辣鸡辣鸡，脏我眼了，虽然我只看了五分钟。辣鸡辣鸡，脏我眼了辣鸡辣鸡，脏我眼了，虽然我只看了五辣鸡辣鸡，脏我眼了，虽然我只看了五辣鸡辣鸡，脏我眼了，虽然我只看了五分钟。分钟。分钟。辣鸡辣鸡，脏我眼了，虽然我辣鸡辣鸡，脏我眼了，虽然我只看了五分钟。只看了辣鸡辣鸡，脏我眼了，虽然我只看了五分钟。辣鸡辣鸡，脏我眼了，虽然我只看辣鸡辣鸡辣鸡，脏我眼了，虽然我只看了五分钟。辣鸡，脏我眼了，虽然我只看了五分钟。辣辣鸡辣鸡，脏我眼了，虽然我只看了五分钟。辣辣鸡辣鸡，脏我眼了，虽然我只看了五分钟。辣鸡辣鸡，脏我眼了，虽然我只看了五分钟。鸡辣鸡，脏我眼了，虽然我只看了五分钟。辣鸡辣鸡，脏我眼了，虽然我只看了五分钟。鸡辣鸡，脏我眼了，虽然我只看了五分钟。了五分钟。五分钟。，虽然我只看了五分钟。

通常来说，一部电影只要导演和编剧他有点起码的想赚观众眼泪的念头，我都会起码地给他一些面子。不是平素好流横泪，也不是多愁善感更不是水摄入量过剩，只是容易入戏，还多少有些比较严重的YY倾向。否则也不会被诸如《Sister Act 2》那种纯得不能再纯的喜剧搞得泪流不止。当然，这种关于放牛班被春风化雨朽化神奇衬托出的人格力量也最易化作刺激我泪腺的激素信息。不过说这些，只不过是说明我的泪腺，其实是很调皮的。

　　几年前Tim Burton的一部《The Big Fish》，教我在第一时间忍受了该天杀的字幕。在长达120多分钟的蒂姆式童话盛筵后，终于在父亲的追悼会上，我倾泻了，甚至不知泪水因何而来。便是一种不可思议的感觉，我被征服了。于是《大鱼》成了让我坚持到字幕放映结束的片子之一，因为泪是要流尽才舒服的，就象鼻子若感到酸就一定要把喷嚏打出来，道理其实是一样的。

　　泪定思泪，当时自然油然升起一种对父辈背后那一串串不曾讲述的悲欢故事的敬意。同时，这似曾相识的感觉竟同样自然地让我回忆起很多很多年前看过的另一部电影，是一部港产喜剧，片名是我后来用角色的名字作关键字在网上查到的，因为当时只是在电视上随机遛台时突然就顿住并看下去的，没有看到片头。无论如何我对于那天放弃看National Geographic而看这部片子感到实在是很明智，因为记得那天国家地理的内容在几天后便重播了。话说回来，影片的名字其实令我相当失望——《新难兄难弟》。

　　当然这部影片的英文名字就很有趣地借用了Hollies的那首著名的《He Ain't Heavy, He's My Brother》的名字，至少我误以为这就是他的英文名很久。因为你如果去搜“新难兄难弟”，得到的结果就是这样。直到前日我意外地在BTChina上看到了一个很不起眼的seed，才亲见其实的名字是《He Ain't Heavy，He's My Father》。其实即使是用Brother，于这部影片来说也没什么任何的不切。不过看到这个句式便能让人想到Brother的这个事实，却也能反使套用后的名字多了些双关的味道。

　　自打大概七、八年前——就是那时不看国家地理我写不下去家庭作业——在电台看到这部陈可辛的《新难兄难弟》后，便一直在找这部片子的完整版。不过音像店无论正版盗版就是一律欠奉。当时的网络条件又很差，更不要提网上购物。而即使是今天，据我所知这部片子也没有再复刻过DVD版本，这对于这样一部明星云集的片子很是不可理喻。于是此片在各式P2P横行的如今依然鲜见，当下流于网络的那些影视压缩团队是决计不屑于拿一部VCD的片子开刀的。

　　直到今年下半年出现了一个已再次绝种的种子，才终得以圆梦。影片是用VCD压缩rmvb，理论上是很难看清字幕的，幸好，根本没有字幕。

　　如今，这双看惯了DVDRip的眼睛，在经历了这如许粗糙的影像后，无论如何，能够像当年那样哭了个一塌糊涂，竟真令人感动呢。

　　要说这部片子非但没能成为家喻户晓的经典，而且终被放到被香港影史中遗忘的角落，是很难理解的。单看梁家辉、梁朝伟、刘嘉玲、袁咏仪这样如今看绝对是顶级豪华的明星阵容，也很难理解其被冷落的理由。何况即使没有这些明星，这部片子足以感染几代人的情节在那个香港电影由长片走向快餐文化的时期也是难得一见，每想及此怎能不令人扼腕？

　　喜欢把《新难兄难弟》同《大鱼》比较。不只因为中心大抵一致，且是由于这两部影片都同样采用充满了一种清新的童话色彩的表现手法，却各有特色。《大鱼》中的童话表现在影片通过影像演绎父亲对自己奇幻般的一生的讲述，几段Tim Burton式的华丽影像交织在父子矛盾的现实中，令人亦真亦幻；而《新难兄难弟》中则是以一种更彻底的童话手段将主角自己送回到了父亲生活的那个年代，时空旅行这种科幻作品中俗到掉渣的题材会出现在当年大多格式分明的香港的电影中并不令人意外，但随着情节的发展，你会发现这看似故作无厘头的开端确实引发了一段交织了人生百味的迷乱的童话故事。而且非要将《大鱼》和《新难兄难弟》的本子打分的话，我认为《新》确是要略胜一筹。

　　同样是卧床不起的父亲，同样是不认可父亲的儿子。《大鱼》中父子间的矛盾直到接近影片的末尾，儿子接触到父亲生前的真相时才开始开始化解，而之前对父亲故事的那些光怪陆离的情节无非更多地是考虑到影像上的华丽，从而使最后父亲葬礼上父亲的古怪旧识齐聚的一幕给观众心理上的震撼得到升华，这同《Edward Scissorhands》中所作的种种铺垫类似。尽管其最后所能达到的感染力之深依然是无懈可击，可影片本身却总因此有一种不紧凑不平衡的突兀感。不过，《大鱼》以及《剪刀手爱德华》的成功证明了这种松散的童话式结构反而是他成功的所在。

　　相比之下，《新难兄难弟》利用一个小小的科幻机关将主角带到了三十年前，在春风街那极端怀旧的背景下，讲述了主角同当时尚未结婚的父母一同生活了充满了人情冷暖的一年，终于与父亲间患难真情的故事。其情节相比《大鱼》明显紧凑丰满，在这种安排下儿子能够亲历父辈的生活艰辛，同父亲称兄道弟历经几次大喜大悲。而且只是说经历，其实是不够的，主角能够积极地介入父辈的生活，甚至企图按照自己的想法去做出一些改变，于是引出了一连串的时而令人捧腹时而令人神伤的故事。单这一点，就要比《大鱼》的感染力高明得多了。尽管说我们并无理由去拿两部片子所独有的特色去比较。

　　故事中形形色色的配角几乎是同时出现在情节的发展中，但是靠着他们明显经过夸张处理的形象与个性，足以能够在第一时间给观众一个深刻的印象，决不拖沓。相比如今的一些电影每介绍一个配角都要快闪好几次，便当真有如背景中的春风街般朴素的可爱了。

　　之前说过，《大鱼》的结尾几乎是承担了影片所有的煽情，之前一些美丽的童话故事都只是印象上的积累。《新难兄难弟》则是一个典型中国式的大团圆的结局，而且还有些呼应地Kuso了一把。会心微笑的同时会让你甚至忘了什么时候开始流出的泪水，怎么就止不住了呢？作为一部喜剧，能够把煽情的意念放大到如此地步的，恐怕是不多了。

　　“献给所有留予我们宝贵回忆与智慧的前辈”，影片最后如是写道。就像我们看这部片子所体会到的，在社会高速发展，道德价值观念日新月异的今天，在如此宽远的代沟对望的两代人之间，尤其是晚辈对长辈究竟还应当有多少理解和多少感激。这是一部Salute之作，不仅是对老一辈香港人善良朴实的草根精神的致敬，从十足甚至略显刻意的港片味道来看，更是对老一辈香港影人的致敬，这也就是这部影片采用了喜剧形式的原因之一吧。

