这是片尾曲——
如果让我遇见你
而你正当年轻
用最真的心
换你最深的情
如果让你遇见我
而我依然年轻
也相信永恒
是不变的曾经
如果让我离开你
而你已能平静
只愿你放心
也不要你担心
如果让你离开我
假装我也平静
就算是伤心
也当作是无心
时空阻隔
岂止长路迢迢
情丝缠绕
岂是长发飘飘
那红尘俗世的人
为什么
总是多情惹烦恼
本是云该化作雨
投入海的胸襟
却含着泪水
任孤独的飘零
本是属于我的你
同把人生看尽
却无缘再聚
怨苍天变了心
无缘再聚
怨苍天变了心

为什么大家都说不好？我觉得很经典a~就是那种看的时候一直笑，看到最后却想哭的经典啦~尤其星爷要回到现代时，巩俐的那声“星星”~叫得2心都碎了~所以很不能接受周星星回到现在后又追着张敏跑的傻样5~

《摩天营救》万能的胶带和假腿。我们熟悉的巨石强森又一次在危难中拯救了自己的家人，不同的是这一次的地点选在了香港。故事讲的很完整，基本每个细节都有前后的对应，结构工整。特别片中的几场高空戏完成的相当棒，反正恐高的我已经看到腿抖！而这次的强森不再是那种神级设置...  (展开)

这篇影评可能有剧透 艾玛 不知道该说啥了 铁打的贤贤 丑女一和男二 丑哭 我想发图片来验证我 但是这个好像需要很多字 我要开始瞎打了。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。..........。。。。。。。。。。。。。...  (展开)

该来的总会来，一但它来了，你就必须勇敢的去面对。方晶石的爆炸，众多村民在森林走失；卡卡少年意外觉醒邪恶之力，面对不能控制的虚空之力和比他高大魁梧百倍的反派大boss，并没有让他退缩，反而想尝试学习驾驭虚空之力保护世界，正如电影中一位老者所说，只有你有一颗守护的...  (展开)

毫无来历的女孩，连名字都是被女巫的老太太们起的。树拉最高兴的时刻就是她可以给别人带来欢乐，但她无法明白为什么会有一个女巫的身份成为了她？被有的人唾弃，被有的人敬仰，她的生命无法有别的选择，民众泄愤的工具还是一个满足私利的工具？树拉想帮助他人，这是她善良的本...  (展开)

一、多个时空


《纯粹理性批判》中的第一经验类比（Analogies of Experience）要求在现象中有一个恒定且唯一之物来表象意识中的时间本身。恒定，或永恒，因为作为总体的时间本身是始终在那的；惟一，因为只有一个时间。这个惟一且永恒的东西，即现象中的实体（Substance）。康德明确把这个实体与洛克的托子（Substratum）区分开来，认为实体是以各种方式显现于人的，而不是像托子那样不可知，也不显现。

我要说，洛克的托子的作用是保证物的个体化与同一性。这个作用在康德那儿，似乎是由物自体和先验范畴共同完成。先验范畴组织现象，在使意识对现象的认识成为可能的同时，也使同一的意识本身成为可能——对先验对象的构成即对自我的构成。而物自体在这个过程中究竟如何起作用，不详。康德的物自体与洛克的托子一样，是个让理论显得尴尬，却又不得不进行的假设。

尽管康德反复说现象中的实体不是洛克的托子，但这个实体究竟是什么，他又语焉不详。出于他对牛顿力学的接受，有人尝试将其理解为牛顿意义上的质量。我论证过，这样的解读将面临一个两难困境：如果实体是个体化了的质量，时间便不是惟一的；如果实体是现象世界中的总质量，基于二律背反的理由——这个总体无法成为经验对象——我们便无法经验到它。（详细论述见篇末附录）

若是跳出康德阐释，取前一个困境：时间不是惟一的，每个作为现象的物都意味着一个独立的时间体系，我们就科幻了：空间中的一个一个的物，奠基着意识中的一个又一个时间系，我们可以生活在不同的时空中，当我们经验不同的物。甚至，对应地说，我们总在成为另一个人，当我们来到不同的时空。

于是，我情愿把亨利的生活看作对康德的一次失败却有趣的解读。与其说他是一位时间旅行者，一位不停地穿越时空的超人或可怜人，不如说，他的意识中并没有一个绝对惟一的时间，他所来到并离开的每一个时空，都是一个独立自在的世界，尽管这些世界看上去很像，但哪个都不依赖于另一个——从理念的意义上说。


二、沉默，或消失


影片的前半部分，亨利的突然消失被解释为一种不治的遗传疾病。没有理由地，他时不时就去了另一个时空，赤身裸体地寻找可以穿上的衣服。仿佛常人来到一个新的环境，总是迫不及待地寻找一个身份，穿到自己身上。
亨利总会在一个无从预料的时刻消失，克莱尔生活在一个不确定的世界中。她的爱情是确定的，但她爱的人不确定地存在着。她的生活中弥漫着不确定性，而这恰好让她格外珍惜亨利在她身边的每一分钟。

