Ta?ma? Maa Harri Marstion & Antero Jakoila 在湖边有一片土地 一个男人站在田间 正值五月的春天 树木都披着黑衣 男人心中别无他念 只愿作物茁壮生长 这是块坚硬多石的土地 也是片灰云常郁的土地 尽管主为农夫带来恩泽 这片土地永远不会如此 无畏的玉米高高挺立 男...  (展开)

作为没看过上集的路人，着实被各种宣传通稿的气氛所感染，最受不了是英雄末路、美人迟暮般的悲情，所以即使太平轮只卖VIP的贵宾厅票，还是拖着一票朋友去捧场了。

作为泪点不高的女人，我直接带了一盒纸巾去的，抽拉200张那种，摆好了架势要来哭一场，毕竟泰坦尼克号哭了好几场。然而直到终场，我都没有打开纸盒的封条。这是一个非常不科学的事情，即使是横冲直撞好莱坞这样的杂烩喜剧片，我都抹了眼泪，怎么可能全场这么冷静漠然淡然呢？也许原因在于这是一个不科学的电影吧！

林保怡要娶如秦海璐样貌却嫌弃如章子怡风姿者；章子怡被各种男人虐却依然干净清丽如宫二般大小姐样；佟大为重伤在身却能各种自救他救（佟兄弟，你完全可以再上战场）；夫人住在吹弹可破的屋子里，将军表示很安心等等，没有一个故事能看进心里。

一个好的故事要么轻轻地挠着你的痒处，要么重重踩着你的痛处，让你或热血沸腾或回忆青春或观望当下或头脑风暴，再不济也会让情绪波动一下，起码我笑笑看你们演也行。但此片什么感觉也没有，的确不觉得冗长，因为看完了还不知道这电影它想干吗，总觉得这还是一个前言，就像以前的评书，在开讲之前总要讲几个小故事热身，然后一拍醒木，言归正传开讲水浒。然而并没有醒木这啪的一声，沉船变成水塘戏，既没有发掘人性的沉痛点，也没有起码的紧迫感，看着大家在拼命演逃生，心里的感觉却是一声cut ，他们随时站起来披浴巾就上岸了。

唯一能让我留印象的是金城武的大嫂，据说是吴宇森导演的女儿，演得真实。我敬佩吴宇森导演的勇气，他的电影也不乏人性佳作，但这一次，真的无悲无喜，即使没有3D，即使没有分上下集，这依然是部目光远大但无法体现的鸡肋之作。

这篇剧评可能有剧透 最解气的几个场景应该是渣男带penny见父母，一场“相谈甚欢”后趁着penny去卫生间补妆的间隙，爸爸说NO，这个女孩不行，妈妈紧接着也说NO，她不行。还有渣男跟女主之前共同的好友，为了避免跟渣男和penny一起看演出，找尽各种理由。再有就是渣男回去求复合的时候女主决绝的“NO...  (展开)

这篇影评可能有剧透 想想看，人生中的很多时刻就是如此遗憾。明明下一秒会哭出来，可还是收住眼泪，努力微笑。 但很多年过去了，想起当年的遗憾，却像早晨反射着阳光的露水，一颗颗闪着光，缓缓蒸发。我们对永恒的奢望，本质上便如此忧伤吧。 当你成长，开始渐渐感到疲倦，也许有一天，你看着熙熙...  (展开)

这篇影评可能有剧透 凯特是一个九岁的安静少女。 虽然家里姊妹众多，但她话很少，性格有些孤僻，常常一个人躺在草地里，导致家人得到处找她。虽然已经九岁了，但她还会尿床，学习上也有些困难，跟同学相比有一定差距。她在学校里似乎也没有什么好朋友，甚至还被姐姐的同学叫做怪胎，而她会默默忍受...  (展开)

既然是“翻身”，这样的人生大概总也离不开荒唐的岁月了吧，这就是一杯茶，香醇、甘冽、苦涩……茶汤都是你的。


看上去艺术影院尚且保留了足本，没有《猩球崛起》被“掐断”的的突兀。毒品、粗口，国父孙中山的画像和含有“中华民国”旗帜、徽章、对白都保留了下来。

在预热《翻滚吧，阿信！》的国内影展上，导演林育贤说，大陆影片不感人。这部台湾青春片保留了监制人李烈《艋舺》式的热血，而导演林育贤则将2005年剧情式纪录片《翻滚吧！男孩》变成了真正的剧情片：80年代的台北县城，少年的梦想、成长的曲折之痛、兄弟情义、纯洁而青涩的爱情、剪不断理还乱的小镇黑道、不甚完美的父母亲情、迷茫的青春泪水，乃至轻轻点点的钢琴曲、田野的风景，这些都组成了台湾青春片的淡雅元素。而正是这样一部平淡如水的影片，让人尝到了温盐水的味道。

《翻滚吧，阿信！》摆脱了纪录片风格，在平铺直叙之外使用了插叙、倒叙，让本来可以以时间轴线顺序交代的故事有了更多跌宕起伏和情感变化，这跟《艋舺》的正在进行时的主线略有不同。用回忆体去讲述80年代发生在平静乡村的不为人知的体操冠军的故事，听上去有些主旋律？没错，青春热血励志片就点出了励志的元素。不知道是不是要一改往日的衰颓之风，在自然风当中寻找一些积极力量。就当下台湾电视选秀传达的印象来说，以（练体操的）梦想作为整部戏的情感推动，更显得俗套了一些。但老套也有老套的好处，每个人都有梦想，片子的回忆体更带有人生、成长的视角，每个人都能理解。虽然这种体操梦的萌生、成长在整部影片交代得那么清淡：爷爷捧场的戏班子、体育系的旁观生、混社会时体操风格的武术和舞蹈、哭泣时的体操倒立……这也许就是“少年之梦”对人的影响，潜移默化在生活中，没有突发的情感却始终没有离开。

