一、多个时空


《纯粹理性批判》中的第一经验类比（Analogies of Experience）要求在现象中有一个恒定且唯一之物来表象意识中的时间本身。恒定，或永恒，因为作为总体的时间本身是始终在那的；惟一，因为只有一个时间。这个惟一且永恒的东西，即现象中的实体（Substance）。康德明确把这个实体与洛克的托子（Substratum）区分开来，认为实体是以各种方式显现于人的，而不是像托子那样不可知，也不显现。

我要说，洛克的托子的作用是保证物的个体化与同一性。这个作用在康德那儿，似乎是由物自体和先验范畴共同完成。先验范畴组织现象，在使意识对现象的认识成为可能的同时，也使同一的意识本身成为可能——对先验对象的构成即对自我的构成。而物自体在这个过程中究竟如何起作用，不详。康德的物自体与洛克的托子一样，是个让理论显得尴尬，却又不得不进行的假设。

尽管康德反复说现象中的实体不是洛克的托子，但这个实体究竟是什么，他又语焉不详。出于他对牛顿力学的接受，有人尝试将其理解为牛顿意义上的质量。我论证过，这样的解读将面临一个两难困境：如果实体是个体化了的质量，时间便不是惟一的；如果实体是现象世界中的总质量，基于二律背反的理由——这个总体无法成为经验对象——我们便无法经验到它。（详细论述见篇末附录）

若是跳出康德阐释，取前一个困境：时间不是惟一的，每个作为现象的物都意味着一个独立的时间体系，我们就科幻了：空间中的一个一个的物，奠基着意识中的一个又一个时间系，我们可以生活在不同的时空中，当我们经验不同的物。甚至，对应地说，我们总在成为另一个人，当我们来到不同的时空。

于是，我情愿把亨利的生活看作对康德的一次失败却有趣的解读。与其说他是一位时间旅行者，一位不停地穿越时空的超人或可怜人，不如说，他的意识中并没有一个绝对惟一的时间，他所来到并离开的每一个时空，都是一个独立自在的世界，尽管这些世界看上去很像，但哪个都不依赖于另一个——从理念的意义上说。


二、沉默，或消失


影片的前半部分，亨利的突然消失被解释为一种不治的遗传疾病。没有理由地，他时不时就去了另一个时空，赤身裸体地寻找可以穿上的衣服。仿佛常人来到一个新的环境，总是迫不及待地寻找一个身份，穿到自己身上。
亨利总会在一个无从预料的时刻消失，克莱尔生活在一个不确定的世界中。她的爱情是确定的，但她爱的人不确定地存在着。她的生活中弥漫着不确定性，而这恰好让她格外珍惜亨利在她身边的每一分钟。

克莱尔一次次怀孕又一次次流产，因为胎儿也有穿越症，莫名其妙地，便在某个时刻，出离了子宫。但克莱尔最后一次怀孕时，对亨利说，你每次消失都是因为感觉到了压力。所以，从现在开始，我要保持绝对地平静，这样胎儿就可以顺利出生了。
看到这里，我恍然大悟，原来亨利的穿越症是个隐喻，关于男人的隐喻：面对压力，便会沉默与回避，这不正是男人的本能反应么——而这在女人看来，仿佛爱人去了另一个时空，不知何时才能回来，甚至，会不会回来。

我查了查，电影改编自一位女造型艺术家的首部小说，写于一段失败的恋情之后。原来如此。

很多年前听到过一个说法：爱情，对男人来说，是挂在墙上的一幅画，你并不总是去看它；但对女人来说，则是房间里音乐，你想不听都不行。所以，男人需要时不时地呆在纯然属于自我的世界里，在沉默中成为自己。女人却要认为这是对她的疏远、对亲密的疏离，并因此而坐立不安，想方设法闯进那份铁一般的沉默。结果，要么把自己撞疼，要么把爱情撞碎。
这是对小儿女情态的描述。若成年点，便会更同情于另一个说法：人生在世，无非是男人讨慰藉，女人讨生活。人并不总是需要慰藉，尤其在得意之时。人却总在生活，就算你不想。


三、看着，却无法改变


在一次穿越中，亨利来到母亲身边，在地铁里，母亲在看报，他们作为陌生人简短却亲切的交谈了一会儿。亨利告诉母亲，他要结婚了，这个女孩让他感到安全。
克莱尔问他：你什么不去阻止那场车祸，既然你可以回到车祸发生之前。“我无法阻止。无数次我回到过去，回到母亲还在的时候，但每次我都无法改变发生着的一切。”——这话让人特别难过。我们并不能改变过去，就像不能重新雕刻一座已然完成的塑像。

不是么？很多时候，我们从自己当下的境遇中抽身而出，试图站在一个更开阔的角度，超脱地看现在的纠结、焦虑，或苦闷，并自嘲这些都没什么的。但当你身在当下，你知道未来的自己就坐在对面，笑着，看着自己，慈悲地。但你还是无法因此脱身而出。你仍然只能呆在你当下的处境中，无论是过分的快乐，还是仿佛无法挣脱的哀伤。

每一个时刻都是三维的，它包含着过去、现在，和未来这三个维度。我们在回忆中编辑时间，编辑自己，有意无意地遗忘一些，并把另一些反复摩挲。过往明明灭灭，像晴天里，随风晃动的百叶窗投在墙上的影子。每次回忆之后，我们都成为另一个人。
未来也是。未来无数次作为想象呈现于当下，各式各样地，仿佛清晰的回忆。回忆与憧憬，如同天平的两臂，对称着，平衡着，在现在这个支点上。所以，现在这个时刻，最重。


四、期限


有天聚会时，亨利中枪后痛苦挣扎的裸体突然出现在他们的门厅里。又消失了。克莱尔说，我从没见过四十岁之后的你。我见过的你总是很年轻。从这个时候起，死亡就成了他们中的另一个在场者，尽管它总是沉默着。

亨利穿越到未来，遇见了自己的已经十岁的女儿。女儿告诉他，他死于自己五岁那年。她们一直很想念他。那时他们的女儿还没出生。那时克莱尔还一如既往地希望与亨利白头偕老，就像她还没长大时那样，就像她长大之后第一次遇到亨利时那样，就像亨利死后，她仍然留着亨利所有的衣服，等着亨利回来那样。

于她而言，亨利是不会死的。他无非是走远了一下子回不来，他无非是在时空中迷了路，找不到一件让他温暖的衣服。

女儿五岁那年，亨利和克莱尔都已知道，亨利即将死去，中弹而死。期限降至，可能在任何一天，任何一个时刻。在它到来之前，所有相聚的时光都是铭刻，都是用最日常的方式来进行的一次祭奠，一次追忆。当这个期限还不确定，他们相爱着，仿佛一对最平凡的恋人；当这个期限已然确定，他们相爱着，装作不知道他们即将分离。