克莱尔一次次怀孕又一次次流产，因为胎儿也有穿越症，莫名其妙地，便在某个时刻，出离了子宫。但克莱尔最后一次怀孕时，对亨利说，你每次消失都是因为感觉到了压力。所以，从现在开始，我要保持绝对地平静，这样胎儿就可以顺利出生了。
看到这里，我恍然大悟，原来亨利的穿越症是个隐喻，关于男人的隐喻：面对压力，便会沉默与回避，这不正是男人的本能反应么——而这在女人看来，仿佛爱人去了另一个时空，不知何时才能回来，甚至，会不会回来。

我查了查，电影改编自一位女造型艺术家的首部小说，写于一段失败的恋情之后。原来如此。

很多年前听到过一个说法：爱情，对男人来说，是挂在墙上的一幅画，你并不总是去看它；但对女人来说，则是房间里音乐，你想不听都不行。所以，男人需要时不时地呆在纯然属于自我的世界里，在沉默中成为自己。女人却要认为这是对她的疏远、对亲密的疏离，并因此而坐立不安，想方设法闯进那份铁一般的沉默。结果，要么把自己撞疼，要么把爱情撞碎。
这是对小儿女情态的描述。若成年点，便会更同情于另一个说法：人生在世，无非是男人讨慰藉，女人讨生活。人并不总是需要慰藉，尤其在得意之时。人却总在生活，就算你不想。


三、看着，却无法改变


在一次穿越中，亨利来到母亲身边，在地铁里，母亲在看报，他们作为陌生人简短却亲切的交谈了一会儿。亨利告诉母亲，他要结婚了，这个女孩让他感到安全。
克莱尔问他：你什么不去阻止那场车祸，既然你可以回到车祸发生之前。“我无法阻止。无数次我回到过去，回到母亲还在的时候，但每次我都无法改变发生着的一切。”——这话让人特别难过。我们并不能改变过去，就像不能重新雕刻一座已然完成的塑像。

不是么？很多时候，我们从自己当下的境遇中抽身而出，试图站在一个更开阔的角度，超脱地看现在的纠结、焦虑，或苦闷，并自嘲这些都没什么的。但当你身在当下，你知道未来的自己就坐在对面，笑着，看着自己，慈悲地。但你还是无法因此脱身而出。你仍然只能呆在你当下的处境中，无论是过分的快乐，还是仿佛无法挣脱的哀伤。

每一个时刻都是三维的，它包含着过去、现在，和未来这三个维度。我们在回忆中编辑时间，编辑自己，有意无意地遗忘一些，并把另一些反复摩挲。过往明明灭灭，像晴天里，随风晃动的百叶窗投在墙上的影子。每次回忆之后，我们都成为另一个人。
未来也是。未来无数次作为想象呈现于当下，各式各样地，仿佛清晰的回忆。回忆与憧憬，如同天平的两臂，对称着，平衡着，在现在这个支点上。所以，现在这个时刻，最重。


四、期限


有天聚会时，亨利中枪后痛苦挣扎的裸体突然出现在他们的门厅里。又消失了。克莱尔说，我从没见过四十岁之后的你。我见过的你总是很年轻。从这个时候起，死亡就成了他们中的另一个在场者，尽管它总是沉默着。

亨利穿越到未来，遇见了自己的已经十岁的女儿。女儿告诉他，他死于自己五岁那年。她们一直很想念他。那时他们的女儿还没出生。那时克莱尔还一如既往地希望与亨利白头偕老，就像她还没长大时那样，就像她长大之后第一次遇到亨利时那样，就像亨利死后，她仍然留着亨利所有的衣服，等着亨利回来那样。

于她而言，亨利是不会死的。他无非是走远了一下子回不来，他无非是在时空中迷了路，找不到一件让他温暖的衣服。

女儿五岁那年，亨利和克莱尔都已知道，亨利即将死去，中弹而死。期限降至，可能在任何一天，任何一个时刻。在它到来之前，所有相聚的时光都是铭刻，都是用最日常的方式来进行的一次祭奠，一次追忆。当这个期限还不确定，他们相爱着，仿佛一对最平凡的恋人；当这个期限已然确定，他们相爱着，装作不知道他们即将分离。

一个期限并不见得让期限到来之前的一切都显得美好。但，美好的东西都有一个期限。确定的期限，或不确定的期限。你不能试图挽留，那会犹如握紧手中的细沙，握得越紧，便流失得越快，宛如时间，从指缝间悄然流走。
这个期限是否到来，何时到来，都不是你能选择的。你能做的，仅仅是在它到来之前的每一刻，不让自己在未来后悔——克莱尔明白这些，并且，她做到了。

而，这不正是人生么。


——————
附录：On Understanding Substance as Mass

Introduction

In the First Analogy of Experience, Kant argues that there must be some permanently persistent substance in the appearances which represents the persistence of time. Given Kant’s endorsement of Newtonian physics, commentators such as Eric Watkins suggest that such permanently persistent substance can be understood as Newtonian mass. In this paper, however, I argue that we face a dilemma when we try to cash out the notion of substance in terms of Newtonian mass.
The paper proceeds in three steps. In the first section, I present the reason why there needs to be a permanently persistent substance in the appearances, and discuss why it seems to be compelling to conceive of the permanently persistent substance as Newtonian Mass. Then, in the second section, I argue that there are (only) two ways of conceiving of the permanently persistent substance as Newtonian mass, namely, to conceive of substance as individuated mass and to conceive of substance as the sum total of mass in the world of appearances. I show that there are textual indications as well as philosophical reasons to support each option. In the third section, however, I argue that both ways suffer from inescapable problems. Thus, conceiving of the permanently persistent substance in terms of Newtonian mass is not viable.

