超前点映那场的确是全场爆笑，从头到尾，这是真的没有骗人——虽然我怀疑有人领笑。今天看豆瓣评论，评分是和我感觉差距不大的。

在无数成龙的访谈和纪录片中都会提到陈爸爸曾经对不得志的儿子说，我做菜能做到六十岁，你打能打到六十岁吗？他真的打到了，但真心让人看着尴尬——全片接地气的网络对白，虽然赢得不少笑声，但都是炒冷饭，追地气，不再有原创，意识形态上更让我哭一哭当年马如龙面对革命党人的一番自白。比起电影，更让人尴尬的他模仿TFBoys的《明明白白我的心》版本——曾经征服观众，如今已是取悦。

他为什么就不能像阿兰德龙和让保罗贝尔蒙多那样，老了老了还能演出有型有款的功夫老爸呢？

不肯退位的老皇帝，证明自己雄风依旧魅力永恒。不仅仅是他一个人，整个港片时代都是——“我拍了四十年电影，你不要跟我驳嘴！”越辉煌的往昔，铸成越高的神坛，后辈不可轻易犯足。
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补一句，在拍摄码头一场戏，有位摄影师不幸殉职，名字叫陈国雄，为这部喜剧蒙上一点点阴影。
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“更让人尴尬的他模仿TFBoys(风格)的《明明白白我的心》版本”

这篇剧评可能有剧透 影视剧、动漫、小说甚至是现实生活中，除非你有强大的主角光环，否则有些话是不能乱说，有些flag 更不能乱立。 比如：我一定会活着回来的！（听到这句话，99%要死翘翘） 这次做完我就金盆洗手!（实际上有一就有二，有二就有接下来的无数次） 甚至还有欺骗无数人的一句话：过了...  (展开)