一个期限并不见得让期限到来之前的一切都显得美好。但，美好的东西都有一个期限。确定的期限，或不确定的期限。你不能试图挽留，那会犹如握紧手中的细沙，握得越紧，便流失得越快，宛如时间，从指缝间悄然流走。
这个期限是否到来，何时到来，都不是你能选择的。你能做的，仅仅是在它到来之前的每一刻，不让自己在未来后悔——克莱尔明白这些，并且，她做到了。

而，这不正是人生么。


——————
附录：On Understanding Substance as Mass

Introduction

In the First Analogy of Experience, Kant argues that there must be some permanently persistent substance in the appearances which represents the persistence of time. Given Kant’s endorsement of Newtonian physics, commentators such as Eric Watkins suggest that such permanently persistent substance can be understood as Newtonian mass. In this paper, however, I argue that we face a dilemma when we try to cash out the notion of substance in terms of Newtonian mass.
The paper proceeds in three steps. In the first section, I present the reason why there needs to be a permanently persistent substance in the appearances, and discuss why it seems to be compelling to conceive of the permanently persistent substance as Newtonian Mass. Then, in the second section, I argue that there are (only) two ways of conceiving of the permanently persistent substance as Newtonian mass, namely, to conceive of substance as individuated mass and to conceive of substance as the sum total of mass in the world of appearances. I show that there are textual indications as well as philosophical reasons to support each option. In the third section, however, I argue that both ways suffer from inescapable problems. Thus, conceiving of the permanently persistent substance in terms of Newtonian mass is not viable.

    
Section I. The Permanently Persistent Substance

In this section, I shall first present the reason why Kant thinks that there must be a permanently persistent substance in the appearances. I then discuss why it is compelling to conceive of such substance as Newtonian mass.
In the chapter “System of all principles of pure understanding,” Kant discusses what makes possible the applications of the categories, i.e. the pure concepts of understanding, to objects, i.e. appearances that are given to sensible intuitions. That is, he discusses what it is that makes the categories have objective validity. Kant’s claim is that the applications of the categories are only possible under certain conditions, and these conditions are spelled out by the principles. For instance, the applications of the relational categories (substance-accidents, cause and effect, and mutual interactions) are possible if they are applied to objects according to the principles of Analogies of Experience. In addition to the three specific principles that correspond to each of the three relational categories, Kant also provides a general principle overarching all three Analogies. The general principle is stated in the second edition as follows: “Experience is possible only through the representations of a necessary connection of perceptions” (B 218). Watkins provides a helpful interpretation of this general principle:
“The general idea is that each of the three relational categories represents a necessary connection that is required for experience of a single time and of objects existing and being temporally related to each other within a single time to be possible.” (My emphasis)
Since this paper is focused on the notion of substance in the first Analogy, I shall ignore the second and third Analogies. So I now turn to a close examination of the first Analogy.
The first Analogy, i.e. the principle of the persistence of substance, is stated in the second edition as follows: “In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.” (B 224) Watkins summarizes Kant’s argument for the first Analogy as follows (which I take to be a correct interpretation):
Premise 1: Appearances, i.e. objects of experience, are made possible by time’s persistence.
Premise 2: We do not perceive time itself.
Therefore, In order to have experience of appearances, there must be some permanent substance in the appearances which can represent time or time’s persistence.
While the appearances, as the objects given to our intuitions, are changing, the substance in appearances always stays the same and is permanent. So, Kant calls the permanent substance “the substratum of everything real” (B 225). But, some clarifications about Kant’s use of the term “substratum” are needed to prevent potential confusions. Substratum in Kant’s text does not mean what Locke uses this term to mean, namely, the bearer of properties which is unchanging and about which we can have no knowledge. For, according to Locke, we can only know what is given to our senses, but since the underlying substratum cannot be given to our senses, we have no access to it and therefore cannot know it.
Kant, by constrast, does not think that there is any Lockean substratum in the world of appearances. For Kant, the fact that the states of the substance are changing and the substance stays the same does not mean the states are separable from the substance. Rather, the changing states of the substance are simply the ways in which the substance is given to us. Thus, we can know the substance, that is, we know the substance through its states. In order to avoid the Lockean implication of the term “substratum,” I shall only use “substance” to refer to the permanently persistent thing in the appearances despite Kant’s own use of “substratum” to talk about what is permanent in the appearances.
Since I have argued that Kant’s notion of substance is not the Lockean substratum, then what is the Kantian notion of substance? We need a positive account of what the substance is. It is obvious that such a permanently persistent thing cannot be captured by ordinary physical objects, no matter whether they are natural objects (say, rocks) or artifacts (say, ships), for neither artifacts nor natural objects always stay the same such that in principle they can never suffer changes. So, it seems no ordinarily construed physical things can be qualified as substance that is permanently persistent. On the other hand, it is very hard to imagine that anything non-physical could play the role the substance is supposed to play. For it is hard to imagine how a non-physical being could be given to our sensible intuition or could be spatiotemporally organized by our a priori intuitions. So, it is unlikely that Kant means something non-physical by “substance.” Thus, there are two constraints on spelling out what substance is. First, it is something physical. Second, as I have shown, the physical being that can be understood as substance cannot be ordinarily individuated physical things such as planet or rock.
In order to meet the above two conditions, Watkins suggests that, given Kant’s commitment to Newtonian science, it is likely that Kant has Newtonian mass in mind when he talks about the substance, since no matter how a physical object changes, its mass always stays the same. Since Newtonian mass is physical and is not an ordinarily individuated object, it seems quite compelling that the substance, which is permanently persistent, just is Newtonian mass. According to common sense, Newtonian mass is understood to be underlying objects such that we cannot directly perceive mass but can only perceive mass through the way it is given to our intuition, namely, through the perception of the objects that have mass. Thus, mass is neither unknowable nor directly perceivable, which seems to fit the description of the substance perfectly.
Moreover, there are many textual indications that suggest the identification of substance with mass. Let me note two examples. First, recall the general principle overarching the three specific Analogies, namely, “In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.” (B 224) It seems that “quantum” is most naturally to be understood as mass, for mass seems to be the only thing in nature that is neither increased nor diminished on Newtonian physics.
The other indication is Kant’s example to illustrate his claim that “he <a philosopher> thus assumed that as incontrovertible that even in fire the matter (substance) never disappears but rather only suffers an alteration in its form.” (B 288, my emphasis):
“A philosopher was asked: How much does the smoke weigh? He replied: If you take away from the weight of the wood that was burnt the weight of the ashes that are left over, you will have the weight of the smoke.” (B 288)
We can see that here Kant explicitly identifies substance with matter. And it is quite plausible to think that “matter” is just another way of saying “mass”. That is, “mass” seems to be the theoretical analog of the term “matter.” This hypothesis is supported by the example of the weight of smoke. For, in the example, the way to calculate the weight of smoke just is to calculate the mass (multiplies the gravitational constant).
However, despite the compelling reasons for the identification of substance with mass, in the next sections, I shall argue that the substance cannot be understood as Newtonian mass, for when we try to work out the details of understanding the substance as mass, we face an unavoidable dilemma.