在荒唐岁月里，混沌少年依然没有彻底离开体操。

对少年来说，梦想只是纤绳，而对于人生来说，梦想已然内化成生活习惯。就像日本动画《灌篮高手》里的三井寿，浪子回头只因希望重新回到自己的轨道上。其实阿信并不是十足的混混，只是偶然性和不能选择强加在少年的心头。荒唐岁月里，人生向上之火从未熄灭。街头打斗、勾心斗角、市侩流氓、人生苦旅都未曾沾染过少年之梦，所以能保留持久。阿信对大佬说，之所以他不怕死，是因为他想“翻身”。故事的结局是一个完美的后空翻，只是多少人能在荒唐过后，像阿信、三井寿那样喊出埋藏在自己身体里的声音。这声音可是是我想练体操、我想打篮球，也可以是我想学英语专业、我想上北外、上外，我想要一所不被hr秒杀的北大毕业证……可以是正常的过完高中，可以是一如16岁那样阳光、健康、单纯、乐天、开朗。

“翻身”的后空翻，阿信翻得很曲折，也很辛苦，这时间可能有好多年，有母亲的不理解、抱怨，有成长之痛、友谊之殇、皮肉之苦、心灵落寞，却也有爱情滋润、长辈关怀。阿信不为名、不为利、不为父母……不为他人左右，甚至不为人生左右，他做了自己想做的事情。他做得很棒。你也可以。我也是。就像是一片儿茶叶在水中的起伏，茶汤当中必然包含了高潮和低谷，“翻身”的人生大概总也离不开荒唐的岁月了，这就是一杯茶，香醇甘冽苦涩都是你的。

在这家艺术影院，剧情片终于还是像优酷上写的那样成为喜剧片。同行的电影爱好者们笑点很低。可我还是看哭了。艺术影院可能还需要一些气氛，比如三层的洗手间小便池临时盖上了黑塑料袋，还有不够洁净的盥洗盆，还有味道，显得影院只顾脸面不顾实用，一层电梯前摆放了电动自行车，还有略显空洞的一层货架。国内第一家艺术影院，总该鼓励一下。库布里克书店不错，终于找到了适合放置《生活月刊》的书店，值得高兴的一件事儿。

 

看过原著封神榜一直都希望能有一部真正展现原著宏大故事的剧出来
but一直很失望
这部剧为了给姜子牙找个伴 硬生生把他年轻并且老婆一直陪到最后一集
人物出的也不全
三妖和申公豹感觉戏份比主角还要多
侯爷演技太夸张了
纣王那妆
玉妖那衣服
经常单打独斗
妖怪说的最多的 下次一定要他好看
姜子牙们说的最多的 别追了
二妖说的最多的 大姐我们接下来该怎么办
槽点太多 但是剧就是剧 纯属娱乐嘛 何必太较真

这篇影评可能有剧透 浑浑噩噩终于熬到晚八下班，无聊的刷了会儿海战，入睡前看完了第1959部电影《走火交易》，一部一个女人和十二个男人躺在地上尬射一小时的美国枪战片……这部电影的全部篇幅，讲述的其实就是一场很简单的军火贩子、中间人和爱尔兰黑帮之间黑吃黑吃黑的军火交易，之所以走火，完...  (展开)

看《决战刹马镇》，想着算打发时间也好，可结果，长达百分钟的时间，我被无数次的KO，估计表情跟那想和林志林生孩子的哥有的一比，哎，我该有多恨自己才会这样啊！

老实的说，个人曾对沙漠产生过莫名的情结，觉着与世隔绝的沙漠就仿佛陶渊明笔下的桃花源，让人神往。至于此情结的始作俑者，已是分不清，有可能是被自己浸淫多年的武侠小说，也有可能是王家卫的那部《东邪西毒》，也有可能是有生之年还未见过大漠而生出的一丝怨念。不过，这些都无关紧要，重要的是这个情结让我对有关沙漠的电影都有拜读的冲动。然而，《决战刹马镇》好似马戏团进了桃花源，雷囧的情节让我又回到了去年看《刺陵》的时光，也让我再次有了问候导演他老母的冲动。

是的，看《决战刹马镇》的感觉就好像桃花源来了马戏团，小丑们忘情的、卖力的装丑，装逼，演完了土匪胡栓子，再演夺宝奇兵，最后在一场华丽丽的西红柿大战里，愣是把一个鸟不拉屎的地方砸成了印象之地，成了塞外的“乌托邦”。这马戏团之于桃花源，可真谓是天“神”下凡啊。套用唐村长的口头禅来感慨一下，去你娘了个腿的。

必须抛却剧本不说。加上‘必须’二字，实在是不得已之举。恨铁能成钢的怨念让我无法蛋定。也许是我眼拙，未能看出编剧是想弄一个闹剧版的山寨夺宝奇兵，只看出一群小丑们在较劲着谁智商更低一些。尤其是那伙被称国际大盗的，他们的可耻行径简直侮辱了大盗二字，感觉就像是从另一个刹马镇过来的俏民。

最可恨的是，那宝物找的也太TMD的简单了吧，而且宝物也太TMD的寒碜了吧，那颗不知是陨石，还是钻石，还是夜明珠的东东，真有一种让人将其拍成齑粉的冲动，就像苏察哈尔灿一掌拍碎王爷的珍珠一样。然后送一句：去你娘了个腿的。

当然，看这电影，还有一点冲动是留给林志玲的。虽然最初看到海报时，那造型，那气势，那菜刀，那眼神……我差点被雷的外焦里嫩，不知所云，顿时想起了一首词句：遥想刹马镇当年，小乔初毁了，使我不得开心颜。

可如此，我就想着，敢情志玲姐要转路线了，吾常闻，大都拌丑的不是都能顺利转路线吗？然而，看完电影，我才知道，志玲姐的精华全在那海报上，电影里有她没她都一样。倒是那位一直摆着囧字脸的二兄太给力了，那要掉未掉的裤子，那支红玫瑰，那句喜欢她，要和她生孩子，连志玲姐都笑了。

影片也不能说一无是处，起码孙红雷大哥的表演还是没话说的，没有之一。唐村长演的很超现实，完全点到了刹马镇的睛，很灵魂。只是，刹马镇的太过超现实，把所有人的魂儿都给带走了，完全找不着北。也许，唐村长的那句口头禅也并不是没有原因的。

这篇剧评可能有剧透 我喜欢周思行。 这个剧很短，每集也就5分多钟。糖度很够，但归为甜宠剧又有那么一丝不和谐。整个剧讲的就是一个刚入社会的男生，遇到了他高中时暗恋的女老师，得偿所愿和女老师谈恋爱，或者说偷偷地下情谈恋爱。 这个剧的男演员，第一次演戏表现的不错。凭借出色的外形条件，让...  (展开)

