这篇影评可能有剧透 電影開頭是這樣的：少年阿良良木曆醒來，在一座陌生的巨大廢墟中徘蕩，他找到出口，踏出了廢墟，戶外滿佈的烏鴉，清晨的晨光與立在一旁的日本國旗太陽旗映入眼簾－－這一瞬間，少年全身燃起了火焰，他痛苦得嘶哮打滾，察覺自己從人類變成了一個吸血鬼。主題曲響起，黑幕浮出，...  (展开)

一、多个时空


《纯粹理性批判》中的第一经验类比（Analogies of Experience）要求在现象中有一个恒定且唯一之物来表象意识中的时间本身。恒定，或永恒，因为作为总体的时间本身是始终在那的；惟一，因为只有一个时间。这个惟一且永恒的东西，即现象中的实体（Substance）。康德明确把这个实体与洛克的托子（Substratum）区分开来，认为实体是以各种方式显现于人的，而不是像托子那样不可知，也不显现。

我要说，洛克的托子的作用是保证物的个体化与同一性。这个作用在康德那儿，似乎是由物自体和先验范畴共同完成。先验范畴组织现象，在使意识对现象的认识成为可能的同时，也使同一的意识本身成为可能——对先验对象的构成即对自我的构成。而物自体在这个过程中究竟如何起作用，不详。康德的物自体与洛克的托子一样，是个让理论显得尴尬，却又不得不进行的假设。

尽管康德反复说现象中的实体不是洛克的托子，但这个实体究竟是什么，他又语焉不详。出于他对牛顿力学的接受，有人尝试将其理解为牛顿意义上的质量。我论证过，这样的解读将面临一个两难困境：如果实体是个体化了的质量，时间便不是惟一的；如果实体是现象世界中的总质量，基于二律背反的理由——这个总体无法成为经验对象——我们便无法经验到它。（详细论述见篇末附录）

若是跳出康德阐释，取前一个困境：时间不是惟一的，每个作为现象的物都意味着一个独立的时间体系，我们就科幻了：空间中的一个一个的物，奠基着意识中的一个又一个时间系，我们可以生活在不同的时空中，当我们经验不同的物。甚至，对应地说，我们总在成为另一个人，当我们来到不同的时空。

于是，我情愿把亨利的生活看作对康德的一次失败却有趣的解读。与其说他是一位时间旅行者，一位不停地穿越时空的超人或可怜人，不如说，他的意识中并没有一个绝对惟一的时间，他所来到并离开的每一个时空，都是一个独立自在的世界，尽管这些世界看上去很像，但哪个都不依赖于另一个——从理念的意义上说。


二、沉默，或消失


影片的前半部分，亨利的突然消失被解释为一种不治的遗传疾病。没有理由地，他时不时就去了另一个时空，赤身裸体地寻找可以穿上的衣服。仿佛常人来到一个新的环境，总是迫不及待地寻找一个身份，穿到自己身上。
亨利总会在一个无从预料的时刻消失，克莱尔生活在一个不确定的世界中。她的爱情是确定的，但她爱的人不确定地存在着。她的生活中弥漫着不确定性，而这恰好让她格外珍惜亨利在她身边的每一分钟。

克莱尔一次次怀孕又一次次流产，因为胎儿也有穿越症，莫名其妙地，便在某个时刻，出离了子宫。但克莱尔最后一次怀孕时，对亨利说，你每次消失都是因为感觉到了压力。所以，从现在开始，我要保持绝对地平静，这样胎儿就可以顺利出生了。
看到这里，我恍然大悟，原来亨利的穿越症是个隐喻，关于男人的隐喻：面对压力，便会沉默与回避，这不正是男人的本能反应么——而这在女人看来，仿佛爱人去了另一个时空，不知何时才能回来，甚至，会不会回来。

我查了查，电影改编自一位女造型艺术家的首部小说，写于一段失败的恋情之后。原来如此。

很多年前听到过一个说法：爱情，对男人来说，是挂在墙上的一幅画，你并不总是去看它；但对女人来说，则是房间里音乐，你想不听都不行。所以，男人需要时不时地呆在纯然属于自我的世界里，在沉默中成为自己。女人却要认为这是对她的疏远、对亲密的疏离，并因此而坐立不安，想方设法闯进那份铁一般的沉默。结果，要么把自己撞疼，要么把爱情撞碎。
这是对小儿女情态的描述。若成年点，便会更同情于另一个说法：人生在世，无非是男人讨慰藉，女人讨生活。人并不总是需要慰藉，尤其在得意之时。人却总在生活，就算你不想。


三、看着，却无法改变


在一次穿越中，亨利来到母亲身边，在地铁里，母亲在看报，他们作为陌生人简短却亲切的交谈了一会儿。亨利告诉母亲，他要结婚了，这个女孩让他感到安全。
克莱尔问他：你什么不去阻止那场车祸，既然你可以回到车祸发生之前。“我无法阻止。无数次我回到过去，回到母亲还在的时候，但每次我都无法改变发生着的一切。”——这话让人特别难过。我们并不能改变过去，就像不能重新雕刻一座已然完成的塑像。

不是么？很多时候，我们从自己当下的境遇中抽身而出，试图站在一个更开阔的角度，超脱地看现在的纠结、焦虑，或苦闷，并自嘲这些都没什么的。但当你身在当下，你知道未来的自己就坐在对面，笑着，看着自己，慈悲地。但你还是无法因此脱身而出。你仍然只能呆在你当下的处境中，无论是过分的快乐，还是仿佛无法挣脱的哀伤。

每一个时刻都是三维的，它包含着过去、现在，和未来这三个维度。我们在回忆中编辑时间，编辑自己，有意无意地遗忘一些，并把另一些反复摩挲。过往明明灭灭，像晴天里，随风晃动的百叶窗投在墙上的影子。每次回忆之后，我们都成为另一个人。
未来也是。未来无数次作为想象呈现于当下，各式各样地，仿佛清晰的回忆。回忆与憧憬，如同天平的两臂，对称着，平衡着，在现在这个支点上。所以，现在这个时刻，最重。


四、期限


有天聚会时，亨利中枪后痛苦挣扎的裸体突然出现在他们的门厅里。又消失了。克莱尔说，我从没见过四十岁之后的你。我见过的你总是很年轻。从这个时候起，死亡就成了他们中的另一个在场者，尽管它总是沉默着。

亨利穿越到未来，遇见了自己的已经十岁的女儿。女儿告诉他，他死于自己五岁那年。她们一直很想念他。那时他们的女儿还没出生。那时克莱尔还一如既往地希望与亨利白头偕老，就像她还没长大时那样，就像她长大之后第一次遇到亨利时那样，就像亨利死后，她仍然留着亨利所有的衣服，等着亨利回来那样。

于她而言，亨利是不会死的。他无非是走远了一下子回不来，他无非是在时空中迷了路，找不到一件让他温暖的衣服。

女儿五岁那年，亨利和克莱尔都已知道，亨利即将死去，中弹而死。期限降至，可能在任何一天，任何一个时刻。在它到来之前，所有相聚的时光都是铭刻，都是用最日常的方式来进行的一次祭奠，一次追忆。当这个期限还不确定，他们相爱着，仿佛一对最平凡的恋人；当这个期限已然确定，他们相爱着，装作不知道他们即将分离。

一个期限并不见得让期限到来之前的一切都显得美好。但，美好的东西都有一个期限。确定的期限，或不确定的期限。你不能试图挽留，那会犹如握紧手中的细沙，握得越紧，便流失得越快，宛如时间，从指缝间悄然流走。
这个期限是否到来，何时到来，都不是你能选择的。你能做的，仅仅是在它到来之前的每一刻，不让自己在未来后悔——克莱尔明白这些，并且，她做到了。

而，这不正是人生么。


——————
附录：On Understanding Substance as Mass

Introduction

In the First Analogy of Experience, Kant argues that there must be some permanently persistent substance in the appearances which represents the persistence of time. Given Kant’s endorsement of Newtonian physics, commentators such as Eric Watkins suggest that such permanently persistent substance can be understood as Newtonian mass. In this paper, however, I argue that we face a dilemma when we try to cash out the notion of substance in terms of Newtonian mass.
The paper proceeds in three steps. In the first section, I present the reason why there needs to be a permanently persistent substance in the appearances, and discuss why it seems to be compelling to conceive of the permanently persistent substance as Newtonian Mass. Then, in the second section, I argue that there are (only) two ways of conceiving of the permanently persistent substance as Newtonian mass, namely, to conceive of substance as individuated mass and to conceive of substance as the sum total of mass in the world of appearances. I show that there are textual indications as well as philosophical reasons to support each option. In the third section, however, I argue that both ways suffer from inescapable problems. Thus, conceiving of the permanently persistent substance in terms of Newtonian mass is not viable.