海贼王罗杰：刑场上开启的新时代
是的，故事由这里开始。罗杰的故乡，开始与结束的地方，在那个死刑台上，这位曾经拥有一切的海贼王笑着留下了一句话：“想要我的财富吗？那就去找吧，我的一切都在那里，在那伟大的航道！” 于是，在刺刀刺入他心脏的那一刻，广场上爆发了响彻天宇的欢呼，沮丧消失了，曾经以为一个时代要因此而结束的人们开始奔向大海，驶入伟大航道，世界迎来了大航海时代！
传奇，再一次由这里拉开了序幕……
路飞：自由意志的召唤、一顶草帽的誓言
蒙奇?D?路飞（Monkey?D?Luffy），姓氏里的“Monkey”似乎已预示了这是一个有如猴子般顽皮而不安分的角色（甚至令人想起了大闹天宫的齐天大圣），是的，这就是我们的路飞。
好奇，顽皮，头脑过于简单，神经过于大条，经常傻得令某些人（比如娜美）绝望。然而就是这样的一个人，才有可能因为好奇而充满幻想、因为顽皮而活的如此彪悍、因为过于简单而对梦想万分执着。
这个犹如野生动物般上串下跳、毫无章法的路飞，反倒真正体现了自由意志的精髓；这块不经雕琢浑然天成的顽石，才正是大自然的杰作、天地万物的造化。
香克斯，那死刑台下继承了罗杰意志的众多青年中的一员，在多年的历经万险之后，看到了自身的局限，却不经意地在一个小岛上遇到了年幼的路飞，在路飞身上，他看到了自己所未能完成的梦想。于是，这个红发的香克斯，用一只手臂换来了一个新时代的希望，用一顶草帽换来了一句坚定的誓言以及关于梦想的继承与延续。“我一定要成为海贼王！”在那个年幼的孩子口中，一个新的伟大传说开始了。
多年后，长大的路飞划着一艘小船开始了他的冒险，也开始了他关于“海贼王”的誓言之旅。一路上寻找伙伴，一路上风浪无阻，一路上伴着梦想与友情驶向伟大航路。背后，始终有香克斯守望的目光，那是路飞精神的家园，是他自由航行中唯一的羁绊。
    “你能统治得了这顽强的大海吗？”
    “我可不打算统治，在这大海上最自由的人就是海贼王。”
这就是我们的路飞，我们“草帽海贼团”的船长，“新世界”的乐章已全面奏响，之后的路飞和伙伴们将上演怎样的精彩，相信不会令人失望。
索隆：响彻天际的承诺、从不退缩的顽强
幼年的索隆骄傲地有些目空一切，古伊娜的剑挫败了他的傲气，也助长了他不服输的倔强。2001次的失败记录，并没有磨掉他的锐气，然而古依娜的一句“我是个女孩子，总有一天会被你打败的”，挫伤了他的骄傲。“哪天我打败你时，你也这么说吗？好像我不是凭实力取胜似的，这样拼命练习的我岂不像个大白痴？”于是，两个同样倔强不服输的孩子约定：总有一天，两人中的某一个，要成为世界第一的剑豪。月光下，那幼小的身影，见证了两个少年的决心与誓言。
无奈古依娜过早夭亡，在她的灵前，伤心的索隆请求师傅把古依娜的剑交给他，并发誓要连她的那份一起变强，强到名字响彻天堂，和她的剑一起完成他们的约定。师傅微笑着把剑交给了他，“古依娜的灵魂和梦想，就交给你了”。多年后，带着古依娜的剑与约定，在师傅信任的目光中，索隆踏上了大剑豪之路。
当然，不久他就遇到了路飞。
这个整日迷迷糊糊的索隆，却总能在大是大非面前保持坚定的立场与顽强的斗志。不期然遇到第一剑豪鹰眼，比剑，失败，宁可被砍伤也毫不退缩。他知道，如果在这一刻退缩，他就永远也回不到这里了。“看清自己，看透世界，变更强！未来不管要等几年，我都会在这最强的位子上等你。超越我吧！”能让鹰眼说出这样的话，恐怕也只有索隆了。失败的索隆向路飞发誓，在打败鹰眼成为剑豪之前，他绝对不会再输了。“你有意见吗？海贼王……”“没意见”于是，一个新的誓言诞生了，一份坚若磐石的友情与信任在他与路飞之间建立了起来。
路飞在死刑台上依然笑得那么开心，索隆在快被蜡烛固定成人体模型时还能想到摆一个不错的造型，无所畏惧，恐怕正是这两个看似如此不同的人所共有的气质吧。
索隆，这个具有船长般威严气势的剑客，曾令多少人误以为他才是“草帽海贼团”的船长？又令多少人质疑他怎会甘心屈居人下？然而，这就是他对路飞的信任，对这个外表嘻嘻哈哈莫名其妙的船长的骨子里的尊敬，因为，他看到了路飞的真正可贵之处。
娜美：故乡的橘子园、美丽自信的航海士
自信、勇敢、调皮、美丽、爱财如命、飞扬跋扈，没错，这就是我们的航海士。
当年的贝尔梅尔是名海军战士，在一场令人绝望的战争中，她捡到了两个失去亲人的小女孩，怀抱着新的希望，三个毫无血缘关系的人组成了一个充满欢笑的家庭：妈妈、姐姐和娜美。在一场残酷的冲突中，为了保护两个孩子，妈妈失去了生命。从此，年幼的娜美开始了忍辱负重的报仇（阿龙海贼团）与拯救（村民），加入敌人的团伙，村民的误解与排斥，她都忍受了。直到彻底绝望的那天，这个顽强的女孩在近乎疯狂的自残中留下了泪水，这个从不求助别人的坚强女孩发出了请求“路飞，帮我”。“那是当然了！”这就是路飞的回答，响彻天际。从此，这个一向“坑蒙拐骗、无恶不作”的女贼娜美，有了真正的伙伴。
娜美是美丽的，她的美丽来自于那不输给任何男孩子的自信、勇敢、坚毅与骄傲，这是妈妈留给她的，而她始终保持着这样的美丽。
故乡，有姐姐和风车大叔的守望；橘子园中，更有妈妈的爱抚慰着她，就这样，在一片充满爱意的骂声与欢呼声中，这个勇敢的女孩，为了不曾割舍的梦想，告别家乡，扬帆起航，成为令每一个成员都感到自豪的航海士。
亲手绘制一张世界地图，这就是我们美丽自信的女孩——娜美。
乌索普：童话般的谎言、胆小鬼的勇气
故事从一开始就很童话。一个形象近似于匹诺曹的长鼻子少年，每天奔走于村落间，欢快地呼喊着“海贼来了！”（貌似“狼来了”的故事情节）。
父亲（红发香克斯船上的狙击手）早年出海未归，母亲病故多年，这个满口大话的骗人大王乌索普，就这样在村民的照顾下欢快自在地长大了。有人说，在乌索普的谎言中，隐藏着他对生活的期待。于是，在乌索普的口中，连谎言也变得充满了童话色彩。
在家乡，乌索普和三个小孩子组成‘乌索普海贼团’，整日幻想着成为了拯救苍生的大英雄，欢快自由地玩耍于家乡的林间草丛。为了让可雅小姐开心，他编造了无数冒险的经历，把自己夸大成了一个无畏的海上战士。直到有一天，一群邪恶海贼的到来，使他意识到了自己的胆小无助。不甘心的乌索普决心做个真正的英雄，并最终在草帽一伙的帮助下解救了可雅和村民。为了成为真正勇敢的海上战士，在一片要当船长的叫嚣声中，胆小的大话王出海了。
就这样，在一群近乎‘怪物’的船员（除了他和娜美，几乎人人都有超常的怪力或能力）中，我们的乌索普一次次地克服自己，成长为了勇敢的海上狙击手，尽管仍旧时常逃跑，但他勇于担当的时候也渐渐多起来了。
故乡，乌索普海贼团的三个小孩仍在每天呼喊着“海贼来了”，可雅小姐开始学习医术（为了有一天帮助乌索普），而这个幸福的大话王则继续着他的成长之旅。
香吉士：足智多谋的骑士、为众生（特指美女）倾倒的王子
这个香吉士，装酷都装得那么理所当然，花痴都花得那么坦然无畏；厨艺精湛得让人垂涎，足智多谋地令人惊叹；骑士起来风度傲然，王子起来洒脱惊艳，见到美女又可以瞬间化为白痴。唯独一样是他不变的期待——All Blue（厨师的天堂海域）。
红脚，一个强势的海贼，却因为同样的梦想，舍弃了他引以为豪的一只脚，救了年幼的香吉士，又在孤岛上把唯一的食物留给了香吉士，险些因此丧命。为了那不曾放弃的梦想，他把绝世踢技和厨艺全部传授给了香吉士。
当香吉士决定跟随路飞的草帽海贼团时，红脚的梦想有了实现的可能。香吉士出海了，为了“All Blue”，也为了报答红脚。在他身后，有红脚期待的目光，如父亲般，充满关爱与信任。
香吉士在草帽海贼团的冒险经历中，除了厨师、路飞战斗的左右手（很能踢），最大的作用恐怕就是担当着近似于军师的角色了。敌人的阴谋，他总是第一个看穿；巧妙的机关，他总是第一个发现并轻松破坏掉（大有四两拨千斤的功效）；并总能将计就计反算敌人一番。可以说，他是草帽海贼团中最有战略头脑的一个，当然，除了在美女面前的那个白痴香吉士。
乔巴：期待的伙伴、绽放的樱花、小驯鹿的海上冒险
这是一只可爱、害羞、纯真、善良的小驯鹿，这是一个有过心灵创伤、孤单寂寞的小男孩。乔巴的可爱，几乎能激起所有人心底最柔软的关爱和保护；乔巴的内心，依然保持着小动物最原始的纯真与质朴。
善良的乔巴，因为有一个蓝鼻子，被鹿群排斥，又因误食了“人人果实”而变得半人半兽，同时成了人中的野兽和兽中的异类，四处逃窜、无处容身，渴望同伴的心灵孤寂无助、伤痕累累。直到有一天，他遇到了那个“伟大的庸医”——西鲁鲁克。这位什么病也治不好的庸医，却用他的爱心医好了乔巴的心灵创伤，用他的生命给这个已无药可救的国家带来了希望。
“我问你，人究竟什么时候会死？
是心脏被枪打中的时候？不对！
是得了不治之症吗？也不对！
是喝了剧毒香菇汤之后吗？当然不是！
……而是被世人遗忘的时候。
就算我消失了，我的梦想还是会实现的，那个梦想一定会拯救这个国家人们的心病。这个国家当然有救，只要有人继承我的梦想。”
乔巴继承了庸医那近乎痴人说梦的梦想，为了实现这个梦想，他向性情古怪但医术精湛的魔女多丽医娘学习真正的医术。路飞的到来，唤醒了他对于伙伴的渴望，梦想成为真正男子汉的乔巴决定跟随草帽开始他梦寐以求的海上冒险。
离别的那一夜，多丽医娘用西鲁鲁克临死前研制的药粉为乔巴送行，那粉红色的雪花犹如绽放于寒冬的樱花般绚丽缤纷，在这样梦幻般醉人的夜晚，在两位老师的祝福中，小驯鹿向着大海出发了。
原来，痴人说梦者的梦想也可以如此绚烂地实现。
继承了庸医高尚医德与医娘精湛医术的乔巴，可以说是一位近乎完美的医生。从两位老师那里继承的梦想将由他来完成，成为能治疗所有疾病的‘万灵药’，这是他的承诺。故乡与天堂，慈爱的目光将一直伴随着他。
罗宾：历史的真相、生存的决心
历史的重负、惨绝人寰的屠杀、莫须有的罪名、世界政府的通缉，一个8岁的女孩，究竟能承担多少？