Section II. Some Mass or the Sum Total of Mass

In this section, I shall argue that there are two ways of conceiving of substance as Newtonian mass, and then show that both ways have some support from the text and are to some extent philosophically plausible. So, both ways deserve detailed considerations. But, in the next section, I shall argue that both ways face insurmountable problems.
In identifying substance with mass, we need to settle an ambiguity: Is the mass meant to be some mass, say the mass of a rock which is 7 kilograms (a randomly chosen weight), or to be the sum total of mass in the world of appearances which is a very large but nonetheless definite amount? Since both some mass and the sum total of mass are permanently persistent, we cannot tell which way of identifying is more plausible with respect to the permanent persistence of substance. So, we must appeal to some other philosophically and/or textually interesting points to ground a preference in choosing one over the other.
Let us first consider identifying the substance with some or individuated mass. First, the first Analogy is the principle according to which the relational category substance-accident is to be applied. Kant defines accidents to be “the determinations of a substance that are nothing other than particular ways for it to exist.”(B 229) Many commentators interpret the relation to be between object and its properties or states. Thus it makes more sense to think that the mass, which is the underlying bearer of properties, is the individuated mass of some object, instead of the sum total of mass in the world of appearances. For instance, in the example of the weight of smoke, Kant seems to conceive of substance as the matter, i.e. mass, of an individual object. Moreover, if we conceive of substance as the sum total of mass in the world of appearances, it is very hard to imagine how substance can be the bearer of properties or what kind of properties of which substance is the bearer.
One might argue that, on the interpretation according to which substance is the sum total of mass, even though we could imagine no properties of which substance is the bearer, we can still conceive of substance as the bearer of (changing) states, i.e. the successive states of the world of appearances. I reply that Kant cannot accept such an idea because the states of the world are not objects of possible experience, for it is at least empirically true that no one could have the whole world of appearances as his object of experience. I will return to this point later on in the paper and use it to argue that conceiving of substance as the sum total of mass is untenable given Kant’s theoretic commitments.
The above discussion is about reasons to prefer the identification of substance with some mass. I now turn to the reasons to prefer the identifications of substance with the sum total of mass. There are some textual evidences in the first Analogy that suggest this latter identification. For instance, the following passage:
“…here the issue is only appearances in the field of experience, the unity of which would never be possible if we were to allow new things (as far as their substance is concerned) to arise. For then everything would disappear that alone can represent the unity of time, namely the identity of the substratum in which alone all change has its thoroughgoing unity. This persistence is therefore nothing more than the way in which we represent the existence of things (in appearances).” (B 229/A186, my emphasis)
In this passage, Kant seems to identify the permanent persistent substance that represents the persistence of time with the unity of appearances, which seems to be the sum total of mass in the whole world of appearances. Let me argue for my understanding of this passage that it indicates that Kant identifies substance with the sum total of mass. I shall argue by reductio: Suppose Kant identified substance with individuated mass in the above passage. Then, it would make no sense to think that the arising of new substance could make the representation of the unity of time impossible. For the arising of new substance in no sense affects the substance, i.e. the mass, of the original objects. Let me use an example to illustrate. Suppose there is a rock whose mass is 7 kilograms and there arises a new object out of nothing, whose mass is 5 kilograms. Insofar as the rock’s mass remains the same, whether or not there are new masses arising out of nothing does not affect the unity of the rock’s mass, which is 7 kilograms. Therefore, in this passage, Kant conceives of substance as the sum total of mass in the whole world of appearances.
So far I have shown that there are compelling reasons to identify substance with some mass or with the sum total of mass respectively. In the next section, I shall argue that there are also devastating reasons to each identification such that either way we go, we face unsolvable problems.