    
Section I. The Permanently Persistent Substance

In this section, I shall first present the reason why Kant thinks that there must be a permanently persistent substance in the appearances. I then discuss why it is compelling to conceive of such substance as Newtonian mass.
In the chapter “System of all principles of pure understanding,” Kant discusses what makes possible the applications of the categories, i.e. the pure concepts of understanding, to objects, i.e. appearances that are given to sensible intuitions. That is, he discusses what it is that makes the categories have objective validity. Kant’s claim is that the applications of the categories are only possible under certain conditions, and these conditions are spelled out by the principles. For instance, the applications of the relational categories (substance-accidents, cause and effect, and mutual interactions) are possible if they are applied to objects according to the principles of Analogies of Experience. In addition to the three specific principles that correspond to each of the three relational categories, Kant also provides a general principle overarching all three Analogies. The general principle is stated in the second edition as follows: “Experience is possible only through the representations of a necessary connection of perceptions” (B 218). Watkins provides a helpful interpretation of this general principle:
“The general idea is that each of the three relational categories represents a necessary connection that is required for experience of a single time and of objects existing and being temporally related to each other within a single time to be possible.” (My emphasis)
Since this paper is focused on the notion of substance in the first Analogy, I shall ignore the second and third Analogies. So I now turn to a close examination of the first Analogy.
The first Analogy, i.e. the principle of the persistence of substance, is stated in the second edition as follows: “In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.” (B 224) Watkins summarizes Kant’s argument for the first Analogy as follows (which I take to be a correct interpretation):
Premise 1: Appearances, i.e. objects of experience, are made possible by time’s persistence.
Premise 2: We do not perceive time itself.
Therefore, In order to have experience of appearances, there must be some permanent substance in the appearances which can represent time or time’s persistence.
While the appearances, as the objects given to our intuitions, are changing, the substance in appearances always stays the same and is permanent. So, Kant calls the permanent substance “the substratum of everything real” (B 225). But, some clarifications about Kant’s use of the term “substratum” are needed to prevent potential confusions. Substratum in Kant’s text does not mean what Locke uses this term to mean, namely, the bearer of properties which is unchanging and about which we can have no knowledge. For, according to Locke, we can only know what is given to our senses, but since the underlying substratum cannot be given to our senses, we have no access to it and therefore cannot know it.
Kant, by constrast, does not think that there is any Lockean substratum in the world of appearances. For Kant, the fact that the states of the substance are changing and the substance stays the same does not mean the states are separable from the substance. Rather, the changing states of the substance are simply the ways in which the substance is given to us. Thus, we can know the substance, that is, we know the substance through its states. In order to avoid the Lockean implication of the term “substratum,” I shall only use “substance” to refer to the permanently persistent thing in the appearances despite Kant’s own use of “substratum” to talk about what is permanent in the appearances.
Since I have argued that Kant’s notion of substance is not the Lockean substratum, then what is the Kantian notion of substance? We need a positive account of what the substance is. It is obvious that such a permanently persistent thing cannot be captured by ordinary physical objects, no matter whether they are natural objects (say, rocks) or artifacts (say, ships), for neither artifacts nor natural objects always stay the same such that in principle they can never suffer changes. So, it seems no ordinarily construed physical things can be qualified as substance that is permanently persistent. On the other hand, it is very hard to imagine that anything non-physical could play the role the substance is supposed to play. For it is hard to imagine how a non-physical being could be given to our sensible intuition or could be spatiotemporally organized by our a priori intuitions. So, it is unlikely that Kant means something non-physical by “substance.” Thus, there are two constraints on spelling out what substance is. First, it is something physical. Second, as I have shown, the physical being that can be understood as substance cannot be ordinarily individuated physical things such as planet or rock.
In order to meet the above two conditions, Watkins suggests that, given Kant’s commitment to Newtonian science, it is likely that Kant has Newtonian mass in mind when he talks about the substance, since no matter how a physical object changes, its mass always stays the same. Since Newtonian mass is physical and is not an ordinarily individuated object, it seems quite compelling that the substance, which is permanently persistent, just is Newtonian mass. According to common sense, Newtonian mass is understood to be underlying objects such that we cannot directly perceive mass but can only perceive mass through the way it is given to our intuition, namely, through the perception of the objects that have mass. Thus, mass is neither unknowable nor directly perceivable, which seems to fit the description of the substance perfectly.
Moreover, there are many textual indications that suggest the identification of substance with mass. Let me note two examples. First, recall the general principle overarching the three specific Analogies, namely, “In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.” (B 224) It seems that “quantum” is most naturally to be understood as mass, for mass seems to be the only thing in nature that is neither increased nor diminished on Newtonian physics.
The other indication is Kant’s example to illustrate his claim that “he <a philosopher> thus assumed that as incontrovertible that even in fire the matter (substance) never disappears but rather only suffers an alteration in its form.” (B 288, my emphasis):
“A philosopher was asked: How much does the smoke weigh? He replied: If you take away from the weight of the wood that was burnt the weight of the ashes that are left over, you will have the weight of the smoke.” (B 288)
We can see that here Kant explicitly identifies substance with matter. And it is quite plausible to think that “matter” is just another way of saying “mass”. That is, “mass” seems to be the theoretical analog of the term “matter.” This hypothesis is supported by the example of the weight of smoke. For, in the example, the way to calculate the weight of smoke just is to calculate the mass (multiplies the gravitational constant).
However, despite the compelling reasons for the identification of substance with mass, in the next sections, I shall argue that the substance cannot be understood as Newtonian mass, for when we try to work out the details of understanding the substance as mass, we face an unavoidable dilemma.


Section II. Some Mass or the Sum Total of Mass

In this section, I shall argue that there are two ways of conceiving of substance as Newtonian mass, and then show that both ways have some support from the text and are to some extent philosophically plausible. So, both ways deserve detailed considerations. But, in the next section, I shall argue that both ways face insurmountable problems.
In identifying substance with mass, we need to settle an ambiguity: Is the mass meant to be some mass, say the mass of a rock which is 7 kilograms (a randomly chosen weight), or to be the sum total of mass in the world of appearances which is a very large but nonetheless definite amount? Since both some mass and the sum total of mass are permanently persistent, we cannot tell which way of identifying is more plausible with respect to the permanent persistence of substance. So, we must appeal to some other philosophically and/or textually interesting points to ground a preference in choosing one over the other.
Let us first consider identifying the substance with some or individuated mass. First, the first Analogy is the principle according to which the relational category substance-accident is to be applied. Kant defines accidents to be “the determinations of a substance that are nothing other than particular ways for it to exist.”(B 229) Many commentators interpret the relation to be between object and its properties or states. Thus it makes more sense to think that the mass, which is the underlying bearer of properties, is the individuated mass of some object, instead of the sum total of mass in the world of appearances. For instance, in the example of the weight of smoke, Kant seems to conceive of substance as the matter, i.e. mass, of an individual object. Moreover, if we conceive of substance as the sum total of mass in the world of appearances, it is very hard to imagine how substance can be the bearer of properties or what kind of properties of which substance is the bearer.
One might argue that, on the interpretation according to which substance is the sum total of mass, even though we could imagine no properties of which substance is the bearer, we can still conceive of substance as the bearer of (changing) states, i.e. the successive states of the world of appearances. I reply that Kant cannot accept such an idea because the states of the world are not objects of possible experience, for it is at least empirically true that no one could have the whole world of appearances as his object of experience. I will return to this point later on in the paper and use it to argue that conceiving of substance as the sum total of mass is untenable given Kant’s theoretic commitments.
The above discussion is about reasons to prefer the identification of substance with some mass. I now turn to the reasons to prefer the identifications of substance with the sum total of mass. There are some textual evidences in the first Analogy that suggest this latter identification. For instance, the following passage:
“…here the issue is only appearances in the field of experience, the unity of which would never be possible if we were to allow new things (as far as their substance is concerned) to arise. For then everything would disappear that alone can represent the unity of time, namely the identity of the substratum in which alone all change has its thoroughgoing unity. This persistence is therefore nothing more than the way in which we represent the existence of things (in appearances).” (B 229/A186, my emphasis)
In this passage, Kant seems to identify the permanent persistent substance that represents the persistence of time with the unity of appearances, which seems to be the sum total of mass in the whole world of appearances. Let me argue for my understanding of this passage that it indicates that Kant identifies substance with the sum total of mass. I shall argue by reductio: Suppose Kant identified substance with individuated mass in the above passage. Then, it would make no sense to think that the arising of new substance could make the representation of the unity of time impossible. For the arising of new substance in no sense affects the substance, i.e. the mass, of the original objects. Let me use an example to illustrate. Suppose there is a rock whose mass is 7 kilograms and there arises a new object out of nothing, whose mass is 5 kilograms. Insofar as the rock’s mass remains the same, whether or not there are new masses arising out of nothing does not affect the unity of the rock’s mass, which is 7 kilograms. Therefore, in this passage, Kant conceives of substance as the sum total of mass in the whole world of appearances.
So far I have shown that there are compelling reasons to identify substance with some mass or with the sum total of mass respectively. In the next section, I shall argue that there are also devastating reasons to each identification such that either way we go, we face unsolvable problems.