一个岛从地图上消失了，历史的真相被永久掩埋，一个无辜的女孩从此担上了“恶魔之子”的罪名，而这一切，全都是处于“正义”一方的世界政府的阴谋。
谎言、背叛、阴谋、出卖，这个8岁的小女孩在天罗地网的通缉中四处躲藏，就这样在夹缝中生存了20年。绝望、挣扎、无助，没有人值得信任。所有人只不过在利用她，利用她的聪明与能力，而她也在利用所有人，利用他们让自己活下来。在她的眼中，世界是一片绝望的黑暗。
她还有梦想——揭开历史的真相。然而那座岛屿的消失正是因为岛上有人要探寻历史真相，而她是唯一逃出来的人，继承了那个梦想，于是世界政府为赶尽杀绝而到处通缉她。她的梦想，有太多阻碍，太多敌人。
草帽海贼团的出现为这片黑暗带来了光明，她珍惜这光明，为了草帽海贼团那六个人的生命，甘愿被世界政府利用，哪怕这利用会断送她的梦想甚至引发战争牺牲更多人的生命。在她的天平上，那六个人的生命，重于全世界。
伙伴们自然不会同意她这样的牺牲，于是，草帽海贼团公然向世界政府宣战了。在那个高塔上，一向冷静的罗宾终于感情爆发：“我想活下去！把我也一起带去大海吧！”
当年，巨人萨龙舍弃生命换来了罗宾的逃离，他临死前的话支撑了她20年的逃亡生涯，“在某处的海域上一定有等着你的伙伴，去找他们吧，罗宾！”现在，那些‘等着她的伙伴’来救她了，在黑暗的尽头，终于迎来了光明。
从此，我们的历史学家再不孤单。
弗兰奇：男子汉响当当的光荣与梦想
一身的痞子气，却又最容易被某些事情感动得涕泗流，感情有时过于丰富细腻，和那个机器人般的身材极为不匹配，这就是我们的造船师。
师傅汤姆是个无论做什么都响当当的男子汉，为海贼王罗杰造船是他一生的骄傲。为了救弗兰奇，也为了梦想的延续，汤姆师傅响当当地牺牲了，留下了海列车、冥王图纸，还有两个水火不容却又同样继承了他的梦想的徒弟——一个做了水之都的市长，一个做了当地黑社会的大哥。
罗宾誓死保护同伴的决心，打动了冰山先生；草帽海贼团为救罗宾向世界政府宣战的行为，感动了同在高塔上的弗兰奇。汤姆的两个徒弟终于走到了一起，齐心合力，为草帽海贼团造了一艘梦想之船——万里阳光号。
弗兰奇接下了修船工的工作，和路飞他们一起出海了。留下了冰山先生，在水之都遥望着这个师弟以及他们共同的杰作，驶向未知的海域，去完成汤姆的心愿，实践他们的光荣与梦想。
布鲁克：死亡也无法阻隔的约定
布鲁克，有些胆小、有些好色，时而英勇无畏像个骑士，时而嬉笑杂耍像个小丑。但那50年前的约定始终不曾忘记，那死守的爆炸头就是他不变的誓言。
隆巴海贼团，一个热爱音乐的团体，一个欢快自由无拘无束的海贼团，他们的欢声笑语可以令天空从此清朗、令哭泣的婴儿露出笑脸、令小鲸鱼拉布追随万里。OP中有众多海贼团，除了草帽一伙，最令人喜欢也最令人感动的恐怕就数隆巴海贼团了。那一张张欢快的笑脸，那令人忘记一切忧愁的“宾克斯的酒”，那临死前全体船员的演奏，那双子峡畔等待了50年的拉布，那死而复生只剩下一把骨头的骷髅布鲁克和藏在他头骨里的最后的合奏，让人们永远记住了这个如音乐般美妙的海贼团。
死而复生的布鲁克，孤身一人在破败的船上挨过了无数的日日夜夜。多少次梦见死去的伙伴，大家又聚在一起欢快地歌唱，梦醒时又是多么的寂寞啊。昨夜今宵梦里寻，永生的能力只不过让他尝尽了孤寂。然而，在草帽那里，他的希望再次点燃了，“能活着真是太好了”，布鲁克终于又找回了伙伴。
路飞从一开始就盼望的音乐家终于上船了，伴着那动人的音乐，布鲁克起航了。在远方的天空下，有我们可爱的拉布，等待着朋友的归来。
薇薇：一个王国的寄托、一位公主的担当
一个幼小的女孩，竟有如此的胸襟与气度，国家的责任、人民的幸福全部压在她一个人的身上，她却始终义无反顾。
有这样的公主，是一个国家的幸福；有这样的伙伴，是草帽海贼团最美好的记忆。还记得那个站在塔楼上弱小的身影，拼尽全力地呼喊着蒙昧的人们“不要再打了!停止战争吧！”为了这个国家，她拼了性命地奔走、呼喊着，这又是怎样的担当啊！
人民终于清醒了，多年来无谓的战争结束了。为了重建家园，为了一个王国的寄托，我们的薇薇公主，毅然放弃了自己的梦想，离开了生死之交的伙伴，留了下来。她把那美丽的梦想，寄托在了伙伴们的身上，在海边，望着他们扬帆远去。
留下的，是那印刻在手臂上不可磨灭的标记，这是他们友情的见证。
黄金梅利号：一艘船的幸福与记忆
从来没有想过，会为了一艘船的死亡而泪如雨下。
这是一艘普通的小船，却承载了非同一般的梦想、欢笑、历险与记忆，实现了超乎寻常的价值与意义。
黄金梅利号，如精灵般勇敢、可爱。当乌索普与路飞为了它决斗的时候，我们分明能感到，它在那儿无言地哭泣。当草帽一伙快要全军覆没的时候，这个已被舍弃的精灵出现了，那一声声号角般的呼唤，让所有陷入绝望的人恍然大悟，“它来救我们了！我们不是还有一名伙伴吗？”“回家吧，我来接你们了。”多么令人自豪的一艘船啊！
梅利的使命如此波澜壮阔地圆满完成了，带着美好的回忆，它幸福地离去了。
曾经拥有这样的一艘船，对草帽海贼团的每个成员来说，又何尝不是一种幸福呢？
梦想的传承
在那个死刑台上，海贼王罗杰的梦想被欢呼的人们继承了，从此开辟了一个新时代。
继承了罗杰梦想的香克斯，用一只手臂赌下了一个新时代的希望，那顶草帽，是他对路飞的期待，从那里，路飞继承了海贼王的意志；
师傅把宝剑交给了索隆，古依娜的灵魂与梦想寄托在了索隆的身上，他要连古依娜的那份一起变强，两个少年的约定，从此变成了永恒的誓言；
妈妈的牺牲、姐姐的关爱、风车大叔和全村人的期待，化作了橘子与风车的标志，永远伴随着那个爱笑的女孩，去完成她的梦想；
天堂的母亲、海上的父亲、家乡的可雅、乌索普海贼团的小孩子，有着这样的关注，我们幸福的狙击手又怎能不成长为一名真正勇敢的海上战士呢？
红脚的寄托、海上餐厅的守望、All Blue的召唤，我们的骑士先生还将摆出多少酷酷的造型和白痴的模样来诠释他的梦想啊！
希鲁鲁克的梦想拯救了一个国家，乔巴带着他的梦想出海，故乡的多丽医娘含着微笑注视着我们可爱的小驯鹿去实现那有如樱花般美丽的梦；
活下来的罗宾继续着关于历史真相的探寻，她知道，在天国有她母亲、牺牲的历史学家和巨人萨龙的祝福；
弗兰奇继续着他那善感而又冲动的冒险，他知道，在他的身后，始终有一位响当当的师傅在为他自豪地放声大笑，当然，还有他的师哥冰山先生；
身后有隆巴海贼团的美好记忆与深深托付，前方的天空下，有等待了50年的朋友，我们的音乐家，又将在怎样的歌声中完成他的诺言啊！
薇薇留下了，梦想却没有终止；梅利走了，它的精灵却在阳光号上复活了。空岛的誓约之钟，是延续了四百年的梦想；海上的奇谈胜景，是流淌在血液中的向往。
是的，梦想是不会终结的，人们追寻梦想的脚步是无法阻挡的。谁说梦想只不过是空想？为什么嫦娥奔月、精卫填海皆已成为传说，我们的脚步却扎扎实实地登上了月球？我们的填海造田又当如何解释？是我们“愚蠢”的梦想将传说变成了现实啊！
骷髅旗的信念、海贼的精神、冒险的热情、人类不懈的追求，这些，都是没有止境、永不衰退的关于梦想的乐章！
自由的呼唤，友情的歌唱
    “世界嘛，没错，就是追求自由。”
“在这片大海上最自由的就是海贼王！”
路飞的梦想是海贼王，其实，就是自由。
为自由而聚到一起的伙伴，谱写了一曲曲感人的友谊之歌。
路飞与索隆的友情，是无论何时都认同对方决定的支持，是决斗时在一旁静静观看的尊重，是将后背放心托付给对方的信任；路飞与娜美，是把最重要的草帽托付给对方的信任，是相信对方能力的认同；路飞与乌索普，是嬉笑打闹时的玩伴，也是认真决斗时的全力以赴，更是冰释前嫌时的痛哭流涕。
索隆对娜美看似无奈其实甘心遵从，对香吉士是即不服又敬重的（香吉士对他亦如此），对乔巴则像大哥哥般爱护甚至有些放任。
娜美对香吉士看似不在意其实是很信赖的，而她对罗宾近乎于妹妹般的百般撒娇更是一种信赖的表现，当然，在乔巴面前，她会立刻变成一个呵护有加的大姐姐。
乌索普和娜美，始终有种同病相怜的理解与支持（唯独他们两个没有任何超能力嘛）。
香吉士对索隆的吵吵闹闹也许只是因为二人在某些方面太像了，而本质上他是非常敬重索隆的，甚至可以说是惺惺相惜；而香吉士对娜美则更不像他表现出的那样只是因为她美丽，这个骑士是很尊重甚至佩服娜美的坚强、勇敢与自信的，对她的好的与坏的方面有着其他人所没有的理解与包容。
乔巴对索隆和娜美都很依恋；对乌索普说的大话始终纯真地相信并万分佩服。
罗宾对路飞有着绝对的信任，但那信任中似乎透着一些好奇（对‘D’的研究）；她与乔巴，有着相似的不被世人所容的悲惨经历，因而也就更加喜爱甚至宠溺乔巴。
弗兰奇因罗宾的“活下去”嚎啕过，因布鲁克与小鲸鱼的约定痛哭过，因与梅利的离别撕心裂肺过，可以说，他是被草帽海贼团伙伴间的友情感动得爱上了这个团体才上了船的。
布鲁克与路飞在不认识的情况下就谈笑欢畅，也许就是某种默契吧；他尊重索隆为路飞牺牲时的决绝，并相信香吉士也有着相同的决心；他与隆巴同伴50年前的友情，在这里得到了延续；而他的小鲸鱼头上，也早已被路飞画上了草帽的骷髅旗；“宾克斯的酒”，欢快、自由的海贼之歌，连接了过去与现在，友情从此超越了时空。
还有，薇薇与大家那高举的手臂，小冯冯那关于友情的表白与牺牲，空岛那相隔四百年的钟声，梅利那航行中无言的陪伴，还有，为救同伴拼尽全力的斗志，兵临城下时无畏的微笑，还有......这是关于伙伴的温暖，这是关于朋友的歌唱，这是一曲响彻四方、充满自豪的友情的乐章。
后记：
现实，是残酷而无奈的。现实世界中的我们，也许正眼睁睁地看着曾经的梦想渐行渐远，往日的朋友日渐生疏，渴望的自由被层层枷锁禁锢。然而，梦想并不会因此终结、人类对自由的追求不会止步、友情的乐章仍将在世间激荡，只要我们不曾放弃，只要——我们的内心仍相信梦想的存在。
海上的冒险仍在继续，我们的世界充满可能。最终的乐章将有怎样的华彩？我们，拭目以待……