    
Section I. The Permanently Persistent Substance

In this section, I shall first present the reason why Kant thinks that there must be a permanently persistent substance in the appearances. I then discuss why it is compelling to conceive of such substance as Newtonian mass.
In the chapter “System of all principles of pure understanding,” Kant discusses what makes possible the applications of the categories, i.e. the pure concepts of understanding, to objects, i.e. appearances that are given to sensible intuitions. That is, he discusses what it is that makes the categories have objective validity. Kant’s claim is that the applications of the categories are only possible under certain conditions, and these conditions are spelled out by the principles. For instance, the applications of the relational categories (substance-accidents, cause and effect, and mutual interactions) are possible if they are applied to objects according to the principles of Analogies of Experience. In addition to the three specific principles that correspond to each of the three relational categories, Kant also provides a general principle overarching all three Analogies. The general principle is stated in the second edition as follows: “Experience is possible only through the representations of a necessary connection of perceptions” (B 218). Watkins provides a helpful interpretation of this general principle:
“The general idea is that each of the three relational categories represents a necessary connection that is required for experience of a single time and of objects existing and being temporally related to each other within a single time to be possible.” (My emphasis)
Since this paper is focused on the notion of substance in the first Analogy, I shall ignore the second and third Analogies. So I now turn to a close examination of the first Analogy.
The first Analogy, i.e. the principle of the persistence of substance, is stated in the second edition as follows: “In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.” (B 224) Watkins summarizes Kant’s argument for the first Analogy as follows (which I take to be a correct interpretation):
Premise 1: Appearances, i.e. objects of experience, are made possible by time’s persistence.
Premise 2: We do not perceive time itself.
Therefore, In order to have experience of appearances, there must be some permanent substance in the appearances which can represent time or time’s persistence.
While the appearances, as the objects given to our intuitions, are changing, the substance in appearances always stays the same and is permanent. So, Kant calls the permanent substance “the substratum of everything real” (B 225). But, some clarifications about Kant’s use of the term “substratum” are needed to prevent potential confusions. Substratum in Kant’s text does not mean what Locke uses this term to mean, namely, the bearer of properties which is unchanging and about which we can have no knowledge. For, according to Locke, we can only know what is given to our senses, but since the underlying substratum cannot be given to our senses, we have no access to it and therefore cannot know it.
Kant, by constrast, does not think that there is any Lockean substratum in the world of appearances. For Kant, the fact that the states of the substance are changing and the substance stays the same does not mean the states are separable from the substance. Rather, the changing states of the substance are simply the ways in which the substance is given to us. Thus, we can know the substance, that is, we know the substance through its states. In order to avoid the Lockean implication of the term “substratum,” I shall only use “substance” to refer to the permanently persistent thing in the appearances despite Kant’s own use of “substratum” to talk about what is permanent in the appearances.
Since I have argued that Kant’s notion of substance is not the Lockean substratum, then what is the Kantian notion of substance? We need a positive account of what the substance is. It is obvious that such a permanently persistent thing cannot be captured by ordinary physical objects, no matter whether they are natural objects (say, rocks) or artifacts (say, ships), for neither artifacts nor natural objects always stay the same such that in principle they can never suffer changes. So, it seems no ordinarily construed physical things can be qualified as substance that is permanently persistent. On the other hand, it is very hard to imagine that anything non-physical could play the role the substance is supposed to play. For it is hard to imagine how a non-physical being could be given to our sensible intuition or could be spatiotemporally organized by our a priori intuitions. So, it is unlikely that Kant means something non-physical by “substance.” Thus, there are two constraints on spelling out what substance is. First, it is something physical. Second, as I have shown, the physical being that can be understood as substance cannot be ordinarily individuated physical things such as planet or rock.
In order to meet the above two conditions, Watkins suggests that, given Kant’s commitment to Newtonian science, it is likely that Kant has Newtonian mass in mind when he talks about the substance, since no matter how a physical object changes, its mass always stays the same. Since Newtonian mass is physical and is not an ordinarily individuated object, it seems quite compelling that the substance, which is permanently persistent, just is Newtonian mass. According to common sense, Newtonian mass is understood to be underlying objects such that we cannot directly perceive mass but can only perceive mass through the way it is given to our intuition, namely, through the perception of the objects that have mass. Thus, mass is neither unknowable nor directly perceivable, which seems to fit the description of the substance perfectly.
Moreover, there are many textual indications that suggest the identification of substance with mass. Let me note two examples. First, recall the general principle overarching the three specific Analogies, namely, “In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.” (B 224) It seems that “quantum” is most naturally to be understood as mass, for mass seems to be the only thing in nature that is neither increased nor diminished on Newtonian physics.
The other indication is Kant’s example to illustrate his claim that “he <a philosopher> thus assumed that as incontrovertible that even in fire the matter (substance) never disappears but rather only suffers an alteration in its form.” (B 288, my emphasis):
“A philosopher was asked: How much does the smoke weigh? He replied: If you take away from the weight of the wood that was burnt the weight of the ashes that are left over, you will have the weight of the smoke.” (B 288)
We can see that here Kant explicitly identifies substance with matter. And it is quite plausible to think that “matter” is just another way of saying “mass”. That is, “mass” seems to be the theoretical analog of the term “matter.” This hypothesis is supported by the example of the weight of smoke. For, in the example, the way to calculate the weight of smoke just is to calculate the mass (multiplies the gravitational constant).
However, despite the compelling reasons for the identification of substance with mass, in the next sections, I shall argue that the substance cannot be understood as Newtonian mass, for when we try to work out the details of understanding the substance as mass, we face an unavoidable dilemma.