Section III. One Single Time and the Limit of Possible Experience

I now turn to the problems from which the each identification suffers. In this section, I shall argue that these problems make both identifications untenable. Let us first consider the identification of substance with individuated mass (i.e. some mass). I argue that the reason why individuated mass cannot be identified with substance is that individuated mass cannot represent the oneness of time. Recall Kant’s argument for the principle of the first Analogy: in order to have experiences of objects as temporal, we must identify a permanently persistent substance that can represent time in objects. While the states of the substance change, the substance persists so that the substance can represent time that persists. It is important to notice that time, which is supposed to be represented by substance in appearances, is one single time. But, individuated mass cannot represent one single time. For there are many individuated masses, for instance, the mass of a rock which is 7 kilograms, the mass of a cup which is 0.5 kilogram, and the mass of a table which is 3 kilograms, each of which is permanently persistent and undergoes changes. If one of them can represent time, any other also can. In that case, we do not have one single time. Rather, we have many times or time-series, each of which is persistent.
Let me explain in details why multiply individuated masses cannot represent on single time. If these individuated masses can represent one single time, there must be some one single thing that is shared by these individuated masses that serves to represent the singularity of time. Whatever this shared thing is, it is not any of these individuated masses. Therefore, individuated mass cannot present one single time. However, on the other hand, time has be to singular. Here is a passage in the first Analogy which explains why time has to be one single time rather than a plurality of times:
“Substances (in appearances) are the substrata of all time-determinations. The arising of some of them and the perishing of others would itself remove the sole condition of the empirical unity of time, and the appearances would then be related to two different times, in which existence flowed side by side, which is absurd. For there is only one time, in which all different times must not be placed simultaneously but only one after another.” (B 232/A189)
One might argue that it does not matter how many individuated masses can represent time, it only matters that there is an individuated mass that represents time. Insofar as there is such a substance, which is permanently persistent, it suffices to represent one single time. I reply that, in that case, we still do not know which individuated mass is suppose to be the representer of the one single time in appearances. For there is not reason to think that the mass of one object is more suitable to represent time than the mass of another object is, insofar as both of the individuated masses are permanently persistent. Any choice of one over the other is arbitrary. But the unity or singularity of time is not arbitrary, for there can only be one time-series which persists, and any other time-series or temporal relations are just temporal parts of this unique time-series. Thus, I conclude that individuated mass cannot be the representer of time in appearances.
I now turn to argue that the sum total of mass cannot represent time either. The idea of my argument is to make use of Kant’s solution to the Antinomies to show that the permanently persistent substance that represents time in the appearances cannot be the sum total of mass because the sum total of mass is not an object of possible experience. Let me lay out my argument in detail.
In “The Antinomy of Pure Reason” chapter, Kant presents four pairs of arguments concerning four cosmological ideas about the world-whole, namely, whether there is a beginning of time, whether there is indivisibly simple substance, whether there is a first cause, and whether there is a necessary existent. As Allen W. Wood argues, the four antinomies share a general form, namely, the thesis of each antinomy claims that there must be a first member of the conditioning-conditioned chain, while the antithesis of each antinomy claims that there is no first member of such a chain and that the chain goes back into infinity. Kant argues that there are valid arguments for each of the four theses as well as valid arguments for each of the four antitheses, so we need a solution to such contradictions.
Kant’s solution to the contradictions, as Wood argues, relies on his doctrine of transcendental idealism. As for the first two antinomies, Wood argues
The mathematical antinomies are generated by mathematical principles that apply to things only insofar as they are given in sensible intuition…But these [the first two] series of conditions are never given to intuition as a whole...The theses are false because the principles of possible experience make it impossible for objects corresponding to the cosmological ideas of a first event, a largest extent of the world or a simple substance, ever to be given to intuition.”
Thus, the reason why Kant thinks that the claims made by the theses of the first and second antinomies are false is that neither the beginning of time nor the spatial boundary of the world or an indivisible substance can ever be given to our sensible intuition. If something cannot be given to our sensible intuition, according to Kant, we cannot have experience of it. Let me call this principle the object-of-sensible-intuition principle, namely, if something cannot be given to our sensible intuitions, then it cannot be object of our possible experience. And we can apply this principle to an object to determine whether that object can be object of possible experience. That is, if the object in question can be given to our sensible intuition, then the object can be object of our possible experience, but if the object cannot be given to our sensible intuition, then it cannot be object of our possible experience.
Now, let me apply the object-of-sensible-intuition principle to the idea of the sum total of mass. We can see that the sum total of mass cannot be given to our sensible intuition, so, the sum total of mass cannot be object of our possible experience. For the world of appearances seems to mean the whole universe or cosmos (because everything in the universe stands in causal relations to each other), there is no way for all of the mass in the whole universe to be given to our sensible intuition. Actually, we do not even know whether there are spatial boundaries of the universe, so we do not even know whether the sum total of mass in the all universe is finite. Thus, the sum total of mass cannot be object of possible experience. So, the sum total of mass cannot be that which represents time in appearances. For the reason there must be a permanently persistent substance in appearances which represents time is to make our temporally connected representations of objects possible. But, if the sum total of mass cannot be object of experience, it cannot make our experience of object possible. Thus, the permanently persistent substance in appearances cannot be the sum total of mass.
One might object that in the antinomies, the cosmological ideas at issue are condition-condition series. (B 436/A410) But the sum total of mass is not a series. Rather, it is an aggregate about which the question of conditioning and conditioned does not arise at all. Thus, Kant’s remarks on the antinomies have no bearing on whether the idea of the sum total of mass has any objective validity or significance. Moreover, the first two antinomies concern whether the conditioning-conditioned series go on into infinities. And it seems that it is impossible for us to experience infinity, for no matter what we experience it is finite insofar as we have experienced it. But, the quantum of the sum total of mass seems to be a definite and finite amount. By virtues of what can we claim that the sum total of mass cannot be object of experience? Is this “cannot” an empirical cannot, or an In-Principle cannot? If the answer is the former, the empirical “cannot” does not seem to be strong enough to show that the sum total of mass cannot be experienced, because we cannot know or predict whether in the future empirical sciences and technologies will make the sum total of mass possible object of experience. If the answer is the latter, at least further explanations of why the sum total of mass, which is a finite and definite amount, cannot be object of possible experience in principle are needed.
To the first objection I have two replies. First, in the first antinomy, Kant also discusses whether there is boundary or the largest extent of space. It is not obvious that there is a spatial series in the sense that it is obvious that there is a temporal series in which one moment succeeds its previous moments. However, according to Kant, we can think of the space acquiring its quantum through repeatedly or successively adding spatial units to the previous spatial units. (A 428/B 456) That is, the way of conceiving of space as a spatial series depends on the way of conceiving of time as a temporal series, which is naturally serial. Then, by the same token, we can also think of the sum total of mass acquiring its quantum by successively adding massive units to previous massive units. Thus, if the object-of-sensible-intuition principle applies to the idea of the boundary of space, it should also apply to the idea of the sum total of mass of the whole world of appearances.
Second, the fact that Kant applies the object-of-sensible-intuition-principle to the first two (or three) cosmological ideas to solve the contradictions does not mean that the principle can only be employed to deal with the antinomies. If the principle is applicable to other ideas, we can also use the principle to deal with other ideas. Since the object-of-sensible-intuition principle is derived from transcendental idealism, which is an important element in the whole Critique, there is no reason why the principle cannot be applied to other ideas than cosmological ideas. Thus, it is legitimate to use the object-of-sensible-intuition principle to show that the sum total of mass of whole world of appearances cannot be object of possible experience. So, the sum total of mass cannot be what represents time in appearances.
My reply to the second objection has two steps. First, it needs to be clarified that, although the first two antinomies concern whether the conditioning-conditioned series are infinite, Kant’s solution by the object-of-sensible-intuition principle does not rely on the whether the series are infinite. The principle only concerns whether the things to which the cosmological ideas refer can be given to our sensible intuition. It does not concern whether the things are infinite. It seems true that infinity cannot be object of sensible intuition. But this does not mean that all finite things can be given to our sensible intuition. Actually Kant rejects the claim that all finite things can be given to our sensible intuition. For Kant thinks the thesis of the first antinomy is false, because the beginning of time or the boundary of space cannot be given to our sensible intuition so that it cannot be object of possible experience.
The second step of my reply is to spell out in which sense of “cannot,” the sum total of mass cannot be object of possible experience. It seems to me that the distinction between empirical “cannot” and In-Principle “cannot” is hard to cash out in the context of Critique. For, in the Critique, any legitimate claim to knowledge entails that the object of which the knowledge is can be experienced. Thus, it seems that the empiricality of the “cannot” entails the In-Principality of the “cannot”.
However, concerning the claim that we cannot predict whether in the future empirical sciences and technologies will make the sum total of mass possible object of experience, what would Kant say? Would Kant agree that future sciences and technologies might or could transform a transcendent idea into an idea which refers to object of possible experience? I do not think he would. For Kant thinks his Critique settles metaphysical questions once and for all by theoretical reason, which is static or a-historical. Future discoveries made by sciences and technologies should be able to do no damage to the doctrines in Critique. Moreover, it should be odd to Kant’s ear that progresses made by empirical sciences could have any bearings on the doctrines in the Critique, which he builds up from scratch employing only pure reason, which is absolutely a-historical.
Thus, I conclude that the above arguments show that identifying substance with the sum total of mass in the world of appearance is not tenable. Since I showed earlier in this section that identifying substance with individuated mass is not tenable either, I conclude that the general strategy of identifying substance with mass is untenable.