Section III. One Single Time and the Limit of Possible Experience

I now turn to the problems from which the each identification suffers. In this section, I shall argue that these problems make both identifications untenable. Let us first consider the identification of substance with individuated mass (i.e. some mass). I argue that the reason why individuated mass cannot be identified with substance is that individuated mass cannot represent the oneness of time. Recall Kant’s argument for the principle of the first Analogy: in order to have experiences of objects as temporal, we must identify a permanently persistent substance that can represent time in objects. While the states of the substance change, the substance persists so that the substance can represent time that persists. It is important to notice that time, which is supposed to be represented by substance in appearances, is one single time. But, individuated mass cannot represent one single time. For there are many individuated masses, for instance, the mass of a rock which is 7 kilograms, the mass of a cup which is 0.5 kilogram, and the mass of a table which is 3 kilograms, each of which is permanently persistent and undergoes changes. If one of them can represent time, any other also can. In that case, we do not have one single time. Rather, we have many times or time-series, each of which is persistent.
Let me explain in details why multiply individuated masses cannot represent on single time. If these individuated masses can represent one single time, there must be some one single thing that is shared by these individuated masses that serves to represent the singularity of time. Whatever this shared thing is, it is not any of these individuated masses. Therefore, individuated mass cannot present one single time. However, on the other hand, time has be to singular. Here is a passage in the first Analogy which explains why time has to be one single time rather than a plurality of times:
“Substances (in appearances) are the substrata of all time-determinations. The arising of some of them and the perishing of others would itself remove the sole condition of the empirical unity of time, and the appearances would then be related to two different times, in which existence flowed side by side, which is absurd. For there is only one time, in which all different times must not be placed simultaneously but only one after another.” (B 232/A189)
One might argue that it does not matter how many individuated masses can represent time, it only matters that there is an individuated mass that represents time. Insofar as there is such a substance, which is permanently persistent, it suffices to represent one single time. I reply that, in that case, we still do not know which individuated mass is suppose to be the representer of the one single time in appearances. For there is not reason to think that the mass of one object is more suitable to represent time than the mass of another object is, insofar as both of the individuated masses are permanently persistent. Any choice of one over the other is arbitrary. But the unity or singularity of time is not arbitrary, for there can only be one time-series which persists, and any other time-series or temporal relations are just temporal parts of this unique time-series. Thus, I conclude that individuated mass cannot be the representer of time in appearances.
I now turn to argue that the sum total of mass cannot represent time either. The idea of my argument is to make use of Kant’s solution to the Antinomies to show that the permanently persistent substance that represents time in the appearances cannot be the sum total of mass because the sum total of mass is not an object of possible experience. Let me lay out my argument in detail.
In “The Antinomy of Pure Reason” chapter, Kant presents four pairs of arguments concerning four cosmological ideas about the world-whole, namely, whether there is a beginning of time, whether there is indivisibly simple substance, whether there is a first cause, and whether there is a necessary existent. As Allen W. Wood argues, the four antinomies share a general form, namely, the thesis of each antinomy claims that there must be a first member of the conditioning-conditioned chain, while the antithesis of each antinomy claims that there is no first member of such a chain and that the chain goes back into infinity. Kant argues that there are valid arguments for each of the four theses as well as valid arguments for each of the four antitheses, so we need a solution to such contradictions.
Kant’s solution to the contradictions, as Wood argues, relies on his doctrine of transcendental idealism. As for the first two antinomies, Wood argues
The mathematical antinomies are generated by mathematical principles that apply to things only insofar as they are given in sensible intuition…But these [the first two] series of conditions are never given to intuition as a whole...The theses are false because the principles of possible experience make it impossible for objects corresponding to the cosmological ideas of a first event, a largest extent of the world or a simple substance, ever to be given to intuition.”
Thus, the reason why Kant thinks that the claims made by the theses of the first and second antinomies are false is that neither the beginning of time nor the spatial boundary of the world or an indivisible substance can ever be given to our sensible intuition. If something cannot be given to our sensible intuition, according to Kant, we cannot have experience of it. Let me call this principle the object-of-sensible-intuition principle, namely, if something cannot be given to our sensible intuitions, then it cannot be object of our possible experience. And we can apply this principle to an object to determine whether that object can be object of possible experience. That is, if the object in question can be given to our sensible intuition, then the object can be object of our possible experience, but if the object cannot be given to our sensible intuition, then it cannot be object of our possible experience.
Now, let me apply the object-of-sensible-intuition principle to the idea of the sum total of mass. We can see that the sum total of mass cannot be given to our sensible intuition, so, the sum total of mass cannot be object of our possible experience. For the world of appearances seems to mean the whole universe or cosmos (because everything in the universe stands in causal relations to each other), there is no way for all of the mass in the whole universe to be given to our sensible intuition. Actually, we do not even know whether there are spatial boundaries of the universe, so we do not even know whether the sum total of mass in the all universe is finite. Thus, the sum total of mass cannot be object of possible experience. So, the sum total of mass cannot be that which represents time in appearances. For the reason there must be a permanently persistent substance in appearances which represents time is to make our temporally connected representations of objects possible. But, if the sum total of mass cannot be object of experience, it cannot make our experience of object possible. Thus, the permanently persistent substance in appearances cannot be the sum total of mass.
One might object that in the antinomies, the cosmological ideas at issue are condition-condition series. (B 436/A410) But the sum total of mass is not a series. Rather, it is an aggregate about which the question of conditioning and conditioned does not arise at all. Thus, Kant’s remarks on the antinomies have no bearing on whether the idea of the sum total of mass has any objective validity or significance. Moreover, the first two antinomies concern whether the conditioning-conditioned series go on into infinities. And it seems that it is impossible for us to experience infinity, for no matter what we experience it is finite insofar as we have experienced it. But, the quantum of the sum total of mass seems to be a definite and finite amount. By virtues of what can we claim that the sum total of mass cannot be object of experience? Is this “cannot” an empirical cannot, or an In-Principle cannot? If the answer is the former, the empirical “cannot” does not seem to be strong enough to show that the sum total of mass cannot be experienced, because we cannot know or predict whether in the future empirical sciences and technologies will make the sum total of mass possible object of experience. If the answer is the latter, at least further explanations of why the sum total of mass, which is a finite and definite amount, cannot be object of possible experience in principle are needed.
To the first objection I have two replies. First, in the first antinomy, Kant also discusses whether there is boundary or the largest extent of space. It is not obvious that there is a spatial series in the sense that it is obvious that there is a temporal series in which one moment succeeds its previous moments. However, according to Kant, we can think of the space acquiring its quantum through repeatedly or successively adding spatial units to the previous spatial units. (A 428/B 456) That is, the way of conceiving of space as a spatial series depends on the way of conceiving of time as a temporal series, which is naturally serial. Then, by the same token, we can also think of the sum total of mass acquiring its quantum by successively adding massive units to previous massive units. Thus, if the object-of-sensible-intuition principle applies to the idea of the boundary of space, it should also apply to the idea of the sum total of mass of the whole world of appearances.
Second, the fact that Kant applies the object-of-sensible-intuition-principle to the first two (or three) cosmological ideas to solve the contradictions does not mean that the principle can only be employed to deal with the antinomies. If the principle is applicable to other ideas, we can also use the principle to deal with other ideas. Since the object-of-sensible-intuition principle is derived from transcendental idealism, which is an important element in the whole Critique, there is no reason why the principle cannot be applied to other ideas than cosmological ideas. Thus, it is legitimate to use the object-of-sensible-intuition principle to show that the sum total of mass of whole world of appearances cannot be object of possible experience. So, the sum total of mass cannot be what represents time in appearances.
My reply to the second objection has two steps. First, it needs to be clarified that, although the first two antinomies concern whether the conditioning-conditioned series are infinite, Kant’s solution by the object-of-sensible-intuition principle does not rely on the whether the series are infinite. The principle only concerns whether the things to which the cosmological ideas refer can be given to our sensible intuition. It does not concern whether the things are infinite. It seems true that infinity cannot be object of sensible intuition. But this does not mean that all finite things can be given to our sensible intuition. Actually Kant rejects the claim that all finite things can be given to our sensible intuition. For Kant thinks the thesis of the first antinomy is false, because the beginning of time or the boundary of space cannot be given to our sensible intuition so that it cannot be object of possible experience.
The second step of my reply is to spell out in which sense of “cannot,” the sum total of mass cannot be object of possible experience. It seems to me that the distinction between empirical “cannot” and In-Principle “cannot” is hard to cash out in the context of Critique. For, in the Critique, any legitimate claim to knowledge entails that the object of which the knowledge is can be experienced. Thus, it seems that the empiricality of the “cannot” entails the In-Principality of the “cannot”.
However, concerning the claim that we cannot predict whether in the future empirical sciences and technologies will make the sum total of mass possible object of experience, what would Kant say? Would Kant agree that future sciences and technologies might or could transform a transcendent idea into an idea which refers to object of possible experience? I do not think he would. For Kant thinks his Critique settles metaphysical questions once and for all by theoretical reason, which is static or a-historical. Future discoveries made by sciences and technologies should be able to do no damage to the doctrines in Critique. Moreover, it should be odd to Kant’s ear that progresses made by empirical sciences could have any bearings on the doctrines in the Critique, which he builds up from scratch employing only pure reason, which is absolutely a-historical.
Thus, I conclude that the above arguments show that identifying substance with the sum total of mass in the world of appearance is not tenable. Since I showed earlier in this section that identifying substance with individuated mass is not tenable either, I conclude that the general strategy of identifying substance with mass is untenable.


