我特别喜欢豆瓣这个平台，多年前（几乎是豆瓣电影频道刚上线的那些年），一次偶然的机会我知道了它。

从那以后，看电影之前去查评分成为我的习惯，为了节省自己宝贵的时间，6分以下的电影我是不会看的。而那些高分电影基本上也没让我失望...

直到有一天，我好奇地在豆瓣搜索一下我最喜欢的香港警匪片《猛龙》（观看的时间几乎是豆瓣电影频道刚上线的那些年），看到那个分数，我几乎对豆瓣绝望了——如果我在观看之前就查询的话，可能我会永远错过这部佳片。

对于《猛龙》，捧它的言语我见过许多，什么“跨国大片”、“演员阵容豪华”、“国博唯一收藏影片”。但都没有说到点子上，对于此片，仅此一点，我就可以给他满分——

【它是第一部突出团队分工合作的警匪片】

以往动作片、警匪片无外乎反派Boss超级强大或者其手下喽喽无数，而主角往往一个人就是整支部队，拿起狙就是狙击手，拿起手枪就是神枪手，抽出匕首就是刺客，空拳就是格斗家，主角，无一例外，样样是第一。而在这部影片中，首先让我坠入爱河的是反派一方，他们劫人犯、杀干警，动作利索，手段残忍。是因为他们，狙击手、冲锋手、车手、打手、指挥官各个都是部队退役的精英人才，目标明确，团队分工合作。要对付这样的竞争对手，单打独斗肯定是不行的，所以主方也是由少数几个精英组成的特警队，然而也不是一开始就旗开得胜，历经挫折之后，他们明白他们这个团队还需要一个高明的领导...

对于国产影视业，这种设定无疑是巨大的创新和进步，从那以后，我就不再迷信个人能力。我的事业需要我的团队支持，小团队人数少精，执行力强、迭代快，分工明确，相互信任，加上战略规划合理，才有可能做出成绩。

回到电影，有人可能要说了，就算如此，也不至于是满分吧。或许大家吐槽的点都对，都有道理。但是对我来说，一部片子，它是真真震撼到我的话，我是可以不在乎细节给它满分的，况且这部影片也没有什么不可理喻的Bug，只是摆脱不了故事片的一些俗套情节。若是细究挑刺的话，我最喜欢的电影，肖申克的救赎，也是有提高改进的空间，但我依然给它满分。

好了说这么多，几乎不写影评的我，想借此机会对中国广大的网民说句话，我不期望能有多少人看到，能给网络带来多大改变，但至少很多进来看这个影评的大多是《猛龙》的拥护者，看到这样的评分可能想破口大骂...

【我希望网友之间不要相互谩骂】

因为这真的很搞笑！我经常会听到说，“你说某某电影不行，你去拍一个试试，你能拍的比他好多少”。这看起来义正言辞的说法，着实是可笑之极。

这就好比说，美工图做的不好，我让他/她修改，他/她反吼我一句：有本事你去做啊？亲爱的，那我要你做什么？如果人人都要有拍影片的本事才能出来评论电影，那豆瓣恐怕早就倒闭了？

如果你一定要骂几句什么的话，你可以骂一部电影，一个制片厂，一个公司，一个组织，一个团体，甚至是政府、国家。因为这些东西才是跟你的生活息息相关，组织越大对你的生活影响也就越大，你骂这些组织，或许还可能引起共鸣，最终影响到这些组织，使你的生活有所改善。所以最应该骂的是我们的政府不是吗？那些个人的想法，跟你的生活有半毛钱的关系吗？这个社会不正是因为大家想法各异才如此丰富多彩吗。而咱们国家的网民真是反其道而行之，网上对不同的意见群起而攻之，对于组织，却鲜有骂声，越大越不敢骂。

