

    从剧情来看，无非就是《马达加斯加3》加一点《冰河世纪》再凑上本片原始剧情的主要矛盾。剥了皮克斯梦工厂迪士尼的糖衣，换上徐福记不老林大白兔的外壳——鹦鹉叫“蕾蒂、嘎嘎”，马戏团叫“好莱屋”，沈阳方特被建立在色彩斑斓的半山层落式居住群里，乍一看还以为是《里约大冒险》的贴图，追逐戏学了功夫熊猫，马戏团群戏学了《马达加斯加》，月亮飞单车让人一眼就看出来是向《ET》致敬，追兵挂在一排背带裤上则是《小黄人》的经典段落。不过这一切并不阻止你在电影院里哈哈哈哈哈，更不会引起何种不适。这才是《熊》的高明之处。他借鉴了很多东西，但归根结底是一部中国本土的动画片，东北口音梗和最炫民族风就是佐证。

    在整个观影过程中，你的情绪会发生各种奇妙的变化：先是不抱有希望的陪孩子开心就好，到特效场面一出来“卧槽卧槽！”，到剧情简简单单推进，你会为发现各种小聪明的细节不断吸引。当你觉得人物太少——噔噔噔噔马戏团登场！当你觉得故事线简单——噔噔噔噔猩猩团长黑风的回忆杀登场！当你觉得音乐有点弱——一行人初到嘉年华时候响起英文插曲。好听不抢戏，完全没有违和感！！当你觉得喜剧效果不明显——熊大居然特么自己出现在电视上！！！
于是整个过程你一直被打脸，一个针对年龄甚至不超过3年级的国产动画居然可以做的如此用心。这种舒爽的观影体验，还真值回票价啊！

    诚然，这绝对不能说是一部优秀的影视艺术作品。但《熊》的导演组明明白白说给我们的，是给中国孩子们的寒假礼物，是一部简单的动物故事，更是多年以后他们回忆里不可缺少的一部分。《熊出没》不是大圣，不会让你热泪盈眶；也不是华纳派拉蒙迪士尼，不可能给你满分的感动与欣喜。但它用最简单最低幼的故事，完成了许多作品无法达到的目的：让孩子们笑。让他们兴奋，让他们拽着爸爸妈妈从座位上跳起来，让他们旁若无人的哈哈哈哈，让他们看他们看得懂的剧情，给他们真正属于他们的动画电影。让带孩子们一起去的家长们觉得这是件有意思的事儿。多年以后当父母们须发皆白肩膀微塌，当年的熊孩子们会回忆起这样的感觉：那年还年轻的他们陪我看了一部很好玩的动画片，走出电影院的时候，我们一家三口，都在笑。

——那年那片子叫什么来着？。。。我记得还是3d的。。。
——3d肉蒲团？

叶光荣到底是谁？---评电影《光荣的愤怒》

  首先，这个评论不适合没有看过这部电影的人，但是这里我向你们推荐看看，因为，它并不完全代表一个艺术作品，更具有价值的是，它是一个呼声，一个在中国很长时间都没有出现的一个呼唤真理的呼声。
  其次，这个评论也不适合那些根本不关心中国社会现状的人，因为剥掉影视的外衣，《光荣》是一个对中国社会现状的批判，这种批判如此犀利，一直于从当时开始看这部电影直到现在，我一直都在怀疑，这样一部敢迎面痛击社会时癖的文艺作品，怎么会通过我国电影审查部的。既然它允许在中国放映了，那我只能欣喜地说，中国还是有在艺术中做批判工作的人的，而且现在这个趋势正在上升，也说明，中国人民正在从无知愚民慢慢转向有头脑，自我意识的合格公民。
  再其次，仿佛有些人说《光荣》类似《三峡好人》。但我这个评论也不太适合那些喜欢类似《三峡好人》伪批判文艺的观众的，因为在文艺作品中有好有坏，有上有下，而真正接近群众生活，从心中热切盼望在自己作品中，探讨一个社会问题，并力图寻找解决这个问题的答案的人，肯定不是《三峡》的导演。

1．我们先回到题目中提到的问题，光荣到底是谁？
  叶光荣是我们讨论的这部电影里黑井县黑井村的村支书，他和在村里一手遮天的熊家四兄弟势不两立，但是表面上唯唯诺诺，完全一副和事老儿的样子。熊家四兄弟手眼通天，上勾结县里和警察局，甚至也立刻腐化里刚来的新县长，下欺压村民，运用手中权利和身边鹰犬欺男霸女，无恶不作，村民私下称其为“四人帮”。终于借着一次熊家兄弟强抢村外妇女的机会，村支书光荣借着县里下的指示的招牌，联络可靠村民，希望通过一次性的“抓熊计划”，彻底地把熊家四兄弟的黑势力彻底从村中铲除掉。但是，道高一尺，魔高一丈，身为村长的熊老三精明过人，逃过被当场捉奸不利局面，反而得到光荣具众闹事的把柄，突下狠手，准备反咬一口把光荣等人解决的当儿口，以新县长为代表的县领导班子，带领公安局大队突然从天而降，彻底地根除了熊家恶势力。
  电影故事情节很简单，熊家四兄弟在明，光荣在暗，通过明暗位置的转化，把代表正义的村支书光荣放到了不利局面，制造了电影的紧张局势，让观众为光荣着实担心了一把。这个通过位置的转化造成的效果，也是电影剧情成功的一个重要因素。