Section II. Some Mass or the Sum Total of Mass

In this section, I shall argue that there are two ways of conceiving of substance as Newtonian mass, and then show that both ways have some support from the text and are to some extent philosophically plausible. So, both ways deserve detailed considerations. But, in the next section, I shall argue that both ways face insurmountable problems.
In identifying substance with mass, we need to settle an ambiguity: Is the mass meant to be some mass, say the mass of a rock which is 7 kilograms (a randomly chosen weight), or to be the sum total of mass in the world of appearances which is a very large but nonetheless definite amount? Since both some mass and the sum total of mass are permanently persistent, we cannot tell which way of identifying is more plausible with respect to the permanent persistence of substance. So, we must appeal to some other philosophically and/or textually interesting points to ground a preference in choosing one over the other.
Let us first consider identifying the substance with some or individuated mass. First, the first Analogy is the principle according to which the relational category substance-accident is to be applied. Kant defines accidents to be “the determinations of a substance that are nothing other than particular ways for it to exist.”(B 229) Many commentators interpret the relation to be between object and its properties or states. Thus it makes more sense to think that the mass, which is the underlying bearer of properties, is the individuated mass of some object, instead of the sum total of mass in the world of appearances. For instance, in the example of the weight of smoke, Kant seems to conceive of substance as the matter, i.e. mass, of an individual object. Moreover, if we conceive of substance as the sum total of mass in the world of appearances, it is very hard to imagine how substance can be the bearer of properties or what kind of properties of which substance is the bearer.
One might argue that, on the interpretation according to which substance is the sum total of mass, even though we could imagine no properties of which substance is the bearer, we can still conceive of substance as the bearer of (changing) states, i.e. the successive states of the world of appearances. I reply that Kant cannot accept such an idea because the states of the world are not objects of possible experience, for it is at least empirically true that no one could have the whole world of appearances as his object of experience. I will return to this point later on in the paper and use it to argue that conceiving of substance as the sum total of mass is untenable given Kant’s theoretic commitments.
The above discussion is about reasons to prefer the identification of substance with some mass. I now turn to the reasons to prefer the identifications of substance with the sum total of mass. There are some textual evidences in the first Analogy that suggest this latter identification. For instance, the following passage:
“…here the issue is only appearances in the field of experience, the unity of which would never be possible if we were to allow new things (as far as their substance is concerned) to arise. For then everything would disappear that alone can represent the unity of time, namely the identity of the substratum in which alone all change has its thoroughgoing unity. This persistence is therefore nothing more than the way in which we represent the existence of things (in appearances).” (B 229/A186, my emphasis)
In this passage, Kant seems to identify the permanent persistent substance that represents the persistence of time with the unity of appearances, which seems to be the sum total of mass in the whole world of appearances. Let me argue for my understanding of this passage that it indicates that Kant identifies substance with the sum total of mass. I shall argue by reductio: Suppose Kant identified substance with individuated mass in the above passage. Then, it would make no sense to think that the arising of new substance could make the representation of the unity of time impossible. For the arising of new substance in no sense affects the substance, i.e. the mass, of the original objects. Let me use an example to illustrate. Suppose there is a rock whose mass is 7 kilograms and there arises a new object out of nothing, whose mass is 5 kilograms. Insofar as the rock’s mass remains the same, whether or not there are new masses arising out of nothing does not affect the unity of the rock’s mass, which is 7 kilograms. Therefore, in this passage, Kant conceives of substance as the sum total of mass in the whole world of appearances.
So far I have shown that there are compelling reasons to identify substance with some mass or with the sum total of mass respectively. In the next section, I shall argue that there are also devastating reasons to each identification such that either way we go, we face unsolvable problems.