我就可以告诉大家，我从未在网上骂过任何人，再奇葩的思想、再激烈的言论，都不。只要这是他真实的想法，他就有发言权。而如果这不是他真实的想法，只是为博得眼球或某个机构的故意炒作，亲爱的各位，这时你再费口水就更没有必要了！所以，如果有人想要在这个帖子下面骂我的话，为避免你尴尬，我友情提醒：我是不会搭理你，我甚至都没时间看你的回复！

不知道今天为什么有闲情一下子写了这么多，可能是因为看到那些不怕被众人唾弃，大胆写满分的影评，莫名有了些许感动，因为你们敢于坚持自己观点，不被主流左右！

昨天出了一部新电影《见爱不怪》 ? 这是一部青少年同性题材轻喜剧电影。娱媒形容本片是“《爱你，西蒙》的邻居”，因为两部片子的背景都是高中校园，剧情都涉足LGBT，编导都是已经结婚的同志。 影片讲述高中生艾利克斯原本过着非常惬意的生活，成绩好、女友美、朋友多...但...  (展开)

这篇影评可能有剧透 2022-6-17 绞肉行动 爱奇艺 个人自用非影评 剧透勿看 尤恩蒙塔古 犹太人 之前在法院工作 把妻子孩子送往美国 加入双十委员会 双十 xx代表欺骗 查尔斯戈弗雷 曾是飞行员 不能再飞了 面见丘吉尔首相 提出计划 目标指向希腊 实际攻打西西里 蒙塔古对查尔斯的计划很感兴趣 二人一拍...  (展开)

亲爱的。
现在，我只想爱你。
投入地，深情地。
不管过去，不理将来，就只要现在。就现在，当永恒一样的来爱你。

诚人在回忆。
回忆的线索，是她总是撒谎。诚人说，她常常对我说谎。

时光流淌回过去。是初识的时候。
大学的开学仪式。迟到的两个人。
是注定要相遇的。是在生命的轨迹里早就铺就了要两个人一起走过的轨迹的。不论宿命是否，都是要摩擦起一些明媚的或是忽隐忽现的火花的。

诚人一定知道，她能读懂人心。和自己一样。
诚人也一定知道，她将是那个离自己的心最近的人。

禁忌的树林。别人的私人领地。他带着她悄悄的潜入。
是世外桃源。是对她来说，只属于他们两个人的地方。
光影。鸟。湖水。心欢。相机的光圈。捕捉的画面。
绕着偌大的林子跑，始终是两个人。
诚人不知道对于那个看上去傻乎乎的小女孩这有多重要，也不知道这是她心中怎样巨大的快乐和幸福。所以，他不小心的就伤害了她。
她难过、委屈地跑出了那个隐秘的树林。可是却再也跑不出自己对他日渐深沉的爱意。

相处继续。
不温不火。
她时不时的提醒诚人，她正在长大，她会长成让诚人目瞪口呆的美人，她的乳牙会换掉，眼镜会摘掉，胸部也会变大。她要诚人后悔当初没有和自己交往。
听着她说，诚人总是笑。看着她笑。

后来，她向诚人要了一个吻，当作生日礼物。诚人的应许让她快乐地说，能被诚人吻，我一定会幸福的死掉的。
不知这能不能算的上是一语成谶？那个充满不止一点爱意的吻，竟真的让诚人永远失去了她。

分别两年后。纽约。她的个人影展。
是特意为诚人办的。里面有很多诚人的照片。各个角度的，各种表情的。那是她眼里的诚人，是她心里的诚人。是她深爱着的诚人。
还有那副湖边他吻她的照片。
静止的阳光。阳光下他吻着她。
一个深情隽永的吻。

亲爱的，电影看到这里，我忽然想起你在短信里，对我说过这样的话。
你说，只要一个深情的吻。
恩。我说，我答应你了。
然后，写着写着，我就想把这篇文献给你。只献给你。

静流吃甜甜圈。还分给诚人吃。
诚人记住静流爱吃甜甜圈。于是，他买给她吃。

我也爱吃甜甜圈。
所以我对你说我最爱吃甜蜜蜜的食物，尤其是建设路那家DONA里售卖的甜甜圈。
然后你说，恩，我也爱吃甜食。
意想不到。于是，我在你看不见的地方，咧嘴笑着。我知道，那滋味远比甜甜圈要甜上更多。