Section IV. Concluding Remarks

In this paper, I showed that a seemingly very promising way of understanding the permanently persistent substance discussed in the first Analogy, namely, conceiving of substance as Newtonian mass, is untenable. Then, I wonder whether there are other promising ways of providing a positive account of substance or actually it is the case that the notion of substance in the first Analogy is itself untenable. At this stage, maybe I could follow Kant’s stance on the things of themselves, namely, they exist, but we can have no knowledge about the way of their existence. But, at the same time, we need to have this minimal conviction that they exist. Similarly, concerning substance, we can have no knowledge about what the permanently persistent substance is, but we need to have the minimal conviction that it exists in the world of appearances and it serves to represent time.

这篇影评可能有剧透 《家族之苦》实则是苦于羁绊，只是这羁绊却也让很多的人甘之如饴。 87岁的山田导演带来了这部电影的第三部，这次把镜头对准了全职主妇史枝，很多人本希望《家族之苦》系列可以和寅次郎的故事一样一直拍下去，但时间却已经不再允许，山田导演的思想也愈发的跟不上这个时代。 还...  (展开)

1223。一集50分钟一共十集终于看完了，原来这个导演是幸福来敲门的导演，怪不得质感这么好。 首先说故事，一个想要骗自己爹娘钱的喜欢魔术的中国功夫爱好者找了个心如死灰的帅辛普森来充当这场骗局的主角，当辛普森进入骗局时才发现这件事情并没有那么简单，这老两口也不是一般...  (展开)

很多时候很没耐心（很多时候也很有，只是根本不觉得难熬。倒是时间对我没耐心了）。 很多电影都得快进，开头几分钟就能确定倍速。凌晨这部是1.5，和别的1.5不同的是，很想重看且依旧很享受。有些东西就是时间本身。鱿鱼习惯是基本不看任何相关信息包括简介（其实对于现实生活中...  (展开)

这篇影评可能有剧透 看到默默留下两行老泪，我想这是一部好电影吧。剧情很简单的，豆瓣简介也就只有一句话而已。但是表哥演技略微动人，james算是很能克制情绪了，在与妻子和朋友的冲突场景中。 只是最后得而复失之后对上帝祷告未果的崩溃和失声痛哭。除此之外影片大多时候是理性的。 男主跟唯一...  (展开)

       日本动漫在全球有着很重要的位置，很多日本动漫作品成为了影响一代人、甚至几代人的生活。而在纷繁复杂的日本动漫中，热血类动漫的生命力最旺盛，连载时间最长，也是影响最深远的。《灌篮高手》、《龙珠》、《死神》等长篇连载动漫至今仍为人津津乐道。而这一类动漫到底有什么魅力，能产生如此深远的影响？以下以《海贼王》为例进行解读。

    “财富，名声，力量，曾经拥有这世界一切的男人、‘海贼王’哥尔多·罗杰，在临刑前的一句话让人们趋之若鹜奔向大海：‘我的财富吗？想要的话可以全部给你！去找吧，我把一切都放在那里！’于是越来越多的人奔向大海，世界迎来了‘大海贼时代’！”1997年8月4日，《海贼王》漫画中第一句话同样开启了属于它的时代。

    《海贼王》的主角为路飞，他的梦想是找到One Piece，并成为海贼王。后来，要成为世界第一大剑豪的索隆、想绘制出自己的世界地图的娜美、希望成为真正勇敢的海上战士的乌索普、寻找奇迹之海All Blue的山治、想当“万能医生”的乔巴、寻找历史正文的罗宾、要制造出梦想之船的弗兰奇及必须依约与鲸鱼“拉布”重逢的布鲁克先后成为了路飞的伙伴，为实现各自的梦想共同踏上冒险之路。这个只有九个人的海贼团在尾田荣一郎笔下的世界扬名的同时，征服了现实世界中的几代人。

    日本进行过一项问卷调查，内容为“你希望自己的孩子阅读哪一部漫画”，而最终的结果《海贼王》位居第一。而之所以选择了海贼王，20岁的年轻人表示“海贼王对于友情的重要和正义是什么有很深的描写”，30岁的人群认为“这部作品是人生的教科书”，40岁人群则表示“希望通海贼王让孩子了解同伴的重要”。而从《海贼王》的影响力来讲，这个调查结果可以说是带有全球性的。

    已经连载15年的《海贼王》在世界上已有30多个翻译版本发行，累积发行量突破2亿册；在日本，它甚至成为了“人权教育”的教材。在剧场版方面，上映完毕的11部电影票房进账超过17亿人民币，正在热映的《最强之敌：Z》最终票房可能突破70亿日元（约5.08亿人民币）。而这部电影的主唱是有“流行小天后”之称的加拿大歌手艾薇儿。国际歌手的加盟在代表着《海贼王》深远影响力的同时，更成功将其推向世界。另一方面，动漫衍生品无孔不入：从海报、挂饰、模型到首饰、主题餐厅甚至主题公园。尾田荣一郎的年收入中，周边衍生品的授权费就有900万美元。这些成绩让同期出道的漫画家们自叹一句“一山不能藏二虎”。

    讲述冒险故事的热血动漫《海贼王》能长期获得极好口碑和成绩，并产生深远的影响，它到底有什么魅力？

    一、情节引人入胜

    《海贼王》的舞台是一个无比开放的世界。这个世界是作者有意而为之。正是因为开放，可以构筑一个个或细致、或宏大的场景、设定各式各样的人物、构建不同类型的故事、有足够的空间留下伏笔。

    《海贼王》的情节是它成功的坚实基础。作者以其丰富的想象，设置了不同章节的故事，以迂回曲折的情节不断地吸引读者：此刻草帽海贼团从空岛回到地面，下一刻你发现他们所处的地方竟然是海军要塞！这一集终于把一些强者打败了，以为Boss准备登场，但下一集你会看到被打败的敌人打算引爆整个建筑，与路飞他们同归于尽！在回忆过往的时候，你才知道有命运羁绊的两个人的相遇可以有多离奇；你会明白这一战的成败对双方来说意味着什么······情节幻想味道浓郁，峰回路转，同时又有适量的留白，给予读者个人想象空间，这是情节设置的成功之处。