　　《新难兄难弟》可以说处于香港电影最是蓬勃发展的时代，作为一部致敬之作，我们可以从影片的很多桥段和细节找到当年港片的影子，包括主角的名字楚原都是借用一位老一辈的著名香港电影演员的。《新难兄难弟》可以说是一部标新立异但坚持传统的典型香港电影。一方面迎合了快餐文化的特征，另一方面为其所表达的致敬精神做出了最大努力的戏剧处理。这正是陈可辛要比王晶之流高明之处吧。

　　虽然本人对香港电影算不上关注，但仍依稀可以看到，十三年后的今天，香港电影的结构体系确发生了很大变化，特别是在香港回归之后。一方面王晶式的快餐作品依然为娱乐圈的一些唱优则演和只会整蛊做秀的二流明星们提供着取悦大众的机会，另一方面黑帮电影和功夫电影在杜琪峰等经典级导演的引领下依然是香港文化的一面大旗。而至于王家卫，周星驰等已自成一派的电影，以及第五六代导演的试验性质的社会问题电影，在香港电影中代表的仅仅是一种曼妙的趋势。而在主流香港电影中，唯一不变的，却是那上世纪8、90年代电影工业化产生的急功近利的弊端。《新难兄难弟》所致敬的的那个年代，已经太遥远了，以至于它本身也终于被丢到了香港电影被遗忘的一隅。尽管在这段历史中，它是一个经典，并代表了一种经典的精神。

　　Tim Burton是大师，因为他独树一帜，所以《大鱼》成为了名篇。

　　而为了致敬，《新难兄难弟》成为了一部典型的香港电影，最终没能不朽。尽管如此却依旧看上去很美。莫不如说它的下场也是在致敬香港电影紧随其后的那段失去自我的悲哀吧。

刘善本同志于1915年出生在山东省昌乐县农村。1935年，刘善本在“航空救国”思想的影响下，考入了杭州笕桥中央航校。他毕业后被分配到国民党空军八大队。1943年，刘善本等二十四个机组人员被送往美国学习，并于1945年春驾驶一批美国制造的B─24型轰炸机，取道印度回国。“文化大革命”中受到残酷迫害，1968年3月10日去世，终年53岁。1975年10月，中共中央批准为他平反昭雪，其骨灰安放在八宝山革命公墓。他是国民党空军中起义人中所景仰的先驱，是一面正义者的旗帜。他引导了我们不少的爱国志士飞向人民的怀抱，走上了平坦的社会主义光明大道！