这篇剧评可能有剧透 看完结局时觉得是最大的bug，后来又仔细想了下。 对于虚颜的王爷会喜欢上女主的原因： 1.大概就是周围所有的人都顺着他，包括女二，底下人是不敢违背他，女二是爱他就和他共沉沦，唯有女主看穿了他本性里的一点善，并且规劝他。 2.两人在街上拉扯时，迎面飞来的小竹球差点击中...  (展开)

香港的武侠电影是有分类的，成家班自成一派，武术动作结合幽默语言，一招一式功底扎实又不乏娱乐，堪称东方卓别林。早期成家班爱拍民国，那叫做时装武打，后来成龙到了国外发展，那叫做最炫民族风。另外一派是徐克这样的，港片黄金期和程小东两人开启了香港武侠电影鸳鸯蝴蝶梦飞侠时代，从头飞到尾，无视一切物理原理重力吸引力，骑马仗剑江湖，到了后来，迷上国仇家恨，宦官当道，忠臣迫害，江湖儿女，乱世情长。还有一派袁和平甄子丹洪金宝杨紫琼惠英红这样的，硬桥硬马，睁来睁上，《咏春》可算是武侠经典，轻松诙谐，动作凌厉生猛，更不用提与《咏春》一脉相承的《铁马骝》里的咏春梅花桩了，近年来甄子丹洪金宝两人在《叶问》中再次合作，咏春寸劲和黐手（粤语名，又名黏手）也是看得我等武侠迷大呼过瘾，尽显老派气场。

而冯德伦的太极，我虽未敢吹其已成大器，但在徐克武功废了、袁和平程小东好莱坞发展、七小福中年发福之后，不得不说，太极出现得正是时候，解了我等武侠迷多年空窗期之渴。

众所周知，香港电影质量近年来每况愈下，大制作大场面的，不叫好也不叫座，拍武侠电影的更是少之又少，原因有三：其一，耗资巨大。其二，拍热血武侠的，没有疯狂的想象力，出来的只能是垃圾。其三，拍摄过程之艰辛常人不可想象，而香港武行又青黄不接，愿拍武戏的明星也屈指可数，有名气的架势不够，有架势的没名气，有名气又有架势的又都是些老骨头，没名气没架势的，麻烦隔壁找场务领盒饭。

然而毕竟世界上还是有像冯德伦这样吃饱了撑着闲得没事干的热血武侠迷+电玩科幻蒸朋宅+富二代的，有一天，他和吴彦祖两个人闲聊，觉得现在的武侠片太难看了，故作搞笑，剧情老套，主演做作，动作垃圾，所以他说，我们来拍一部好玩的武侠片吧。

若你认为，这部太极由于融入了蒸汽朋克，各种华丽特效，摇滚配乐，搞笑字幕，大地图地点标示，招式身法分解图而成为了武侠电影史上的一个新概念的话，那你就大错特错了。在我看来，它恰恰是一部传统得不能再传统的武侠电影，有外行看热闹内行看门道的动作设计与武术指导，光是客串阵容就有有华丽丽的香港武行宗师：火云邪神梁小龙开篇云手接茶碗，有完整解释咏春历史的名作《赞先生与找钱华》中的成家班首席武指冯克安打酱油，有《黄飞鸿》从幕后武行一战成名的刘家良干儿子，刘家班首席武指鬼脚七熊欣欣，勤伯陈家村门前十二路谭腿扫黄沙，更不用说，主演袁晓超，实为2008奥运武术冠军，龙套豆腐哥，为本片太极武术指导申思，陈氏太极第十二代传人；有简单但热血的快意恩仇；有轻松幽默而又不显勉强做作的诙谐包袱，笑点连连，亲民又不卖弄；有华丽而不喧宾夺主的特效3D；有高潮迭起又忠于原著（《杨露禅陈家沟偷拳》，民间传说，后改为戏剧，改编较成功作品有吴京《太极宗师》）；有老戏骨梁家辉扮作如少林火头僧似的隐士高人在水深火热之时出其不意的威风登场力克千军轻松退敌的热血反转，有angelababy一看便知刻苦用功钻研数月颇有模有样的太极架势。

若说一部只是看个新鲜的话，二部倒是看出了武侠功底的沉淀，与太极的阴阳调和，全片无睡点尿点。其中有热血少年丧母离家，命悬一线，千难万险过关斩将千里拜师，有豆腐哥“碰到我手上的豆腐就算你赢”这种传统武侠片的比试过招，有无知小子天赋异禀终成大师。以上种种，无一不是香港武侠片传统套路，在人人绞尽脑汁花招百出想博出位赚票房的现今电影市场上，太极有着一股浓浓的怀旧味道，这是对香港传统武侠片的最高献礼，是致敬，是怀念，是传承。尤其结尾处杨露禅京城九战，厨房中七小福之元彪与主角厨房意念对决，可说是洪金宝近年来最好的设计。

当然，我并非是说在第一部中的略显浮夸，情节稍微松散，剧情简单反派太好打发等等细节硬伤可以脑残粉的心态一笔带过，然而在武侠电影油尽灯枯前路茫茫不知去向的今天，感谢一众幕后默默无闻的外行观众大概只能认个眼熟的武行特技陪伴了我整个热血的青春时期，感谢还有像冯德伦这样拍武侠电影的人。

2013，期待巅峰在望。

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客串名单可参考http://movie.douban.com/review/5632478/

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世人常误以为太极不过是公园里上至80岁大爷，下至学龄小儿无人不会比划两下，纯作健身之用。其实太极之实战威力比偏重力道刚猛的泰拳一派甚至有过之而无不及，我学习体育及武术的朋友们经常告诉我一些关于自己学习太极的师兄在武术比赛中由于一时之气把前来挑衅的泰拳选手用野马分鬃、揽雀尾等招式打至飞起的故事。而杨氏太极之所以广传于世，因杨露禅弟子多为王公大臣，贝勒贵族，生活奢侈而体弱多病，又不耐艰苦。杨露禅考虑到这些人的身体素质和保健需要，将陈家拳中的一些高难度动作改动，让拳架姿势较为简单，动作柔和易练，既适合穿长衫、留辫子的人练习，又有益于健身（杨氏太极来源见百度百科 http://baike.baidu.com/view/101502.htm）。然而尽管简化，其威力仍不容小觑。

有一集陈国邦演的舅舅在医院治疗，漫姿去学了许久都不想学的开车。脑海中闪现出往昔舅舅对她说的一些话，开车、打太极、看望老人院的老人。过去一年里，陪伴在她的身边，帮她治疗情伤，让她不再失眠。那一幕让我忽然有种感慨，也许一个真正爱你的人，不是令你为了他不顾一切，为他伤心、失眠，甚至失去自我，而是要令你成为更好的自己。
有人说，爱情是盲目的，爱情里面没有自我，只有对方。看着漫姿为了晓阳伤心流泪，默默付出，甘心忍受。我好想对她说，算了吧，不要为这样的男人再伤害自己了。也许有人说我不懂爱，说我不懂，爱情里是没有理性的，所以他再混蛋也还是爱他。也许我真的不懂。
一个风流成性的男人，每天早上醒来身边都是不同的女人。如果他说他喜欢你，让你做他的女朋友，愿意为你放弃森林。你是不是会很感动，是不是会认为他真的很爱你？如果你们在一起之后，虽然他偶尔还是会有别的女人，但始终你才是他正式的女友。那么你是不是应该庆幸，告诉自己他最爱的还是自己？
不知道从什么时候开始，电影电视剧中多了好多这样的男人，还很受欢迎。不知道从什么时候开始，我开始无法理解。也许是有人说的我不懂爱。
舅舅对漫姿说，我这条路太短，所以我不敢找人陪我。所以他不敢追漫姿。钟晓阳说，男人都是禽兽，上床只是需要。所以他可以和任何一个女人上床，拍拖，就是不能和漫姿。他知道他不能伤害漫姿，可终究他还是伤害了，不是吗。我知道他爱漫姿，但是他更爱自己。可以说，游走于花丛中用情不专的渣男，爱的都是自己。
是否爱到失去了自我才是真的爱，是否为他伤透了心才是真的爱？如果爱情是付出，如果他爱你，那么他一定会让你更快乐，一定会让你变得更好。而不是让你受伤。

头脑乱乱地写了这篇不算影评的影评。黄浩然的粉丝或者漫姿晓阳cp粉不小心点进来，请无视。

我看电影前就想只要能看下去这部电影就成功了，结果它比成功还高一点，于是我把它推荐给杨幂和刘恺威的粉丝和一众颜控们，你们不会是失望失望，但是其他人还是慎重选择去不去电影院看吧。

反正这部剧已经神了，留的坑比线索还多，那就大胆猜吧！ 关于诺亚的身份，大胆猜测，个人观点，不认同或者不喜欢请不要骂，可以留下自己的意见。 开始： 纵观第一季，诺亚在好几个年代都出现过，并且容貌没有变，首先这是一部科幻剧，“永生”个人觉得太扯，不太可能；那么，很...  (展开)