这篇影评可能有剧透 《我的冤家是条狗》一听名字就非常中国风 谁能想到，这竟然是英国人拍的电影。对于年人均读书数37本书的国家，这个电影的编剧和导演真的是。。。不说啦 原来这部电影上映了，原名叫《Patrick》，也就是小狗的名字，被中国发行商改的真是！中国村土气息十足！不亏是人均读书量0....  (展开)

藏文珠穆朗玛就是“大地之母”的意思，英文称Mount Everest。最近一次高度测量是在2005年，历时2个月，由中国国家测绘局测定，高度为8844.43米。也有其他几种高度的说法，差别均为几米。

　　●1921年，第一支英国登山队在查尔斯·霍华德·伯里中校的率领下开始攀登珠穆朗玛峰，到达海拔7000米处。
　　●1922年，第二支英国登山队是用供氧装置到达海拔8320米处。
　　●1924年，第三支英国登山队攀登珠穆朗玛峰时，乔治·马洛里和安德鲁·欧文在使用供氧装置登顶过程中失踪。马洛里的遗体于1999年在海拔8150米处被发现，而他随身携带的照相机失踪，故无法确定他和欧文是否是登顶成功的世界第一人。

　　★1953年5月29日，来自新西兰的34岁英国登山队队员艾德蒙·希拉里与39岁的尼泊尔向导丹增·诺盖一起沿南坡登上珠穆朗玛峰，是纪录上第一个登顶成功的登山队伍。

　　●1956年，以阿伯特·艾格勒为首的瑞士登山队在人类历史上第二次登上珠穆朗玛峰。（有准确记录以来）
　　●1960年5月25日，中国人首次登上珠穆朗玛峰，分别为王富洲、贡布、屈银华，此次攀登也是首次从北坡攀登成功。
　　●1963年，以诺曼·迪伦弗斯为首的美国探险队首次从西坡登顶成功。
　　●1975年5月16日，日本人田部井淳子成为世界上首位从南坡登上珠穆朗玛峰的女性。
　　●1975年5月27日，中国登山队第二次攀登珠峰，九名队员登顶，其中藏族队员潘多成为世界上第一位从北坡登顶成功的女性。
　　●1978年，奥地利人彼得·哈贝尔和意大利人莱茵霍尔德·梅斯纳尔首次未带氧气瓶登顶成功。
　　●1980年，波兰登山家克日什托夫·维里克斯基第一次在冬天攀登珠穆朗玛峰成功。
　　●1988年，中国、日本、尼泊尔三国联合登山队首次从南北两侧双跨珠穆朗玛峰成功。
　　●1992年，湛易佳成为首位登顶的香港人。
　　●1993年，参与两岸联合珠穆朗玛远征队，吴锦雄成为首位登顶的台湾人。
　　●1994年，台湾登山家拾方方（本名：石方芳）于5月8日17：38登上珠峰，但在下撤途中遇上暴风雪而失踪。拾方方为第二位登顶的台湾人，首位在珠峰登顶中过世的台湾登山家。
　　●1995年，台湾登山家江秀真与陈国钧联手登顶成功，江秀真成为第一位登顶的台湾女性登山家。

　　★1996年，包括著名登山家罗布·哈尔和史考特·费雪在内的15名登山者在登顶过程中牺牲，是史上攀登珠穆朗玛峰牺牲人数第三多的一年。美国“户外”杂志记者强·克拉库尔幸运逃过一劫，将亲身经历写成《巅峰》（Into Thin Air）一书。台湾登山家高铭和死里逃生，写下《九死一生》一书。此事件被改编成2015年电影《珠穆朗玛峰》，片中也有稍微提及台湾登山团的故事。

　　●1998年，美国人汤姆·惠特克成为世界上第一个攀登珠穆朗玛峰成功登顶的残障人士。
　　●2000年，尼泊尔著名登山家巴布·奇里从大本营出发由北坡攀登，耗时16小时56分登顶成功，创造了登顶的最快纪录。
　　●2001年，美国人维亨迈尔成为世界上首个登上珠穆朗玛峰的盲人。
　　●2003年，纪念人类首次成功攀登珠穆朗玛峰50周年。
　　●2005年，中国第四次珠峰地区综合科考高度测量登山队成功攀登珠峰并测量珠峰高度数据。
　　●2006年5月，19岁的英国探险家James Hooper和Rob Gauntlett从北侧成功攀上山峰，并成为全英国最年轻的珠穆朗玛峰登顶者。
　　●2007年，尼泊尔观光部指出，美国19岁少女“珊曼莎·拉森”是最年轻的成功登顶外国女性。
　　●2008年5月8日，北京奥运圣火珠峰登山队的队员抵达珠穆朗玛峰峰顶，并燃点起祥云火炬，进行约200米的火炬传送。
　　●2009年，台湾人江秀真成为首位从南、北两侧均成功攀登珠穆朗玛峰的女性。
　　●2009年5月22，台湾人李小石背著妈祖神像登顶成功。
　　●2010年5月18日，台湾人林永富以57岁之龄从北侧成功登上珠穆朗玛峰，为目前台湾成功登顶珠峰年龄最年长的攻顶者。
　　●2010年5月22日，英国人普伊（Lewis Gordon Pugh）在珠穆朗玛峰上的冰湖里游动一公里，费时22分51秒，成为珠峰长泳的第一人。
　　●2010年5月22日，来自美国加州13岁少年乔丹·罗麦罗从北侧成功登上珠穆朗玛峰，成为世界最年轻登上珠穆朗玛峰者。
　　●2012年5月19日，来自日本山梨县的73岁女登山家渡边玉枝于当地时间上午7时成功登上珠穆朗玛峰，成为年龄最高的女性登顶者。
　　●2012年5月19日，中国地质大学登山队4名队员德庆欧珠、次仁旦达、陈晨和董范于8时16分从北坡成功登上珠穆朗玛峰顶峰，成为中国第一支登上珠穆朗玛峰的大学登山队。其中德庆欧珠、次仁旦达、陈晨均为中国地质大学（武汉）在校大学生。
　　●2013年5月19日，香港攀山家曾志成第二度成功登峰，由西藏取道北坡上珠峰，是首位港人完成由南、北两坡登珠峰壮举。
　　●2013年5月23日，日本登山家三浦雄一郎于80岁时，第三度登上珠穆朗玛峰，成为最年长的登顶者。刷新尼泊尔登山家于2008年以76岁攻顶成功的纪录。
　　●2014年4月18日，雪崩造成15人丧生，为人类于1950年代首次登顶珠峰以来，所发生死亡人数第二多的事故。
　　●2015年4月25日，尼泊尔地震导致18人遇难，百余人受伤或失踪，再度打破2014年登山山难纪录，惟此次事故主因为地震。