人物简介编辑
刘善本（1915—1968），山东省昌乐县泊庄人。
1932年考入北京大学附中，1935年考入杭州笕桥中央航校，毕业后被分配到国民党空军八大队任任作战参谋、上尉飞行员。抗战初期，随这支远程轰炸部队袭击日军。1943年被派往美国学习，1945年春，取道印度，绕道卡拉奇“就地待命”。1945年春准予驾机回国。1946年6月26日，他利用由成都去昆明运输美军移交的通讯器材的机会，巧妙地摆脱地面控制，驾机起义，飞抵延安，开创了国民党空军驾机起义的先例。毛泽东、朱德亲临欢迎大会，朱总司令还把他请到自己窑洞里作客。 在他的影响下，国民党空军先后有100余人驾驶42架飞机起义。周恩来总理多次称，“刘善本同志是国民党空军起义的带头人”。1946年9月22日， 毛泽东主席在其办公室接见了刘善本，让他到东北筹建第一所航空学校，并与他合影留念。1946年9月，他赴东北参加创办全国第一所航空学校（老航校）的工作，被任命为副校长。1949年2月，加入中国共产党。
1949年10月1日开国大典，他驾机领航，接受检阅。在抗美援朝战争中，作为中国人民志愿军航空兵某师师长率部参战，曾经组织过人民空军的首例夜袭作战，并首次使用了电子对抗和照明轰炸的作战法。
他先后任延安总部航空教员、东北老航校副校长、第一航空学校校长、空军学院领航系主任、华东空军混成四旅副旅长、航空某师师长、空军军训部副部长、空军学院副教育长等职，对新中国人民空军的创建、成长和壮大做出了一定的贡献，获一级解放勋章。1955年授大校军衔。1964年2月，被授予中国人民解放军空军少将军衔。是第一、二、三届国防委员委员，中国人民政治协商会议第一届全体会议代表，第二、三届全国委员会委员，第一、二、三届全国人民代表大会代表。“文化大革命”中受到残酷迫害，1968年3月10日去世，终年53岁。1975年10月，中共中央批准为他平反昭雪，其骨灰安放在八宝山革命公墓。
人物生平编辑
1946年6月26日，正当国民党政府不顾抗战胜利后全国人民要求和平民主建国的一致愿望，在美帝国主义的支持下，悍然发动全面内战，扬言“要在三个月内消灭共产党”的时候，原国民党空军八大队上尉飞行员刘善本，不顾个人安危，毅然驾机起义，飞向延安，距今已经三十七年多了。刘善本同志在同林彪反革命集团斗争中惨遭迫害、不幸逝世，也已经十五年多了。我们这些曾在刘善本起义后的不同时期与之共过事的人，深深怀念这位好同志。
　　一
　　刘善本同志于1915年出生在山东省昌乐县农村。1935年，刘善本在“航空救国”思想的影响下，考入了杭州笕桥中央航校。他毕业后被分配到国民党空军八大队。这支远程轰炸机部队的爱国将士，在抗日战争的最初几年，也曾奋起为民族做出过壮烈的牺牲。但是，由于国民党政府推行“不抵抗主义”，八大队在撤至河西走廊、兰州一线后，便再也没有飞向抗日前线。
　　刘善本开始对自己的选择产生了怀疑。他和密友李鑫淼等曾打算去找当时八路军驻兰州办事处，探寻抗日救国的正确道路，但未能如愿。于是，他便团结一部分飞行员，坚持锻炼身体，刻苦学习技术，等待为抗战效力的机会。
　　1943年，刘善本等二十四个机组人员被送往美国学习，并于1945年春驾驶一批美国制造的B─24型轰炸机，取道印度回国。当时，抗日战争已露出胜利的曙光。刘善本壮怀激烈，一心要在对日寇的最后一战中献上自己的满腔热血，但他又一次地失望了——在卡拉奇，他们突然接到了“就地待命”的命令，而且一“待”就是六个多月。直到日本投降之后，才被准予回国。原来，一向主张“攘外必先安内”的国民党当局所关心的，并不是早日把日本侵略者赶出去，而是要保存实力，消灭共产党。刘善本等人回国后便被派去赶运军火。内战迫在眉睫！国民党政府的当权者们一心只想着“在三个月内消灭共产党”，竟然连湖南一带发生严重水灾，三百万人流离失所都置之不顾了。
　　早在美国学习和在卡拉奇“待命”期间，刘善本就曾私下阅读过英文版的《红星照耀着中国》（即《西行漫记》）。后来，他又得到了一本《新民主主义论》。毛泽东同志在该书中的第一句话“中国向何处去”？曾引导他思考过许多问题。他亲眼看到了在中国这片土地上，正在进行的光明与黑暗两种命运两条道路的殊死斗争。刘善本彻底惊醒了，他深深地感到：自己再也不能迟疑、不能沉默了！
　　1946年6月22日，毛泽东主席发表严正声明，反对美国政府军事援蒋，挑起中国内战。第二天，在南京发生了十万群众向国民党政府请愿，要求停止内战、民主建国，却遭到残酷镇压。当时叫做“下关惨案”。出于对全国人民正义愿望的支持和对国民党政府倒行逆施的抗议，6月26日，刘善本利用由昆明往成都运送军火的机会，巧妙地摆脱了地面控制，在同机组人员张受益、唐世耀、唐玉文等同志的配合下，冒着生命危险，驾驶530号B─24型轰炸机安全飞抵延安，完成了“标志着全国人民争取和平、民主、独立的新高潮”（朱德总司令语）的伟大义举。
　　在当时的国民党军队中，空军被称为“天之骄子”，飞行员的生活是很优裕的。刘善本又素以学习成绩优异、飞行技术超群而负盛名，在一般人眼里，他更是“仕途”坦荡、令人羡慕的佼佼者。然而，刘善本却视荣华富贵如粪土，宁肯同当时还处于弱小一方的解放区军民一道，钻山沟、住窑洞，献身于中国人民的解放事业。
　　在延安，刘善本及其机组人员受到了党和人民的热情欢迎——毛泽东、朱德同志亲临欢迎大会，朱总司令还把他们请到自己窑洞里作客。那时的解放区还不可能象我们今天对待驾机起义的同志那样，给予优厚的物质待遇，连延安商界联合赠送给刘善本等人的那份“厚礼”，也不过只是“香烟一条、饼干五包”而已。然而，刘善本却为自己能生活在人民之中而感到了真正的满足。8月14日，他以“这里的人情充满了温暖”为题，发表了热情洋溢的广播讲话，表达了他决心同党和人民一道战胜困难、迎接美好未来的坚定信念。
　　刘善本的起义，发生在那样一种特定的历史条件下，已经远不再是单纯个人的行为了。正如当时一位诗人所写的：“这是一声响亮的信号”，它宣告“人民不朽，正义不朽，在黎明的号角里，一切魔怪都要退掉！”它极大地鼓舞了正在为保卫抗战胜利果实而战斗的各解放区军民，也促使国民党军队中具有爱国之心的广大官兵重新思考和选择自己的道路。在他之后，国民党空军先后有42架飞机、100余人起义。单是刘善本原先所在的第八航空大队，从1948年到1954年的七年间，就有杨培光、俞渤、谭汉洲、谢派芬、阎磊、刘焕统、徐骏英、张雨农、毛履武、唐宛体等十数人先后驾驶飞机回到人民的怀抱中来。所以，周恩来总理生前曾多次称“刘善本同志是国民党空军起义的带头人”。
　　时隔三十多年，一位1948年驾机起义的同志。回忆往事，仍十分动情地指出：“刘善本同志是我们这些从国民党空军中起义过来的人所景仰的先驱，是一面正义者的旗帜。他引导了我们不少的爱国志士飞向人民的怀抱，走上了不平坦的社会主义光明大道！”[1]
人生经历编辑
刘善本，1915年生，山乐省昌乐县人。自幼聪颖好学，秉性刚正。1932年入北平大学附属高中部学习。1931年“九·一八”事变后，他积极参加学校进步组织和抗日爱国运动。1935年毕业时，面对国家民族危亡的命运，在“航空救国”的思想影响下，考入航空学校。同年夏到南京小营国民党陆军军官学校的“空军入伍生营”学习陆军知识。一年后，转入中央航空学校洛阳分校，在那里完成了初级飞行训练。1937年3月，又转入杭州笕桥中央航空学校总校（1938年7月改为空军军官学校）中级班进行中级飞行训练。1938年底，毕业于该校轰炸科，后在成都空军轰炸总队、第六大队和第八大队任准尉、少尉、中尉飞行员。1937年抗日战争爆发后，由于国民党实行不抵抗政策，刘善本所在的轰炸机部队被撤到河西走廊、兰州一线，没能飞上抗日前线。他团结一些飞行员，坚持锻炼身体，刻苦钻研航空理论和飞行技术，等待着抗日报国的机会。[2] 1943年初，刘善本作为副驾驶兼领航，参加青海大河坝、玉树、昌都的航线试飞。在大队长蔡锡昌因高空缺氧昏厥情况下，刘善本临危不惧，沉着驾机安全飞回，为在高原玉树建立第一个航空基地立下功劳。同年秋，他和部分空勤人员赴美学习，先后在4所航校和基地进行B—24型轰炸机飞行训练。他曾对领航计算尺提出改革意见，获圣地安娜航校奖励。 1945年春，反法西斯战争胜利在即，刘善本驾驶B—24型轰炸机回国。飞到巴基斯坦卡拉奇时，被指令“就地待命”。眼看着与日本侵略军最后拼搏的机会没有了，他非常失望苦闷。6个月后，国民党当局才准予他们回国。回国后，进驻上海大场机场，即被派出赶运军火。他目睹国民党不顾人民死活，蓄意制造内战的现实，对国民党当局完全失望了，思索着如何对国家、民族作出自己的贡献。
　　1946年6月26日，蒋介石公开撕毁国共两党签署的“双十协定”，调集30万大军进攻解放区。就在这一天，刘善本利用由昆明飞往成都运送军火的机会，机智、勇敢、沉着地摆脱了国民党当局的控制，在机组人员张受益、唐世跃、唐玉文的配合下，驾驶530号B—24型轰炸机，飞抵延安，受到中国共产党和人民的热情欢迎。毛泽东主席、朱德总司令亲临欢迎大会，接见机组人员。
　　刘善本飞行技术高超，是当时国民党空军中的佼佼者。他的起义，唤醒了国民党军中一些官兵的爱国之心。在他之后，国民党空军先后有40余架飞机、100余人起义。周恩来曾多次称赞“刘善本同志是国民党空军起义的带头人”。
　　1946年9月底，他受总部委派，赴东北参与创建解放区第一所航空学校，于1947年2月到达黑龙江地区密山县东安镇，被任命为航校副校长。当时，条件十分艰苦，又经常有敌机来袭扰。刘善本吃苦在前，主动作起义人员和教职员的思想工作。亲自兼任教官，既讲航空理论又教实际操作。教学设备缺乏，没有教材，他设计出计算尺模型，编写了《领航学》、《仪表学》等教材。还设计制作了测风盘，直到中华人民共和国成立后一个时期，航校、航空部队还广泛应用。在航校工作期间，不仅担负繁重的管理、教学任务，而且经常执行紧急的飞行任务。1947年8月，按东北民主联军总部的命令，完成了空运地图的任务，受到上级的表扬。1948年冬，锦州前线缴获一架C—46型运输机，飞机破损严重，他为在航校增设C—46型飞机训练，冒着生命危险，驾驶这架飞机飞回航校。
　　1949年2月，经中共中央批准，刘善本加入了中国共产党。
　　1949年9月24日，毛泽东主席宴请傅作义、刘善本、邓兆祥等国民党起义人员。指出：“由于国民党军中一部分爱国军人举行起义，不但加速了国民党残余军事力量的瓦解，而且使我们有了迅速增强的空军和海军。”
　　1949年10月1日，在举行开国大典时，刘善本驾驶C—46型飞机作为空中分队的领队长机，飞越天安门上空，接受党和国家领导人检阅。
　　1949年12月，中央军委决定在老航校的基础上组建6所航空学校，刘善本任第一航空学校校长。1950年6月，速成班学员毕业，他率领这些学员组建华东空军第四混成旅，任副旅长。1951年11月，以第四混成旅第12团为基础，扩编为航空兵第10师，刘善本任师长。在抗美援朝战争中，他作为航空兵师长率部参战，曾组织过空军的首例夜袭作战，并使用了电子对抗和照明轰炸等战法。
　　刘善本具有高超的驾驶技术和丰富的实践经验，作战坚毅果断，为人豪爽热情，遇事严谨求实。1955年，他被授予大校军衔，并荣获一级解放勋章。1964年，晋空军少将军衔。曾当选第一、二、三届全国人民代表大会代表，第一届中国人民政治协商会议委员、国防委员会委员。还曾任空军学院副教育长。
　　“文化大革命”中，同林彪、吴法宪一伙进行坚决斗争，不顾个人安危，上书揭露林彪、吴法宪反革命罪行，结果遭到秘密关押和无端审讯，以及残酷迫害，于1968年3月10日不幸逝世。终年53岁。
　　1975年10月，空军党委作出决定，为刘善本平反，恢复名誉，并将其骨灰安放在八宝山革命公墓。