    另一方面，作者善于留下伏笔，而且这一伏笔往往在很多集后才明示出来。鲸鱼“拉布”在路飞他们刚进入伟大航路时便出现，并知道它不断伤害自己的原因是想去寻找曾经的伙伴。而这个伙伴，恰是路飞的第八个伙伴布鲁克，前后跨越近300集。如果按动画每周一集的播放速度，那么这一伏笔“沉睡”了6年多，换言之，在《海贼王》创作早期，尾田荣一郎已经把后面350多集的内容都构思好了。这种情节安排能力不能不让人钦佩。

    二、人物精神感人

   《海贼王》是一部让人又笑又哭的热血动漫。笑是因为他们冒险中的各种趣事，而哭是为他们的精神而感动。

    “王”只有一个。在“大海贼时代”，群雄并立，敢喊出“我一定会当上海贼王”的人有几个？而一个17岁的小鬼向别人做自我介绍时，“我是要当上海贼王的男人”是必然出现的话，说得干脆、说得自信。即使会被人笑话，但是路飞却从没有改变过口头禅。为了这个单纯、简单梦想，他在每一次战斗中都拼尽全力，从不逃避，让自己不断变强。可是，路飞从来没有自负，他不会因为胜利、因为强大而看轻任何人，他不会炫耀自己的成功，以平等的态度对待任何人。正是这种真正的自信与对梦想的执着及坚持，让他在这片大海上得到越来越多的伙伴，让海贼团的每个成员都尊敬并服从这位给予他们充分尊重与自由的特别的船长。

    路飞的八个伙伴有各自的梦想，他们的梦想同样被嘲笑过、被否定过：娜美因受制于鱼人，梦想近乎破灭；山治因为说出自己的梦想而受到其他厨子的欺负；布鲁克已经只剩下一副骨头，被龙马嘲笑为“不可能信守承诺的男人”······但是他们心底里没有放弃过自己的梦想，因为那是支撑他们在困境中一定要活着的信念。正是因为有这样的坚持，路飞会想尽办法让他们成为草帽海贼团的一员，但从不强迫。他们是根据自己的心去做出对路飞的邀请的选择，而且在他们做出选择的同时，他们已经作好了为同伴牺牲的觉悟。

    在他们冒险中，遇上了有为停止国家内乱而奋斗的薇薇公主、即使被羞辱仍相信黄金钟存在于天空之岛的大叔、想在有生之年再见一次阳光的老人等等，他们为自己心中所想而坚持不懈的精神深深打动了所有人，让草帽海贼团无怨地与他们并肩作战，帮助他们达成梦想。

   《海贼王》中的人物意志坚定，不懈的努力、真挚的感情、积极的心态、正面的思考，让他们不仅在虚构的世界，更在现实的世界深深感动着所有人，让读者因他们的失落而感到悲伤，因他们的战斗而兴奋，因他们的成功而感动落泪。

    三、契合现实情感

   《海贼王》在人物性格塑造方面与其他热血动漫一样，有意去夸大人物某一方面的性格。路飞的自信、索隆的坚持、乔巴的可爱等等。而之所以作这样的处理，是因为作者意识到，这些方面是人们在现实中缺失的、没有拥有的东西。

    在物质横流的现实社会，很多人在没日没夜的忙碌中渐渐失去了自我，忘记了自己最初的梦想，随波逐流。当有那么一天，这些高速旋转的陀螺停下来的时候，他们是否还有去梦想的勇气，抑或是怕被嘲笑早已怯懦于梦想？

    在贫富差距越发明显的今天，因财富与地位而自视高人一等的人无处不在，自认卑微的人也不在少数。当有那么一天，他们坐在一起的时候，成为一个团队的时候，自命不凡的人是否会思考凭什么对方要承受这些痛苦，自觉不如的人是否会沉思为什么自己不能享有某些权力？

    现实中，人们已经缺失了很多东西：信心、勇气、努力、友谊、信任······当人们在某些方面觉得空虚时，在虚构的世界中可以让他们找到一点慰藉。在《海贼王》中，各类读者可以找到共鸣角色，从每个故事中找到各种情感的慰藉，得到各种情感的启发。

    每个伙伴的加入都有一段属于每个人的特殊故事。索隆本想与挚友一起为世界第一剑豪这一目标努力，但是挚友却意外身亡，他请求老师把挚友的佩剑交给自己，“我会连她的份一起努力，成为世界第一剑豪，让我的名字响彻天堂！”乔巴因为身来就是蓝鼻子，所以受到同类的驱逐；吃了人人果实后，想以人的形态与人类友好相处，又被称为“怪物”。身心受到伤害的乔巴对人生失去希望之际，遇上了庸医希鲁鲁克，他不仅传授乔巴医术，更治好了乔巴心灵的创伤，最后却因统治者卑鄙的玩笑而死······一段段让人胸口发暖的故事，正传递着友情、平等、亲情、勇气等感情，而这些恰恰是当下人们缺失或者不信任的情感。

    草帽海贼团自成立开始，从他们称呼彼此为同伴开始，他们就是一个整体。为了伙伴，为了梦想，即使赌上自己的生命也在所不惜。他们的友情是可以相互托付后背的绝对信任；只要他们的背影出现在面前，就会给人一种安全感。“只要有命在就行了，谁都有做得到或做不到的事情。你做不到的事情由我来做，我做不到的事情由你来完成！”“我做好自己的部分，接下来轮到你，做不好的话我就揍扁你。要是有这种决心才能算是团队精神吧！”这些经典的话很好地诠释了团队精神的内涵，因此，在《海贼王》中，他们都是以必死的决心去做好自己该做的事情。

   《海贼王》用行动而非说教告诉我们这些深刻的道理。正因为我们大多数人缺失、不相信这些情感与精神，没有像草帽海贼团中的人的那么自信与勇气、对梦想的如此坚持与执着，所以才在漫画中觉得这些如此真实，如此感人。读者觉得动漫里面的人都很帅，而这个“帅”已经很大程度超离了这些角色的外貌，而触及了他们的精神。与现实情感有完美的契合，使得《海贼王》与各年龄段的读者产生极大的共鸣，这也是它的伟大之处。

    四、代表标志鲜明

    在《海贼王》出现之前，或者有很多人都会认为海贼旗上面就是简单的骷髅骨图案。但是在《海贼王》中，出现的各类旗帜让人惊讶：原来海贼旗中的骷髅图案只是基本元素，黑色不是固定的底色，加入不同的图案，则代表不同的人物。

    例如世界最强海盗白胡子，他的海贼旗表示有一撇白色胡子的骷髅骨；四皇红发的海贼旗则是骷髅骨右眼有三道红色疤痕、后面加两把西洋刀，与他的相貌特征和所佩带的武器相关；路飞的海贼旗是带着草帽的骷髅骨，凸显他最明显的特征。当各类海贼旗出现的时候，读者便可以判断现在是哪些人聚在了一起，而不需要作者再费笔墨去把这些人物勾勒出来。