Section IV. Concluding Remarks

In this paper, I showed that a seemingly very promising way of understanding the permanently persistent substance discussed in the first Analogy, namely, conceiving of substance as Newtonian mass, is untenable. Then, I wonder whether there are other promising ways of providing a positive account of substance or actually it is the case that the notion of substance in the first Analogy is itself untenable. At this stage, maybe I could follow Kant’s stance on the things of themselves, namely, they exist, but we can have no knowledge about the way of their existence. But, at the same time, we need to have this minimal conviction that they exist. Similarly, concerning substance, we can have no knowledge about what the permanently persistent substance is, but we need to have the minimal conviction that it exists in the world of appearances and it serves to represent time.

    如果说唐山大地震是对灾难的痛苦回忆，那么倾城就是灾难中人性的升华。
    看完整部影片，我多么渴望自己永远停留在前二十分钟和谐自然的生活中不再出来。但是生活就是生活，喜怒哀乐是每个人所不能掌控的。我们能做的，只能是让自己活的无怨无悔。
    对于这部影片，我只能说是我近些时日以来看过的最好看的电影。它还原了生活，因为生活就是有嬉笑也有痛苦；它还原了人性，因为人性总是有善良也有邪恶。生活是如此，电影亦是如此。
    正能量的电影，正能量的生活，我们都需要正能量。
    不说了，让我安静一下。有空看看吧。。。。。。。

《步步追魂》这部惊悚片可谓是考虑到观众的种种需要，惊悚、情欲、床戏、悬疑……每个镜头都力求刺激观众的视觉神经，片中以袁成杰、谭卓领衔的各位主演皆是帅哥靓女组合，不仅很养眼，而且表演的力度能感觉的出来，很用心的一部片子。影片基于一个发生在医院之中的恐怖事件，原本在医院工作的男主人公意外卷入了一起阴谋之中，内部的阴谋搞鬼和外在的危险交织在一起，直到影片最后，才能解开最后的谜底，而男女主人公的痴情热恋在最后也面临着最大的生死考验。


号称“惊吓零距离”的本片，采用了3D拍摄团队实景拍摄，据说本片是由《龙门飞甲》3D拍摄团队与《寒战》特效团队共同打造的，这在质量上是给予保证的，如今电影发展的趋势和影院影厅的配置，3D电影的票房要超过普通2D影片，尤其是以视觉效果为主的影片，惊悚片是做3D的最佳类型片之一，那种如影随形身临其境的惊吓，往往让观众尤其是女性观众尖叫不已。本片在片头服用迷幻药自杀的那段戏上，破碎的镜子，飞溅的血滴，颇有冲击力。片中的大部分场景也是全3D拍摄的，层次感分明。另外，当男主角进入幻觉时，冒出来的长舌厉鬼是本片最大的吓点，在影院看的时候，大部分观众在那一刻有尖叫声放出来。


袁成杰可谓是影片的主心骨，整个剧情的推动靠着他对正义的坚持，对真相的坚持，还有对爱情的坚持，本来可以置身事外，最后他的坚持让自己差一点粉身碎骨，这也是影片所传递出来的正能量，在这个社会，黑暗面无处不在，能够坚持自己的良心的人，并不多见，往往会在某一个压力点上放弃了自己的原则。另外，想要揭开真相，不仅需要勇气，还需要智慧，甚至是手段，袁成杰饰演的医生周劼对付坏人的手段最后甚至已经属于复仇，在中国电影的审查尺度下，正义的一方采用接近于虐杀的手段，其实已经有些踩线了。

11月的电影档期片子多，几部好莱坞大片肯定要分去最多的票房份额，而作为类型片里很鲜明的惊悚题材《步步追魂》有望能取得不错的票房，因为上周几部小清新爱情片已经欢度了光棍节，现在到了惊悚一刻的重口味时间，所以蛮期待这个电影能取得不错的票房成绩。

风消逝了，循着自己的旧梦，在不眠的时光里静静地等待。四年里，她就像一片孤独的落叶，只在飘零的凄美中惊鸿，也许是她的古装戏太多太多了，以至于视觉极度疲劳，即使她依然在风中浪漫的飞舞，心中总会升腾出一种莫名的等待，等待有一天沉醉于她超然的身影中。

那年真人秀《偶像来了》，娜扎的现代穿搭遭到网友“求同款”，2016上半年虽然满屏的娜扎，但总也不觉得她就是为古装而生的，当她的黑史被淡化以后，从未像现在这样如此期待她的时装剧，直到江苏卫视幸福剧场正在热播的《柠檬初上》里的宁小檬，一个极具生活气息的普通女孩，由青涩单纯的大学生演绎至跨越八年时光逐渐成长的成熟女性，初演时装剧就跨度如此之大，这是一次性让你看个够的节奏么，虽说她曾经也在胡歌的《旋风十一人》的剧集中有过客串，但实在没看过瘾，娜扎会打扮在圈内也是小有名气，追了几集她的新戏《柠檬初上》，无论是清新利落的短发还是干练时尚的波波头或是八年前刚生下妙妙时的长发飘飘，都是女人味十足，如果你看娜扎霸屏的古装戏看到有些麻木了，不如换换口味细品一杯《柠檬初上》，这里不仅有台湾垦丁如诗如画的景致，还有娜扎首次挑战揪心辣妈的小皱眉哦。

说起辣妈，对于年级不大毫无经验的娜扎来说，实在有点难度，在如今“看脸”的时代里，空有颜值没有演技也是空谈，娜扎每次进组之前就会做足功课，了解导演的拍摄风格，研读剧本，和其他演员切磋演技，在当今浮躁的娱乐圈内，这样的新人其实很难得，《柠檬初上》作为娜扎的重要转型作品，她可谓是全身心投入，甚至还把“宁小檬”带入自己的私人生活中去，要做一个“妈妈”，戏中还要和一个八岁的“女儿”妙妙搭戏，这种情感的掌控非常的有难度，娜扎想到的就是和这位扮演妙妙的台湾小姑娘朝夕相处培养感情，不管年龄怎么样，至少关系要变得融洽才是。直到有一天她们相处的如同闺蜜一般，娜扎就知道，她对驾驭好宁小檬这样一个始终处于抉择之中，前路扑朔迷离的年轻母亲已经有底了。有一场娜扎回来找寻妙妙的戏，在skyline的偶遇，那种盼了八年，女儿就在身后，自己又在犹豫要不要迅速回头，回头看见女儿又该是怎样一种表情，自己日夜思念的复杂情绪在距离女儿不到两米时迅速膨胀到兴奋，可这种兴奋马上又要被理智所抑制，时间是魔鬼，宁小檬脸上写着愧疚，她有点小心的偷偷打量这个八年来不闻不问的女儿，目光对视时，妙妙只是如同看旅馆来来走走的陌生人一样瞥了一眼这个陌生的，挺漂亮的阿姨，而宁小檬看到的是女儿一种倔强的眼神，在没有妈妈日子里，她必须坚强的面对爱的缺失，对复杂情感的拿捏，是我在娜扎的眼睛里看到最直接的变化，她的眼睛里有戏了，其实了解娜扎的朋友知道，她本是一位不擅交流的女孩，如今生活的历练让她成熟多了，无论在角色定位、或者造型都让人值得期待。

作为一个典型宅女，平时娜扎也就喜欢看着韩剧吃零食。生活的习惯也影响着她对剧本的选择，总还是无法逃出最熟悉的路子，她也明白古装剧女神的名号加持一辈子也并不是多光鲜的事情，这只能证明自己在古装戏方面是非常擅长的，可一个演员绝不能只拘泥于一角容易被定型，勇敢迈出去就会看到更广袤的世界，总还会记得《偶像来了》时娜扎的眼泪，是对过往的痛苦释放也是对未来的勇敢前行，如今有了好的事业，也有了好的感情，那个自信满满的娜扎又回来了。

与其等待你渴望的东西降临，倒不如怀揣信心去追求。《柠檬初上》里娜扎和刘恺威、孙艺洲的新鲜组合不可谓不吸睛，特别是与“冻龄男神”之称的刘恺威组18岁年龄差CP，这画风一点都没有觉得怪异，反倒让一群网友觉得清新自然，娜扎饰演的宁小檬在戏中乐观开朗、热情真诚，勇敢追求自己想要的爱情。两人从校园到职场，从相知到相爱，时而针锋相对火花四溅，时而互相扶持温暖动人，与以往偶像剧不同的是，《柠檬初上》主打轻虐高糖风格，保持了剧情的张力却向狗血桥段说不，暖心的画风加之高颜值的组合，一晚上我一口气连追六集表示无压力，这样有点不负责任的“妈”，我想说一点也不让我感到反感，会而会被这段喜泪交织的浪漫爱情逼得有点泪花涌出，老男人姑且如此了，你们呢？