亲爱的。就这样越来越熟悉你的存在。越来越熟悉你给的关怀。越来越熟悉你能懂得的那些我们之间的感觉。
谢谢你在我独自旅行时，不间断的问候和牵挂。谢谢你在我孤单的吃着大分至尊披萨的时候给我信息说：我不能在你身边。但是你可以想象我现在就在你对面，陪你一起吃。你说，要深化这思念的力量。

你真的一点点就跑到我心里去了。

电话里，我说我家的地址。你忽然就笑起来。我问你笑什么。你就把你家的地址说给我听。然后，我也笑。
原来，我们竟然住的那样近。我在坡底，你在坡顶。那么多年，在我们不知道的时候，也许都擦身而过许多次了。反正你回家，总是要先经过我家的。

说到小时候。我说我就是在理工玩大的。你说当年你也总是领着一帮小孩在理工里玩。
说到食物。我们都讨厌肥肉。我们都爱甜的东西。
说到孤独感。我们心中的那份感受竟会如此相像。总觉得，那是除了挚友之外，没有人能懂的。可是你竟然会明白。

亲爱的。
究竟还要和你相似到什么程度呢？
究竟还要我还要让自己陷入多深呢？

我愿意不顾一切的爱你。在你身边陪着你。给你安全的感觉。让你安心。让你觉得幸福。
可是也要请你原谅，我也许不够勇敢。原谅我也许将来某一天会消失不见。原谅我没有控制住自己，让自己最终陷入两难的困境。

在那一天到来之前。我只求现在，现在，我只想爱你。
我想念着你。
于是，我听到因为想你，而一下一下，自己那分明又深刻的心跳声。

这篇剧评可能有剧透 讲真，第一季发现病毒是靠吸收辐射生长，侯扥决定把爱神推向太阳的时候，我是捏了一把冷汗的，如果病毒坠入太阳后没有没消灭，反而依靠太阳的能量壮大，就像同化金星那样，同化了太阳，那真的不该说什么了一群人怀揣救世之心，没有论证的一意孤行，完全不信任政府，在未知的边...  (展开)

这篇剧评可能有剧透 douban存稿 写于停播回归 №5（EP5） 「我也想放弃……」 申导的《机智》（后面都用简称）就像砂锅焐高汤，小火、费时，却后味十足。 男主金济赫出场后，木讷寡言，最鲜明的标签是「努力」。 能够克服一切困难、犹如不死之鸟的国民偶像。 每个人面对他，看到的都是那只不死鸟。...  (展开)

每一部都是一个南美地区的一个女人的奋斗史，她们的奋斗就是自己的厨艺。她们对抗婚姻，对抗不公，对抗同性恋爱的束缚。每一个美食都很简单，但是用心做好每一个简单的食物，往往需要花很多的心思和热情。她们不害怕苦难，而是用勇气和耐心战胜生活。直到手艺被世界所赞扬。苏...  (展开)

一、多个时空


《纯粹理性批判》中的第一经验类比（Analogies of Experience）要求在现象中有一个恒定且唯一之物来表象意识中的时间本身。恒定，或永恒，因为作为总体的时间本身是始终在那的；惟一，因为只有一个时间。这个惟一且永恒的东西，即现象中的实体（Substance）。康德明确把这个实体与洛克的托子（Substratum）区分开来，认为实体是以各种方式显现于人的，而不是像托子那样不可知，也不显现。

我要说，洛克的托子的作用是保证物的个体化与同一性。这个作用在康德那儿，似乎是由物自体和先验范畴共同完成。先验范畴组织现象，在使意识对现象的认识成为可能的同时，也使同一的意识本身成为可能——对先验对象的构成即对自我的构成。而物自体在这个过程中究竟如何起作用，不详。康德的物自体与洛克的托子一样，是个让理论显得尴尬，却又不得不进行的假设。