2．光荣代表了什么？
  自古正邪不两立，有压迫就有反抗，而与熊家四兄弟恶势力做斗争的代表，就是叶光荣，而这个正义势力的代表，其实并不是那么的“正义”。正义这个词，在中国可以从两个角度出发：一个是从道德的角度，正义代表道德上的公正。光荣虽然是从这方面的代表，但是他默默地接受了熊老三通过人情给他妻子找来的工作机会；用钱去引诱“狗卵”去作他的帮手；打着“县里的指示”的招牌，网罗帮手对付熊四，看来，从道德的角度讲，他和他的支书身份不相符。二，正义这个词在中国还从法律角度来理解，正义代表法律上的合法，但是光荣也没有得到上级的同意，私下在没有搜查令的情况下，侵入别人的家去搜索，看来他还是做错事情了。但是，我们从人民的角度来讲，他是“正义”的，村民们被压迫这么久，在如今人情关系和官僚腐败的大环境下，他揭竿而起，毅然地作出于恶势力斗争的举措。“不在沉默中爆发，就在沉默中灭亡”，光荣虽然是农民出身，但是却拥有类似欧洲启蒙运动后公民意识，在遇到不公正的时候，不去逆来顺受地服从于它，而是通过行动与之对抗，从中得到扩展自己的权利，而这个“权利”有两个不同层次的意义： 一是作为一个生命的个体，有保护自己和自身利益的权利，二是作为社会中的一份子，有权利代表与自己类似的整个阶层像社会呼喊和行动的权利。所以说，光荣的举动，可以与中国历史中那些类似陈胜吴广起义区分开来，因为陈胜吴广反抗压迫，是打着被压迫的老百姓的名义，如果成功，最后龙袍加身，反抗果实自己一人享用，成为下一个统治者的无限循环。而光荣的怒吼则是代表着所有被压迫的村民的愿望，希望通过行动换得一个公平公正的社会环境。

3．再问：光荣到底是谁？
  也许有人会笑：关于这个村支书的其人其事前面不是都说清楚了么，为什么这里还无聊地去问。不过大家不要忘了，我们看的是电影，是一个故事，是一个虚构的情节，虽然这个故事的背景源自现实，但是如果我们真正去看看真实中的社会，会发现压迫虽有，但是反抗压迫是很少的，中国人向来逆来顺受，董仲书的社会行为准则“三刚五常”到现在还在人们心中拥有主导的地位，估计在这里，真正出现光荣这样的人的几率大概为0.01%。像电影中反映出这样的事在生活中是非常可悲的，然而更可悲的是，在现实生活中就算出现了电影里的情景，我们的人民，我们的社会都不会发出任何声音，做任何的动作，这种死一样的寂静是非常非常可怕的，可怕到需要在一部电影里，或者一个文学作品里虚拟地塑造出一个英雄来，解救人民于水火之间，这样的心里自我安慰的方法，只能用鲁迅先生形容的阿Q精神来比喻，让人民在这样零星的批判社会的文学作品里找到一种自我解放的方法，漫漫地，人民觉得这个解脱不再在虚拟的文学里了，仿佛在真实生活里也能找到，从而达到彻底麻痹人民感知的器官。

4．电影《光荣的愤怒》代表了什么？
  我看《光荣》的时候，真是替电影捏了把汗，并不是因为紧张的情节，而是替电影本身紧张。真没想到，在如今电影审查制度这么严格的情况下，这部电影竟然通过审查，按说要在以前，这么露骨地表达社会问题会经常通过审查制度和谐掉的。不过就是因为这个制度，电影也没有真正完整的展现在人民面前，而是在后边加了一个美式的Happy ending的尾巴，武警如天降奇兵，瞬间铲除了邪恶，还民一个清白。但是估计大部分人都像我一样，在电影最后10分钟的时候已经有了另一个清楚的结局。这个结局更加真实，更加振聋发聩。
  而透过现象看本质，通过这部电影看到的是一种民怨（或者叫民愿）。早在18世纪，西方就给这种人民通过一种介质表达自己意愿的形式叫“公众舆论”，英文：public opinion，法文：opinion publique，德文：Oeffentlichkeit。这种公众舆论最开始是只允许在文学艺术批判方面进行，被完全刨除在政治范围之外的，但随着教育和经济的提高，还有启蒙运动和自由主义等各种因素的影响，西方国民之间的社会地位差距越来越小（譬如贵族阶级和中产阶级之间，中产阶级和农民阶级之间），这种文学批判然后转成了也可以进行社会批判，最后在英法德等各国先后产生了一种就算在政治方面也不会被国家禁言的公众舆论，而这种舆论也成为国家与人民联系的一个重要通道，国家通过公众舆论获取需要解决问题的所有信息，而公民通过舆论监督和纠正政府的管理方针。从另外一种角度来说，公众舆论就成为国家和公民之间互相依存和互相制约的工具，仿佛神经存在于大脑和肌肉之间，传输大脑的指令的同时也传递肌肉的疼痛，从而防止了因为运动过量导致的身体机能的全部瘫痪。
  反观我国，这种公众舆论仅限于道德领域还有小范围的文学领域，而那些牵扯到社会或者政治，关系到老百姓切身利益的话题会因为种种限制而被扼杀掉，实在是人民可悲之处。那些作家文人，只有小心翼翼地生活在夹缝中，惟恐触及政治或者社会的敏感带，而导致不测。以前是根本没人敢说，现在是有些人敢说，但是戴个棉纱或者削去重点，让人看着不伦不类好蒙混过关。不过，从无到有，从少到多，从多到广，这毕竟需要个过程，电影《光荣》作为这么个领头羊，还是让人庆幸的。