这篇影评可能有剧透 时间如同一个漩涡。年轻与年老面对时间的区别，大概在于距离漩涡远和近时截然不同的意识。前者因为手里尚有大把时间可用来挥霍，于是一径麻木。后者则逐渐有所警觉，所以他的心和眼睛如同寂静的房子，在某个时刻突然被深夜的月光照得雪亮。 他们也有相似。相似在于无论快慢终有...  (展开)

先放英文版歌词好了，引自贴吧日剧吧 [qcccy520] 的《 【后知后觉】你们关注白富美的...》三楼 This City In Plague Time Knew Our Brief Eternity Our Brief Eternity Our Love Our Love Knew The Blank Walls At Street Level Our Love Knew The Frequency Of Silence Our Lo...  (展开)

由于漫画进度远快于动画而且我看完了漫画已连载的部分，所以写个漫评。作品在感官层面，对人的肢体动作的表现与利用静态的线条&黑白色彩表现动态的音乐&舞蹈的能力自不必说--我是没想到我生平第一次看芭蕾看哭是通过漫画这种体裁；在思想层面，作品也对性别气质、性别...  (展开)

一、多个时空


《纯粹理性批判》中的第一经验类比（Analogies of Experience）要求在现象中有一个恒定且唯一之物来表象意识中的时间本身。恒定，或永恒，因为作为总体的时间本身是始终在那的；惟一，因为只有一个时间。这个惟一且永恒的东西，即现象中的实体（Substance）。康德明确把这个实体与洛克的托子（Substratum）区分开来，认为实体是以各种方式显现于人的，而不是像托子那样不可知，也不显现。

我要说，洛克的托子的作用是保证物的个体化与同一性。这个作用在康德那儿，似乎是由物自体和先验范畴共同完成。先验范畴组织现象，在使意识对现象的认识成为可能的同时，也使同一的意识本身成为可能——对先验对象的构成即对自我的构成。而物自体在这个过程中究竟如何起作用，不详。康德的物自体与洛克的托子一样，是个让理论显得尴尬，却又不得不进行的假设。

尽管康德反复说现象中的实体不是洛克的托子，但这个实体究竟是什么，他又语焉不详。出于他对牛顿力学的接受，有人尝试将其理解为牛顿意义上的质量。我论证过，这样的解读将面临一个两难困境：如果实体是个体化了的质量，时间便不是惟一的；如果实体是现象世界中的总质量，基于二律背反的理由——这个总体无法成为经验对象——我们便无法经验到它。（详细论述见篇末附录）

若是跳出康德阐释，取前一个困境：时间不是惟一的，每个作为现象的物都意味着一个独立的时间体系，我们就科幻了：空间中的一个一个的物，奠基着意识中的一个又一个时间系，我们可以生活在不同的时空中，当我们经验不同的物。甚至，对应地说，我们总在成为另一个人，当我们来到不同的时空。

于是，我情愿把亨利的生活看作对康德的一次失败却有趣的解读。与其说他是一位时间旅行者，一位不停地穿越时空的超人或可怜人，不如说，他的意识中并没有一个绝对惟一的时间，他所来到并离开的每一个时空，都是一个独立自在的世界，尽管这些世界看上去很像，但哪个都不依赖于另一个——从理念的意义上说。


二、沉默，或消失


影片的前半部分，亨利的突然消失被解释为一种不治的遗传疾病。没有理由地，他时不时就去了另一个时空，赤身裸体地寻找可以穿上的衣服。仿佛常人来到一个新的环境，总是迫不及待地寻找一个身份，穿到自己身上。
亨利总会在一个无从预料的时刻消失，克莱尔生活在一个不确定的世界中。她的爱情是确定的，但她爱的人不确定地存在着。她的生活中弥漫着不确定性，而这恰好让她格外珍惜亨利在她身边的每一分钟。

克莱尔一次次怀孕又一次次流产，因为胎儿也有穿越症，莫名其妙地，便在某个时刻，出离了子宫。但克莱尔最后一次怀孕时，对亨利说，你每次消失都是因为感觉到了压力。所以，从现在开始，我要保持绝对地平静，这样胎儿就可以顺利出生了。
看到这里，我恍然大悟，原来亨利的穿越症是个隐喻，关于男人的隐喻：面对压力，便会沉默与回避，这不正是男人的本能反应么——而这在女人看来，仿佛爱人去了另一个时空，不知何时才能回来，甚至，会不会回来。

我查了查，电影改编自一位女造型艺术家的首部小说，写于一段失败的恋情之后。原来如此。

很多年前听到过一个说法：爱情，对男人来说，是挂在墙上的一幅画，你并不总是去看它；但对女人来说，则是房间里音乐，你想不听都不行。所以，男人需要时不时地呆在纯然属于自我的世界里，在沉默中成为自己。女人却要认为这是对她的疏远、对亲密的疏离，并因此而坐立不安，想方设法闯进那份铁一般的沉默。结果，要么把自己撞疼，要么把爱情撞碎。
这是对小儿女情态的描述。若成年点，便会更同情于另一个说法：人生在世，无非是男人讨慰藉，女人讨生活。人并不总是需要慰藉，尤其在得意之时。人却总在生活，就算你不想。


三、看着，却无法改变


在一次穿越中，亨利来到母亲身边，在地铁里，母亲在看报，他们作为陌生人简短却亲切的交谈了一会儿。亨利告诉母亲，他要结婚了，这个女孩让他感到安全。
克莱尔问他：你什么不去阻止那场车祸，既然你可以回到车祸发生之前。“我无法阻止。无数次我回到过去，回到母亲还在的时候，但每次我都无法改变发生着的一切。”——这话让人特别难过。我们并不能改变过去，就像不能重新雕刻一座已然完成的塑像。

不是么？很多时候，我们从自己当下的境遇中抽身而出，试图站在一个更开阔的角度，超脱地看现在的纠结、焦虑，或苦闷，并自嘲这些都没什么的。但当你身在当下，你知道未来的自己就坐在对面，笑着，看着自己，慈悲地。但你还是无法因此脱身而出。你仍然只能呆在你当下的处境中，无论是过分的快乐，还是仿佛无法挣脱的哀伤。

每一个时刻都是三维的，它包含着过去、现在，和未来这三个维度。我们在回忆中编辑时间，编辑自己，有意无意地遗忘一些，并把另一些反复摩挲。过往明明灭灭，像晴天里，随风晃动的百叶窗投在墙上的影子。每次回忆之后，我们都成为另一个人。
未来也是。未来无数次作为想象呈现于当下，各式各样地，仿佛清晰的回忆。回忆与憧憬，如同天平的两臂，对称着，平衡着，在现在这个支点上。所以，现在这个时刻，最重。


四、期限


有天聚会时，亨利中枪后痛苦挣扎的裸体突然出现在他们的门厅里。又消失了。克莱尔说，我从没见过四十岁之后的你。我见过的你总是很年轻。从这个时候起，死亡就成了他们中的另一个在场者，尽管它总是沉默着。

亨利穿越到未来，遇见了自己的已经十岁的女儿。女儿告诉他，他死于自己五岁那年。她们一直很想念他。那时他们的女儿还没出生。那时克莱尔还一如既往地希望与亨利白头偕老，就像她还没长大时那样，就像她长大之后第一次遇到亨利时那样，就像亨利死后，她仍然留着亨利所有的衣服，等着亨利回来那样。

于她而言，亨利是不会死的。他无非是走远了一下子回不来，他无非是在时空中迷了路，找不到一件让他温暖的衣服。

女儿五岁那年，亨利和克莱尔都已知道，亨利即将死去，中弹而死。期限降至，可能在任何一天，任何一个时刻。在它到来之前，所有相聚的时光都是铭刻，都是用最日常的方式来进行的一次祭奠，一次追忆。当这个期限还不确定，他们相爱着，仿佛一对最平凡的恋人；当这个期限已然确定，他们相爱着，装作不知道他们即将分离。

一个期限并不见得让期限到来之前的一切都显得美好。但，美好的东西都有一个期限。确定的期限，或不确定的期限。你不能试图挽留，那会犹如握紧手中的细沙，握得越紧，便流失得越快，宛如时间，从指缝间悄然流走。
这个期限是否到来，何时到来，都不是你能选择的。你能做的，仅仅是在它到来之前的每一刻，不让自己在未来后悔——克莱尔明白这些，并且，她做到了。

而，这不正是人生么。


——————
附录：On Understanding Substance as Mass

Introduction

In the First Analogy of Experience, Kant argues that there must be some permanently persistent substance in the appearances which represents the persistence of time. Given Kant’s endorsement of Newtonian physics, commentators such as Eric Watkins suggest that such permanently persistent substance can be understood as Newtonian mass. In this paper, however, I argue that we face a dilemma when we try to cash out the notion of substance in terms of Newtonian mass.
The paper proceeds in three steps. In the first section, I present the reason why there needs to be a permanently persistent substance in the appearances, and discuss why it seems to be compelling to conceive of the permanently persistent substance as Newtonian Mass. Then, in the second section, I argue that there are (only) two ways of conceiving of the permanently persistent substance as Newtonian mass, namely, to conceive of substance as individuated mass and to conceive of substance as the sum total of mass in the world of appearances. I show that there are textual indications as well as philosophical reasons to support each option. In the third section, however, I argue that both ways suffer from inescapable problems. Thus, conceiving of the permanently persistent substance in terms of Newtonian mass is not viable.