我为了这个已荡然无存的建筑，辗转反侧了3个小时而不能入眠。
把圆明园称做建筑是不确切的，但是你说它是艺术品也同样很苍白。它是一个梦想，一个不可企及的但是真实存在过的幻境。比任何一个幻境都真实，比任何一个真实都幻境。
不论外国的传教士，当时的士兵，将军，还是伟大的雨果，他们关于圆明园的惊叹、回忆或者记述都是苍白无力的。没有人可以面对一件超过自己想象范围和修辞学范围的事物进行描述。
它，圆明园，也许实在过于辉煌和震撼，才不得不承受这样的结局。当一群肆意妄为的人，面对这样的事物，除了毁掉它，实在想不出任何办法可以平复内心那种迷茫和狂乱。他们动手烧毁的是一个相当于600个足球场那么大的建筑群，对于这样的暴行和不文明举动，我想连下令烧园的狗日的额尔金自己都讲不出一个明确的理由，好去解释他自己的这个决定。
我无意去考究历史，关于当时外交或者时局，我也无心去谴责那些狗日的联军的行为，因为在今天这一切都是徒然的。
我只是想说这样一个举世无双的园林，中国古代建筑、审美、艺术的集大大大成者，没有了。在它之前，没有一个国家或者集团有财力和能力做这样一件事，之后同样也不会有了。这是全世界有机械作业之前最伟大最顶尖最不可思议的建筑行为。
假使这个“所有园林建筑的最高范本”现在依然存在，只能说所有的其他被人传颂的建筑都会黯然几分。光是长春园西洋楼就可以让任何欧洲建筑本身自惭不已，而其千变万化的中国园林群体，则超越中国现存园林太多太多。故宫与之相比，实在太过朴素和冰冷，苏州园林与之相比，又显得过于儿科和市井。它不可思议的用建筑来实现中国古代诗歌、绘画、书法的意境，经过一个盛世皇朝一个多世纪的不间断实现，中间汇集了你所能想到世间最奢华的用材和最聪慧的智力，成就了这个万园之园的圆明园。
当然只用了三天它就销毁在一障烟雾之中。
其中心疼，何以用悲恸，谴责，幻想，怜惜，忿忿不平，瞠目结舌，无语凝咽等等词汇就可以释怀？
它不是也不应该作为我们反思历史的教材，这太残忍了。
忘记它吧，就当没有存在过，就像所有的童话和寓言，一切都没有存在过。也许只有这样我们才会好过一点。
要不然，我们该要怎样的心痛呢。

P.S.关于影片，我尽管可以理解为导演故意保持冷静，只通过洋人之口来表述圆明园的实况和被毁的经历，但是对于里面民族遭遇的耻辱和烧毁圆明园的举止，没有表述任何的立场和愤慨，我依旧无法忍受。我们已经习惯了用批判的眼光来回望我们的近代史，不厌其烦的阐释闭关锁国、落后就要挨打的道理，这太可笑了。落后就会有被人欺负的危险，但是不代表落后就应该被挨打，难道反过来讲就是强大就可以欺负弱小。这是荒谬的和扭曲的价值观。我们一直以来似乎为了体现极好的修养和客观的世界观，而选择像一个局外人一样看待我们自己那段不忍回首的历史，但那是错的。不管清朝后期如何腐败和没落，鸦片战争都是我们这个民族不可能抹去的耻辱和不公正待遇，那些人是我们的祖先，那些土是我们祖先的土，那些土上的一草一木一砖一瓦是我们祖先的神圣不可侵犯的财产。现在我们搞得好像事不关己一样批判自身，是不是演得有点过了。我们不能逃避我们的这个民族就是这样一步一步演化、发展过来的，如果抛弃什么意识形态，社会结构不谈，这个民族经历的荣耀和屈辱都是连贯的，都是我们自身的。我20岁发达，30岁被人打，40岁翻身都是我的记忆，都是我的快乐和悲痛，而不因为40岁后我信佛了，硬生生把40岁前和40岁后瓜分开来。这是自欺欺人。只有正确的价值观才会让人懂得进取而有礼，奋发而谦逊。也只有这样人类才能真的和平，历史才不会重演。如果那一天我们强大到可以把白宫和凡尔赛宫毁了，但是我们没有这么做，那么关于圆明园的记忆才有价值。

这篇影评可能有剧透 这部电影有两条善恶线，主线是明石副线是北村，相比较而言，懒人觉得北村线更扣题而且更有吸引力。主线明石居然会被复仇对象同化，懒人只能用莫名其妙，不可思议来形容了。本身明石从善到恶决定复仇的情绪就不太饱满，事件冲突对他的刺激和影响也不够彻底，说白了反而是奈奈在...  (展开)

我偶像咪蒙也觉得本片很好看呢！10分有木有！和偶像兴趣爱好一致就是好啊！！！我偶像说“尹相铉简直是《legal high》里的新垣结衣附体”，我在这里偷偷地说，legal high里我爱新垣结衣果断是因为妹子的颜啊，尹oppa的颜我不爱啊我不爱,用结衣妹子比oppa是不是有点那个小浪费= =（oppa的粉不要bia飞我，我忏悔，我是个肤浅的颜控）

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王小波这厮虽然长得有碍风流，但是其写的情书，却让我见“风流”泪，我最爱的一句是，“爱你就像爱生命”。谨套用我最爱的这句情话作为剧评的标题——爱你就像爱正义。

正义这么庄严的东西，配上爱，刚刚好而已。

<量心打造的一只男主>

世上给女人提供最多幻想的事物莫过于二：化妆保养品和偶像剧。前者，死不要脸地请一些整容拉皮明星宣传自己的产品，“保养到基因”，“一抹小V脸”，“你本来就很美”；后者，步步精心地请了成打的帅哥编造童话，量身打造算什么，编剧们（于妈除外）可是寸寸量心，用高级定制的水准打造男主角好么？不管你的胸怀是A cup还是E cup，不管你的智商是150还是250，统统都合适好么！

量心打造，是的，编剧们听见了你们的声音，编剧们就是比男主还懂读心术，量心打造一只男主。

虽然我最爱的是西装大叔范，可是李钟硕同学森森地把校服裤穿出了西装裤的效果。把校服穿那么帅怎么行，老少女难道要跟随你的校服裤再去读一遍可怕的高中么？

对于男二，我只能说，同样是演《秘密花园》，酱油男都能变身男主了，你咋还是男二？啥，有女观众说男二长得不够帅，天生没有男主的底子？乃们别闹，不知道TVB的当家小生叫陈豪末！

<怕你不再美好>

作为暗恋界曾经的三八红旗手，姑娘我要表示，比暗恋痛苦的是，你曾经喜欢的人不再美好。因此看见修夏对彗星失望，我简直是感同身受。

彗星不让被告说实话，她说，“我会颜面尽失，我不允许这种情况发生”，“在裁判中胜利的才是真相”。Really？佘祥林曾被误判，但最终无罪释放。裁判可以改变，而“真相只有一个”，能被改变动摇的都不是真相。（“真相只有一个”，引自，我深爱11年的著名小学生侦探江户川柯南。）

比暗恋更痛苦的是，你不再美好。当你不再美好，屈服于世间丑恶，就好像我的爱和信仰都不值得了一样。

当然，泡菜国编剧是不允许假恶丑战胜真善美的，所以女主会继续一边毒舌一边美好下去么。当辩护开始的那一刻，女主默默在心里问男主，我可以相信你么？男主回了她一个坚定的点头。这种来自于超能力的沟通画面真美好。是的，超能力不用来谈恋爱的男主都是耍流氓好么！

看看蜘蛛侠，他抱着女主穿梭摩天大楼无压力好么；看看钢铁侠，炸了战甲就为了辣椒姐展颜一笑好么；看看仁显王后她男人，回回穿越都是要谈恋爱的么。

超能力不用来谈恋爱，都是耍流氓好么！想想以后的剧情，色厉内荏的女主一不小心出卖了自己的春心，傲娇男主一边暗自偷乐一边假装无知，这是多么有爱的场景啊。

-------------------------------3,4集的分界线-------------------------------------

<女汉子的春天>

如果你，尖酸刻薄高智商，年近28没男友，天天呼喊：“春天在哪里啊，春天在哪里？”。本文就给出了一个答案，春天不在小朋友的眼睛里，春天也不只野百合才能拥有。如果你想在28岁收获女汉子的春天，请在18岁那年的秋天，在你家的后山上种上一棵可爱的小正太，对他好点勤浇水，到了28岁的春天，你就可以自动收获一只身高堪比具俊表，打架堪比laughing哥，外加比李大仁还懂你心声的朴修夏一枚。

女汉子的春天来得真不容易。演好女汉子的春天，也相当不容易！

如何表现一个女汉子的庸俗而不媚俗？李宝英一定默默学习了好多日剧，才练成了睥睨一众韩国女演员的翻白眼技能，以及傲视众多1米8男汉子的抬下巴技能。而后，练成人前一丝不苟白骨精，人后邋邋遢遢大宅女的变身术。只有这样，女汉子才能征服女观众。哎，做女演员太难，又不是像男演员那样只要长得帅点，就可以收获一打的女观众。

虽然号称女汉子，但女汉子也有柔弱细腻的时候么。被小混混围殴时，狐假虎威；跟屁虫受伤时，边刀子嘴边去睡沙发。

有这么多萌点的女汉子，我能不喜欢么？

Ps当然，女汉子（例如张慧星）如果长得像刘诗诗，以上我的废话您可以跳过不看了。喜欢长得像刘诗诗的女汉子你需要太多的理由吗？

<我要做超能少年的耳机>

有人看了大叔精彩的辩论之后，立刻转投了大叔旗下，觉得大叔温暖善良又上进。但是，我作为一个资深西服控，我分分钟不能接受大叔的白袜子配黑皮鞋。对于这种模仿杰克逊着装的男人，他们往往只得到了1/3的精髓，即“逊”。大叔还是留给办公室里的男秘书吧，祝你们幸福！