    第一次看这电影是小学的某次六一儿童节的下午，那个年代好像儿童节都放半天假然后组织看电影，可不知道学校为什么选了这部片子，更奇怪的是当时只对电影中电子游戏的内容感兴趣，却深刻的记得这次观影经历。成人后又看过此片好几次，越看越喜欢，大概是自己也是个天生胆小的人吧，梁天葛优谢园的表演真挚生动不做作，让人很有共鸣。而导演通过短短一个钟头左右一条主线三件小事这种作文式的结构并行不悖中把故事讲的完整在今天看来也属不易。
    首先说，这片子特别北京还有点用现在的话说叫主旋律，但并不影响这是一部贴近老百姓的片子。影片一开头是一场足球比赛，94年应该是中国足球职业联赛开展的第一年，中国球迷对足球的关注日渐升温。其实这场比赛应该是北京国安对AC米兰的那场（国安2-1赢了），但影片虚构为中国队主场输球，球迷开始发泄不满上街闹事。有个镜头是一位大爷从自家四合院抱着电视出来，家人紧给后面拉着，嘴里喊着“谁都别拦着我，我特么今后再看球我就是大伙的孙子。”后把电视砸烂。放到今天来看，中国球迷的悲剧真是命中注定，梁天后来跟葛优聊天“咱中国球迷就是受虐狂，输多少年了，哪会骂完了也照看不误”一语成谶...还有一个就是北京的hooligan真是伴随着足球职业化就开始了，真是够历史悠久的。
    从一开始出警，葛优和梁天俩人的对比就出来了，葛优怵球迷不？其实他也怵，但他是所长，得拿份儿，梁天怂了也没忘了贫上一句“所长，要不我也看车得了，保证人在车在。”...葛优喊话那段太有意思了，我们领导现在讲话还在每句话中间加个，“是吧”。由于在球迷闹事中意外受伤，梁天借机鼓足勇气向所长坦白“我这人天生胆小，不爱和人打交道，您放我一马。”后来葛优受不了梁天老来蘑菇，顺口说了一句“你办成三个案子，我就放你走”没想到梁天心里就较上劲了，故事慢慢就铺开了。与其说是仨案子，其实也就最后一件还算点案子，其他俩都是片警平时工作中的鸡毛蒜皮的小事。通过这几个小故事，把那个年代的标签通通展示一遍。如：贼有责任感的居委会老大爷、录像带、加里森敢死队、红白机、魂斗罗、牛群冯巩的相声、崇拜诗人的文艺女青年等等。最有感的还是梁天和谢园演的劳改犯的友谊。梁天还说了这么一段话“警察嘛，说白了就是国家机器，甭管你是达官显贵还是平头百姓，兹要是你犯他们手里头，就得拉下脸来收拾你。”那时候居然这么写而且没被删减简直有点不可思议啊。再看看客串的何冰、李耕、马羚、李媛媛，都是那个年代银幕上活跃的主。整个故事就在讲述一个不愿意与人打交道的胆小青年警察如何在日常工作生活和局长的言传身教下渐渐爱上了警察这工作，这着实有点扯淡。但其实这也是在讲一个出入社会的青年怎么慢慢成长的历程，梁天的怯不是真正的胆小，是不爱惹是非，不善与人打交道，不爱抛头露脸，其实心里的主意正着呢。陈佩斯曾经评价梁天是“蔫土匪”大概就这么个意思。
    那时的梁天、葛优、谢园乃至张国立都演了很多很生活的电影，这些在今天看来一点也不过时，甚至还很出色。一是怀旧情绪作祟，二是那时人们的精神状态没有当下如此焦虑不安。当下除了葛大爷曝光率较高之外，其他的都闲云野鹤退居幕后了，但我觉得那个年代的国产故事片都能把故事讲的不错，反观如今的大制作...题外话，看过BTV做个一个梁天的访谈，定的题目就是“天生胆小”可见此片对于梁天的重要，也切实感觉的梁天是个极其低调朴素之人。
   最后说一句，影片插曲臧天朔唱的“盛名之下”非常好听。

一本正经的大拉比讨论着经书里的选择和自由的命题，不一会儿他一本正经的死了，在这个一本正经的犹太社区里那是很重要的事情，凭借着人人都一本正经的爱着这个拉比，就可以在这个社区里一个个道貌岸然的做一个道德情操高尚的人,一旦看见别人抽烟烫头取乐，就会各式各样以老天代...  (展开)

      据说在韩国票房今年第一啊，于是慕名找来看看。先前看了几部韩影，比如《新世界》，《暗杀》，《七号房间的礼物》，《观相》等等，因此，这部影片也算是有几个韩国明星认识了。