    
Section I. The Permanently Persistent Substance

In this section, I shall first present the reason why Kant thinks that there must be a permanently persistent substance in the appearances. I then discuss why it is compelling to conceive of such substance as Newtonian mass.
In the chapter “System of all principles of pure understanding,” Kant discusses what makes possible the applications of the categories, i.e. the pure concepts of understanding, to objects, i.e. appearances that are given to sensible intuitions. That is, he discusses what it is that makes the categories have objective validity. Kant’s claim is that the applications of the categories are only possible under certain conditions, and these conditions are spelled out by the principles. For instance, the applications of the relational categories (substance-accidents, cause and effect, and mutual interactions) are possible if they are applied to objects according to the principles of Analogies of Experience. In addition to the three specific principles that correspond to each of the three relational categories, Kant also provides a general principle overarching all three Analogies. The general principle is stated in the second edition as follows: “Experience is possible only through the representations of a necessary connection of perceptions” (B 218). Watkins provides a helpful interpretation of this general principle:
“The general idea is that each of the three relational categories represents a necessary connection that is required for experience of a single time and of objects existing and being temporally related to each other within a single time to be possible.” (My emphasis)
Since this paper is focused on the notion of substance in the first Analogy, I shall ignore the second and third Analogies. So I now turn to a close examination of the first Analogy.
The first Analogy, i.e. the principle of the persistence of substance, is stated in the second edition as follows: “In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.” (B 224) Watkins summarizes Kant’s argument for the first Analogy as follows (which I take to be a correct interpretation):
Premise 1: Appearances, i.e. objects of experience, are made possible by time’s persistence.
Premise 2: We do not perceive time itself.
Therefore, In order to have experience of appearances, there must be some permanent substance in the appearances which can represent time or time’s persistence.
While the appearances, as the objects given to our intuitions, are changing, the substance in appearances always stays the same and is permanent. So, Kant calls the permanent substance “the substratum of everything real” (B 225). But, some clarifications about Kant’s use of the term “substratum” are needed to prevent potential confusions. Substratum in Kant’s text does not mean what Locke uses this term to mean, namely, the bearer of properties which is unchanging and about which we can have no knowledge. For, according to Locke, we can only know what is given to our senses, but since the underlying substratum cannot be given to our senses, we have no access to it and therefore cannot know it.
Kant, by constrast, does not think that there is any Lockean substratum in the world of appearances. For Kant, the fact that the states of the substance are changing and the substance stays the same does not mean the states are separable from the substance. Rather, the changing states of the substance are simply the ways in which the substance is given to us. Thus, we can know the substance, that is, we know the substance through its states. In order to avoid the Lockean implication of the term “substratum,” I shall only use “substance” to refer to the permanently persistent thing in the appearances despite Kant’s own use of “substratum” to talk about what is permanent in the appearances.
Since I have argued that Kant’s notion of substance is not the Lockean substratum, then what is the Kantian notion of substance? We need a positive account of what the substance is. It is obvious that such a permanently persistent thing cannot be captured by ordinary physical objects, no matter whether they are natural objects (say, rocks) or artifacts (say, ships), for neither artifacts nor natural objects always stay the same such that in principle they can never suffer changes. So, it seems no ordinarily construed physical things can be qualified as substance that is permanently persistent. On the other hand, it is very hard to imagine that anything non-physical could play the role the substance is supposed to play. For it is hard to imagine how a non-physical being could be given to our sensible intuition or could be spatiotemporally organized by our a priori intuitions. So, it is unlikely that Kant means something non-physical by “substance.” Thus, there are two constraints on spelling out what substance is. First, it is something physical. Second, as I have shown, the physical being that can be understood as substance cannot be ordinarily individuated physical things such as planet or rock.
In order to meet the above two conditions, Watkins suggests that, given Kant’s commitment to Newtonian science, it is likely that Kant has Newtonian mass in mind when he talks about the substance, since no matter how a physical object changes, its mass always stays the same. Since Newtonian mass is physical and is not an ordinarily individuated object, it seems quite compelling that the substance, which is permanently persistent, just is Newtonian mass. According to common sense, Newtonian mass is understood to be underlying objects such that we cannot directly perceive mass but can only perceive mass through the way it is given to our intuition, namely, through the perception of the objects that have mass. Thus, mass is neither unknowable nor directly perceivable, which seems to fit the description of the substance perfectly.
Moreover, there are many textual indications that suggest the identification of substance with mass. Let me note two examples. First, recall the general principle overarching the three specific Analogies, namely, “In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.” (B 224) It seems that “quantum” is most naturally to be understood as mass, for mass seems to be the only thing in nature that is neither increased nor diminished on Newtonian physics.
The other indication is Kant’s example to illustrate his claim that “he <a philosopher> thus assumed that as incontrovertible that even in fire the matter (substance) never disappears but rather only suffers an alteration in its form.” (B 288, my emphasis):
“A philosopher was asked: How much does the smoke weigh? He replied: If you take away from the weight of the wood that was burnt the weight of the ashes that are left over, you will have the weight of the smoke.” (B 288)
We can see that here Kant explicitly identifies substance with matter. And it is quite plausible to think that “matter” is just another way of saying “mass”. That is, “mass” seems to be the theoretical analog of the term “matter.” This hypothesis is supported by the example of the weight of smoke. For, in the example, the way to calculate the weight of smoke just is to calculate the mass (multiplies the gravitational constant).
However, despite the compelling reasons for the identification of substance with mass, in the next sections, I shall argue that the substance cannot be understood as Newtonian mass, for when we try to work out the details of understanding the substance as mass, we face an unavoidable dilemma.


Section II. Some Mass or the Sum Total of Mass

In this section, I shall argue that there are two ways of conceiving of substance as Newtonian mass, and then show that both ways have some support from the text and are to some extent philosophically plausible. So, both ways deserve detailed considerations. But, in the next section, I shall argue that both ways face insurmountable problems.
In identifying substance with mass, we need to settle an ambiguity: Is the mass meant to be some mass, say the mass of a rock which is 7 kilograms (a randomly chosen weight), or to be the sum total of mass in the world of appearances which is a very large but nonetheless definite amount? Since both some mass and the sum total of mass are permanently persistent, we cannot tell which way of identifying is more plausible with respect to the permanent persistence of substance. So, we must appeal to some other philosophically and/or textually interesting points to ground a preference in choosing one over the other.
Let us first consider identifying the substance with some or individuated mass. First, the first Analogy is the principle according to which the relational category substance-accident is to be applied. Kant defines accidents to be “the determinations of a substance that are nothing other than particular ways for it to exist.”(B 229) Many commentators interpret the relation to be between object and its properties or states. Thus it makes more sense to think that the mass, which is the underlying bearer of properties, is the individuated mass of some object, instead of the sum total of mass in the world of appearances. For instance, in the example of the weight of smoke, Kant seems to conceive of substance as the matter, i.e. mass, of an individual object. Moreover, if we conceive of substance as the sum total of mass in the world of appearances, it is very hard to imagine how substance can be the bearer of properties or what kind of properties of which substance is the bearer.
One might argue that, on the interpretation according to which substance is the sum total of mass, even though we could imagine no properties of which substance is the bearer, we can still conceive of substance as the bearer of (changing) states, i.e. the successive states of the world of appearances. I reply that Kant cannot accept such an idea because the states of the world are not objects of possible experience, for it is at least empirically true that no one could have the whole world of appearances as his object of experience. I will return to this point later on in the paper and use it to argue that conceiving of substance as the sum total of mass is untenable given Kant’s theoretic commitments.
The above discussion is about reasons to prefer the identification of substance with some mass. I now turn to the reasons to prefer the identifications of substance with the sum total of mass. There are some textual evidences in the first Analogy that suggest this latter identification. For instance, the following passage:
“…here the issue is only appearances in the field of experience, the unity of which would never be possible if we were to allow new things (as far as their substance is concerned) to arise. For then everything would disappear that alone can represent the unity of time, namely the identity of the substratum in which alone all change has its thoroughgoing unity. This persistence is therefore nothing more than the way in which we represent the existence of things (in appearances).” (B 229/A186, my emphasis)
In this passage, Kant seems to identify the permanent persistent substance that represents the persistence of time with the unity of appearances, which seems to be the sum total of mass in the whole world of appearances. Let me argue for my understanding of this passage that it indicates that Kant identifies substance with the sum total of mass. I shall argue by reductio: Suppose Kant identified substance with individuated mass in the above passage. Then, it would make no sense to think that the arising of new substance could make the representation of the unity of time impossible. For the arising of new substance in no sense affects the substance, i.e. the mass, of the original objects. Let me use an example to illustrate. Suppose there is a rock whose mass is 7 kilograms and there arises a new object out of nothing, whose mass is 5 kilograms. Insofar as the rock’s mass remains the same, whether or not there are new masses arising out of nothing does not affect the unity of the rock’s mass, which is 7 kilograms. Therefore, in this passage, Kant conceives of substance as the sum total of mass in the whole world of appearances.
So far I have shown that there are compelling reasons to identify substance with some mass or with the sum total of mass respectively. In the next section, I shall argue that there are also devastating reasons to each identification such that either way we go, we face unsolvable problems.