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　　◆攀爬珠穆朗玛峰必须遵守“两点钟规则”，即攻顶时间一定要在下午两点前完成，不然就必须回头。

　　◆截至2012年，大约有235人丧生在攀登珠峰途中。大多数丧生者死亡在8000米以上高度，雪崩和意外滑落是两个最大原因。

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　　资料来源：维基百科

刚看完电影，没太看懂，上豆瓣看看大家怎么评论，深受启发； 1.我认为小小乔，隐指女主的事业。这份工作听上去高大上，但是是违法道德的。它的盛开让周围的生物死亡。女主开始时并没有想到，但它腾空出世，就无法阻止它的杀伤力，和诱惑。也许是毒品，武器，教义。。。。 2.她...  (展开)

看这部剧是因为男票推荐过这本小说，百度的时候刚好看到电视剧就看了，我没看过原著，所以就是单纯地评论电视剧，感觉还是可以的，看到好多差评的，几乎都是因为看了原著在看电视剧，还有说结尾不好的，其实单纯的就论结尾来说，它的结尾就是周影这个影魅死了，例如，孙倩眼睛复明的时候说她再也见不到她爱的人了，到最后的画面周影也没出现，可以说明他已经死了，但是却给了你一种周影还没死，这部剧还没完的感觉，结尾留白给人想象的空间这一点，用的很成功

再一个，这部剧我感觉有点像灵魂摆渡，叙事的手法上来讲与灵魂摆渡类似，不过毕竟都是爱奇艺自制剧，像也无可厚非。这部剧到最后我只看到了它讲述的自由是相对的，没有绝对的。

再有，毕方称刘地为地狗明显要比称他为地狼显得毕方可爱，或许你们会说这是幼稚，但是明显的说过毕方还小，它还是只神兽，这点小傲娇显得它很可爱、俏皮。

最为全篇反转最大的人物，严医生的转变让我感觉非常惊艳。从最开始阔少身边的小帮手，阔少女朋友小雅的地下情人，到最终暴露身份，竟是小雅的杀父仇人，他的故事比女主小雅更动人 严医生第一次出场是时候恰逢李家老爷中邪身亡，作为一个存在感不强的小医生，没有人会把他和李老...  (展开)

说起奇门遁甲，我们便可想到传统文化。奇门遁甲之术始于较早的三皇五帝时期。标志性的事情应该是皇帝大战蚩尤时造指南车，指南车的制造原理跟奇门遁甲有异曲同工之妙。我们渴望优秀传统文化的回归，我们对奇门遁甲文化的回归自然也是喜闻乐见的。那前段时间电影院放映的奇门遁...  (展开)

一、多个时空


《纯粹理性批判》中的第一经验类比（Analogies of Experience）要求在现象中有一个恒定且唯一之物来表象意识中的时间本身。恒定，或永恒，因为作为总体的时间本身是始终在那的；惟一，因为只有一个时间。这个惟一且永恒的东西，即现象中的实体（Substance）。康德明确把这个实体与洛克的托子（Substratum）区分开来，认为实体是以各种方式显现于人的，而不是像托子那样不可知，也不显现。

我要说，洛克的托子的作用是保证物的个体化与同一性。这个作用在康德那儿，似乎是由物自体和先验范畴共同完成。先验范畴组织现象，在使意识对现象的认识成为可能的同时，也使同一的意识本身成为可能——对先验对象的构成即对自我的构成。而物自体在这个过程中究竟如何起作用，不详。康德的物自体与洛克的托子一样，是个让理论显得尴尬，却又不得不进行的假设。

尽管康德反复说现象中的实体不是洛克的托子，但这个实体究竟是什么，他又语焉不详。出于他对牛顿力学的接受，有人尝试将其理解为牛顿意义上的质量。我论证过，这样的解读将面临一个两难困境：如果实体是个体化了的质量，时间便不是惟一的；如果实体是现象世界中的总质量，基于二律背反的理由——这个总体无法成为经验对象——我们便无法经验到它。（详细论述见篇末附录）

若是跳出康德阐释，取前一个困境：时间不是惟一的，每个作为现象的物都意味着一个独立的时间体系，我们就科幻了：空间中的一个一个的物，奠基着意识中的一个又一个时间系，我们可以生活在不同的时空中，当我们经验不同的物。甚至，对应地说，我们总在成为另一个人，当我们来到不同的时空。

于是，我情愿把亨利的生活看作对康德的一次失败却有趣的解读。与其说他是一位时间旅行者，一位不停地穿越时空的超人或可怜人，不如说，他的意识中并没有一个绝对惟一的时间，他所来到并离开的每一个时空，都是一个独立自在的世界，尽管这些世界看上去很像，但哪个都不依赖于另一个——从理念的意义上说。


二、沉默，或消失


影片的前半部分，亨利的突然消失被解释为一种不治的遗传疾病。没有理由地，他时不时就去了另一个时空，赤身裸体地寻找可以穿上的衣服。仿佛常人来到一个新的环境，总是迫不及待地寻找一个身份，穿到自己身上。
亨利总会在一个无从预料的时刻消失，克莱尔生活在一个不确定的世界中。她的爱情是确定的，但她爱的人不确定地存在着。她的生活中弥漫着不确定性，而这恰好让她格外珍惜亨利在她身边的每一分钟。