      主角是《新世界》里面演黑帮大哥的丁青，演员叫黄政民。一点不帅，但是，电影我们本来就不是来看颜值的，人家演技好，这就够了！在这部片子里他却演的一个警察。热血，正义，也有点吊儿郎当。

      还有个认识的就是吴达洙了，在《七号房间的礼物》里演的是一个监狱里的逗比老大，以及《暗杀》里面也是一个可爱的老头，《老手》里面演的也是警察，角色塑造性很强。对韩影还不够了解，就我看的这几部来说，是个很给力的配角，有点类似于我们的吴孟达大叔。
      
      第三位，来说说里面的反派，影片中叫赵泰晤，是个脾气暴戾，冷血无情的富二代。漠视生命，用钱解决问题。看的真是让人牙痒痒啊，太变态了，不得不说，演得好，让我有冲进屏幕打他一顿冲动，不过估计打不过，人家练过的......
      
    那个女警察据说是模特，难怪一直让她用长腿踢人，一踢一个准。
    
    以及这部韩国电影有种浓浓的港片味道，主角打斗时的套路是在学习成龙么？

改编自一部低分而且影响一般的美剧，不明白片方为什么要挑这样一个故事，但可以看到一种不好的现象：国内翻拍已经不管原版是经典还是烂片了！好吧，原创就真的那么难？国内就真的没有编剧能写出比老外的烂片要好的剧本？ 不过这部系列网大还是带来了一个比较正面的东西：在网...  (展开)

终于在清明假期看了电影《情人》，影片结束很久了，心中却残留着屡屡遗憾。为东尼与简的擦肩而过而遗憾，也为古往今来相爱却错过的情人们而遗憾。
遗憾的不是相爱却错过，而是，我爱着你，却从未告诉你我爱你。《情人》中，简爱着东尼，她却一直嘴硬，告诉他“我不爱你，我跟你在一起是为了钱”。可是，当终于告别，在返回法国的轮渡上响起动人的华尔兹，她却瑟缩在角落里哭得像个傻逼。她仿佛突然恍然大悟，自己竟然那么那么爱东尼。
放在今天的社会环境下，《情人》应该算是一部颠覆三观的电影，因为它所讲述的，是一个大叔包养“幼女”的故事。
《情人》带有杜拉斯的自传的色彩，影片以女主的视角，回忆了那段爱欲交织的往事。

简是一个生活在越南的法国少女，才15岁。她在西贡上学，而她的家庭则充满了不幸和冲突，她的母亲靠办一个小学校挣不多的收入，家境清屏。而他的哥哥比尔则是一个脾气暴躁的瘾君子，经常欺负她和懦弱的二哥保罗。母亲却又偏爱大哥，因此，家庭对她而言，不仅是个没有爱的地方，反而恨意弥漫。
故事发生在去往西贡学校的轮渡上。

15岁的简穿着丝质的连衣裙和镶着亮片的廉价高跟鞋，她双手撑在船的栏杆，一只脚踏在最低的栏杆上，微风吹着她的裙摆，一动一动，风情万种，撩动着他的心。东尼从老式汽车里走下来跟她搭讪，此时他的内心应该有一点紧张与激动，情欲在他心间绽放，他的心颤抖，手也颤抖，老司机也有笨手笨脚的时候。
简拒绝了东尼的烟，他却说：你这么美，是可以为所欲为的。

东尼邀请简乘坐他的汽车，送她去学校。汽车驶过春天也可能是夏天的田野、林荫大道，而暧昧的空气也在车内弥漫。东尼的手开始慢慢地探索，开始试探着触碰她的手指，没有反抗，于是他继续深入，握住了她的手……当抵达她的学校时，他的双手已经在她的双腿之间放肆地为所欲为了。简的眼睛瞥过他的汽车、钻石大扳指，那一刻，她内心已经充满了对财富的向往，此时此刻，她就是一头待宰的羔羊。

第二天放学，东尼的车停在校外，她走过去，故意在车窗上留下了深深一吻，这一吻，如天雷勾动地火，撩得他欲火焚身，情难自己。

在他们的感情中，简仿佛更主动一些。她随着他来到他父亲送给东尼专用供养情人使用的屋子，欲望蠢动着，但面对这一方未被开发过的处女地，他却有些退缩了，他是一个被欲望吞噬的男人，但内心原有的道德却让他畏缩不前。她却对他说“对我做你对其他女人做的事吧”。然后她主动地褪去了衣衫，十五岁半的年轻美好的胴体在他眼前展露无遗，他内心的道德防线在那一刻，终于被欲望冲垮，一泻千里。
刚开始的时候，对他们来说，彼此真的就只是情人，这场性事，对他们而言，只是一场交易而已。简是为了东尼的钱，而东尼呢，则是为了她年轻的肉体。