Section III. One Single Time and the Limit of Possible Experience

I now turn to the problems from which the each identification suffers. In this section, I shall argue that these problems make both identifications untenable. Let us first consider the identification of substance with individuated mass (i.e. some mass). I argue that the reason why individuated mass cannot be identified with substance is that individuated mass cannot represent the oneness of time. Recall Kant’s argument for the principle of the first Analogy: in order to have experiences of objects as temporal, we must identify a permanently persistent substance that can represent time in objects. While the states of the substance change, the substance persists so that the substance can represent time that persists. It is important to notice that time, which is supposed to be represented by substance in appearances, is one single time. But, individuated mass cannot represent one single time. For there are many individuated masses, for instance, the mass of a rock which is 7 kilograms, the mass of a cup which is 0.5 kilogram, and the mass of a table which is 3 kilograms, each of which is permanently persistent and undergoes changes. If one of them can represent time, any other also can. In that case, we do not have one single time. Rather, we have many times or time-series, each of which is persistent.
Let me explain in details why multiply individuated masses cannot represent on single time. If these individuated masses can represent one single time, there must be some one single thing that is shared by these individuated masses that serves to represent the singularity of time. Whatever this shared thing is, it is not any of these individuated masses. Therefore, individuated mass cannot present one single time. However, on the other hand, time has be to singular. Here is a passage in the first Analogy which explains why time has to be one single time rather than a plurality of times:
“Substances (in appearances) are the substrata of all time-determinations. The arising of some of them and the perishing of others would itself remove the sole condition of the empirical unity of time, and the appearances would then be related to two different times, in which existence flowed side by side, which is absurd. For there is only one time, in which all different times must not be placed simultaneously but only one after another.” (B 232/A189)
One might argue that it does not matter how many individuated masses can represent time, it only matters that there is an individuated mass that represents time. Insofar as there is such a substance, which is permanently persistent, it suffices to represent one single time. I reply that, in that case, we still do not know which individuated mass is suppose to be the representer of the one single time in appearances. For there is not reason to think that the mass of one object is more suitable to represent time than the mass of another object is, insofar as both of the individuated masses are permanently persistent. Any choice of one over the other is arbitrary. But the unity or singularity of time is not arbitrary, for there can only be one time-series which persists, and any other time-series or temporal relations are just temporal parts of this unique time-series. Thus, I conclude that individuated mass cannot be the representer of time in appearances.
I now turn to argue that the sum total of mass cannot represent time either. The idea of my argument is to make use of Kant’s solution to the Antinomies to show that the permanently persistent substance that represents time in the appearances cannot be the sum total of mass because the sum total of mass is not an object of possible experience. Let me lay out my argument in detail.
In “The Antinomy of Pure Reason” chapter, Kant presents four pairs of arguments concerning four cosmological ideas about the world-whole, namely, whether there is a beginning of time, whether there is indivisibly simple substance, whether there is a first cause, and whether there is a necessary existent. As Allen W. Wood argues, the four antinomies share a general form, namely, the thesis of each antinomy claims that there must be a first member of the conditioning-conditioned chain, while the antithesis of each antinomy claims that there is no first member of such a chain and that the chain goes back into infinity. Kant argues that there are valid arguments for each of the four theses as well as valid arguments for each of the four antitheses, so we need a solution to such contradictions.
Kant’s solution to the contradictions, as Wood argues, relies on his doctrine of transcendental idealism. As for the first two antinomies, Wood argues
The mathematical antinomies are generated by mathematical principles that apply to things only insofar as they are given in sensible intuition…But these [the first two] series of conditions are never given to intuition as a whole...The theses are false because the principles of possible experience make it impossible for objects corresponding to the cosmological ideas of a first event, a largest extent of the world or a simple substance, ever to be given to intuition.”
Thus, the reason why Kant thinks that the claims made by the theses of the first and second antinomies are false is that neither the beginning of time nor the spatial boundary of the world or an indivisible substance can ever be given to our sensible intuition. If something cannot be given to our sensible intuition, according to Kant, we cannot have experience of it. Let me call this principle the object-of-sensible-intuition principle, namely, if something cannot be given to our sensible intuitions, then it cannot be object of our possible experience. And we can apply this principle to an object to determine whether that object can be object of possible experience. That is, if the object in question can be given to our sensible intuition, then the object can be object of our possible experience, but if the object cannot be given to our sensible intuition, then it cannot be object of our possible experience.
Now, let me apply the object-of-sensible-intuition principle to the idea of the sum total of mass. We can see that the sum total of mass cannot be given to our sensible intuition, so, the sum total of mass cannot be object of our possible experience. For the world of appearances seems to mean the whole universe or cosmos (because everything in the universe stands in causal relations to each other), there is no way for all of the mass in the whole universe to be given to our sensible intuition. Actually, we do not even know whether there are spatial boundaries of the universe, so we do not even know whether the sum total of mass in the all universe is finite. Thus, the sum total of mass cannot be object of possible experience. So, the sum total of mass cannot be that which represents time in appearances. For the reason there must be a permanently persistent substance in appearances which represents time is to make our temporally connected representations of objects possible. But, if the sum total of mass cannot be object of experience, it cannot make our experience of object possible. Thus, the permanently persistent substance in appearances cannot be the sum total of mass.
One might object that in the antinomies, the cosmological ideas at issue are condition-condition series. (B 436/A410) But the sum total of mass is not a series. Rather, it is an aggregate about which the question of conditioning and conditioned does not arise at all. Thus, Kant’s remarks on the antinomies have no bearing on whether the idea of the sum total of mass has any objective validity or significance. Moreover, the first two antinomies concern whether the conditioning-conditioned series go on into infinities. And it seems that it is impossible for us to experience infinity, for no matter what we experience it is finite insofar as we have experienced it. But, the quantum of the sum total of mass seems to be a definite and finite amount. By virtues of what can we claim that the sum total of mass cannot be object of experience? Is this “cannot” an empirical cannot, or an In-Principle cannot? If the answer is the former, the empirical “cannot” does not seem to be strong enough to show that the sum total of mass cannot be experienced, because we cannot know or predict whether in the future empirical sciences and technologies will make the sum total of mass possible object of experience. If the answer is the latter, at least further explanations of why the sum total of mass, which is a finite and definite amount, cannot be object of possible experience in principle are needed.
To the first objection I have two replies. First, in the first antinomy, Kant also discusses whether there is boundary or the largest extent of space. It is not obvious that there is a spatial series in the sense that it is obvious that there is a temporal series in which one moment succeeds its previous moments. However, according to Kant, we can think of the space acquiring its quantum through repeatedly or successively adding spatial units to the previous spatial units. (A 428/B 456) That is, the way of conceiving of space as a spatial series depends on the way of conceiving of time as a temporal series, which is naturally serial. Then, by the same token, we can also think of the sum total of mass acquiring its quantum by successively adding massive units to previous massive units. Thus, if the object-of-sensible-intuition principle applies to the idea of the boundary of space, it should also apply to the idea of the sum total of mass of the whole world of appearances.
Second, the fact that Kant applies the object-of-sensible-intuition-principle to the first two (or three) cosmological ideas to solve the contradictions does not mean that the principle can only be employed to deal with the antinomies. If the principle is applicable to other ideas, we can also use the principle to deal with other ideas. Since the object-of-sensible-intuition principle is derived from transcendental idealism, which is an important element in the whole Critique, there is no reason why the principle cannot be applied to other ideas than cosmological ideas. Thus, it is legitimate to use the object-of-sensible-intuition principle to show that the sum total of mass of whole world of appearances cannot be object of possible experience. So, the sum total of mass cannot be what represents time in appearances.
My reply to the second objection has two steps. First, it needs to be clarified that, although the first two antinomies concern whether the conditioning-conditioned series are infinite, Kant’s solution by the object-of-sensible-intuition principle does not rely on the whether the series are infinite. The principle only concerns whether the things to which the cosmological ideas refer can be given to our sensible intuition. It does not concern whether the things are infinite. It seems true that infinity cannot be object of sensible intuition. But this does not mean that all finite things can be given to our sensible intuition. Actually Kant rejects the claim that all finite things can be given to our sensible intuition. For Kant thinks the thesis of the first antinomy is false, because the beginning of time or the boundary of space cannot be given to our sensible intuition so that it cannot be object of possible experience.
The second step of my reply is to spell out in which sense of “cannot,” the sum total of mass cannot be object of possible experience. It seems to me that the distinction between empirical “cannot” and In-Principle “cannot” is hard to cash out in the context of Critique. For, in the Critique, any legitimate claim to knowledge entails that the object of which the knowledge is can be experienced. Thus, it seems that the empiricality of the “cannot” entails the In-Principality of the “cannot”.
However, concerning the claim that we cannot predict whether in the future empirical sciences and technologies will make the sum total of mass possible object of experience, what would Kant say? Would Kant agree that future sciences and technologies might or could transform a transcendent idea into an idea which refers to object of possible experience? I do not think he would. For Kant thinks his Critique settles metaphysical questions once and for all by theoretical reason, which is static or a-historical. Future discoveries made by sciences and technologies should be able to do no damage to the doctrines in Critique. Moreover, it should be odd to Kant’s ear that progresses made by empirical sciences could have any bearings on the doctrines in the Critique, which he builds up from scratch employing only pure reason, which is absolutely a-historical.
Thus, I conclude that the above arguments show that identifying substance with the sum total of mass in the world of appearance is not tenable. Since I showed earlier in this section that identifying substance with individuated mass is not tenable either, I conclude that the general strategy of identifying substance with mass is untenable.