克莱尔一次次怀孕又一次次流产，因为胎儿也有穿越症，莫名其妙地，便在某个时刻，出离了子宫。但克莱尔最后一次怀孕时，对亨利说，你每次消失都是因为感觉到了压力。所以，从现在开始，我要保持绝对地平静，这样胎儿就可以顺利出生了。
看到这里，我恍然大悟，原来亨利的穿越症是个隐喻，关于男人的隐喻：面对压力，便会沉默与回避，这不正是男人的本能反应么——而这在女人看来，仿佛爱人去了另一个时空，不知何时才能回来，甚至，会不会回来。

我查了查，电影改编自一位女造型艺术家的首部小说，写于一段失败的恋情之后。原来如此。

很多年前听到过一个说法：爱情，对男人来说，是挂在墙上的一幅画，你并不总是去看它；但对女人来说，则是房间里音乐，你想不听都不行。所以，男人需要时不时地呆在纯然属于自我的世界里，在沉默中成为自己。女人却要认为这是对她的疏远、对亲密的疏离，并因此而坐立不安，想方设法闯进那份铁一般的沉默。结果，要么把自己撞疼，要么把爱情撞碎。
这是对小儿女情态的描述。若成年点，便会更同情于另一个说法：人生在世，无非是男人讨慰藉，女人讨生活。人并不总是需要慰藉，尤其在得意之时。人却总在生活，就算你不想。


三、看着，却无法改变


在一次穿越中，亨利来到母亲身边，在地铁里，母亲在看报，他们作为陌生人简短却亲切的交谈了一会儿。亨利告诉母亲，他要结婚了，这个女孩让他感到安全。
克莱尔问他：你什么不去阻止那场车祸，既然你可以回到车祸发生之前。“我无法阻止。无数次我回到过去，回到母亲还在的时候，但每次我都无法改变发生着的一切。”——这话让人特别难过。我们并不能改变过去，就像不能重新雕刻一座已然完成的塑像。

不是么？很多时候，我们从自己当下的境遇中抽身而出，试图站在一个更开阔的角度，超脱地看现在的纠结、焦虑，或苦闷，并自嘲这些都没什么的。但当你身在当下，你知道未来的自己就坐在对面，笑着，看着自己，慈悲地。但你还是无法因此脱身而出。你仍然只能呆在你当下的处境中，无论是过分的快乐，还是仿佛无法挣脱的哀伤。

每一个时刻都是三维的，它包含着过去、现在，和未来这三个维度。我们在回忆中编辑时间，编辑自己，有意无意地遗忘一些，并把另一些反复摩挲。过往明明灭灭，像晴天里，随风晃动的百叶窗投在墙上的影子。每次回忆之后，我们都成为另一个人。
未来也是。未来无数次作为想象呈现于当下，各式各样地，仿佛清晰的回忆。回忆与憧憬，如同天平的两臂，对称着，平衡着，在现在这个支点上。所以，现在这个时刻，最重。


四、期限


有天聚会时，亨利中枪后痛苦挣扎的裸体突然出现在他们的门厅里。又消失了。克莱尔说，我从没见过四十岁之后的你。我见过的你总是很年轻。从这个时候起，死亡就成了他们中的另一个在场者，尽管它总是沉默着。

亨利穿越到未来，遇见了自己的已经十岁的女儿。女儿告诉他，他死于自己五岁那年。她们一直很想念他。那时他们的女儿还没出生。那时克莱尔还一如既往地希望与亨利白头偕老，就像她还没长大时那样，就像她长大之后第一次遇到亨利时那样，就像亨利死后，她仍然留着亨利所有的衣服，等着亨利回来那样。

于她而言，亨利是不会死的。他无非是走远了一下子回不来，他无非是在时空中迷了路，找不到一件让他温暖的衣服。

女儿五岁那年，亨利和克莱尔都已知道，亨利即将死去，中弹而死。期限降至，可能在任何一天，任何一个时刻。在它到来之前，所有相聚的时光都是铭刻，都是用最日常的方式来进行的一次祭奠，一次追忆。当这个期限还不确定，他们相爱着，仿佛一对最平凡的恋人；当这个期限已然确定，他们相爱着，装作不知道他们即将分离。

一个期限并不见得让期限到来之前的一切都显得美好。但，美好的东西都有一个期限。确定的期限，或不确定的期限。你不能试图挽留，那会犹如握紧手中的细沙，握得越紧，便流失得越快，宛如时间，从指缝间悄然流走。
这个期限是否到来，何时到来，都不是你能选择的。你能做的，仅仅是在它到来之前的每一刻，不让自己在未来后悔——克莱尔明白这些，并且，她做到了。

而，这不正是人生么。


——————
附录：On Understanding Substance as Mass

Introduction

In the First Analogy of Experience, Kant argues that there must be some permanently persistent substance in the appearances which represents the persistence of time. Given Kant’s endorsement of Newtonian physics, commentators such as Eric Watkins suggest that such permanently persistent substance can be understood as Newtonian mass. In this paper, however, I argue that we face a dilemma when we try to cash out the notion of substance in terms of Newtonian mass.
The paper proceeds in three steps. In the first section, I present the reason why there needs to be a permanently persistent substance in the appearances, and discuss why it seems to be compelling to conceive of the permanently persistent substance as Newtonian Mass. Then, in the second section, I argue that there are (only) two ways of conceiving of the permanently persistent substance as Newtonian mass, namely, to conceive of substance as individuated mass and to conceive of substance as the sum total of mass in the world of appearances. I show that there are textual indications as well as philosophical reasons to support each option. In the third section, however, I argue that both ways suffer from inescapable problems. Thus, conceiving of the permanently persistent substance in terms of Newtonian mass is not viable.