一场云雨后，在高档餐厅共进晚餐，他甚至试图撇清，他说：“我不能娶你了，因为你已经不是处女了。”
她一边狼吞虎咽，一边无所谓地回应：“那太好了，反正我不喜欢中国人。”
从何时才开始看到爱的呢？大概是东尼请简的家人共进晚餐，餐毕，简在众目睽睽之下与自己的二哥贴身热舞。而在一旁的东尼眼睛中泛起了点点泪花，甚至于哽咽了。回到他们的小屋，他甩了她一个耳光说：“你就是个天生的婊子。”
那一巴掌，是嫉妒，是恨，也是尊严被践踏的悲愤，而这一巴掌，却也让人看到了浓浓的爱意。只有真的爱，才会产生真的羡慕嫉妒恨。
东尼为了简甚至还向父亲求过情，他想娶简的。但黄种人和白种人互相的歧视，让他不能如意。他对她说：“我不能舍弃我父亲的财富。”

他被刻画成了一个懦弱的男人，物质上很富有，但精神上却一穷二白，他周旋在不同的女人之间，寻欢作乐。可是当他遇到真正喜欢的女人，却又不能给她婚姻和承诺。其实，如果她给他肯定答复，也许他还可以反抗，还可以努力一把。但是她从没说过她爱他。她说他爱她，她却说“我来找你，是因为钱。”
太多的失望，让东尼觉得自己的努力仿佛毫无意义，他说，他为他的情人死了。他只好屈从于父亲，娶了别人。而她则见证了他的婚礼。隔着人群，在喧天的锣鼓和炮仗声中，他越过攒动的人头定定地看着她，眼里充满了无奈和悲哀。那一刻，我无限同情他，一个高富帅，一个富甲一方的男人，却不能对自己的人生负责，不能去爱最想爱的那个女人。或者说，在他自己的意识中，他就算再怎么努力，也无法得到她的爱，那才是最悲哀的。
有人说，简从头至尾并没有表现出多爱东尼，她也从未说过爱他，直到在返回法国的轮渡上，爱才觉醒。但这并不客观。

东尼结婚后，简就曾去过了他们共同生活很久的小屋，在那里还有东尼的余温，旧时的情欲余温尚存。她久久地坐在床上，雨淅淅沥沥地下，而要等的那个人，再也不会来了。
简是爱东尼的，但她大概是出于自尊，故意撒谎而已。明明是为你而来，却偏偏要说是为了钱。这么努力地把自己包裹成一个混蛋，只是不想受到伤害吧。一直逞强，一直嘴硬。直到离别来临，她站在船上，以为等不到送别，然而当船离岸，她才看到，他的汽车就停在码头的角落，原来他一直在目送她离开。

当华尔兹响起，她痛哭流涕。她的眼泪，有力地证明了这场注定不完美的爱情。
爱情中多少错过，都是因为嘴硬和逞强呢？如果爱一个人，为什么不能告诉他呢？如果注定要离别，让他在被爱过的余温里度过一生，总比在从未被爱过的冰冷和伤痛中度过要好。相爱时要抱紧一点，离别时要用力一点，在茫茫人海中相遇很难，而在茫茫人海中失去，却只在一念之间。

这篇影评可能有剧透 这是一部非常丰富的影片。其内容除了边缘人群的生活状态，战争后创伤老兵重新融入社会问题和子女教育问题等，这个影片还做了一个很好的思想实验，那就是，在当今社会，在完全不合群的状态下，你能逃多远。 影片的主人公可能是一个比较极端的例子，一个因创伤后遗症而从心理和生...  (展开)

就很神奇，汤姆汉克斯好像有缩短时间的能力，不知不觉两个小时没了…… 上一次看演员这么少的电影，还是汤姆汉克斯的荒岛余生，他跟一个排球演了两小时。 这一次他幸福多了，有条狗还有个机器人还有个机器狗，一家四口末日求生。 中间没有特别惊心动魄的大场面，但是画面每一帧...  (展开)

2.13
就剧中而言，珍珠是李俶的软肋，珍珠是安庆绪的铠甲。李俶的诸多选择是为了求一个家国和私情的两全，安庆绪的执念是家国天下不过是为了换珍珠回眸。所以无论独孤也好，太子也好，怕是都不想让珍珠留在李俶身边，因为“为王者，最不应该有的便是儿女私情”。但李俶自小就是重情重义之人，一边是舍不掉的皇室责任，一边是不愿弃的心中挚爱，都说忠孝不能两全，对李俶而言，是家国和爱情不能两全。

其实最开始，虽说崔氏进府是因为两家制衡，但沈氏也不过是棋盘上的另一枚棋子罢了。珍珠在广平王看来一是为了沈易直手中可号令独孤家的麒麟令，二是由于沈家灭门心中些微的愧疚，三是为了制衡崔氏，全是理性全是权谋，感情是半点都没有的。而大婚之夜，发现概念里的“沈氏”就是心中念的“珍珠”，于李俶而言，那一眼怕是“上天垂怜”，给了这个一直以来扛着唐氏江山的少年一份柔软的感情。

独孤靖瑶说“我才是与他最有益的女人”。可这谁不知道呢？李俶当然知道，一个独孤靖瑶一个麒麟令，十万云南军，非战时都想拿到的绝对权力，更何况当时已经安史之乱了；珍珠不知道么？她当然也知道，知道自己母家全灭，不仅自己那些所谓才华在乱世中对李俶丝毫没有助益（论才能，冬郎又何曾输给过自己），自己对李俶的感情甚至可能是他前进的拖累，所以才慨然割舍，名分也好陪伴也好，都不要了。