Section III. One Single Time and the Limit of Possible Experience

I now turn to the problems from which the each identification suffers. In this section, I shall argue that these problems make both identifications untenable. Let us first consider the identification of substance with individuated mass (i.e. some mass). I argue that the reason why individuated mass cannot be identified with substance is that individuated mass cannot represent the oneness of time. Recall Kant’s argument for the principle of the first Analogy: in order to have experiences of objects as temporal, we must identify a permanently persistent substance that can represent time in objects. While the states of the substance change, the substance persists so that the substance can represent time that persists. It is important to notice that time, which is supposed to be represented by substance in appearances, is one single time. But, individuated mass cannot represent one single time. For there are many individuated masses, for instance, the mass of a rock which is 7 kilograms, the mass of a cup which is 0.5 kilogram, and the mass of a table which is 3 kilograms, each of which is permanently persistent and undergoes changes. If one of them can represent time, any other also can. In that case, we do not have one single time. Rather, we have many times or time-series, each of which is persistent.
Let me explain in details why multiply individuated masses cannot represent on single time. If these individuated masses can represent one single time, there must be some one single thing that is shared by these individuated masses that serves to represent the singularity of time. Whatever this shared thing is, it is not any of these individuated masses. Therefore, individuated mass cannot present one single time. However, on the other hand, time has be to singular. Here is a passage in the first Analogy which explains why time has to be one single time rather than a plurality of times:
“Substances (in appearances) are the substrata of all time-determinations. The arising of some of them and the perishing of others would itself remove the sole condition of the empirical unity of time, and the appearances would then be related to two different times, in which existence flowed side by side, which is absurd. For there is only one time, in which all different times must not be placed simultaneously but only one after another.” (B 232/A189)
One might argue that it does not matter how many individuated masses can represent time, it only matters that there is an individuated mass that represents time. Insofar as there is such a substance, which is permanently persistent, it suffices to represent one single time. I reply that, in that case, we still do not know which individuated mass is suppose to be the representer of the one single time in appearances. For there is not reason to think that the mass of one object is more suitable to represent time than the mass of another object is, insofar as both of the individuated masses are permanently persistent. Any choice of one over the other is arbitrary. But the unity or singularity of time is not arbitrary, for there can only be one time-series which persists, and any other time-series or temporal relations are just temporal parts of this unique time-series. Thus, I conclude that individuated mass cannot be the representer of time in appearances.
I now turn to argue that the sum total of mass cannot represent time either. The idea of my argument is to make use of Kant’s solution to the Antinomies to show that the permanently persistent substance that represents time in the appearances cannot be the sum total of mass because the sum total of mass is not an object of possible experience. Let me lay out my argument in detail.
In “The Antinomy of Pure Reason” chapter, Kant presents four pairs of arguments concerning four cosmological ideas about the world-whole, namely, whether there is a beginning of time, whether there is indivisibly simple substance, whether there is a first cause, and whether there is a necessary existent. As Allen W. Wood argues, the four antinomies share a general form, namely, the thesis of each antinomy claims that there must be a first member of the conditioning-conditioned chain, while the antithesis of each antinomy claims that there is no first member of such a chain and that the chain goes back into infinity. Kant argues that there are valid arguments for each of the four theses as well as valid arguments for each of the four antitheses, so we need a solution to such contradictions.
Kant’s solution to the contradictions, as Wood argues, relies on his doctrine of transcendental idealism. As for the first two antinomies, Wood argues
The mathematical antinomies are generated by mathematical principles that apply to things only insofar as they are given in sensible intuition…But these [the first two] series of conditions are never given to intuition as a whole...The theses are false because the principles of possible experience make it impossible for objects corresponding to the cosmological ideas of a first event, a largest extent of the world or a simple substance, ever to be given to intuition.”
Thus, the reason why Kant thinks that the claims made by the theses of the first and second antinomies are false is that neither the beginning of time nor the spatial boundary of the world or an indivisible substance can ever be given to our sensible intuition. If something cannot be given to our sensible intuition, according to Kant, we cannot have experience of it. Let me call this principle the object-of-sensible-intuition principle, namely, if something cannot be given to our sensible intuitions, then it cannot be object of our possible experience. And we can apply this principle to an object to determine whether that object can be object of possible experience. That is, if the object in question can be given to our sensible intuition, then the object can be object of our possible experience, but if the object cannot be given to our sensible intuition, then it cannot be object of our possible experience.