    
Section I. The Permanently Persistent Substance

In this section, I shall first present the reason why Kant thinks that there must be a permanently persistent substance in the appearances. I then discuss why it is compelling to conceive of such substance as Newtonian mass.
In the chapter “System of all principles of pure understanding,” Kant discusses what makes possible the applications of the categories, i.e. the pure concepts of understanding, to objects, i.e. appearances that are given to sensible intuitions. That is, he discusses what it is that makes the categories have objective validity. Kant’s claim is that the applications of the categories are only possible under certain conditions, and these conditions are spelled out by the principles. For instance, the applications of the relational categories (substance-accidents, cause and effect, and mutual interactions) are possible if they are applied to objects according to the principles of Analogies of Experience. In addition to the three specific principles that correspond to each of the three relational categories, Kant also provides a general principle overarching all three Analogies. The general principle is stated in the second edition as follows: “Experience is possible only through the representations of a necessary connection of perceptions” (B 218). Watkins provides a helpful interpretation of this general principle:
“The general idea is that each of the three relational categories represents a necessary connection that is required for experience of a single time and of objects existing and being temporally related to each other within a single time to be possible.” (My emphasis)
Since this paper is focused on the notion of substance in the first Analogy, I shall ignore the second and third Analogies. So I now turn to a close examination of the first Analogy.
The first Analogy, i.e. the principle of the persistence of substance, is stated in the second edition as follows: “In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.” (B 224) Watkins summarizes Kant’s argument for the first Analogy as follows (which I take to be a correct interpretation):
Premise 1: Appearances, i.e. objects of experience, are made possible by time’s persistence.
Premise 2: We do not perceive time itself.
Therefore, In order to have experience of appearances, there must be some permanent substance in the appearances which can represent time or time’s persistence.
While the appearances, as the objects given to our intuitions, are changing, the substance in appearances always stays the same and is permanent. So, Kant calls the permanent substance “the substratum of everything real” (B 225). But, some clarifications about Kant’s use of the term “substratum” are needed to prevent potential confusions. Substratum in Kant’s text does not mean what Locke uses this term to mean, namely, the bearer of properties which is unchanging and about which we can have no knowledge. For, according to Locke, we can only know what is given to our senses, but since the underlying substratum cannot be given to our senses, we have no access to it and therefore cannot know it.
Kant, by constrast, does not think that there is any Lockean substratum in the world of appearances. For Kant, the fact that the states of the substance are changing and the substance stays the same does not mean the states are separable from the substance. Rather, the changing states of the substance are simply the ways in which the substance is given to us. Thus, we can know the substance, that is, we know the substance through its states. In order to avoid the Lockean implication of the term “substratum,” I shall only use “substance” to refer to the permanently persistent thing in the appearances despite Kant’s own use of “substratum” to talk about what is permanent in the appearances.
Since I have argued that Kant’s notion of substance is not the Lockean substratum, then what is the Kantian notion of substance? We need a positive account of what the substance is. It is obvious that such a permanently persistent thing cannot be captured by ordinary physical objects, no matter whether they are natural objects (say, rocks) or artifacts (say, ships), for neither artifacts nor natural objects always stay the same such that in principle they can never suffer changes. So, it seems no ordinarily construed physical things can be qualified as substance that is permanently persistent. On the other hand, it is very hard to imagine that anything non-physical could play the role the substance is supposed to play. For it is hard to imagine how a non-physical being could be given to our sensible intuition or could be spatiotemporally organized by our a priori intuitions. So, it is unlikely that Kant means something non-physical by “substance.” Thus, there are two constraints on spelling out what substance is. First, it is something physical. Second, as I have shown, the physical being that can be understood as substance cannot be ordinarily individuated physical things such as planet or rock.
In order to meet the above two conditions, Watkins suggests that, given Kant’s commitment to Newtonian science, it is likely that Kant has Newtonian mass in mind when he talks about the substance, since no matter how a physical object changes, its mass always stays the same. Since Newtonian mass is physical and is not an ordinarily individuated object, it seems quite compelling that the substance, which is permanently persistent, just is Newtonian mass. According to common sense, Newtonian mass is understood to be underlying objects such that we cannot directly perceive mass but can only perceive mass through the way it is given to our intuition, namely, through the perception of the objects that have mass. Thus, mass is neither unknowable nor directly perceivable, which seems to fit the description of the substance perfectly.
Moreover, there are many textual indications that suggest the identification of substance with mass. Let me note two examples. First, recall the general principle overarching the three specific Analogies, namely, “In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.” (B 224) It seems that “quantum” is most naturally to be understood as mass, for mass seems to be the only thing in nature that is neither increased nor diminished on Newtonian physics.
The other indication is Kant’s example to illustrate his claim that “he <a philosopher> thus assumed that as incontrovertible that even in fire the matter (substance) never disappears but rather only suffers an alteration in its form.” (B 288, my emphasis):
“A philosopher was asked: How much does the smoke weigh? He replied: If you take away from the weight of the wood that was burnt the weight of the ashes that are left over, you will have the weight of the smoke.” (B 288)
We can see that here Kant explicitly identifies substance with matter. And it is quite plausible to think that “matter” is just another way of saying “mass”. That is, “mass” seems to be the theoretical analog of the term “matter.” This hypothesis is supported by the example of the weight of smoke. For, in the example, the way to calculate the weight of smoke just is to calculate the mass (multiplies the gravitational constant).
However, despite the compelling reasons for the identification of substance with mass, in the next sections, I shall argue that the substance cannot be understood as Newtonian mass, for when we try to work out the details of understanding the substance as mass, we face an unavoidable dilemma.