    另外，在人物设定的时候，尾田荣一郎很细心地为他们配上了专属的特征。路飞的草帽、索隆的三颗耳坠、山治的卷眉、乌索普的长鼻子等等，在画面中只要给这些特征做一个特写，便知道出场的人是谁。这些设定简单而又形象，让人看一眼就记在了心里。

    代表标志非常鲜明，让读者容易记住主要人物，同时也容易把握每一个单元故事中的人物关系，即使把《海贼王》当做是快餐文化的一员，也满足这类读者的需求——当读者下一次看的时候，只要看到代表标志，便知道现阶段是哪些人在干什么事情。另一方面，这些标志也成为了动漫周边物品的标识，顾客根据图案便可以选择自己想要的商品。

    尾田荣一郎在接受日本当地媒体采访时向记者表示，鱼人岛40话后，主角将进入新世界，初步计划用13年，2025年，将会迎来海贼王的完结。如今，这部热血动漫已经有了非常多“忠实”的读者，他们有统一的名字——“海迷”。而在未来的13年里，“海迷”会用自己的方式去介绍这部不可多得的作品，从而吸引更多人看《海贼王》，扩大它的影响范围。这样，《海贼王》将把各种正面的精神灌输给更多的人，在高度和广度上，产生更大的影响。

    日本热血动漫以“友情、努力、胜利”的精神影响着几代人。《海贼王》、《火影忍者》、《灌篮高手》、《龙珠》等动漫的共同特点是：不放弃就有希望。随着日本动漫走向世界，贯彻动漫始终的勇敢、善良、奋斗、努力、责任的价值观也向全球读者传递，不同年龄、不同性格的读者都能在热血动漫中共鸣的角色。同时，日本热血动漫是成长的动漫，读者在成长、作者在成长，作者在作品中投射自己的经历与思考，使剧情反映着社会的现状和变化，即使连载数年或数十年，作者与读者之间的隔阂并不大。情感的共鸣和默契的氛围，让日本热血动漫吸引各年龄层段的读者，不仅在日本，也在世界产生深远的影响，保持着旺盛的生命力，经久不衰。

  没有看过太极1，直接看的2，最初的剧情有些接不上。但是被剧中新颖的拍摄手法与灯光运用吸引。冯德伦为香港新锐导演，当我们对于古装武打电影的怀念还停留在黄飞鸿方世玉那个阶段。冯导却带给我们新的视觉享受。无论是演员，剧情，道具（机关器），背景音乐全注入了冯导独特的思考。

   看过这部片子的人影评褒贬不一，但是作为新风格武侠电影的尝试它还是颇为成功的。第一整体不拧巴，开始在各个层面大胆创新从史灌终，由最初的看的新鲜，略带批判，到了后期已然适应片子的整体风格。反而觉得很有趣味。第二演员的启用，要是穿上现代装束，这些人活脱脱偶像剧的班底。被人们惯用帅哥来形容的彭于晏冯绍峰二人在片中有着出色的发挥，冯绍峰所饰演的陈栽秧，最后用威天翼的桥段活脱脱全民超人汗考克汉化版。彭于晏对于方子敬的复仇，冷血的诠释也大大出乎了我们对他传统的印象。A&B饰演的玉娘，虽说还难摆脱稚嫩，但是已经尽力在做诠释。A&B清新脱俗的外形，随个别镜头略有做作，但是瑕不掩瑜。

  片中的失败个人认为有两点。第一点电影配乐绝对失败，本应很紧张很凸显人物的情节被背景音乐带的全无，仿佛在看一幕舞台剧，音乐盖过了剧情的发展，有很多情节显得很鸡肋。第二影片的结局，看到最后高潮本应由玉娘&露禅上京告状开始，但是过“七关”包括最后厨房的打斗，结束很仓促，感觉一下子片酬不足似的。最后的结局也十分的拼凑，拼凑的生硬无谓。

   虽说剧情音乐有些不合理，但是冯德伦还是努力尝试一种新的武侠观念，还是让我们印象深刻。加油

这篇影评可能有剧透 笑点很多，能让人笑崩，虽然有些神经质。主演丽莎的演员莱斯利·曼恩很有气质，徐娘半老、风韵犹存…… 以下剧透，严重的剧透，留心： 女孩朱莉、凯拉、萨姆从小就是好朋友，于是三个深爱着自己女孩的父母丽莎、米切尔、亨特也因此彼此相识，亨特甚至想以此也彼此成为好朋友，...  (展开)

正常说来，社会经济的迅速发展和基础教育的广泛普及，一定会促进国民科学意识的普遍增长，以及封建迷信观念的大幅退潮。但很有讽刺意味是，进入新世纪以来，形形色色的风水迷信思潮非但没有得到控制与根绝，反而大有愈演愈烈之势，其所造成的危害，一点都不能低估。
而且千万不要以为，只有被命运一再嘲弄的失败者才信迷信认风水，一些看起来无比精明睿智的成功人士，迷信起来也让卢瑟们大开眼界，叹为观止。而他们的榜样示范作用，无疑又能令广大屌丝照猫画虎，有样学样。
即将于10月29日上映的犯罪悬疑电影《八棺索财》，讲述的就是一起发生于施工中的酒店内，由子虚乌有的符咒所引发的连环凶杀案。特别值得一提的是，本片的监制和主演，都是著名影星喻恩泰。导则是演田宇。

位于荣海市的天豪大酒店，在施工中连续发生工人死亡事件，一个被水泥掩埋，搞得血肉模糊；另一个被钢筋刺穿头颅，活活钉在地上；还有一个从高处堕落，摔得脑浆崩裂。总之死法都相当离奇，场面非常血腥，影响极其恶劣，搞得建筑工人纷纷跑开去，媒体记者纷纷跑过来，荣海电视台的资深女记者苏丽，当然要领上摄影师，第一时间赶到现场，而本地知名网红鱼子酱也给惊动了，她扭着34D娇躯、带着“老公”慕名而来，号称是要搞“推理直播”。
记者和网红，显然是竞争对手，俩人还都美到没朋友，要是不撕上一家伙，就太对不起吃瓜群众了吧。
警方初步认定民工死亡是意外事件，但网上却疯传着一个神秘的“八棺索财”传言，说是酒店施工时，在地下挖出了八口棺材，预示着要死上八个人，这事才算告一段落。流言的发布者，是一个戴着白色面具的蒙面人。苏丽和鱼子酱都认为传言是无稽之谈，她们找到经理周振发（喻恩泰饰），要求进酒店现场调查。
于是，第二天的天豪大酒店中，出现了一个由六人组成的“探险小分队”，苏丽一人前来，鱼子酱却要一定要拉上“老公”；而周经理则带了两个人：一个猥琐的中年保安，是当向导的，一个冷艳的娇小女生，是做保镖的。
六个各怀心事、各藏心机的人，一起走入阴森的酒店，一起走过几位民工死亡的现场，一起试图还原三场死亡的经过，一起分析凶手可能的动机，却又各自打着自己的算盘，相互猜疑他人的动机。
每一个成员的倒下，都令活着的人更加惊慌，每一条生命的陨落，都大大加重了在世者的末日情节。每一点风吹草动，都会让他们高度紧张，也让观众坐不安稳……