尽管康德反复说现象中的实体不是洛克的托子，但这个实体究竟是什么，他又语焉不详。出于他对牛顿力学的接受，有人尝试将其理解为牛顿意义上的质量。我论证过，这样的解读将面临一个两难困境：如果实体是个体化了的质量，时间便不是惟一的；如果实体是现象世界中的总质量，基于二律背反的理由——这个总体无法成为经验对象——我们便无法经验到它。（详细论述见篇末附录）

若是跳出康德阐释，取前一个困境：时间不是惟一的，每个作为现象的物都意味着一个独立的时间体系，我们就科幻了：空间中的一个一个的物，奠基着意识中的一个又一个时间系，我们可以生活在不同的时空中，当我们经验不同的物。甚至，对应地说，我们总在成为另一个人，当我们来到不同的时空。

于是，我情愿把亨利的生活看作对康德的一次失败却有趣的解读。与其说他是一位时间旅行者，一位不停地穿越时空的超人或可怜人，不如说，他的意识中并没有一个绝对惟一的时间，他所来到并离开的每一个时空，都是一个独立自在的世界，尽管这些世界看上去很像，但哪个都不依赖于另一个——从理念的意义上说。


二、沉默，或消失


影片的前半部分，亨利的突然消失被解释为一种不治的遗传疾病。没有理由地，他时不时就去了另一个时空，赤身裸体地寻找可以穿上的衣服。仿佛常人来到一个新的环境，总是迫不及待地寻找一个身份，穿到自己身上。
亨利总会在一个无从预料的时刻消失，克莱尔生活在一个不确定的世界中。她的爱情是确定的，但她爱的人不确定地存在着。她的生活中弥漫着不确定性，而这恰好让她格外珍惜亨利在她身边的每一分钟。

克莱尔一次次怀孕又一次次流产，因为胎儿也有穿越症，莫名其妙地，便在某个时刻，出离了子宫。但克莱尔最后一次怀孕时，对亨利说，你每次消失都是因为感觉到了压力。所以，从现在开始，我要保持绝对地平静，这样胎儿就可以顺利出生了。
看到这里，我恍然大悟，原来亨利的穿越症是个隐喻，关于男人的隐喻：面对压力，便会沉默与回避，这不正是男人的本能反应么——而这在女人看来，仿佛爱人去了另一个时空，不知何时才能回来，甚至，会不会回来。

我查了查，电影改编自一位女造型艺术家的首部小说，写于一段失败的恋情之后。原来如此。

很多年前听到过一个说法：爱情，对男人来说，是挂在墙上的一幅画，你并不总是去看它；但对女人来说，则是房间里音乐，你想不听都不行。所以，男人需要时不时地呆在纯然属于自我的世界里，在沉默中成为自己。女人却要认为这是对她的疏远、对亲密的疏离，并因此而坐立不安，想方设法闯进那份铁一般的沉默。结果，要么把自己撞疼，要么把爱情撞碎。
这是对小儿女情态的描述。若成年点，便会更同情于另一个说法：人生在世，无非是男人讨慰藉，女人讨生活。人并不总是需要慰藉，尤其在得意之时。人却总在生活，就算你不想。


三、看着，却无法改变


在一次穿越中，亨利来到母亲身边，在地铁里，母亲在看报，他们作为陌生人简短却亲切的交谈了一会儿。亨利告诉母亲，他要结婚了，这个女孩让他感到安全。
克莱尔问他：你什么不去阻止那场车祸，既然你可以回到车祸发生之前。“我无法阻止。无数次我回到过去，回到母亲还在的时候，但每次我都无法改变发生着的一切。”——这话让人特别难过。我们并不能改变过去，就像不能重新雕刻一座已然完成的塑像。

不是么？很多时候，我们从自己当下的境遇中抽身而出，试图站在一个更开阔的角度，超脱地看现在的纠结、焦虑，或苦闷，并自嘲这些都没什么的。但当你身在当下，你知道未来的自己就坐在对面，笑着，看着自己，慈悲地。但你还是无法因此脱身而出。你仍然只能呆在你当下的处境中，无论是过分的快乐，还是仿佛无法挣脱的哀伤。