  说起来对闪电侠的期待要远远大于糖糖，因为糖糖毕竟是二线角色，但是闪电一直是作为JL的绝对主要角色而存在的。这种地位是不输给老爷的，因为最开始的正义协会里面就由闪电创建，初创成员都没有老爷。但是为什么电视要改成这样？或者说为什么DC要改成这样？
  虽然基于电视这种平台肯定不可能按漫画原著来拍，但是莫名的改动就是简直画蛇添足。原著的巴里一直是身材高大，体格健硕，经典的美式英雄形象，虽然剧里这么干有点不合适，但是至少也应该弄的壮实一点，古斯丁实在是太瘦了。尤其是穿上那个“暗红”色的紧身衣时就显的更瘦了。最不能原谅的巴里应该是金发啊！就算演员不是金发，染成金发或者带个假发就那么难吗？
  第二、很多人吐槽的艾瑞斯，问题也出在演员上。为什么要找个黑人？如果为了电视平台需要可以放弃一些特效或者其他的。这是可以理解的，但是演员肤色种东西难道和电视平台有关系吗？原著后来是改了艾瑞斯的肤色，但是别人是拉丁裔，就比如摩登家庭里的Gloria相似。
 第三、也许是编剧的设计，至少我希望是。剧中威尔斯博士从各方面看都是逆闪电，他是科学家、他有了逆闪的衣服、他不断的刺激巴里提高速度、他知道未来的事。但是剧中他名字叫哈里森 威尔斯而不是斯旺！！！那么可以这样想编剧希望逆闪博士不叫斯旺，而是一个别的名字。没错，为什么非要限定逆闪叫斯旺呢。但是既然逆闪不叫斯旺，为什么要安排一个艾瑞斯的男优叫斯旺？这就是莫名其妙了。
  但是在闪电侠里有这样一种可能，博士一直就是斯旺，从来就不是威尔斯。可以这样解释，第一集结尾博士拿出了未来的报纸，2024年闪电侠消失。根据漫画，这个是大事件无限地球危机，巴里马力全开拯救世界的事。所以博士来自未来，这是肯定的，这一点和逆闪的设定一样。但是有个悖论是来自未来的人不能和现在的自己同时存在。就是说未来的你可以回到过去，但是不能见到过去的你。博士从未来而来，但是他不能叫斯旺，或者说他不能成为斯旺，他必须成为别的人，比如用灵魂占据别人的身体，或者其他的。或者他成为威尔斯就是悖论的结果。质能方程决定光速不可突破，但是假如在一个接近光速的火车上开枪，子弹相对火车没有达到光速，但是相对地面（要加上火车接近光速的速度）就突破光速了。可是质能方程告诉我们光速不可达到，这就形成了悖论。那么自然法则的修正结果就是时间会自然变快，这就是时光机的原理。所以博士叫威尔斯可能就是自然法则修正的结果。
  博士从未来而来，但是，是从25世纪来的？还是2024年左右来的？如果是从25世纪来的，那么剧中的斯旺就可能是逆闪的祖先，或者是机器人、生化人什么的。因为逆闪电对闪电侠极度痛恨，但是又不能杀了闪电侠，所以夺走闪电侠所爱就会让闪电侠极度痛苦。因此杀了巴里的妈，安排一个生化人什么的抢走巴里的妹子。安排这个生化人叫斯旺就是为了表明是自己干的（就好像闪点悖论里斯旺将逆闪的衣服给了巴里）。而如果博士是从2024年左右来的那么，威尔斯博士就是悖论的结果了。他从未来而来甚至都不用在乎自己会是什么样子，叫什么名字，是什么身份。因为这一切都是自然法则的修正结果，他不用改动，他也无法改动。
  另外还有一个可能也是关于穿越时空造成悖论的。因为未来的报纸明确提到了“无限地球危机”。而“无限地球危机”是DCU第一次大洗牌，洗牌结束前，时空怎么混乱都说的过去，同一个人，存在同一错位时空里，但是身份不同了，或者说成为了另一种存在。比如同样蝙蝠侠，1号地球（ 记得在 闪点发生 N52之前 原始地球是1号地球 之后改成了0号地球）杯面是老爷，但是在闪点穿越的世界里杯面成了老爷的父亲太老爷。

为，为什么我K看了七集最萌的反而是BG（大胸副手和酒吧老板）啊OTZ，这让我情何以堪啊OTZ，是因为配音表里一堆受就一个杉田智和和那个红毛王勉强能攻的起来吗OTZ。还有长发的名字是肿么回事，每次看全称都会看成夜刀神狼狗，每次看名字都会看成狗郎，翻译一定就写个狗字不可吗？
还有那个伏八哪里萌了，明明是双王强强CP更萌啊。TUT我还以为死的会是伏八里的小攻呢，怎么死我的小攻了。这种背叛爱人所在阵营转投他人其实心里还是深爱小受但为了XX或OO原因只能一再激怒小受最后临死之前口吐真言让小受悔不当初挂念一辈子的梗多好啊！！《东京巴比伦》里多经典啊，《闪灵二人组》里还用了两次啊两次，一个是眼镜男和花月还是谁，一次是阿蛮爸爸和阿蛮啊！！既然第一王权者都是不死之身了，就不能分点能力给赤王吗，我还寄希望于他能顺便兼个治愈能力了TUT。
这部剧要是把卖肉的力气放在卖腐上就好了，尼玛还没有《生死线》腐。

       可以为你躲进衣橱，然后等一切平静的时候就这样看着你沉沉的睡去。
    可以为你在冬夜的台阶下，煮你想吃的面条。
    可以就这样，知道你、懂你。
    即使用那个不属于自己的名字，为了你而成为他。
    即使我只会写出“我爱你，就想春天里的车轮。”
    是啊，很笨拙，优雅不属于我。可是你知道吗？那些也是我想对你说的啊！你知道吗？我爱你，虽然从没勇气说出。

    真不知道这样的笨拙的恋情，生活中是不是还有。
    即使粉身碎骨，只是为你留在我身边。

跟朋友由昨天的两位风云人物聊到中国社会现状，我们想破脑袋也不明白，这一切究竟是怎么了。夺人眼球的事情每时每刻都在发生，世人几乎在麻木的状态下都难逃爆炸性信息的轰炸，今天哪位官员落马，明天肯定又有比他更大的接受调查，否则人们不会再拨冗关注，桃色事件更是如此—...  (展开)

其实真的很不喜欢羽墨.感觉她说话眼神空洞.她不是在演戏.她是在给观众留美好印象,感觉她不愿为角色牺牲一点形象,没有给予自己角色一点灵魂.说白了,就没演活倒演死了.看第一季的时候,每个角色都活灵活现。搞笑而带有灵气.第三季拜托不用羽墨好不好.我喜欢傻傻的美嘉.心的善良聪明的宛禹还有展博。

这篇剧评可能有剧透 版权所有 禁止转载 禁止引用 新婚甜心是同事 奇缘巧配 第一篇 不是偶然 虽然先结婚后恋爱的故事有很多，可是如同三浦真夏和春田亚美这样，为了结婚而结婚，在决定结婚之前甚至都没有问过对方的家庭背景和工作单位的伴侣，还真是不多。就因为这份迷糊，成就了一段特别的缘分。 ...  (展开)

     怎么没有负分呢？？？有这么挫的高富帅男猪么？
   你见过现在的京城四少没？且不说钱多钱少，哪一个长相是本片中这种挫法的？
   话说本片的男主真心是我见过的最挫最圆的完全和我们可爱的土豪或者高大上毫无“亲缘关系”的男猪脚。这到底是在贬低大家的审美呢？还是在贬低大家的审美呢？
   借用某些睿智的网友的话语主观上：如此之挫的男主演员，还有看下去的必要么？看到你的面容就只能记得你如此狂拽的嘴脸，其他的你在演什么戏，说什么台词， 跑什么主角，或者龙套，都会忘记，不是有首歌唱么：“只是在人群中看了你狂拽的嘴脸，再也无法忘记你容颜。”你怎么这么令人难忘呢？可惜再难忘，我也不想看见你。
   客观上：如此之无聊的剧情配上如此之烂掉的男主。还有可看的必要么？
   此片只能负分啊，负分啊！有木有，有木有！