Now, let me apply the object-of-sensible-intuition principle to the idea of the sum total of mass. We can see that the sum total of mass cannot be given to our sensible intuition, so, the sum total of mass cannot be object of our possible experience. For the world of appearances seems to mean the whole universe or cosmos (because everything in the universe stands in causal relations to each other), there is no way for all of the mass in the whole universe to be given to our sensible intuition. Actually, we do not even know whether there are spatial boundaries of the universe, so we do not even know whether the sum total of mass in the all universe is finite. Thus, the sum total of mass cannot be object of possible experience. So, the sum total of mass cannot be that which represents time in appearances. For the reason there must be a permanently persistent substance in appearances which represents time is to make our temporally connected representations of objects possible. But, if the sum total of mass cannot be object of experience, it cannot make our experience of object possible. Thus, the permanently persistent substance in appearances cannot be the sum total of mass.
One might object that in the antinomies, the cosmological ideas at issue are condition-condition series. (B 436/A410) But the sum total of mass is not a series. Rather, it is an aggregate about which the question of conditioning and conditioned does not arise at all. Thus, Kant’s remarks on the antinomies have no bearing on whether the idea of the sum total of mass has any objective validity or significance. Moreover, the first two antinomies concern whether the conditioning-conditioned series go on into infinities. And it seems that it is impossible for us to experience infinity, for no matter what we experience it is finite insofar as we have experienced it. But, the quantum of the sum total of mass seems to be a definite and finite amount. By virtues of what can we claim that the sum total of mass cannot be object of experience? Is this “cannot” an empirical cannot, or an In-Principle cannot? If the answer is the former, the empirical “cannot” does not seem to be strong enough to show that the sum total of mass cannot be experienced, because we cannot know or predict whether in the future empirical sciences and technologies will make the sum total of mass possible object of experience. If the answer is the latter, at least further explanations of why the sum total of mass, which is a finite and definite amount, cannot be object of possible experience in principle are needed.
To the first objection I have two replies. First, in the first antinomy, Kant also discusses whether there is boundary or the largest extent of space. It is not obvious that there is a spatial series in the sense that it is obvious that there is a temporal series in which one moment succeeds its previous moments. However, according to Kant, we can think of the space acquiring its quantum through repeatedly or successively adding spatial units to the previous spatial units. (A 428/B 456) That is, the way of conceiving of space as a spatial series depends on the way of conceiving of time as a temporal series, which is naturally serial. Then, by the same token, we can also think of the sum total of mass acquiring its quantum by successively adding massive units to previous massive units. Thus, if the object-of-sensible-intuition principle applies to the idea of the boundary of space, it should also apply to the idea of the sum total of mass of the whole world of appearances.
Second, the fact that Kant applies the object-of-sensible-intuition-principle to the first two (or three) cosmological ideas to solve the contradictions does not mean that the principle can only be employed to deal with the antinomies. If the principle is applicable to other ideas, we can also use the principle to deal with other ideas. Since the object-of-sensible-intuition principle is derived from transcendental idealism, which is an important element in the whole Critique, there is no reason why the principle cannot be applied to other ideas than cosmological ideas. Thus, it is legitimate to use the object-of-sensible-intuition principle to show that the sum total of mass of whole world of appearances cannot be object of possible experience. So, the sum total of mass cannot be what represents time in appearances.
My reply to the second objection has two steps. First, it needs to be clarified that, although the first two antinomies concern whether the conditioning-conditioned series are infinite, Kant’s solution by the object-of-sensible-intuition principle does not rely on the whether the series are infinite. The principle only concerns whether the things to which the cosmological ideas refer can be given to our sensible intuition. It does not concern whether the things are infinite. It seems true that infinity cannot be object of sensible intuition. But this does not mean that all finite things can be given to our sensible intuition. Actually Kant rejects the claim that all finite things can be given to our sensible intuition. For Kant thinks the thesis of the first antinomy is false, because the beginning of time or the boundary of space cannot be given to our sensible intuition so that it cannot be object of possible experience.
The second step of my reply is to spell out in which sense of “cannot,” the sum total of mass cannot be object of possible experience. It seems to me that the distinction between empirical “cannot” and In-Principle “cannot” is hard to cash out in the context of Critique. For, in the Critique, any legitimate claim to knowledge entails that the object of which the knowledge is can be experienced. Thus, it seems that the empiricality of the “cannot” entails the In-Principality of the “cannot”.
However, concerning the claim that we cannot predict whether in the future empirical sciences and technologies will make the sum total of mass possible object of experience, what would Kant say? Would Kant agree that future sciences and technologies might or could transform a transcendent idea into an idea which refers to object of possible experience? I do not think he would. For Kant thinks his Critique settles metaphysical questions once and for all by theoretical reason, which is static or a-historical. Future discoveries made by sciences and technologies should be able to do no damage to the doctrines in Critique. Moreover, it should be odd to Kant’s ear that progresses made by empirical sciences could have any bearings on the doctrines in the Critique, which he builds up from scratch employing only pure reason, which is absolutely a-historical.
Thus, I conclude that the above arguments show that identifying substance with the sum total of mass in the world of appearance is not tenable. Since I showed earlier in this section that identifying substance with individuated mass is not tenable either, I conclude that the general strategy of identifying substance with mass is untenable.