每一个时刻都是三维的，它包含着过去、现在，和未来这三个维度。我们在回忆中编辑时间，编辑自己，有意无意地遗忘一些，并把另一些反复摩挲。过往明明灭灭，像晴天里，随风晃动的百叶窗投在墙上的影子。每次回忆之后，我们都成为另一个人。
未来也是。未来无数次作为想象呈现于当下，各式各样地，仿佛清晰的回忆。回忆与憧憬，如同天平的两臂，对称着，平衡着，在现在这个支点上。所以，现在这个时刻，最重。


四、期限


有天聚会时，亨利中枪后痛苦挣扎的裸体突然出现在他们的门厅里。又消失了。克莱尔说，我从没见过四十岁之后的你。我见过的你总是很年轻。从这个时候起，死亡就成了他们中的另一个在场者，尽管它总是沉默着。

亨利穿越到未来，遇见了自己的已经十岁的女儿。女儿告诉他，他死于自己五岁那年。她们一直很想念他。那时他们的女儿还没出生。那时克莱尔还一如既往地希望与亨利白头偕老，就像她还没长大时那样，就像她长大之后第一次遇到亨利时那样，就像亨利死后，她仍然留着亨利所有的衣服，等着亨利回来那样。

于她而言，亨利是不会死的。他无非是走远了一下子回不来，他无非是在时空中迷了路，找不到一件让他温暖的衣服。

女儿五岁那年，亨利和克莱尔都已知道，亨利即将死去，中弹而死。期限降至，可能在任何一天，任何一个时刻。在它到来之前，所有相聚的时光都是铭刻，都是用最日常的方式来进行的一次祭奠，一次追忆。当这个期限还不确定，他们相爱着，仿佛一对最平凡的恋人；当这个期限已然确定，他们相爱着，装作不知道他们即将分离。

一个期限并不见得让期限到来之前的一切都显得美好。但，美好的东西都有一个期限。确定的期限，或不确定的期限。你不能试图挽留，那会犹如握紧手中的细沙，握得越紧，便流失得越快，宛如时间，从指缝间悄然流走。
这个期限是否到来，何时到来，都不是你能选择的。你能做的，仅仅是在它到来之前的每一刻，不让自己在未来后悔——克莱尔明白这些，并且，她做到了。

而，这不正是人生么。


——————
附录：On Understanding Substance as Mass

Introduction

In the First Analogy of Experience, Kant argues that there must be some permanently persistent substance in the appearances which represents the persistence of time. Given Kant’s endorsement of Newtonian physics, commentators such as Eric Watkins suggest that such permanently persistent substance can be understood as Newtonian mass. In this paper, however, I argue that we face a dilemma when we try to cash out the notion of substance in terms of Newtonian mass.
The paper proceeds in three steps. In the first section, I present the reason why there needs to be a permanently persistent substance in the appearances, and discuss why it seems to be compelling to conceive of the permanently persistent substance as Newtonian Mass. Then, in the second section, I argue that there are (only) two ways of conceiving of the permanently persistent substance as Newtonian mass, namely, to conceive of substance as individuated mass and to conceive of substance as the sum total of mass in the world of appearances. I show that there are textual indications as well as philosophical reasons to support each option. In the third section, however, I argue that both ways suffer from inescapable problems. Thus, conceiving of the permanently persistent substance in terms of Newtonian mass is not viable.