既然我是你的软肋，那我自断牵绊，送你前行。

可谁又心甘呢。

上面那段是刚看四天《大唐》，但看了片花和B站《为江山》以及和独孤同框剧照心情极其悲愤，每念及此都暴哭的我写下的。
然，两周后……

2.28
独孤正式上线。虽然这几天组里骂她的人很多，我也不想为她洗白，但是这两天补完更新，却也觉得从她角度出发，她的行为（截至目前）是合理的，李俶于她的态度也从未逾越半分，别说逾越了，就连暧昧都未曾有。

先说一句，冬珠大旗永不倒！冬珠大旗永不倒！冬珠大旗永不倒！

（下文不是为了独孤洗白，只是试图分析理解一下她，从她自己角度出发）
（仅对54集以前内容负责，后面如果黑化了，本文概不负责，比心）

独孤靖瑶首先上线是杨国忠派人拿着假的麒麟令去云南找她，那会儿她一句“我独孤家的麒麟令只对沈家守诺！”让我一瞬间有想站独孤x珍珠百合CP的冲动。那会儿出场的独孤靖瑶是自小在云南军中长大的女将军，她是手握十万大军号令一方的云南王的女儿。在那个年代，云南虽然算是大唐一部分，但某种程度上也并不是朝廷里的一员，所以她自小应该是没有什么家国情怀的。这一点自然是比不上李俶这个皇长孙的，也甚至比不过太守之女沈珍珠。沈易直虽不在京为官，但也是一方太守，护着大唐子民，更何况还有文人风骨在，珍珠自小受的教育和熏陶，自然是先有国再有家，李唐皇室是根本，万民百姓是根基。从这一点上，其实从一开始，独孤靖瑶和李俶珍珠，就是道不同的两派人。所以无论是李俶x靖瑶，还是靖瑶x珍珠，两对CP都毫无疑问是BE。

故事继续发展，安史之乱爆发，云南王反唐号称是因为奸臣当道皇帝昏庸，反正“乱臣贼子”总是要找个借口的。和安禄山一起从范阳起兵攻打洛阳（其实这边应该有个bug吧，毕竟云南的十万大军要跑到河北然后再从北向南打洛阳，我实在是理解不了这样排兵布阵是为哪般，但这不重要，按下不表。）攻下长安后，安庆绪掳了珍珠，还刺了她一剑，又救了她藏在独孤靖瑶的府上（啊，好想吐槽安庆绪，忍住）。这时候，于独孤靖瑶来说，一个是跟自己有婚约、但自己不想嫁、还送来一个大人情的安庆绪，一个是自己不认识、但据说跟自家颇有渊源的、却没拿着麒麟令的沈家之女。她帮着照顾沈珍珠是因为想以此来换得安庆绪的退婚，但她面对珍珠的询问也说了“只要你拿出麒麟令，就算赔上我独孤家家业，也会退兵”；她看着安庆绪这么百般讨好，也劝慰过珍珠不如为自己打算从了他，但她听过珍珠肺腑之言后，也拿走了安庆绪给珍珠送的“笼中之鸟”。我相信此时，她的立场还是中立的。只不过这个中立，是出自于自己的利益，而非天下。但这一点，之前我也说过了，因为她心中从没有家国。（你看她们云南兵，连服装都和大唐完全不一样。）
这就是她和珍珠最大的不同，她寻求的从来是私利，而珍珠，就像景甜所有采访里说的那样，是“心中有大爱”的人。

独孤靖瑶是每一个选择都只从当下的自身出发而做出的，基本上从不顾及他人。从这一点上，独孤人设从没崩坏。只不过是我们一直以为女将军应该是隔壁《琅琊榜》剧组里的霓凰那样。但霓凰是自小和林殊，靖王一起长大啊，哪能一样嘛！
是以，独孤给珍珠下药，躲避同安庆绪结婚，是那个当下，于她最有利的选择。就像她在郊外和她部下说的那样“你好我好大家好”。独孤的内心OS肯定是：反正你珍珠嫁给安庆绪也不会吃亏遭罪，还能治病，他安庆绪娶了你一高兴也不会治我逃婚之罪，我逃了婚还不会受罚，多好！但她不知道也不懂的是，珍珠对李俶的感情，珍珠对大唐的感情，其实在安庆绪起兵的那一刻，珍珠和他就永无可能了。

然后，安庆绪那个偏执狂借着大婚杀独孤全家，独孤就立马去救珍珠了。其实这块我还算“敬她是个汉子”的，因为洛阳城是他安家的天下，她虽不是单枪匹马，也基本上是虾兵蟹将了，去报仇的时候还想着“对不起珍珠”要抢她回来，之后还给了车马让她珍珠跑路，对于她自私人设来说，也算难得了。

之后屠安将军上线，李俶上线，愤怒值飙升！
（对，虽然我已经可以理解独孤，也不觉得我俶留情，但是我还是对于编剧设计的他俩感情线出离愤怒！是的！就是这么狭隘！）
（妈个鸡，耐着性子继续写）