Section IV. Concluding Remarks

In this paper, I showed that a seemingly very promising way of understanding the permanently persistent substance discussed in the first Analogy, namely, conceiving of substance as Newtonian mass, is untenable. Then, I wonder whether there are other promising ways of providing a positive account of substance or actually it is the case that the notion of substance in the first Analogy is itself untenable. At this stage, maybe I could follow Kant’s stance on the things of themselves, namely, they exist, but we can have no knowledge about the way of their existence. But, at the same time, we need to have this minimal conviction that they exist. Similarly, concerning substance, we can have no knowledge about what the permanently persistent substance is, but we need to have the minimal conviction that it exists in the world of appearances and it serves to represent time.

电视剧《打狗棍》情节虚假到荒唐的程度
近来很有耐心的看长达70集的抗日大戏《打狗棍》，看看热闹而已。有些情节实在是太虚假了，有的甚至虚假到荒唐的程度。
鸡冠山头领老二婶率众下山打日本鬼子，中了埋伏，几乎全军覆没，老二婶胸部中了数枪。一般人胸部中一枪立即倒毙，这老二婶要害中枪，满胸是血，却与老婆那素芝临终告别，极尽缠绵，除了临终嘱咐，还大肆回忆过去， 因为老婆爱听京剧，还大唱了一段京剧《霸王别姬》。虚假如此，真是匪夷所思。类此之虚假情节，长盛不衰，很有传统性，在很多电视剧中都可以看到，大概是中国电视剧一大特色。
主角戴天理之父戴翰霆手持大刀在避暑山庄大门外刀劈小鬼子，被枪杀，戴家人奔来救护，戴天理的女儿若雪为了防止戴天理冲动，竟向他后脑狠命打了一棍子，令他昏厥，使不可收场的矛盾得以解决。这手法竟成为灵丹妙药，在后面竟用了多次。马九斤在危急时拒绝撤退，被那素芝打击后脑临时昏厥。戴天理受伤没好，却要一个人拿着打狗棒去找鬼子算账，马九斤为了阻止他，也照他后脑打了一下子，昏厥不醒。照电视剧中的打法，不被打死也得严重脑震荡。散打、拳击、搏击等比赛项目，严格禁止击打后脑，是禁击部位。电视剧中这一情节完全违背常理，纯属瞎编。
马九斤胳膊中枪，鲜血染红了半个胳膊，却能手抡大刀，所向披靡。这胳膊实在是神奇威武！
剧中的中医针灸神奇的不得了，马九斤中了一铁球，被打的吐血，靠针灸复原。财神一只手被砍掉、巴瑞德眼睛中飞刀，据剧中说都是靠格格的针灸治好。最神奇的是戴天理胸部、腹部中了好几枪，血染了半个身子，死过去，也靠格格的针灸起死回生。看来医院各科可以关门，只留中医针灸就可以包治百病、起死回生了！
剧中戴天理的儿媳妇格格，居然有神奇的预测功能。马九斤出外几年，格格居然能准确预先知道他要回来了，而且预测无误。日本鬼子来袭的时候，她能预先发出警报，比千里眼、顺风耳还灵。
戴天理得知若冰和高靖湖被小鬼子抓住要枪毙，就自投罗网，闯入丽正门前刑场上，身披大红花，燃放两排大鞭炮，长篇大论痛骂鬼子汉奸，并为二人现场举办婚礼，拜堂成亲，这一幕足足演了半集之长，杀人不眨眼的日本鬼子居然对戴天理的所作所为听之任之，直到这场虚假的戏演完，竟然未开杀戒，真是荒唐到极点。我们的电视剧为了塑造高大的英雄形象，往往肆意编造虚假的情节，其效果可能正相反。这电视剧很多镜头极其血腥，视觉难以接受。实属儿童不宜观看，国外影视剧分级，是很有道理的，中国也应该与国际接轨，目的是保护儿童不受心灵伤害。（转载自http://bbs.hsw.cn/m/read.php?all=1&tid=6118059）

我的一个朋友 今年三十岁。在年初许的新年愿望里其中有一项就是在2010年内结婚。
只不过这个愿望在六月的时候她才想起来。呀 这都过了半年了
可是 你跟谁结婚啊 大家都这么问
她说 我哪儿知道跟谁啊 都知道跟谁结婚了 那还叫闪婚嘛……

然后我无意中看了一个电影儿 《摇摆的婚约》。
因为他的剧照 姚晨和朱雨辰我都喜欢。于是搜出来看一看。
是这样的一个故事：

有这么一对儿白领情侣。男的供职于某科技公司 大概是个中层。女的在《时尚》杂志做小编 打杂儿 跑腿儿 像个小碎催儿样的。婚期就在眼前，俩人住同一屋檐下，奇怪的是 同居在一起 没有夫妻之实。每每到了晚上 这个女的就对男的说 忍忍啊 还有18天就可以睡一起了。看到这的时候 我觉得这个情节假的可以，之前在看郭德纲主持的一个访谈节目 采访对象是文章 说到他和马伊琍的婚事儿，文章说就内天晚上我俩在床上就把这事儿（结婚）给定了……然后全场哄笑，这才是真实的生活嘛。哎呀 跑题儿了。接着说，每每说完 导演就给个特写在这个男的脸上，总是一副苦大仇深的样子 面露难色。镜头一转 这男的的公司里 才知道他和他的女同事已然有了一腿。于是男的就总是一副特纠结的样子 跟哪个女的在一块也没法开心。后来有一天晚上 这个男的大学同学突然到访，要借住在他们家。这个男的就把自己难言的心事跟他的好朋友讲了。说打算和这个女的分手。他的大学同学说 你因为一个女人而离开另一个女人 这不叫分手 这叫抛弃啊。这是整部电影里我印象最深的一句话。后来有一天这个大学同学跟这个女的聊天的时候有意无意的问她 如果你男朋友跟你分手了 你怎么办啊 女的可能是为了安慰刚刚失恋的大学同学 就说 这个世界那么大 谁离开谁活不了啊。其实也未见得是安慰，不就是这么回事儿吗，谁离了谁活不了。然后有一天 这个女的在杂志社又被主编刁难 被调到了仓库做库管 回到家里 这个男的特别认真的跟他说 咱俩分手吧。这个女的都惊了，原来距离他俩的婚期只有一天。这个男的就头也不回的走了。他的大学同学就出去追。说你走算怎么回事儿啊 你走我也得走了。这个男的说 别 你不能走 你安慰安慰他。