我最讨厌男人说，你们女人啊，青春就那么几年，赶快找个人嫁了吧。搞得好像男人的青春就能像万古长青的乌龟一样，搞得好像女人除了那么几年青春一无所有了一样，搞得好像我辛辛苦苦读那么多年书就为了到一个优质男多的地方一样。所以，为了逆反，我坚定不移地喜欢修夏少年，既有如花的外在美，还有有着欣赏大龄女青年的能力，百分百鼓励女主追求正义的事业。

隔壁看《一吻定情》的妹子们高呼着：“小哥，用我的手机壳！”这厢看《听》的我一个劲地呼喊，我要做超能少年的耳机。包住你的耳朵，只让你听我的声音，吊在你的脖子上，好像从身后拥抱你。

或许，喜欢超能少年的原因，只是因为他听老师讲“初恋”忽然情绪激动、刷地一下站起来，只是因为他很傻气地让小混混们模仿韩信的胯下之辱。超能少年是向日葵，彗星是天上的太阳，向日葵绕着太阳，默默守护，嘴硬不承认的爱。

------------------------第6、7集的分割线---------------------------------------
<最萌年龄差>

我一直不懂为什么40岁的男人找20岁的女人天经地义，而30岁的女人和20岁的男人在一起就会显得天理不容。这是什么道理？！20岁的女人找40岁的男人无非图财，40岁的男人找20岁的女人无非图色，好吧，20岁的女人也许真的不会嫌弃40岁的大叔中年发福的肚子，他们真的可能是真爱。

请让我们将男一与女一之间的年龄差成为“最萌年龄差”好不？男不求色，女不求财，听起来就充满了平等自由的气息，多么高尚的字样啊！

而对于男二和女一之间，我只能送上相对的评价，“最不萌心理年龄差”！时时刻卖萌，分分钟幼稚是怎么回事？不是说，大叔有三宝成熟、隐忍、易推倒么？男二叔叔说好的成熟隐忍呢？不过，马克思爷爷教育我们，要一分为二看问题！看在男二约会会买我最爱的ROYCE巧克力，我立刻就觉得他不成熟地有萌点。

（ROYCE巧克力的小广告：大概是一年前的一天，我的一位朋友从新加坡机场给我带了一盒抹茶ROYCE巧克力，我的吃货心就彻底被ROYCE击败了。昂贵如吉利莲，廉价如金帝，都是批量生产，长期可食；而ROYCE虽然只是巧克力家族中的中产阶级，但是它只能存活在有限温度、有限小时，它需要妥帖收藏，仅是这份精致就正中我心。我们每个人是不是有时候都会矫情地想要被人妥帖珍藏呢？正如那些ROYCE巧克力一样）

----------------------update ep7、8---------------------------------------------

<爱你如同月光倾城>（写给彗星的妈妈）

如果彗星是一颗星，那么修夏就是一直默默守护的北极星，彗星的妈妈就是天幕上皎洁的月光。她的爱，如同那月光倾城。

还记得，年少时，在高中读书，老师说，你们要好好读书，把晚自习教室里的灯光当做妈妈的目光，好好读书，不要让她失望。当年，就在那样的灯光下，少年歪和王后雄殊死搏战，相爱相杀。

妈妈的爱，总是如同披在肩上的光，那是看不见的温暖。

彗星妈妈的爱，宛如月光倾城。是她在全世界都不相信彗星的时候依旧守护；是她满街满巷地贴“庆祝彗星进步本店大酬宾”的广告；是她鼓励彗星报考法大；是她一边在电话里严厉训斥彗星要做好国选律师，一边在大街上拿着扫帚手舞足蹈；是她听见女儿要嫁给法庭不想相亲，都能包容；是她在生命的最后一刻，还教育女儿放下仇恨向前走。

她，只是个平凡又普通的大婶，开着一家小小的炸鸡店，做人看似粗枝大叶，但实际细致入微。

白月光，照天涯的两端。没有了月光的晚上，路太黑，夜太长，会不会一路跌跌撞撞？


ps 弱弱地说句，楼主其实在咪蒙推荐本剧之前，就已经开始写本剧的影评。作为咪蒙的脑残粉，真的可能真的不知不觉有了咪蒙的色彩。从心所写，肆意而至，愿博君一笑。

pss 今天老馆的猫死了，哎。。。写不出东西，明日更新看看。

-----------------------ep11-------------------------------------------------------
<就算全世界与你为敌>

上文总结到，张慧星就是一条标配版女汉子。她都能做到心理上的变形金刚，不，是心理上的擎天柱。在这个女汉子能撑起两半边天的时代下，不搞点赞扬女汉子的文艺作品，简直对不起她们贡献的GDP。
女汉子刚毅果敢地说，就算全世界与你为敌，我依然相信你，我依然不会逃避。真的女汉子，敢于用眼神恐吓警察，敢于自揭伤疤救人水火。女汉子，必须打遍天下无敌手。

就算全世界与你为敌，我依然相信你。但是，泡菜编剧有三宝，车祸失忆绝症好！泡菜编剧，创造了无数个医学奇迹，伫立在世界医学进步的前端。本片以车祸杀人案开始，以失忆过渡，目测这就是快神剧的节奏，就差“绝症”就能集齐三宝了。

虽然没有“绝症”这剂猛药，泡菜编剧还是找到“失能”来代替。听不见声音的少年，听不见彗星姐姐的真心，只能贱兮兮软绵绵惨巴巴地蹲在落大雨的街角，靠着装惨和卖萌来测试姐姐的真心。于是忠犬的少年，蹲在街角，给半蹲的姐姐撑着伞，瞬间俘获真心。就像犬夜叉蹲着对视戈薇的场景一样。嗯，戈薇最后被犬夜叉推到了。恩，目测姐姐也会被。。。。。。

话说，我一直觉得蹲一直是个毫无美感的字眼，有“蹲”字的场面往往都很不堪，例如，蹲大街，蹲茅厕，蹲班房，蹲腿。但是帅哥就是能把有“蹲”的场面都刻画地毫无违和感，人美果然是生产力啊。

-----------------------ep13、14--------------------------------------------------
<一颗心噗通噗通地狂跳>

13和14集的粉红剧情，我看得是一颗心噗通噗通地狂跳！人艰不拆（人生已经如此的艰难，有些故事就不要拆穿）的是，作为女汉子的我俨然不是女主角。因为帅气的男主，我真是花痴到梦里口水流多少；因为我不是女主，我真是悲伤到逆流成河。

其实，韩剧给点吻戏就是粉红了，看看美剧英剧，那大尺度开放的，都铎王朝开场10分钟，就三具玉体横陈在我电脑屏幕上。面对这种高密度大尺度的电视剧，当年年仅高二的我，差点被吓到在电脑屏幕前。我妈要是在我看都铎王朝的时候飘过来，我苦心维持的小白兔形象岂不是立刻就破碎了？无法在尺度上推陈出新，韩剧做到了在吻戏场景上精雕细琢，金三顺的南山台阶之吻，仁显王后的垫脚吻，还有听声的悬空吻。每次都是，狡猾地致命地正中女粉丝的红心。男人们可能觉得，给女朋友Tiffany才是浪漫；但他们可能不知道的是，是他们的单膝一跪，一下打动了女朋友的心。C12有什么了不起！

至于，男二大叔，你从了男秘书吧。你们多粉红啊，还在石膏上写字！赶快回家你侬我侬互相喂饭吧。男秘书，你看看你，工资都是从申律师和张律师工资里剐出来的，还天天没事去男二办公室！你对得起养你的张律师和申律师么，为了这份工资，你必须要做点好事，譬如掰弯男二。

嗯，本集还穿越了《绅士的品格》番外，是我最喜欢的一对cp，崔律师和林回音。看崔律师那在学弟面前，一副大哥大的纸老虎样子，然后接到回音电话，瞬间变身hello kitty。林回音，你果然跟着富婆姐姐学出了一身的女王气场，你超棒，训兽成猫。

总之，13到14集，女观众们一定和我一样看得是，心一直一直噗通噗通地狂跳，嗯，修夏少年你有没有听到？

ps 爱你就像爱正义。那么什么是正义？在我的心里，正义就是无知之幕背后的判断。当我们不知道自己将会是谁时，作出的判断。剧情中法庭外的公平女神，蒙着双眼，一手举剑，一手天平。于是，爱你就像爱正义，蒙上布条，看不见外貌，看不见年龄，看不见金钱，因为你的那颗心而爱你。

PSS，在爱你的人面前，辣酱、罐头配冷饭都可以吃得津津有味么？爱字怎么写？我曾以为田螺姑娘洗手作羹汤是一种爱，现在才知道“馄饨卖不完，正好当晚餐”也是一种爱。喜欢一个人，可以是为他付出，也可以是为她将就。

--------------------------update 15-16-------------------------------------------

<编剧不做死，主角就不会死>

为了显得本段影评铿锵有力，本段影评一共就两句话：编剧，你甭作死啊！！！男主女主，你们不许死！

------------------少年歪含泪留言------------------------------------------------

<音乐停下来，我们都将离场>

咪蒙大概说过，偶像剧是女人们的A片。我大概是阅历尚浅，仍就觉得偶像剧是女人们的成年童话。这个故事包装得与现实无比，有鳞次栉比的高楼，有货品琳琅的百货，有似成相识的人物。但，童话是不会成真的。