Section IV. Concluding Remarks

In this paper, I showed that a seemingly very promising way of understanding the permanently persistent substance discussed in the first Analogy, namely, conceiving of substance as Newtonian mass, is untenable. Then, I wonder whether there are other promising ways of providing a positive account of substance or actually it is the case that the notion of substance in the first Analogy is itself untenable. At this stage, maybe I could follow Kant’s stance on the things of themselves, namely, they exist, but we can have no knowledge about the way of their existence. But, at the same time, we need to have this minimal conviction that they exist. Similarly, concerning substance, we can have no knowledge about what the permanently persistent substance is, but we need to have the minimal conviction that it exists in the world of appearances and it serves to represent time.

本来是带孩子去看《功夫熊猫》。可是孩子已经不把自己当小孩了，临时要求去看另一个大小孩的电影，所以我就来看《叶问3》了。发现这个电影纯属意外，没想到美国影院上映，这个影院不是万达AMC。粤语配英文字幕，有点影响观影。

我给《叶问3》打好评。武打非常精彩，是近年来最过瘾的一部武打片。回来一查，动作设计是袁和平，不亏是金字招牌。里面还有拳王泰森，是个亮点。

叶问这个系列，第一部令人眼前一亮，一扫当时武打片的颓势。打得太帅了！武戏太密集了！我最喜欢的，是甄子丹喊出“我要打十个！”那场戏。那个情绪的蓄积，和动作的爆发，让人可以一看再看。IMDB Top 250里，华语片只有《叶问》这一个电影。当然IMDB是美国影评，他们不怎么看外语片，不能用它说明叶问在华语片甚至武打片里的地位，但是《叶问》的水平和流行度可见一斑。如果让我评，叶问进武打片前十名绝对没问题。对文艺小清新的豆瓣的低分评价，请直接无视之。

叶问的第二部很糟糕，我看完了没什么印象。然后就可笑了，冒出一个《叶问终极一战》，风评之差让我根本懒得去看。我以为这个系列就这么毁掉了。现在叶问3出来才知道，那个什么终极一战是个冒牌货，借着叶问的名字而已，整个制作班子是另一套。

所以《叶问3》是个对这个系列很合适的收官，没有发生虎头蛇尾的惨剧。第三部和第一部水平在一个档次上。

作为一个系列，他有重复出现的因素，比如在车间工厂和几十人上百人的打斗，这个设定在三集里都出现了。第一部一样，武戏也非常密集，文戏过下场就开打。

这一集我最喜欢的武戏是和泰拳在电梯和楼梯里的打斗。电梯里的狭小空间，楼梯上的长镜头。可惜这段武打太短了，我看晕了，一定要重看一遍。叶问太太看着电梯门缓缓关上，自己的丈夫面对着凶狠的敌人，然后电梯下沉，等门再打开，泰拳师已经落败而逃，自己的丈夫还是那么温柔的等着自己。这个处理很用心，有范儿。

文戏故事简单，但毫不沉闷。我最后还是有一点点感动的。叶问夫人将不久于人世，想听丈夫在练武桩上再打一套拳。很让观众理解他们日常的生活，一个丈夫沉浸于自己的世界，一个妻子欣赏和支持丈夫的事业。

香港凭借着强大的电影行业，为我们创造了很多粤系的武术大师，性格还是挺不一样的。黄飞鸿心怀天下，方世玉顽皮，叶问呢，可以形容为“谦良”。一个谦良的中国人。

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可能原文没有说很清楚。我说“IMDB Top 250里，华语片只有《叶问》这一个电影。”是指第一集，不是这个第三集。那个行文是在讲第一集的感受，然后讲到第二集，再讲第三集，顺下来的。叶问第一集评分是8。卧虎藏龙是7.9，不在top 250。当然这个榜单和评分都是变动的，它的局限性我原文也说了。有人提示花样年华和无间道也是250内，说的是对的。其他人，很简单自己打开网页就能看到的。难道连imdb也墙了？

40年前的老电影，大部分场景在摄影棚里完成，与其说是电影，其实更像舞台剧。

简单的人物，简单的情节，简单的场面，可看完以后我的心好像被什么情感裹住，无法言说；直到看了这位豆友的影评，方才恍然大悟。请移玉步→ http://movie.douban.com/review/1517800/

故事开始，是江湖少侠雷力的个人秀：一袭白衣、目光冷峻，双刀舞得天花乱坠。他以为武功高便是一切，名利自然手到擒来，不想江湖险恶，惨遭龙异之摆道后只得自断右臂。是以，少年英雄们前仆后继，而龙大侠却永远是龙大侠。

新出道的封俊杰，双刀舞得同样漂亮，他在小酒馆遇见雷力是一年以后的事情，后者整天把自己封闭在旧日的自责中，早已隐姓埋名不问江湖事。如果让他们一年前碰见，或许能成个“双生花”一样的组合，可缘分特意让他们此时相遇，自有安排。

为什么会一见如故，因为他们就是彼此，断臂后的雷力是升级版的封俊杰，而封俊杰是断臂前雷力的升级版：雷力（断臂前）→封俊杰→雷力（断臂后），一步一步由少年的神采飞扬走向男人的忍辱负重。

封俊杰初见雷力，便立刻被其身上的悲剧气质所吸引，“如果我像你这般放得下，便好了”，殊不知这气质没有一番痛彻心骨的体验，哪儿会轻易得来？而遭奸人算计的雷力，在封俊杰身上看到了从前的自己，踌躇满志，纯洁无暇；初出他回避封俊杰的示好，是觉得自己已被这尘世污浊，不配拥有这么个完美的俊友，后来终被打动，结为兄弟，更一心只想与其（即为纯洁的自己）归隐田园，再不问世事。这便是你中有我，我中有你。

雷力在夕阳中望眼欲穿地等着封俊杰，好不容易重新寻得的“纯洁的自我”又要与龙异之一决高下，雷力对于这个决定惶恐不安。终于，噩耗传来，他愤怒了。这愤怒来得结结实实，没有其他杂念，他就是去复仇的，纯纯粹粋，“我。。。我就是来送死的！”，只为了吊念另一个自己。

故事至此，断臂后的雷力再次面临升级，他有两条路，一是成为比龙异之更恶的恶人，一是另辟蹊径，成为终极版本的雷力。后来我们都看到了，三把刀同时飞起，解决了龙异之，也成就了雷力，他身上所有的包袱一扫而光，连同封俊杰的一份纯洁也重回体内。

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腐女们看“基情”看得眼冒金星，可这到底是种什么样的情感？至少可以肯定，绝对不是同性恋那么简单。基情，是朋友情、兄弟情、也是自恋的情感，一个男人，在另一个男人身上看到了自己，引得他去欣赏、爱慕，英雄所见，惺惺相惜。连旁人看来，也为之动容，只因这情感是如此的纯粹，不参一点欲念。

我想我终于懂了。