Section II. Some Mass or the Sum Total of Mass

In this section, I shall argue that there are two ways of conceiving of substance as Newtonian mass, and then show that both ways have some support from the text and are to some extent philosophically plausible. So, both ways deserve detailed considerations. But, in the next section, I shall argue that both ways face insurmountable problems.
In identifying substance with mass, we need to settle an ambiguity: Is the mass meant to be some mass, say the mass of a rock which is 7 kilograms (a randomly chosen weight), or to be the sum total of mass in the world of appearances which is a very large but nonetheless definite amount? Since both some mass and the sum total of mass are permanently persistent, we cannot tell which way of identifying is more plausible with respect to the permanent persistence of substance. So, we must appeal to some other philosophically and/or textually interesting points to ground a preference in choosing one over the other.
Let us first consider identifying the substance with some or individuated mass. First, the first Analogy is the principle according to which the relational category substance-accident is to be applied. Kant defines accidents to be “the determinations of a substance that are nothing other than particular ways for it to exist.”(B 229) Many commentators interpret the relation to be between object and its properties or states. Thus it makes more sense to think that the mass, which is the underlying bearer of properties, is the individuated mass of some object, instead of the sum total of mass in the world of appearances. For instance, in the example of the weight of smoke, Kant seems to conceive of substance as the matter, i.e. mass, of an individual object. Moreover, if we conceive of substance as the sum total of mass in the world of appearances, it is very hard to imagine how substance can be the bearer of properties or what kind of properties of which substance is the bearer.
One might argue that, on the interpretation according to which substance is the sum total of mass, even though we could imagine no properties of which substance is the bearer, we can still conceive of substance as the bearer of (changing) states, i.e. the successive states of the world of appearances. I reply that Kant cannot accept such an idea because the states of the world are not objects of possible experience, for it is at least empirically true that no one could have the whole world of appearances as his object of experience. I will return to this point later on in the paper and use it to argue that conceiving of substance as the sum total of mass is untenable given Kant’s theoretic commitments.
The above discussion is about reasons to prefer the identification of substance with some mass. I now turn to the reasons to prefer the identifications of substance with the sum total of mass. There are some textual evidences in the first Analogy that suggest this latter identification. For instance, the following passage:
“…here the issue is only appearances in the field of experience, the unity of which would never be possible if we were to allow new things (as far as their substance is concerned) to arise. For then everything would disappear that alone can represent the unity of time, namely the identity of the substratum in which alone all change has its thoroughgoing unity. This persistence is therefore nothing more than the way in which we represent the existence of things (in appearances).” (B 229/A186, my emphasis)
In this passage, Kant seems to identify the permanent persistent substance that represents the persistence of time with the unity of appearances, which seems to be the sum total of mass in the whole world of appearances. Let me argue for my understanding of this passage that it indicates that Kant identifies substance with the sum total of mass. I shall argue by reductio: Suppose Kant identified substance with individuated mass in the above passage. Then, it would make no sense to think that the arising of new substance could make the representation of the unity of time impossible. For the arising of new substance in no sense affects the substance, i.e. the mass, of the original objects. Let me use an example to illustrate. Suppose there is a rock whose mass is 7 kilograms and there arises a new object out of nothing, whose mass is 5 kilograms. Insofar as the rock’s mass remains the same, whether or not there are new masses arising out of nothing does not affect the unity of the rock’s mass, which is 7 kilograms. Therefore, in this passage, Kant conceives of substance as the sum total of mass in the whole world of appearances.
So far I have shown that there are compelling reasons to identify substance with some mass or with the sum total of mass respectively. In the next section, I shall argue that there are also devastating reasons to each identification such that either way we go, we face unsolvable problems.