在那个倒霉客栈前，独孤看到了一表人才风流倜傥盘亮条顺的广平王殿下，“一眼就如受牵制”。起码她的眼光是没问题的，嗯。
然后就是那倒霉的转圈圈了。（深呼吸，冷静）其实最开始出预告的时候，真的觉得“李俶你是要死么？你那个是什么眼神！！！昂！？！！？看什么看啊！！！戳瞎你啊！！！！”但真的再看的时候，其实我俶看她的眼神是真的没什么的，基本上是无波澜，跟看静物没啥区别。熟看偶像剧的我们，应该都知道，这种狗血桥段的固定搭配是：转圈圈，慢镜头，男主含情脉脉或者略微惊讶的表情，起身后两人都略微尴尬，再拉开距离。但是这里面，除了前两个条件有以外，无论是我俶的表情，还是起身后我俶的动作，都是磊落的。最不磊落的，其实是后期配BGM的。
（在这里我要夸一下万茜的演技，真的，那种小女生的爱慕，真的好明显，就像她后期自己说的，“并不矜持”，真的很到位，到位到想戳瞎她。此时李俶对独孤的态度是，你干嘛这么看我？吹一下我超儿演技。啊还有一处，独孤跪在她爹尸首旁浑身颤抖的那段儿，真的演技太棒了。）

之后俶姐上线，独孤得知俶姐就是那日一眼万年的人，就是广平王殿下，就是唐室皇子，就是被自己害了又被自己救了的沈氏之夫，她其实是犹豫的。后来珍珠携夫持麒麟令来找她的时候，她仍是犹豫的。她一上来只跟珍珠打招呼，并不理会李俶，也不怎么看他，看得出是极力克制的。她犹豫，一是先叛唐后叛燕，要是再投诚，没脸；二是先害珍珠后救珍珠，要是再真的爱上她老公，没脸。但是珍珠拿着麒麟令来了，她拒绝不了。无论是拒绝不了麒麟令，还是拒绝不了自己的心，哎，谁都知道，最不受控的就是感情啊。
所以她问“妹妹确定要我去殿下身边么？”内心OS是：我努力不靠近了，我真的努力了，是你来找我的，到时候我控制不住了，我自私本性上线了，你别后悔啊。事实上，最后一句话她自言自语说出来了。
此时我的殿下在想什么呢？他在想：这姑娘性情有点儿古怪啊。
其实在独孤问出那句话的时候，李俶是觉得奇怪的，珍珠也愣了一下，但是珍珠没多想。珍珠没多想其实好理解，当时那个时代下，其实并没有一世一双人的设定的，珍珠嫁给广平王的时候，得知是双孺人也没有什么微词。想必皇家贵胄配几个妻妾，在当时的女子心中应该是正常不过的事儿了，所以即便独孤对李俶有情，珍珠会吃醋，但珍珠不奇怪，也并不十分抗拒，同理可见崔彩屏，几日以御是没问题的，但是坏孩子就会很吃醋（摊手）。

然后就是行军打仗啦，战场之中，又有将才，日日而对，独孤对李俶肯定是越来越爱的。这个不用分析了，不爱才有鬼，谁不爱殿下啊！但李俶对独孤呢？对她维护是为了治军严谨（私以为这段可以参考琅琊榜里梅长苏初去靖王军营，被靖王手下挑衅，靖王也是惩治了手下，为的是立军威。）“我看中请来的将军，不容他人置喙。”这跟性别无关。
后来长安收复，独孤为李俶挡了一箭，导致不孕不育了。说实话，这块是我觉得唯一不合理的一点，怎么就喊靖瑶了？从没喊过啊？你喊屠安不好么？喊独孤不好么？哪怕喊将军不好么？这块儿是真的百思不得其解。编辑在这儿强行上感情线，莫名其妙。

然后就是告白啦，其实我觉得那块儿独孤还算是直白不扭捏的，但是在自信在李俶看来，是：哎呀好尴尬啊”、“我就只把你当兄弟，你却想嫁我？”、“要怎么拒绝她啊？都是战友，她人还不错的（不像崔彩屏母胎厌烦），况且她还为了我不孕不育了”、“哎呀妈呀太尴尬了”。
（这块儿再次吹一下我超儿演技，真的了，那个尴尬的劲儿，我都要尴尬癌犯了，溢出屏幕了都要！）

以上。
所以真的，截至目前，独孤的所有行为我都觉得其实是合理的，人设并没有崩，只是和我们心中以为的“女将军”设定不符而已。她自己的人物线是合理的。如果按照隔壁楼所说，后期李俶怼她越怼越狠的话，凭借着她本身的自私人设，以及编剧喜欢把所有配角极端偏执化描写的习惯来看，给李俶下毒逼走珍珠，也是合理的。

摸着良心说，独孤这一个角色，就是为了衬托、对比珍珠的。珍珠的那种为了家国可以牺牲自身，为了大爱可以舍弃小我的精神无疑是伟大的，也正是这一点深深地吸引着李俶，他俩的所求从根本上是绝对一致的，要的是海晏河清，要的是万家和平。他俩都是为了肩上责任心中大爱，可以忍己身之苦的人，都是不忘初心，不为外界纷扰所困的人。他俩是各自的伴侣，也是各自的知己，是那个动荡不安的时代下，最稳固的存在。