童话的结局很完美，女王与少年骑士携手共度。童话落幕了，演员们回到自己的生活。现实中，女王大人与自己的真命天子宣布婚期，少年骑士决定与自己的好基友同建组合。

音乐停下来，我们也都将离场。

在生活中，我们依旧不能像张慧星那样尖牙利嘴，依旧要一个人搞定换灯泡，依旧一个人想着自己的心事。尽管那个爱你就像爱正义的人，还没有出现。但，我总算知道，不要把人生浪费在抱怨上，人生那么美好，我们那么努力去活都还不够。

大家也许在想，此博主前文这么蹦跶这么欢脱这么牙尖嘴利，怎么最后一部分却写得那么平淡无奇呢？因为，博主约莫觉得离开童话的梦幻，去拥抱带刺的人生，需要这么一个平淡的缓冲。

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ps 最近在追冲2，五星推荐之~不老的sam哥瞬间让我变成了大叔控><

看到那段老人的温情故事，真的哭得稀里哗啦的，老爷爷有绝症，老奶奶有老年痴呆症，老爷爷为了给奶奶留下最美好的回忆，假装自己是奶奶的初恋情人，最后爷爷病逝了，奶奶发现他竟是自己的老伴儿，那一刻我撕心裂肺的哭了一通，真的太感人了，虽然剧情很老套，但我还是很容易被...  (展开)

这篇影评可能有剧透 正好契合当下在Ukraine发生的事，看了Mr. Jones. 他本来有光明平坦的未来：眼光独到的外交顾问，老首相劳合乔治喜爱的小同乡，一个会讲俄语的威尔士年轻人。没准他将来能当上首相呢！虽然出了一个威尔士首相老乔治已经很难得了，but who knows? 荧幕上的伦敦在大萧条里愁眉不展...  (展开)

写在前面，本来想给三星半

但是看在这么多牛B演员的份上，就四星吧.....（几天前重看一次带字幕的，忍不住拿走一颗星...三星吧）
——————————————————————

开始关注这部电影几近一年的光景
刚开始一切都没有眉目，鄙人只能苦苦对着少量流放出来的剧照YY
这样一个阵容的电影，对于任何一个人都是有致命吸引的
我还清楚记得第一个预告片发布出来时我的激动
歌曲的节奏和画面的剪辑每一帧都巧妙而精准的结合在一起
如果不是因为我比较鄙视穿越，我早就去给它打上五颗星了
出于沉着，我一再苦等，影片的上映时间也是延迟并且很操蛋的小范围公映
在经历了漫长岁月的苦等，我终于有幸看到这部电影的庐山真面目

首先，意大利式的发音在没有字幕的情况下看得我很崩溃
几度在电影院想要睡着


Rob Marshall的《Chicago》算是本片除了演员阵容以外最吸引人的因素了
我也是坚信，同是歌舞片，同样的导演，自然震撼程度不会逊色
但是，我忽视了导演还有颇为雷人的《艺伎回忆录》
我也完全忽略了《Chicago》的成功其实很大一部分功劳都要归功于舞台剧本身强大的气场以及功底的累计
基于对于这一切的忽视，导致我对于这部电影还是小失望大于惊喜的

首先，与《Chicago》一样，《Nine》同样源自改编
首先有歌舞剧作为脚本，其次是源自意大利导演Federico Fellini的8?
作为改编自这样一部伟大的电影，必须说导演还是勇气可嘉的
影片开场第五分钟，所有女性演员齐齐出场，片头一场盛大而优雅的歌舞场面让我鸡皮疙瘩起了一身！如果说年度最佳片头我必须选这部电影了！当时我心里就暗暗想，导演真是果断而大胆啊，才一开始就把所有大腕都扔出来了，而且配合的如此之精湛而完美，我几乎流下眼泪。可是事实证明这也就是全片最完美的地方了，再没一个场面可以如此让人激动了。换句话来说，这一段全部被剪进了预告片，除去预告片的，几是平庸。

故事几乎是叙述的比较完整，而且比较能留住观众
但是作为一部歌舞片的前提是，这还是一部电影
而最为一部电影，《nine》的叙事就显得较为片段化
许多拼凑比较零散，出去歌舞的戏份节奏性不够强
以至于每当有歌舞场面就让人精神抖擞，其他叙事场面有些零碎

对于演员的表演，这还是无可挑剔的
Daniel Day-Lewis 还是那个演技之神，两座奥斯卡最佳男主角奖不是白拿的，虽然他在这部戏的情感上表现出自己是个改过自新的男银，但是基于他有抛妻弃子的前科，我总觉得这也算是本色演出。虽然他为这部电影改变了口音，但是这已经不是新鲜事，这样的"壮举"早在《血色降至》中他就有很华丽的尝试。但是比较失望的是这次的表演没有什么惊人的突破，比较像和老马合作的那部《纯真年代》，不温不火。不会像看完《血色降至》或者《我的左脚》一样让人被其精湛的演技所惊声尖叫，小有失望.......

Marion Cotillard的一座奥斯卡最佳女主角奠定了她加盟的基础，作为导演的妻子，她的表演算是很惊艳，几乎分为三个层次，一开始是几近绝望，对于自己的丈夫与情妇纠缠不清的局面，她用一种几近麻痹的隐忍去诠释。第二个阶段发生在试镜会后，她的一句，Thank you，thanks for you to let me know I‘m not special.成为全片爆发的起点，这一段的歌舞爆发力十足，最后一个几近露点的画面也透视了法国女星的戏路之宽广。第三个阶段是时过境迁，面对自己丈夫重新的出发而发出发自内心的微笑。在最后一个镜头，属于男主角生命里所有女人都用一种超现实的手法出现，唯独Marion Cotillard是以平凡人的姿态出境，这也预示了她第一女主角的身份，以及希望的预兆。一句话，Marion Cotillard的演技无可挑剔，年轻的法国影后前途无量。也许是对于她非常狂热的偏爱，我觉得她是全片最出色的一名女星，她的隐忍她的微笑都是全剧的闪光点。


Penélope Cruz其实没什么戏份，相对于原著的情妇，她多了一分楚楚可怜的气质，以至于让人一时之间难以责怪她，而只能默默的感叹这只是正常男人犯的一个可以原谅的过错。这一段的歌舞是全片最为火辣的，Penélope Cruz表现出来的完全就是一个充满自信，以及胜利者的情妇形象。但是对比于《Vicky Cristina Barcelona》里的表演，Penélope 说是演技经验倒也不至于，只能说完成了自己的工作。作为赢得奥斯卡最佳女配角之后的第一部戏，显得稍微稚嫩。这次的表演不如今年一部《破碎的拥抱》有爆发力，当然相对于此，和自己的老搭档Pedro Almodóvar合作可能更加自在且易发挥。

说到Judi Dench，其实和Daniel Day-Lewis是一样的，演技精湛，无可挑剔。但是由于戏份有限，无法狠狠的发挥。只是女伯爵的气场异常强大，尽管已经风华不在，但每次出场都能压住戏，算是视觉盛宴。可惜的是看到最后我还是对她的戏份印象不深，很难记住


Nicole Kidman，票房毒药是她，但凭她一己之力毁掉这部电影是很难的，那是她积攒多少年人品都办不到的。但是她也是戏份颇少，而且她的演出诠释的除了漂亮就是漂亮，所以她只要站在那美美的当一个缪斯就够了，这个角色其实换了哪个漂亮人都能演。经历了《Moulin Rouge》惊艳的献唱后，我着实被她的演唱所折服过一阵子，觉得她的演唱算是很有内涵的（虽然不及伊万）。本以为导演会给她多安排点歌弥补一下她演技的不足，但是不晓得为啥，她的歌曲本分很平淡的过度，几乎毫无记忆点可言，实属杯具。到最后唯一演出的恐怕就是她那点漂亮了。

从《新娘大作战》里原地复活的Kate Hudson算是打了个漂亮的翻身仗。作为全戏时尚感最强的一段歌舞，她算是功德圆满。其中与Daniel Day-Lewis 调情的一段很自然出众，情绪表情都很到位，是个男人都会忽忽悠悠的过去了。但碍于只是个小配角，消失的比较突然，但还是贡献了最出色的歌舞之一。

当初听说意大利国宝Sophia Loren的加盟我其实很激动
但是看完了以后说老实话，这真的是一个任何人都可以去演的角色，
而且Sophia 阿姨也完全没啥发挥，基于她的年纪，歌舞对她来说实在困难，所以一切简单为主，这就造就了一段大材小用的演出，实在可惜。不晓得为何导演要大力邀请Sophia阿姨出山又不加以重任，难道只是想要这部电影有一个纯粹的意大利人？

Stacy Ferguson算是我觉得除了Marion Cotillard最惊艳的表演，作为专业的歌手，她的那一段表演堪称完美，一切由童年，回忆以及躁动串联在一起。当初我也是被预告片里她这首歌强大的气场吸引。这一段歌舞的编排完全达到了《Chicago》时的经典，每一个动作都敲击在心头上，真是乱花渐欲迷人眼，一时之间被气场所震撼，完全投入其中无法自拔。