PS：如果评分条是这样的-☆-☆-☆-☆-☆ ☆☆☆☆☆大家会怎么评？

反正我果断的-★-★-★-★-★☆☆☆☆☆。你呢？

只能说这部电影我很喜欢，本来想用手机看一会就睡了，结果一气儿看完了，也半夜一点了。现在的国产片能有这样的好剧本，能拍成这样，真是难能可贵，片子不尽人意的地方都是受超低成本的限制。不可否认，这片子好看最大的功臣是主演沙溢，他演喜剧即使夸张也会让人觉得自然，片中很多地方我都笑出声了，靠《武林外传》走红的这些演员，沙溢是最低调的一个，也是最受待见的一个，也是最幸福的一个，希望他和胡可的婚姻能长久（胡可还是很有味儿的，沙溢眼光不错，说回来潘粤明和董洁这样的夫妻都能离婚，娱乐圈的婚姻开始即使是爱情，最后的结果还真是没一定）。至于女主角叶青，88年出生的，很年轻也很漂亮，某些角度看着特别喜欢，她演的是一个大众心中的坏女人，为了自己不择手段，但在这个残酷的社会，底层的女人还是弱的，一个女人也有权利狠起来，所以这个角色有喜欢的也会有不喜欢的，本人不讨厌这个角色，因为社会上有很多这样的女生，存在即是真理。
片子有搞笑，有悬疑，有犯罪也有爱情，片中的爱情正如海报上说的“爱情是金钱撒的谎”，但又不尽然。片中沙溢饰演的落魄律师正直热心，也和我们普通人一样，当他看到叶青饰演的这个“漂亮且无助”的女生时，也产生正常男人该有的保护欲，但却开始被利用。片中的爱情最后的结局是好的，再坏的女人，如果碰到一个爱自己的好男人，即使不是一见倾心的类型，我相信她会被他感化，也会有很大的几率爱上他，所以当片尾我看到再次怀孕挺着大肚子躲避城管的坏女人叶青跳上了沙溢这个好男人的三轮车，伴着沙溢的那句“老婆，上车”，我也开心的笑了。

一、多个时空


《纯粹理性批判》中的第一经验类比（Analogies of Experience）要求在现象中有一个恒定且唯一之物来表象意识中的时间本身。恒定，或永恒，因为作为总体的时间本身是始终在那的；惟一，因为只有一个时间。这个惟一且永恒的东西，即现象中的实体（Substance）。康德明确把这个实体与洛克的托子（Substratum）区分开来，认为实体是以各种方式显现于人的，而不是像托子那样不可知，也不显现。

我要说，洛克的托子的作用是保证物的个体化与同一性。这个作用在康德那儿，似乎是由物自体和先验范畴共同完成。先验范畴组织现象，在使意识对现象的认识成为可能的同时，也使同一的意识本身成为可能——对先验对象的构成即对自我的构成。而物自体在这个过程中究竟如何起作用，不详。康德的物自体与洛克的托子一样，是个让理论显得尴尬，却又不得不进行的假设。

尽管康德反复说现象中的实体不是洛克的托子，但这个实体究竟是什么，他又语焉不详。出于他对牛顿力学的接受，有人尝试将其理解为牛顿意义上的质量。我论证过，这样的解读将面临一个两难困境：如果实体是个体化了的质量，时间便不是惟一的；如果实体是现象世界中的总质量，基于二律背反的理由——这个总体无法成为经验对象——我们便无法经验到它。（详细论述见篇末附录）

若是跳出康德阐释，取前一个困境：时间不是惟一的，每个作为现象的物都意味着一个独立的时间体系，我们就科幻了：空间中的一个一个的物，奠基着意识中的一个又一个时间系，我们可以生活在不同的时空中，当我们经验不同的物。甚至，对应地说，我们总在成为另一个人，当我们来到不同的时空。

于是，我情愿把亨利的生活看作对康德的一次失败却有趣的解读。与其说他是一位时间旅行者，一位不停地穿越时空的超人或可怜人，不如说，他的意识中并没有一个绝对惟一的时间，他所来到并离开的每一个时空，都是一个独立自在的世界，尽管这些世界看上去很像，但哪个都不依赖于另一个——从理念的意义上说。


二、沉默，或消失


影片的前半部分，亨利的突然消失被解释为一种不治的遗传疾病。没有理由地，他时不时就去了另一个时空，赤身裸体地寻找可以穿上的衣服。仿佛常人来到一个新的环境，总是迫不及待地寻找一个身份，穿到自己身上。
亨利总会在一个无从预料的时刻消失，克莱尔生活在一个不确定的世界中。她的爱情是确定的，但她爱的人不确定地存在着。她的生活中弥漫着不确定性，而这恰好让她格外珍惜亨利在她身边的每一分钟。

克莱尔一次次怀孕又一次次流产，因为胎儿也有穿越症，莫名其妙地，便在某个时刻，出离了子宫。但克莱尔最后一次怀孕时，对亨利说，你每次消失都是因为感觉到了压力。所以，从现在开始，我要保持绝对地平静，这样胎儿就可以顺利出生了。
看到这里，我恍然大悟，原来亨利的穿越症是个隐喻，关于男人的隐喻：面对压力，便会沉默与回避，这不正是男人的本能反应么——而这在女人看来，仿佛爱人去了另一个时空，不知何时才能回来，甚至，会不会回来。

我查了查，电影改编自一位女造型艺术家的首部小说，写于一段失败的恋情之后。原来如此。

很多年前听到过一个说法：爱情，对男人来说，是挂在墙上的一幅画，你并不总是去看它；但对女人来说，则是房间里音乐，你想不听都不行。所以，男人需要时不时地呆在纯然属于自我的世界里，在沉默中成为自己。女人却要认为这是对她的疏远、对亲密的疏离，并因此而坐立不安，想方设法闯进那份铁一般的沉默。结果，要么把自己撞疼，要么把爱情撞碎。
这是对小儿女情态的描述。若成年点，便会更同情于另一个说法：人生在世，无非是男人讨慰藉，女人讨生活。人并不总是需要慰藉，尤其在得意之时。人却总在生活，就算你不想。


三、看着，却无法改变


在一次穿越中，亨利来到母亲身边，在地铁里，母亲在看报，他们作为陌生人简短却亲切的交谈了一会儿。亨利告诉母亲，他要结婚了，这个女孩让他感到安全。
克莱尔问他：你什么不去阻止那场车祸，既然你可以回到车祸发生之前。“我无法阻止。无数次我回到过去，回到母亲还在的时候，但每次我都无法改变发生着的一切。”——这话让人特别难过。我们并不能改变过去，就像不能重新雕刻一座已然完成的塑像。

不是么？很多时候，我们从自己当下的境遇中抽身而出，试图站在一个更开阔的角度，超脱地看现在的纠结、焦虑，或苦闷，并自嘲这些都没什么的。但当你身在当下，你知道未来的自己就坐在对面，笑着，看着自己，慈悲地。但你还是无法因此脱身而出。你仍然只能呆在你当下的处境中，无论是过分的快乐，还是仿佛无法挣脱的哀伤。

每一个时刻都是三维的，它包含着过去、现在，和未来这三个维度。我们在回忆中编辑时间，编辑自己，有意无意地遗忘一些，并把另一些反复摩挲。过往明明灭灭，像晴天里，随风晃动的百叶窗投在墙上的影子。每次回忆之后，我们都成为另一个人。
未来也是。未来无数次作为想象呈现于当下，各式各样地，仿佛清晰的回忆。回忆与憧憬，如同天平的两臂，对称着，平衡着，在现在这个支点上。所以，现在这个时刻，最重。


四、期限


有天聚会时，亨利中枪后痛苦挣扎的裸体突然出现在他们的门厅里。又消失了。克莱尔说，我从没见过四十岁之后的你。我见过的你总是很年轻。从这个时候起，死亡就成了他们中的另一个在场者，尽管它总是沉默着。

亨利穿越到未来，遇见了自己的已经十岁的女儿。女儿告诉他，他死于自己五岁那年。她们一直很想念他。那时他们的女儿还没出生。那时克莱尔还一如既往地希望与亨利白头偕老，就像她还没长大时那样，就像她长大之后第一次遇到亨利时那样，就像亨利死后，她仍然留着亨利所有的衣服，等着亨利回来那样。