说实话，如果要吐槽《大唐荣耀》，我可以再写个比这个长两倍的文章，bug太多了，后期问题太多了，剧情设置、节奏、人物设定，为虐而虐太多了，《大唐》真的不是我最爱的电视剧，但是……

谨以此文，送给我最爱的CP：李俶x沈珍珠，愿我们都可以找到那个温柔了岁月的人。

整部片子感觉最深的大概就是画面和语言，感到跟以前看过很多片子有类似的地方就是一个个水的画面，来分解了整部片子．这让我想起看＜大话西游＞的时候，看到至尊宝每次在看到水后所呈现的另一个空间的分隔，与此相类似的还有＜象鸡毛一样飞＞中的利用一次次把鞋子掉在水里，而分割的情节，一直都不是很明白所谓的立体解构主义，不知道这些算不算是？利用某一个重复的场景，把不同的时空、人物及情节连接起来。反正看东西都是自己琢磨，呵呵～希望有高人指点指点！

《平壤之约》其实还是透露了神秘朝鲜的很多真实信息，否则韩国不会成为国际上第一个购买该片发行权的国家。在平壤的外国游客必须有导游无时无刻寸步不离地陪伴，导演把这个“纪律”描写在影片里，朝方也欣然准许了，真是习惯成自然啊。影片里平壤的人们维持着起码的体面（似乎好过文革时候的北京），在平壤的人民之中还有爱心和爱情存在，还有纯真的羞涩和单纯的信念，他们和中国年轻人接触时的理念碰撞痕迹清晰，这都被导演诚实地记录了下来。不过，国内的80后90后对这些东西是毫无感觉的，他们直接用全球化的眼光评判此片，把它和好莱坞的商业片作比较，这就完全错了 - 这不是商业片，这是一部朝鲜的国家形象片。

我想， 怀念单纯和痴狂的60年代和70年代的老一辈中国人，看这部电影的时候会发现很多很多自己熟悉的场景，比如小学生排着队、唱着歌，走很远的路去参加“有意义的活动”；比如为了买一件称心的礼物，坐着不方便的交通工具、费了很长时间、还耽误了重要的约会；比如工人学生机关干部可以拿出整天整天的时间来排节目、都不上班；比如动不动就拿“敬爱的将军”来吓唬人。一国的首都里似乎毫无商业活动的迹象，大家最关心的事情就是：跳集体舞。电影在描述这些场景的时候，是怀着无比的诚意而没有丝毫的揶揄。这就是在中国已经随风飘逝的纯真年代。问题在于，精神不能代替物质，中国人费了30年才搞懂这个道理。(中国完全用物质取代精神，则是走了另一个极端，或许正被朝鲜人讥笑呢。)

其实，政治宣传并不是此片的最大问题，好莱坞的电影里那个没有美国至上的宣传，那个没有“政治上的正确”？这部电影最大的问题其实是某些电影的通病 - 没有剧烈的戏剧冲突和峰回路转的剧情高潮，情节安排极其的平淡和乏味，缺乏任何时事参照物，似乎是发生在另一个平行宇宙的事情。这大概是合拍双方妥协的无奈后果。但反过来一想，难道这不正是最真实的反映了朝鲜的现实吗？与世隔绝，沉浸在自己贫瘠而又单纯、可能很残酷的世界里，等待着一位贤君，领导人民走向开放。也许，看完电影以后，你能体会到那种心情。

这篇影评可能有剧透 非常典型的热血青春双男主商业片 整部电影诙谐中透着严肃 严肃中带着热血 热血中又有残酷的现实 整部电影都以双男主的视角来呈现两个警察学生的成长 两位性格迥异的少年考上了警察学校 一个学霸一个学渣 他们的共同点就是比较傻瓜2333 电影开头用幽默的手段来体现两人 真的是让...  (展开)

这篇剧评可能有剧透 本来以为这部剧是探案剧，现在看来更多讲的是人心。因此剧情上有些乏善可陈，第2集，第5集，第6集，第9集比较有张力，其次第3集，第10集。不过第10集画的那么大一个饼——国际绑架组织到底什么回事还没交代…期待续篇吧～ 本剧最可圈可点的是人物的塑造了。日剧10集塑造一个人...  (展开)

完全流水线的冒险片，就像一个所有路线都规划好的迪士尼游乐项目。什么都不缺，但也什么都是寻常。 Emily Blunt的确适合比较英气的角色，但还是和Dwayne Johnson缺少一些CP感。当然能和Dwayne Johnson有CP感的似乎也不是很好找。 Aguirre如果是为了救女儿，只需要回来带女儿去...  (展开)

很容易想到《乔伊的奋斗》。还有韩国任昌丁的《爱情真可怕》。反而女主老公与“小三”的戏更抢镜，话说女配颇像周丽淇。太长了点，居然2个小时还有多。还有结尾最后一通电话为什么不是老公打来？就算是老公现场表白，能不能花点心思煽点情啊？前面都铺垫那么长了，怎么到后面就痿了呢？还让不让人高潮了？
       题外话：突然发现一样很有意思的东西：内地的电视购物、电信诈骗和成功学都是从台湾传过来的，他们是以假乱真的鼻祖啊。再联想到莆田系，这……好吧，我就不地域了。总觉得这有点奇怪。