    
Section I. The Permanently Persistent Substance

In this section, I shall first present the reason why Kant thinks that there must be a permanently persistent substance in the appearances. I then discuss why it is compelling to conceive of such substance as Newtonian mass.
In the chapter “System of all principles of pure understanding,” Kant discusses what makes possible the applications of the categories, i.e. the pure concepts of understanding, to objects, i.e. appearances that are given to sensible intuitions. That is, he discusses what it is that makes the categories have objective validity. Kant’s claim is that the applications of the categories are only possible under certain conditions, and these conditions are spelled out by the principles. For instance, the applications of the relational categories (substance-accidents, cause and effect, and mutual interactions) are possible if they are applied to objects according to the principles of Analogies of Experience. In addition to the three specific principles that correspond to each of the three relational categories, Kant also provides a general principle overarching all three Analogies. The general principle is stated in the second edition as follows: “Experience is possible only through the representations of a necessary connection of perceptions” (B 218). Watkins provides a helpful interpretation of this general principle:
“The general idea is that each of the three relational categories represents a necessary connection that is required for experience of a single time and of objects existing and being temporally related to each other within a single time to be possible.” (My emphasis)
Since this paper is focused on the notion of substance in the first Analogy, I shall ignore the second and third Analogies. So I now turn to a close examination of the first Analogy.
The first Analogy, i.e. the principle of the persistence of substance, is stated in the second edition as follows: “In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.” (B 224) Watkins summarizes Kant’s argument for the first Analogy as follows (which I take to be a correct interpretation):
Premise 1: Appearances, i.e. objects of experience, are made possible by time’s persistence.
Premise 2: We do not perceive time itself.
Therefore, In order to have experience of appearances, there must be some permanent substance in the appearances which can represent time or time’s persistence.
While the appearances, as the objects given to our intuitions, are changing, the substance in appearances always stays the same and is permanent. So, Kant calls the permanent substance “the substratum of everything real” (B 225). But, some clarifications about Kant’s use of the term “substratum” are needed to prevent potential confusions. Substratum in Kant’s text does not mean what Locke uses this term to mean, namely, the bearer of properties which is unchanging and about which we can have no knowledge. For, according to Locke, we can only know what is given to our senses, but since the underlying substratum cannot be given to our senses, we have no access to it and therefore cannot know it.
Kant, by constrast, does not think that there is any Lockean substratum in the world of appearances. For Kant, the fact that the states of the substance are changing and the substance stays the same does not mean the states are separable from the substance. Rather, the changing states of the substance are simply the ways in which the substance is given to us. Thus, we can know the substance, that is, we know the substance through its states. In order to avoid the Lockean implication of the term “substratum,” I shall only use “substance” to refer to the permanently persistent thing in the appearances despite Kant’s own use of “substratum” to talk about what is permanent in the appearances.
Since I have argued that Kant’s notion of substance is not the Lockean substratum, then what is the Kantian notion of substance? We need a positive account of what the substance is. It is obvious that such a permanently persistent thing cannot be captured by ordinary physical objects, no matter whether they are natural objects (say, rocks) or artifacts (say, ships), for neither artifacts nor natural objects always stay the same such that in principle they can never suffer changes. So, it seems no ordinarily construed physical things can be qualified as substance that is permanently persistent. On the other hand, it is very hard to imagine that anything non-physical could play the role the substance is supposed to play. For it is hard to imagine how a non-physical being could be given to our sensible intuition or could be spatiotemporally organized by our a priori intuitions. So, it is unlikely that Kant means something non-physical by “substance.” Thus, there are two constraints on spelling out what substance is. First, it is something physical. Second, as I have shown, the physical being that can be understood as substance cannot be ordinarily individuated physical things such as planet or rock.
In order to meet the above two conditions, Watkins suggests that, given Kant’s commitment to Newtonian science, it is likely that Kant has Newtonian mass in mind when he talks about the substance, since no matter how a physical object changes, its mass always stays the same. Since Newtonian mass is physical and is not an ordinarily individuated object, it seems quite compelling that the substance, which is permanently persistent, just is Newtonian mass. According to common sense, Newtonian mass is understood to be underlying objects such that we cannot directly perceive mass but can only perceive mass through the way it is given to our intuition, namely, through the perception of the objects that have mass. Thus, mass is neither unknowable nor directly perceivable, which seems to fit the description of the substance perfectly.
Moreover, there are many textual indications that suggest the identification of substance with mass. Let me note two examples. First, recall the general principle overarching the three specific Analogies, namely, “In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.” (B 224) It seems that “quantum” is most naturally to be understood as mass, for mass seems to be the only thing in nature that is neither increased nor diminished on Newtonian physics.
The other indication is Kant’s example to illustrate his claim that “he <a philosopher> thus assumed that as incontrovertible that even in fire the matter (substance) never disappears but rather only suffers an alteration in its form.” (B 288, my emphasis):
“A philosopher was asked: How much does the smoke weigh? He replied: If you take away from the weight of the wood that was burnt the weight of the ashes that are left over, you will have the weight of the smoke.” (B 288)
We can see that here Kant explicitly identifies substance with matter. And it is quite plausible to think that “matter” is just another way of saying “mass”. That is, “mass” seems to be the theoretical analog of the term “matter.” This hypothesis is supported by the example of the weight of smoke. For, in the example, the way to calculate the weight of smoke just is to calculate the mass (multiplies the gravitational constant).
However, despite the compelling reasons for the identification of substance with mass, in the next sections, I shall argue that the substance cannot be understood as Newtonian mass, for when we try to work out the details of understanding the substance as mass, we face an unavoidable dilemma.