于她而言，亨利是不会死的。他无非是走远了一下子回不来，他无非是在时空中迷了路，找不到一件让他温暖的衣服。

女儿五岁那年，亨利和克莱尔都已知道，亨利即将死去，中弹而死。期限降至，可能在任何一天，任何一个时刻。在它到来之前，所有相聚的时光都是铭刻，都是用最日常的方式来进行的一次祭奠，一次追忆。当这个期限还不确定，他们相爱着，仿佛一对最平凡的恋人；当这个期限已然确定，他们相爱着，装作不知道他们即将分离。

一个期限并不见得让期限到来之前的一切都显得美好。但，美好的东西都有一个期限。确定的期限，或不确定的期限。你不能试图挽留，那会犹如握紧手中的细沙，握得越紧，便流失得越快，宛如时间，从指缝间悄然流走。
这个期限是否到来，何时到来，都不是你能选择的。你能做的，仅仅是在它到来之前的每一刻，不让自己在未来后悔——克莱尔明白这些，并且，她做到了。

而，这不正是人生么。


——————
附录：On Understanding Substance as Mass

Introduction

In the First Analogy of Experience, Kant argues that there must be some permanently persistent substance in the appearances which represents the persistence of time. Given Kant’s endorsement of Newtonian physics, commentators such as Eric Watkins suggest that such permanently persistent substance can be understood as Newtonian mass. In this paper, however, I argue that we face a dilemma when we try to cash out the notion of substance in terms of Newtonian mass.
The paper proceeds in three steps. In the first section, I present the reason why there needs to be a permanently persistent substance in the appearances, and discuss why it seems to be compelling to conceive of the permanently persistent substance as Newtonian Mass. Then, in the second section, I argue that there are (only) two ways of conceiving of the permanently persistent substance as Newtonian mass, namely, to conceive of substance as individuated mass and to conceive of substance as the sum total of mass in the world of appearances. I show that there are textual indications as well as philosophical reasons to support each option. In the third section, however, I argue that both ways suffer from inescapable problems. Thus, conceiving of the permanently persistent substance in terms of Newtonian mass is not viable.

    
Section I. The Permanently Persistent Substance

In this section, I shall first present the reason why Kant thinks that there must be a permanently persistent substance in the appearances. I then discuss why it is compelling to conceive of such substance as Newtonian mass.
In the chapter “System of all principles of pure understanding,” Kant discusses what makes possible the applications of the categories, i.e. the pure concepts of understanding, to objects, i.e. appearances that are given to sensible intuitions. That is, he discusses what it is that makes the categories have objective validity. Kant’s claim is that the applications of the categories are only possible under certain conditions, and these conditions are spelled out by the principles. For instance, the applications of the relational categories (substance-accidents, cause and effect, and mutual interactions) are possible if they are applied to objects according to the principles of Analogies of Experience. In addition to the three specific principles that correspond to each of the three relational categories, Kant also provides a general principle overarching all three Analogies. The general principle is stated in the second edition as follows: “Experience is possible only through the representations of a necessary connection of perceptions” (B 218). Watkins provides a helpful interpretation of this general principle:
“The general idea is that each of the three relational categories represents a necessary connection that is required for experience of a single time and of objects existing and being temporally related to each other within a single time to be possible.” (My emphasis)
Since this paper is focused on the notion of substance in the first Analogy, I shall ignore the second and third Analogies. So I now turn to a close examination of the first Analogy.
The first Analogy, i.e. the principle of the persistence of substance, is stated in the second edition as follows: “In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.” (B 224) Watkins summarizes Kant’s argument for the first Analogy as follows (which I take to be a correct interpretation):
Premise 1: Appearances, i.e. objects of experience, are made possible by time’s persistence.
Premise 2: We do not perceive time itself.
Therefore, In order to have experience of appearances, there must be some permanent substance in the appearances which can represent time or time’s persistence.
While the appearances, as the objects given to our intuitions, are changing, the substance in appearances always stays the same and is permanent. So, Kant calls the permanent substance “the substratum of everything real” (B 225). But, some clarifications about Kant’s use of the term “substratum” are needed to prevent potential confusions. Substratum in Kant’s text does not mean what Locke uses this term to mean, namely, the bearer of properties which is unchanging and about which we can have no knowledge. For, according to Locke, we can only know what is given to our senses, but since the underlying substratum cannot be given to our senses, we have no access to it and therefore cannot know it.
Kant, by constrast, does not think that there is any Lockean substratum in the world of appearances. For Kant, the fact that the states of the substance are changing and the substance stays the same does not mean the states are separable from the substance. Rather, the changing states of the substance are simply the ways in which the substance is given to us. Thus, we can know the substance, that is, we know the substance through its states. In order to avoid the Lockean implication of the term “substratum,” I shall only use “substance” to refer to the permanently persistent thing in the appearances despite Kant’s own use of “substratum” to talk about what is permanent in the appearances.
Since I have argued that Kant’s notion of substance is not the Lockean substratum, then what is the Kantian notion of substance? We need a positive account of what the substance is. It is obvious that such a permanently persistent thing cannot be captured by ordinary physical objects, no matter whether they are natural objects (say, rocks) or artifacts (say, ships), for neither artifacts nor natural objects always stay the same such that in principle they can never suffer changes. So, it seems no ordinarily construed physical things can be qualified as substance that is permanently persistent. On the other hand, it is very hard to imagine that anything non-physical could play the role the substance is supposed to play. For it is hard to imagine how a non-physical being could be given to our sensible intuition or could be spatiotemporally organized by our a priori intuitions. So, it is unlikely that Kant means something non-physical by “substance.” Thus, there are two constraints on spelling out what substance is. First, it is something physical. Second, as I have shown, the physical being that can be understood as substance cannot be ordinarily individuated physical things such as planet or rock.
In order to meet the above two conditions, Watkins suggests that, given Kant’s commitment to Newtonian science, it is likely that Kant has Newtonian mass in mind when he talks about the substance, since no matter how a physical object changes, its mass always stays the same. Since Newtonian mass is physical and is not an ordinarily individuated object, it seems quite compelling that the substance, which is permanently persistent, just is Newtonian mass. According to common sense, Newtonian mass is understood to be underlying objects such that we cannot directly perceive mass but can only perceive mass through the way it is given to our intuition, namely, through the perception of the objects that have mass. Thus, mass is neither unknowable nor directly perceivable, which seems to fit the description of the substance perfectly.
Moreover, there are many textual indications that suggest the identification of substance with mass. Let me note two examples. First, recall the general principle overarching the three specific Analogies, namely, “In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.” (B 224) It seems that “quantum” is most naturally to be understood as mass, for mass seems to be the only thing in nature that is neither increased nor diminished on Newtonian physics.
The other indication is Kant’s example to illustrate his claim that “he <a philosopher> thus assumed that as incontrovertible that even in fire the matter (substance) never disappears but rather only suffers an alteration in its form.” (B 288, my emphasis):
“A philosopher was asked: How much does the smoke weigh? He replied: If you take away from the weight of the wood that was burnt the weight of the ashes that are left over, you will have the weight of the smoke.” (B 288)
We can see that here Kant explicitly identifies substance with matter. And it is quite plausible to think that “matter” is just another way of saying “mass”. That is, “mass” seems to be the theoretical analog of the term “matter.” This hypothesis is supported by the example of the weight of smoke. For, in the example, the way to calculate the weight of smoke just is to calculate the mass (multiplies the gravitational constant).
However, despite the compelling reasons for the identification of substance with mass, in the next sections, I shall argue that the substance cannot be understood as Newtonian mass, for when we try to work out the details of understanding the substance as mass, we face an unavoidable dilemma.