看完《Nine》后我只有那么几个想法
首先，搞艺术的男银还是不要找来当老公的，不然很容易杯具，因为不是他想来乱的，而是这个世界诱惑太多，多少潜规则追着他跑。
第二，尽管能挑出不少缺点，这还算是一部演技爆发的影片。
第三，我要重新审视一下今年我期待的其他电影了，我经不起下一轮失望了。
最后，戏如人生，人生如戏。别为了戏剧性而制造冲突。毕竟这是真生活，没办法喊cut重新来过。

————————————————————————————————————
8年了....我又回来看了这篇影评，有好几个我想推翻的

（1）《艺伎回忆录》并不雷人，是我当年还不成熟。
（2）世界诱惑太多以及潜规则追着男人跑，也不是他出轨的借口。
（3）Daniel Day-Lewis要息影了；Marion Cotillard依然美丽，这些年依然在好莱坞与法国文艺片界游走，与她“两小无猜”的老公生了二胎，真是粉对了CP，情人节年年都过；Nicole Kidman终于拜托了票房毒药的恶名，一连几部电视剧与电影的演出让她彻底爆了，重新爆红，也让人感叹女神真是吃防腐剂长大的，怎么就是不老呢；Penélope Cruz婚后消失了几年，今年再出现在大家的视野里，是《东方快车谋杀案》的配角，也很让人唏嘘....8年一晃而过，这八年来，好电影坏电影，都层出不穷，但像《Nine》这样的阵容，也永远的成为了历史。

这篇影评可能有剧透 2018年，动作科幻动画电影《哥斯拉：决战之都 | GODZILLA 決戦機動増殖都市》 哥斯拉怪兽行星的续集。。一个新的动脑系列。 第一部已经神话哥斯拉 让其驱赶人类独占地球2年。一个全新的世界观，更加霸气的哥斯拉。 但是这一部看起来可以说是大型预告片，从打斗场面来看完全没有...  (展开)

如果不在意演员愣头愣脑的生涩演技和单薄的剧情，你将发现，在这部讲述马永贞闯荡上海滩的港产动作片中展示的炫目武技和生猛的打斗场面，堪称近年来华语大银幕上的翘楚！

最爱的镜头出现在影片中段，马永贞一记迅雷不及掩耳的高踢腿，把目中无人的龙七嘴上叼着的香烟一脚踹飞，却又完全没有碰到对方半根毫毛，这一脚干净利索，实在太帅太牛逼了（我保证你会像我一样倒退、用慢镜回放一遍）！银幕下的我和骄傲的龙七一样，只见眼前一花，在愕然中根本来不及作出任何反应，可见出腿劲力之巧，速度之迅猛！

最终马永贞浑身浴血，放倒所有对手，来到大BOSS日本东洋会长面前，后者一副慢条斯理胜券在握的架势，尝试说服我们的大英雄，哪知刚一开口只吐出半句，就被根本不想听其废话的马永贞一声怒吼：“滚出中国”噎了回去———二人开打！

姑且不论这是谁家的孩子，但三维白雪公主，的确还真是等了77年，到了今天才有个结果。
　　
一、关于电影效果
目前可以看到的只有一个效果未如人意的先行版预告与大堆剧照，同档期的作品来说，其实效果算是无功无过，正如网友说的角色表情呆滞，莫非《丛林之王》不是吗？拿小本生意跟人家千万级制作比效果，显然不合理，但是作为一个看不少动画电影的童鞋来说，电影没有最终上映，效果不好说，只希望能够“看得过去”就可以了。
　　
二、关于电影剧情
笔者百度过这部电影的网络宣传新闻，对剧情的描述多数都是说白雪公主又被王后陷害，这次轮到小矮人出手救公主与王子，故事情节确实不算新鲜，不过敢于对被封为经典三百余年的《白雪公主》开刀，总算勇气可嘉。
从改编的方向，可以看出电影走的是亲子路线，对于牙牙学语、小学小伙伴们来说，过多的人物关系，他们理解不了，过深的内涵道理，他们启蒙不了，所以改编成这样，还算是合情合理，而且还加上时兴的魔法元素，不得不说是一部向市场“低头”的改编作品（没法子，中国小孩子就爱这套），虽然当今国内电影风潮来说，低幼化的真善美电影往往是未经上映就被喷得半死（估计这部的豆瓣也应该被喷得血流成河了），但这部分的作品还是不可划缺，正如美国有个朵拉，有个蒂亚戈，被低估的低幼亲子类作品往往才是小孩子真正的启蒙动画。

三、关于三维白雪公主
看完先行预告，只能说制作方是有头脑，但是技术不够给力的代表，77年了，都没有人想到吧白雪公主做成个玲珑浮凸的三维模型，就给他们想到了，虽然效果不如人意，但这一想法，或许会带给动漫电影的一个启发，笔者可以猜测，这部电影不火还好，一火估计众多经典童话改编的三维作品将蜂拥而至（那画面太美我不敢想象）。
说回公主，预告片公主只是露面了2秒不到的时间，所以说印象，还真比不上满场走走碰碰的小矮人们，但从海报来说，好吧，勉强收货吧……但实话说，站在上百年的首次三维化，这部动画的意义或许比它的效果显得更为重要，笔者总绝对这位不少想进军动画电影的商家开辟了一个模式。
　　
四、关于小矮人
笔者已经20的人了，小时候听过白雪公主的故事，但实话说，真心没看过动画，拯救迪士尼的1937年版本也是上大学的时候才补回来的，小矮人这个群体，一直都是被贪婪、智慧等关键词包围，起码在文学作品中，笔者看过的霍比特人，玩过的魔兽世界，对小矮人的评价都是喜忧参半，这次白雪公主里的小矮人算是扬眉吐气，逆袭地做了一次丰功伟绩，而不是再次沦为万年好人卡备胎，具体怎样逆袭，我也不清楚，不过估计跟水有关（预告有一幕就是小矮人打破墙壁被水冲的）。
　　
下来笔者果断盘点写还没被三维化的童话作品，供各大电影制作商选择哈！怎么说，在没有看正片之前，笔者还是表示中立，毕竟笔者不是喷子，也不是专业影评人，这些重任，就交给你们啦！
（PS：8.13 最近电影更新了MV，一个不小心给我在龙之谷前看到了，好吧，我觉得只有主题曲是最吸引我的，其他也只能凑合了……）

香港的娱乐片有个通病，总是喜欢刻意表现，比如说韦家辉的《购物狂》，本来两对情侣精神有点不正常还可以理解，可是偏偏要让所有出场的演员都神经兮兮的，导演的用意可能是要表明现代社会有点精神障碍是很平常的，连心理医生都难逃此劫，所以没什么好害怕的。可是一部电影拍成这样多多少少是有些让人觉得别扭的。

除此之外，《购物狂》还是有一部可圈可点的影片，同时前辈徐小凤的加入更是为此片锦上添花。爱情题材的电影几乎都拍滥，灰姑娘的故事已经没有市场了，而导演决定重新为这样的题材注入活力，如果有两个王子呢，如果有两个灰姑娘呢，如果爱情发生在两个王子和两个灰姑娘之间呢？怎么样，兴趣来了吧。刻骨铭心的爱我们看的太多，有一种爱那么的不确定，那么的随便，一个女性答应两个男人的求婚，一个女性觉得可以随便的嫁一个。有钱人找老婆是件好麻烦的事，问题出在钱上；找有钱人做老公也是麻烦事，问题同样是钱。张柏芝面临一个选择，一个不是特别艰难的选择，因为不是让她在贫富之间决定，资产上了200亿之后就没差别了。两个富家公子也要选择，都是貌美如花的女子，选起来也不该艰难。因此，他们要做的是放下世俗里的一切选自己的真爱，对一般人来说，不难，可是这四个人当中没一个是精神正常的，他们分别罹患了选择恐惧症、失恋创伤后遗症、性格分裂、购物狂，更要命的是，他们在决定结婚的时候刚好吃错了药。

最后是小凤姐帮了两对新人的大忙，总之关系是错综复杂，我觉得她用的方法就是一个，让他们亲自去感触得到和失去时苦楚和欢欣，如此反复之后，他们自然而然的知道了内心的选择。爱情，真的好奇怪，你说爱上了一个人，爱得死去活来，可等到要得到那份爱的时候，也许会迟疑，你真的是爱她的吗？所以，爱情需要考验，需要反复的考验，突然间，你要失去她了，突然间，你要得到她了，突然间，你又要和另一个女人过一辈子了，突然间，又有其他人要抢走你的她。也许你本来是懦弱的、腼腆的、自卑的，可是经历的这些，你会坚定自己的信念，明白谁是属于你生命中的女人，然后你就会去争取，不论外力有多强大，你会尽全力去拼。最重要的，没有任何人和你说你爱的是谁，甚至你自己都没有说，你感觉到了，这种感觉是任何精神障碍和药物都干扰不了的，哪怕你被疾病药物折磨得失去理智，可是心中的那份爱是永远不变的。

看到最后，我甚至有点感动，或许我该去守候属于我的那个女人。

http://www.blogmvp.com/2006/04/shopaholics.html