于是，真正的男一号和女一号的故事上演了。
这个大学同学也就是真正的男一号就一直陪着这个女的。安慰她保护她。总之这样狗血的剧情不说你也能猜到一二了。 俩人去民政局领了结婚证 然后这个女的跑到他前男友办公室里大闹说 不就结婚嘛 没你 我照样结。接着为了给女方父母一个交代 男一号又去陪她拍了婚纱照。在慢慢接触的过程中 大概就有点爱上这个女人了。后来有一天晚上 这个女的和她的同事还有一民营企业家一起去KTV唱歌，唱到特别晚了还不回去 男一号担心女一号会出事儿 就跑KTV去找他们 还因此产生了个误会 男一号怕女一号被民营企业家色狼揩油 发疯一样的到处找她 甚至还砸了别人一辆车 当然最后进局子了……再往后，其实我就看的没那么认真了，有一搭无一搭的，大概的剧情就是内女的觉得也结了婚了 也算是报复了前男友 男一号也觉得在KTV发生的事儿简直无法言说 俩人就协议去离婚。结果到了民政局一经调节 也没离成。俩人就聊聊天谈谈心 可能这个时候彼此心里都觉得挺有爱的了。回到家 这个男的收拾了东西就离开了。又过了挺多天，男的挺想念女的 就打电话约好一起吃晚饭。结果偏这个时候 前男友来了 说要带女的去山顶看这个城市，说这是这个女的未了的心愿。好不容易车开到了山顶上，这个女的说 咱回去吧。然后骂了一句混蛋 就又开车回去了……然后又赶到内个约好的餐厅，可惜太晚了。就又错过了。再后来，可能是又过了好久 俩人还是挺彼此思念的 然后终于有情人终成了眷属。剧终了。

你说这男的多好啊。挺帅的又贴心还专一。也闪婚。这简直太毒害大众了。
我就对我朋友说 我今天看了一个电影 讲闪婚的 你可千万别看。
她说 我看了以后就会放弃闪婚这个念头了对吗
我说 不是 你看了以后更坚持要闪婚了。
她就叹一口气。
电影多扯啊，现实生活中 哪有这么好的事儿啊。你失恋了 还没来得及一个人悲伤 就有个新的帅哥在你身边嘘寒问暖，陪你一起天荒地老。生活是这样的吗。
当然我的朋友也来不及看，下班之后 她要忙着去相亲了。
你看，生活其实是这个样子。
既然没有那么多的帅哥主动送上门 那就相亲吧。
我朋友本来收拾东西要下班去赴烛光晚餐的时候 突然被部门主管抓来临时开了个会。她就给内男的打了一个电话说要晚一些 临时开个会。内男的说OK 没有问题。40分钟的会议结束后，我朋友打车到了他们约好的地方，到了地儿之后打电话给内男的 原来他根本没到。等了二十分钟之后 男的来了 一开口 咱们找个地喝杯咖啡吧，我已经吃过饭了……我朋友肚子都饿的咕咕叫了，说好的。附近没有咖啡店啊 往前走一走吧，我朋友蹬着十厘米高的高跟鞋陪着他走啊走，然后在一家丝芙兰前 这男的停了脚步，扭头对我朋友说 我要进去买个沐浴乳……我朋友饿着肚子陪着他在店里转了十分钟 付款又要十分钟。这男的买了瓶欧舒丹的沐浴乳，我朋友在心里骂 老娘都没用过这么高级的货。终于买完了 然后在麦当劳，我朋友才得以吃到晚餐 一份儿童套餐，男的点了新地。俩个人，怎么聊都聊不到共同感兴趣的话题。我朋友在心里对他宣判了死刑 估计俩人谁也没想着再见面。

我的朋友回来跟大家发一顿牢骚 生活还是要继续 亲还是要相下去。毕竟2010年 只过了半年，还有六个月的时间 打起精神 继续为爱向前冲。多无奈。哎 年纪越大 越不容易遇到合适的爱人。都说上帝其实早就给每个人都配了对儿 只是为什么 合适的人总也不出现，不是太早就是太晚。 这是一句很流行的话，我20岁的时候认识老雷，他要什么没什么 我就是义无反顾的跟他在一起，我常常想 要是我25岁认识他 他还是一无所有 我铁定不会这么义无反顾的跟了他。连假设一下都不能够，你看是铁定没戏。人的经历越多，对感情的要求就越苛刻，越苛刻就越难找到爱情，转了一圈 等你真的明白所谓婚姻也不过就是两个人在一起过的平凡的日子 没有太多烦恼 舒舒服服的就很好了。可就连这样简单的情感都变得难以寻觅。到底是什么，拌住了我们的双脚呢蒙住了我们的眼睛呢？

这残酷的生活，永远比狗血的电影儿更加的出其不意。

哦对了，我朋友今天上午说，PPS上竟然没有找到这部电影儿 真奇怪。
我说 真的，你还是别看了。

这篇影评可能有剧透 松居大悟确实好狠，本来想说这一部里 过分强调 时间因素 过度贴近现实发展 会让整部电影都陷入到某种平铺直叙的平淡当中（某些电视电影）。但结果没想到随着像 存档点一般的回溯过去，生日那一天发生的所有事情，以及安排得元素一一最终得到回应，这算是工整得，比喻的话就像是...  (展开)