Section II. Some Mass or the Sum Total of Mass

In this section, I shall argue that there are two ways of conceiving of substance as Newtonian mass, and then show that both ways have some support from the text and are to some extent philosophically plausible. So, both ways deserve detailed considerations. But, in the next section, I shall argue that both ways face insurmountable problems.
In identifying substance with mass, we need to settle an ambiguity: Is the mass meant to be some mass, say the mass of a rock which is 7 kilograms (a randomly chosen weight), or to be the sum total of mass in the world of appearances which is a very large but nonetheless definite amount? Since both some mass and the sum total of mass are permanently persistent, we cannot tell which way of identifying is more plausible with respect to the permanent persistence of substance. So, we must appeal to some other philosophically and/or textually interesting points to ground a preference in choosing one over the other.
Let us first consider identifying the substance with some or individuated mass. First, the first Analogy is the principle according to which the relational category substance-accident is to be applied. Kant defines accidents to be “the determinations of a substance that are nothing other than particular ways for it to exist.”(B 229) Many commentators interpret the relation to be between object and its properties or states. Thus it makes more sense to think that the mass, which is the underlying bearer of properties, is the individuated mass of some object, instead of the sum total of mass in the world of appearances. For instance, in the example of the weight of smoke, Kant seems to conceive of substance as the matter, i.e. mass, of an individual object. Moreover, if we conceive of substance as the sum total of mass in the world of appearances, it is very hard to imagine how substance can be the bearer of properties or what kind of properties of which substance is the bearer.
One might argue that, on the interpretation according to which substance is the sum total of mass, even though we could imagine no properties of which substance is the bearer, we can still conceive of substance as the bearer of (changing) states, i.e. the successive states of the world of appearances. I reply that Kant cannot accept such an idea because the states of the world are not objects of possible experience, for it is at least empirically true that no one could have the whole world of appearances as his object of experience. I will return to this point later on in the paper and use it to argue that conceiving of substance as the sum total of mass is untenable given Kant’s theoretic commitments.
The above discussion is about reasons to prefer the identification of substance with some mass. I now turn to the reasons to prefer the identifications of substance with the sum total of mass. There are some textual evidences in the first Analogy that suggest this latter identification. For instance, the following passage:
“…here the issue is only appearances in the field of experience, the unity of which would never be possible if we were to allow new things (as far as their substance is concerned) to arise. For then everything would disappear that alone can represent the unity of time, namely the identity of the substratum in which alone all change has its thoroughgoing unity. This persistence is therefore nothing more than the way in which we represent the existence of things (in appearances).” (B 229/A186, my emphasis)
In this passage, Kant seems to identify the permanent persistent substance that represents the persistence of time with the unity of appearances, which seems to be the sum total of mass in the whole world of appearances. Let me argue for my understanding of this passage that it indicates that Kant identifies substance with the sum total of mass. I shall argue by reductio: Suppose Kant identified substance with individuated mass in the above passage. Then, it would make no sense to think that the arising of new substance could make the representation of the unity of time impossible. For the arising of new substance in no sense affects the substance, i.e. the mass, of the original objects. Let me use an example to illustrate. Suppose there is a rock whose mass is 7 kilograms and there arises a new object out of nothing, whose mass is 5 kilograms. Insofar as the rock’s mass remains the same, whether or not there are new masses arising out of nothing does not affect the unity of the rock’s mass, which is 7 kilograms. Therefore, in this passage, Kant conceives of substance as the sum total of mass in the whole world of appearances.
So far I have shown that there are compelling reasons to identify substance with some mass or with the sum total of mass respectively. In the next section, I shall argue that there are also devastating reasons to each identification such that either way we go, we face unsolvable problems.


Section III. One Single Time and the Limit of Possible Experience

I now turn to the problems from which the each identification suffers. In this section, I shall argue that these problems make both identifications untenable. Let us first consider the identification of substance with individuated mass (i.e. some mass). I argue that the reason why individuated mass cannot be identified with substance is that individuated mass cannot represent the oneness of time. Recall Kant’s argument for the principle of the first Analogy: in order to have experiences of objects as temporal, we must identify a permanently persistent substance that can represent time in objects. While the states of the substance change, the substance persists so that the substance can represent time that persists. It is important to notice that time, which is supposed to be represented by substance in appearances, is one single time. But, individuated mass cannot represent one single time. For there are many individuated masses, for instance, the mass of a rock which is 7 kilograms, the mass of a cup which is 0.5 kilogram, and the mass of a table which is 3 kilograms, each of which is permanently persistent and undergoes changes. If one of them can represent time, any other also can. In that case, we do not have one single time. Rather, we have many times or time-series, each of which is persistent.
Let me explain in details why multiply individuated masses cannot represent on single time. If these individuated masses can represent one single time, there must be some one single thing that is shared by these individuated masses that serves to represent the singularity of time. Whatever this shared thing is, it is not any of these individuated masses. Therefore, individuated mass cannot present one single time. However, on the other hand, time has be to singular. Here is a passage in the first Analogy which explains why time has to be one single time rather than a plurality of times:
“Substances (in appearances) are the substrata of all time-determinations. The arising of some of them and the perishing of others would itself remove the sole condition of the empirical unity of time, and the appearances would then be related to two different times, in which existence flowed side by side, which is absurd. For there is only one time, in which all different times must not be placed simultaneously but only one after another.” (B 232/A189)
One might argue that it does not matter how many individuated masses can represent time, it only matters that there is an individuated mass that represents time. Insofar as there is such a substance, which is permanently persistent, it suffices to represent one single time. I reply that, in that case, we still do not know which individuated mass is suppose to be the representer of the one single time in appearances. For there is not reason to think that the mass of one object is more suitable to represent time than the mass of another object is, insofar as both of the individuated masses are permanently persistent. Any choice of one over the other is arbitrary. But the unity or singularity of time is not arbitrary, for there can only be one time-series which persists, and any other time-series or temporal relations are just temporal parts of this unique time-series. Thus, I conclude that individuated mass cannot be the representer of time in appearances.
I now turn to argue that the sum total of mass cannot represent time either. The idea of my argument is to make use of Kant’s solution to the Antinomies to show that the permanently persistent substance that represents time in the appearances cannot be the sum total of mass because the sum total of mass is not an object of possible experience. Let me lay out my argument in detail.
In “The Antinomy of Pure Reason” chapter, Kant presents four pairs of arguments concerning four cosmological ideas about the world-whole, namely, whether there is a beginning of time, whether there is indivisibly simple substance, whether there is a first cause, and whether there is a necessary existent. As Allen W. Wood argues, the four antinomies share a general form, namely, the thesis of each antinomy claims that there must be a first member of the conditioning-conditioned chain, while the antithesis of each antinomy claims that there is no first member of such a chain and that the chain goes back into infinity. Kant argues that there are valid arguments for each of the four theses as well as valid arguments for each of the four antitheses, so we need a solution to such contradictions.
Kant’s solution to the contradictions, as Wood argues, relies on his doctrine of transcendental idealism. As for the first two antinomies, Wood argues
The mathematical antinomies are generated by mathematical principles that apply to things only insofar as they are given in sensible intuition…But these [the first two] series of conditions are never given to intuition as a whole...The theses are false because the principles of possible experience make it impossible for objects corresponding to the cosmological ideas of a first event, a largest extent of the world or a simple substance, ever to be given to intuition.”
Thus, the reason why Kant thinks that the claims made by the theses of the first and second antinomies are false is that neither the beginning of time nor the spatial boundary of the world or an indivisible substance can ever be given to our sensible intuition. If something cannot be given to our sensible intuition, according to Kant, we cannot have experience of it. Let me call this principle the object-of-sensible-intuition principle, namely, if something cannot be given to our sensible intuitions, then it cannot be object of our possible experience. And we can apply this principle to an object to determine whether that object can be object of possible experience. That is, if the object in question can be given to our sensible intuition, then the object can be object of our possible experience, but if the object cannot be given to our sensible intuition, then it cannot be object of our possible experience.
Now, let me apply the object-of-sensible-intuition principle to the idea of the sum total of mass. We can see that the sum total of mass cannot be given to our sensible intuition, so, the sum total of mass cannot be object of our possible experience. For the world of appearances seems to mean the whole universe or cosmos (because everything in the universe stands in causal relations to each other), there is no way for all of the mass in the whole universe to be given to our sensible intuition. Actually, we do not even know whether there are spatial boundaries of the universe, so we do not even know whether the sum total of mass in the all universe is finite. Thus, the sum total of mass cannot be object of possible experience. So, the sum total of mass cannot be that which represents time in appearances. For the reason there must be a permanently persistent substance in appearances which represents time is to make our temporally connected representations of objects possible. But, if the sum total of mass cannot be object of experience, it cannot make our experience of object possible. Thus, the permanently persistent substance in appearances cannot be the sum total of mass.
One might object that in the antinomies, the cosmological ideas at issue are condition-condition series. (B 436/A410) But the sum total of mass is not a series. Rather, it is an aggregate about which the question of conditioning and conditioned does not arise at all. Thus, Kant’s remarks on the antinomies have no bearing on whether the idea of the sum total of mass has any objective validity or significance. Moreover, the first two antinomies concern whether the conditioning-conditioned series go on into infinities. And it seems that it is impossible for us to experience infinity, for no matter what we experience it is finite insofar as we have experienced it. But, the quantum of the sum total of mass seems to be a definite and finite amount. By virtues of what can we claim that the sum total of mass cannot be object of experience? Is this “cannot” an empirical cannot, or an In-Principle cannot? If the answer is the former, the empirical “cannot” does not seem to be strong enough to show that the sum total of mass cannot be experienced, because we cannot know or predict whether in the future empirical sciences and technologies will make the sum total of mass possible object of experience. If the answer is the latter, at least further explanations of why the sum total of mass, which is a finite and definite amount, cannot be object of possible experience in principle are needed.
To the first objection I have two replies. First, in the first antinomy, Kant also discusses whether there is boundary or the largest extent of space. It is not obvious that there is a spatial series in the sense that it is obvious that there is a temporal series in which one moment succeeds its previous moments. However, according to Kant, we can think of the space acquiring its quantum through repeatedly or successively adding spatial units to the previous spatial units. (A 428/B 456) That is, the way of conceiving of space as a spatial series depends on the way of conceiving of time as a temporal series, which is naturally serial. Then, by the same token, we can also think of the sum total of mass acquiring its quantum by successively adding massive units to previous massive units. Thus, if the object-of-sensible-intuition principle applies to the idea of the boundary of space, it should also apply to the idea of the sum total of mass of the whole world of appearances.
Second, the fact that Kant applies the object-of-sensible-intuition-principle to the first two (or three) cosmological ideas to solve the contradictions does not mean that the principle can only be employed to deal with the antinomies. If the principle is applicable to other ideas, we can also use the principle to deal with other ideas. Since the object-of-sensible-intuition principle is derived from transcendental idealism, which is an important element in the whole Critique, there is no reason why the principle cannot be applied to other ideas than cosmological ideas. Thus, it is legitimate to use the object-of-sensible-intuition principle to show that the sum total of mass of whole world of appearances cannot be object of possible experience. So, the sum total of mass cannot be what represents time in appearances.
My reply to the second objection has two steps. First, it needs to be clarified that, although the first two antinomies concern whether the conditioning-conditioned series are infinite, Kant’s solution by the object-of-sensible-intuition principle does not rely on the whether the series are infinite. The principle only concerns whether the things to which the cosmological ideas refer can be given to our sensible intuition. It does not concern whether the things are infinite. It seems true that infinity cannot be object of sensible intuition. But this does not mean that all finite things can be given to our sensible intuition. Actually Kant rejects the claim that all finite things can be given to our sensible intuition. For Kant thinks the thesis of the first antinomy is false, because the beginning of time or the boundary of space cannot be given to our sensible intuition so that it cannot be object of possible experience.
The second step of my reply is to spell out in which sense of “cannot,” the sum total of mass cannot be object of possible experience. It seems to me that the distinction between empirical “cannot” and In-Principle “cannot” is hard to cash out in the context of Critique. For, in the Critique, any legitimate claim to knowledge entails that the object of which the knowledge is can be experienced. Thus, it seems that the empiricality of the “cannot” entails the In-Principality of the “cannot”.
However, concerning the claim that we cannot predict whether in the future empirical sciences and technologies will make the sum total of mass possible object of experience, what would Kant say? Would Kant agree that future sciences and technologies might or could transform a transcendent idea into an idea which refers to object of possible experience? I do not think he would. For Kant thinks his Critique settles metaphysical questions once and for all by theoretical reason, which is static or a-historical. Future discoveries made by sciences and technologies should be able to do no damage to the doctrines in Critique. Moreover, it should be odd to Kant’s ear that progresses made by empirical sciences could have any bearings on the doctrines in the Critique, which he builds up from scratch employing only pure reason, which is absolutely a-historical.
Thus, I conclude that the above arguments show that identifying substance with the sum total of mass in the world of appearance is not tenable. Since I showed earlier in this section that identifying substance with individuated mass is not tenable either, I conclude that the general strategy of identifying substance with mass is untenable.