影片对于节奏的把控和铺排、伏笔的埋设与揭开、悬念的营造与强化，可以说颇见功力，自然得体的服化道及恰到好处的BGM，对于恐怖气氛的营造，同样也是功不可没。随着剧情一步步推进，旧的疑点似乎一层层被解开，而新的麻烦却显然一步步在逼近。
最先倒下的必然是小虾米，最后露馅的一定才是大boss。各位同学肯定不难看出，只要再灭掉五个人，“八棺索财”伟业不就完成了吗？之所以现场有六人，难不成幕后黑手就在其中？My God！
当真相大白之时，我们终于可以恍然大悟，当谜底揭开那一刻，观众这才明白了凶手的真正目的。作案者行为之残忍，行事之缜密，与其观念之弱智，动机之愚蠢，形成了何等鲜明的对比。生活在二十一世纪，可以便捷地使用各种高科技设备的现代人，居然还愿意相信上千年前的迷信，并不惜为此走上犯罪道路，这种行为无疑相当弱智和滑稽，但我们却根本笑不出来。
正如片中人所说，一切都是人心的丑恶！《八棺索财》对于社会阴暗面的无情揭露与鞭挞，清晰地展示出了主创人员的艺术追求与良知。

作为卡司里最大的牌，最红的咖，最亮的星，喻恩泰老师奉献出了教科书般的表演，精准诠释了一个表面上鸡贼怕事，却似乎另有隐情的酒店老板。只见他时而唯唯诺诺，委曲求权，时而双手抱头，仰天长叹，时而挺身直言，怒不可遏，用自己的精彩表演，推动着剧情一路前行，也让观众们不断猜测与怀疑，这伙计到底是暗藏深重杀机的大反派，还是力求息事宁人的受气包？
在喻恩泰的调教、带动与感染之下，整个剧组的成员们，都展示出了令人眼前一亮的表演功力。特别是三大美女主演，为这部悬疑电影增添了别样色彩，记者的果敢，网红的娇媚，保镖的高冷，无不令人印象深刻。显然，即便这般妩媚的身躯里隐藏了再多阴谋，无数男人可能都愿意选择原谅，就算她们的纤纤素手高举屠刀，太多屌丝恐怕只会幸福地闭上双眼吧。毫无疑问，导演太会选女演员了。
不过说了半天，到底谁能笑到最后，谁又是操纵这一切的凶手？本宝宝当然打死也不敢如此剧透，担心导演把我打死。还是请大家10月29号自行观看，支持国产电影良心之作吧，而且，自己能推测出来才算本事，才能向身边的女生吹嘘，显得你有水平嘛。

在中国文以载道的历史当中，乡村从来都是一个幻境。他提供给文人一个独立于功名仕途之外的另外空间，乡愁和归隐是永恒的主题。可是赵本山却从不提供给观众另外的空间，对他而言，乡村空间是唯一性的，他将一个海市蜃楼一样的乡村置于东北的沃野之上，以写实并荒诞并存、抒情与冷酷集于一身的奇特面貌在今日的中国存在着。

乡村爱情的故事到今天已经拍摄了四部，几乎保持了完全一致的水准，这当然可以证明创作者与乡村故事之间的极为贴近的关系，那些故事如同一粒粒瓜子，源源不断从他的裤兜里掏出来，甚至没有哪怕一点可能掏完的迹象。作品当中随处可见的那种从容不迫的节奏，让你不得不相信，只要愿意，这个故事可以永远这样讲下去。还是那几个人，还是那个小村子，还是那些陈芝麻烂谷子的事儿，他们偏偏还是能讲的那样津津有味，这有点像是种庄稼，春种秋收，寒来暑往，四季交叠之中一年又一年重复着，生活原本就是如此，他将你纳入到固缓缓敲响的节奏当中，慢慢的体味安于现状的乐趣所在。所有的喜怒全都可以熬进稀粥，所有的哀乐都可以变成酸菜，再悲催的结果也无非是柳荫下的一盘死棋，过路的看客沉溺其中，半晌过去抬眼一看，下棋的人早已走了。这无疑是种难得的境界，看透了那些大喜大悲不再纠结孰是孰非，只是心安理得跟你唠两段家常，他那里尚在不动声色，你这边早就不禁莞尔，在电视荧屏上，你目睹的不是乡村爱情交响曲，是中国乡村智慧和幽默在现而今的最高形态。

可乡村爱情交响曲中的乡村又是极不真实的，这个系列拍到第四部，距离现实已经愈发遥远。即便它令你身临其境，手触泥土，如沐田野里的风，闻到炊烟的味道，但有个声音却在告诉我们，这大部分都是假象，尤其是当真正的乡村愈发衰败，愈发冷清，愈发残酷的时候，我们凭什么相信这其中的那些精致的浪漫和美好？乡村里还有多少爱情？还有多少年轻人常年生活在那里呢？没有青春的乡村里面，爱情是一个什么样的概念？或许它正在经历前所未有的危机，年轻人的心是一片片荒芜干旱的焦土，生活的重压之下，婚姻和爱情被朝不保夕的焦虑环绕着，还有多少心安理得的乡村爱情呢？

赵本山的电视剧，基础仍是二人转，不过我们看到舞台化的精髓被生活化的表象有效掩盖，二人转是一个男女关系，爱情同样如此，女性人物是被动的因素，但同时又是稳定的因素。所以我们看到在乡村爱情交响曲以及其前作乡村爱情故事里面，女性人物永远是貌似处于被支配的地位，实际则完全掌握着情感的方向，男性人物往往是随性而为，不负责任，与之相对应的女人则是理性与母性的完美结合，她们会包容男人的那些可以包容的过错，同时亦会在心中为自己保留几分，这是乡村爱情故事当中最美好的东西。时代变化多端，人心不古，善良难觅，男人的心坏了或许还有救赎之路，但女人的心就一定不能坏，因为女人要为我们养育孩子，她们能够保持善良和高贵的母性，我们的未来才有希望。