Section III. One Single Time and the Limit of Possible Experience

I now turn to the problems from which the each identification suffers. In this section, I shall argue that these problems make both identifications untenable. Let us first consider the identification of substance with individuated mass (i.e. some mass). I argue that the reason why individuated mass cannot be identified with substance is that individuated mass cannot represent the oneness of time. Recall Kant’s argument for the principle of the first Analogy: in order to have experiences of objects as temporal, we must identify a permanently persistent substance that can represent time in objects. While the states of the substance change, the substance persists so that the substance can represent time that persists. It is important to notice that time, which is supposed to be represented by substance in appearances, is one single time. But, individuated mass cannot represent one single time. For there are many individuated masses, for instance, the mass of a rock which is 7 kilograms, the mass of a cup which is 0.5 kilogram, and the mass of a table which is 3 kilograms, each of which is permanently persistent and undergoes changes. If one of them can represent time, any other also can. In that case, we do not have one single time. Rather, we have many times or time-series, each of which is persistent.
Let me explain in details why multiply individuated masses cannot represent on single time. If these individuated masses can represent one single time, there must be some one single thing that is shared by these individuated masses that serves to represent the singularity of time. Whatever this shared thing is, it is not any of these individuated masses. Therefore, individuated mass cannot present one single time. However, on the other hand, time has be to singular. Here is a passage in the first Analogy which explains why time has to be one single time rather than a plurality of times:
“Substances (in appearances) are the substrata of all time-determinations. The arising of some of them and the perishing of others would itself remove the sole condition of the empirical unity of time, and the appearances would then be related to two different times, in which existence flowed side by side, which is absurd. For there is only one time, in which all different times must not be placed simultaneously but only one after another.” (B 232/A189)
One might argue that it does not matter how many individuated masses can represent time, it only matters that there is an individuated mass that represents time. Insofar as there is such a substance, which is permanently persistent, it suffices to represent one single time. I reply that, in that case, we still do not know which individuated mass is suppose to be the representer of the one single time in appearances. For there is not reason to think that the mass of one object is more suitable to represent time than the mass of another object is, insofar as both of the individuated masses are permanently persistent. Any choice of one over the other is arbitrary. But the unity or singularity of time is not arbitrary, for there can only be one time-series which persists, and any other time-series or temporal relations are just temporal parts of this unique time-series. Thus, I conclude that individuated mass cannot be the representer of time in appearances.
I now turn to argue that the sum total of mass cannot represent time either. The idea of my argument is to make use of Kant’s solution to the Antinomies to show that the permanently persistent substance that represents time in the appearances cannot be the sum total of mass because the sum total of mass is not an object of possible experience. Let me lay out my argument in detail.
In “The Antinomy of Pure Reason” chapter, Kant presents four pairs of arguments concerning four cosmological ideas about the world-whole, namely, whether there is a beginning of time, whether there is indivisibly simple substance, whether there is a first cause, and whether there is a necessary existent. As Allen W. Wood argues, the four antinomies share a general form, namely, the thesis of each antinomy claims that there must be a first member of the conditioning-conditioned chain, while the antithesis of each antinomy claims that there is no first member of such a chain and that the chain goes back into infinity. Kant argues that there are valid arguments for each of the four theses as well as valid arguments for each of the four antitheses, so we need a solution to such contradictions.
Kant’s solution to the contradictions, as Wood argues, relies on his doctrine of transcendental idealism. As for the first two antinomies, Wood argues
The mathematical antinomies are generated by mathematical principles that apply to things only insofar as they are given in sensible intuition…But these [the first two] series of conditions are never given to intuition as a whole...The theses are false because the principles of possible experience make it impossible for objects corresponding to the cosmological ideas of a first event, a largest extent of the world or a simple substance, ever to be given to intuition.”
Thus, the reason why Kant thinks that the claims made by the theses of the first and second antinomies are false is that neither the beginning of time nor the spatial boundary of the world or an indivisible substance can ever be given to our sensible intuition. If something cannot be given to our sensible intuition, according to Kant, we cannot have experience of it. Let me call this principle the object-of-sensible-intuition principle, namely, if something cannot be given to our sensible intuitions, then it cannot be object of our possible experience. And we can apply this principle to an object to determine whether that object can be object of possible experience. That is, if the object in question can be given to our sensible intuition, then the object can be object of our possible experience, but if the object cannot be given to our sensible intuition, then it cannot be object of our possible experience.
Now, let me apply the object-of-sensible-intuition principle to the idea of the sum total of mass. We can see that the sum total of mass cannot be given to our sensible intuition, so, the sum total of mass cannot be object of our possible experience. For the world of appearances seems to mean the whole universe or cosmos (because everything in the universe stands in causal relations to each other), there is no way for all of the mass in the whole universe to be given to our sensible intuition. Actually, we do not even know whether there are spatial boundaries of the universe, so we do not even know whether the sum total of mass in the all universe is finite. Thus, the sum total of mass cannot be object of possible experience. So, the sum total of mass cannot be that which represents time in appearances. For the reason there must be a permanently persistent substance in appearances which represents time is to make our temporally connected representations of objects possible. But, if the sum total of mass cannot be object of experience, it cannot make our experience of object possible. Thus, the permanently persistent substance in appearances cannot be the sum total of mass.
One might object that in the antinomies, the cosmological ideas at issue are condition-condition series. (B 436/A410) But the sum total of mass is not a series. Rather, it is an aggregate about which the question of conditioning and conditioned does not arise at all. Thus, Kant’s remarks on the antinomies have no bearing on whether the idea of the sum total of mass has any objective validity or significance. Moreover, the first two antinomies concern whether the conditioning-conditioned series go on into infinities. And it seems that it is impossible for us to experience infinity, for no matter what we experience it is finite insofar as we have experienced it. But, the quantum of the sum total of mass seems to be a definite and finite amount. By virtues of what can we claim that the sum total of mass cannot be object of experience? Is this “cannot” an empirical cannot, or an In-Principle cannot? If the answer is the former, the empirical “cannot” does not seem to be strong enough to show that the sum total of mass cannot be experienced, because we cannot know or predict whether in the future empirical sciences and technologies will make the sum total of mass possible object of experience. If the answer is the latter, at least further explanations of why the sum total of mass, which is a finite and definite amount, cannot be object of possible experience in principle are needed.
To the first objection I have two replies. First, in the first antinomy, Kant also discusses whether there is boundary or the largest extent of space. It is not obvious that there is a spatial series in the sense that it is obvious that there is a temporal series in which one moment succeeds its previous moments. However, according to Kant, we can think of the space acquiring its quantum through repeatedly or successively adding spatial units to the previous spatial units. (A 428/B 456) That is, the way of conceiving of space as a spatial series depends on the way of conceiving of time as a temporal series, which is naturally serial. Then, by the same token, we can also think of the sum total of mass acquiring its quantum by successively adding massive units to previous massive units. Thus, if the object-of-sensible-intuition principle applies to the idea of the boundary of space, it should also apply to the idea of the sum total of mass of the whole world of appearances.
Second, the fact that Kant applies the object-of-sensible-intuition-principle to the first two (or three) cosmological ideas to solve the contradictions does not mean that the principle can only be employed to deal with the antinomies. If the principle is applicable to other ideas, we can also use the principle to deal with other ideas. Since the object-of-sensible-intuition principle is derived from transcendental idealism, which is an important element in the whole Critique, there is no reason why the principle cannot be applied to other ideas than cosmological ideas. Thus, it is legitimate to use the object-of-sensible-intuition principle to show that the sum total of mass of whole world of appearances cannot be object of possible experience. So, the sum total of mass cannot be what represents time in appearances.
My reply to the second objection has two steps. First, it needs to be clarified that, although the first two antinomies concern whether the conditioning-conditioned series are infinite, Kant’s solution by the object-of-sensible-intuition principle does not rely on the whether the series are infinite. The principle only concerns whether the things to which the cosmological ideas refer can be given to our sensible intuition. It does not concern whether the things are infinite. It seems true that infinity cannot be object of sensible intuition. But this does not mean that all finite things can be given to our sensible intuition. Actually Kant rejects the claim that all finite things can be given to our sensible intuition. For Kant thinks the thesis of the first antinomy is false, because the beginning of time or the boundary of space cannot be given to our sensible intuition so that it cannot be object of possible experience.
The second step of my reply is to spell out in which sense of “cannot,” the sum total of mass cannot be object of possible experience. It seems to me that the distinction between empirical “cannot” and In-Principle “cannot” is hard to cash out in the context of Critique. For, in the Critique, any legitimate claim to knowledge entails that the object of which the knowledge is can be experienced. Thus, it seems that the empiricality of the “cannot” entails the In-Principality of the “cannot”.
However, concerning the claim that we cannot predict whether in the future empirical sciences and technologies will make the sum total of mass possible object of experience, what would Kant say? Would Kant agree that future sciences and technologies might or could transform a transcendent idea into an idea which refers to object of possible experience? I do not think he would. For Kant thinks his Critique settles metaphysical questions once and for all by theoretical reason, which is static or a-historical. Future discoveries made by sciences and technologies should be able to do no damage to the doctrines in Critique. Moreover, it should be odd to Kant’s ear that progresses made by empirical sciences could have any bearings on the doctrines in the Critique, which he builds up from scratch employing only pure reason, which is absolutely a-historical.
Thus, I conclude that the above arguments show that identifying substance with the sum total of mass in the world of appearance is not tenable. Since I showed earlier in this section that identifying substance with individuated mass is not tenable either, I conclude that the general strategy of identifying substance with mass is untenable.


Section IV. Concluding Remarks

In this paper, I showed that a seemingly very promising way of understanding the permanently persistent substance discussed in the first Analogy, namely, conceiving of substance as Newtonian mass, is untenable. Then, I wonder whether there are other promising ways of providing a positive account of substance or actually it is the case that the notion of substance in the first Analogy is itself untenable. At this stage, maybe I could follow Kant’s stance on the things of themselves, namely, they exist, but we can have no knowledge about the way of their existence. But, at the same time, we need to have this minimal conviction that they exist. Similarly, concerning substance, we can have no knowledge about what the permanently persistent substance is, but we need to have the minimal conviction that it exists in the world of appearances and it serves to represent time.

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