Section IV. Concluding Remarks

In this paper, I showed that a seemingly very promising way of understanding the permanently persistent substance discussed in the first Analogy, namely, conceiving of substance as Newtonian mass, is untenable. Then, I wonder whether there are other promising ways of providing a positive account of substance or actually it is the case that the notion of substance in the first Analogy is itself untenable. At this stage, maybe I could follow Kant’s stance on the things of themselves, namely, they exist, but we can have no knowledge about the way of their existence. But, at the same time, we need to have this minimal conviction that they exist. Similarly, concerning substance, we can have no knowledge about what the permanently persistent substance is, but we need to have the minimal conviction that it exists in the world of appearances and it serves to represent time.

Dot the I.


原来爱奴讲的竟是这样一个故事。这是我看完电影后的第一感觉。虽然这部片子名声赫赫，但总觉得名字过于香艳，提不起看的兴致。Kiss 是为i（爱）加上点。Hoho～多美妙的说法。


到底是有更多共同点的人比较容易互相吸引还是截然相反的人生会有更多火花？我要是卡门就选择太太平平地做幸福的新娘，一个陌生人的吻怎敌得过安稳平静的后半生！还好我不是卡门。


原来两个相似的人反而像不同的磁极，这种引力与生俱来无法抵抗。

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这篇剧评可能有剧透 一时兴起才重看了to my star，没想到一下跃升成为我的耽美top2！短小但完整，而且足够让人心动，过去一个月里重刷了起码三遍。 印象最深的一点，在于导演非常用心地呈现出了“你说的话，我都听见了”这种心意相通的状态： 初见的时候书俊说自己不吃鸡蛋，第二天晚上智宇做夜宵...  (展开)

之二、充满背信感的同盟，互换的二人 为了避免就这样含冤被捕，彩子无奈只好与阳斗结成同盟，互换身份躲过调查。在被要求删掉个人保密信息并交换手机时，她问起了阳斗随身携带凶器的原因却被阳斗搪塞过去。依然不甘心的彩子也删掉了手机中某样东西以防后患。得到指示后的第二天...  (展开)

作为X战警的粉丝，我特地看了三D版，结果大失所望。整个剧情没有一点新意，笑话不搞笑，人物没有性格，很多细节也不能自圆其说。

整个剧情都可以简单地预料到：金刚狼会通过一场恶战解开心结；他的超能力最终会恢复，日本女孩会安然无恙。。。。然后接下来的一个半小时就是在无聊中等待老套的剧情展开。唯一出乎我意料的是金刚狼和日本女孩上床了 - 如果金刚狼日日夜夜都想念Jean的话，怎么随随便便跟人家上床？如果真爱日本女孩的话又怎么轻易离开？救了人家的命就可以理所应当地上床吗？说白了就一个字，俗。

有一个地方最扯淡，毒液女在大结局的时候做出了一个骇人的动作，她用指甲把自己的脸皮从上至下划开，然后顺着划痕把整个身体的皮肤都撕了下来。我以为她马上就要展示一个新的惊世骇俗的超能力了，结果唯一的区别就是从之前的金发美女变成了秃头。再无其他。尼玛能稍微来点想象力吗？？？这难道是一部喜剧片？和我初中校长骑车被大风吹掉假头套有什么区别？？？

这篇影评可能有剧透 ====== 破坏环境 目光短浅 ====== 悬吧猪栏字幕电影宇宙 宇宙代码: 2116 总编号: XBZL-127 2020年美国惊悚恐怖电影《人为释放》（一译《挖掘》） 剧情简介: 多兰一家和洛马克一家是宾夕法尼亚州某乡村两户相邻的农场家庭。近日，债台高筑的洛马克决定将自己的土地租给一家...  (展开)

整片节奏应该是快的，但情节并没有很丰满，原因在于更多注重在细节上。开头部分入戏得比较慢是一大败笔，人物交代上确实不太容易让观众迅速理解，但这样做其实也没有任何问题，如果你想认真看的话完全没有问题。说到感情戏部分，我的意见是，第一遍观影跟着电影走，虽然有的人...  (展开)