Section II. Some Mass or the Sum Total of Mass

In this section, I shall argue that there are two ways of conceiving of substance as Newtonian mass, and then show that both ways have some support from the text and are to some extent philosophically plausible. So, both ways deserve detailed considerations. But, in the next section, I shall argue that both ways face insurmountable problems.
In identifying substance with mass, we need to settle an ambiguity: Is the mass meant to be some mass, say the mass of a rock which is 7 kilograms (a randomly chosen weight), or to be the sum total of mass in the world of appearances which is a very large but nonetheless definite amount? Since both some mass and the sum total of mass are permanently persistent, we cannot tell which way of identifying is more plausible with respect to the permanent persistence of substance. So, we must appeal to some other philosophically and/or textually interesting points to ground a preference in choosing one over the other.
Let us first consider identifying the substance with some or individuated mass. First, the first Analogy is the principle according to which the relational category substance-accident is to be applied. Kant defines accidents to be “the determinations of a substance that are nothing other than particular ways for it to exist.”(B 229) Many commentators interpret the relation to be between object and its properties or states. Thus it makes more sense to think that the mass, which is the underlying bearer of properties, is the individuated mass of some object, instead of the sum total of mass in the world of appearances. For instance, in the example of the weight of smoke, Kant seems to conceive of substance as the matter, i.e. mass, of an individual object. Moreover, if we conceive of substance as the sum total of mass in the world of appearances, it is very hard to imagine how substance can be the bearer of properties or what kind of properties of which substance is the bearer.
One might argue that, on the interpretation according to which substance is the sum total of mass, even though we could imagine no properties of which substance is the bearer, we can still conceive of substance as the bearer of (changing) states, i.e. the successive states of the world of appearances. I reply that Kant cannot accept such an idea because the states of the world are not objects of possible experience, for it is at least empirically true that no one could have the whole world of appearances as his object of experience. I will return to this point later on in the paper and use it to argue that conceiving of substance as the sum total of mass is untenable given Kant’s theoretic commitments.
The above discussion is about reasons to prefer the identification of substance with some mass. I now turn to the reasons to prefer the identifications of substance with the sum total of mass. There are some textual evidences in the first Analogy that suggest this latter identification. For instance, the following passage:
“…here the issue is only appearances in the field of experience, the unity of which would never be possible if we were to allow new things (as far as their substance is concerned) to arise. For then everything would disappear that alone can represent the unity of time, namely the identity of the substratum in which alone all change has its thoroughgoing unity. This persistence is therefore nothing more than the way in which we represent the existence of things (in appearances).” (B 229/A186, my emphasis)
In this passage, Kant seems to identify the permanent persistent substance that represents the persistence of time with the unity of appearances, which seems to be the sum total of mass in the whole world of appearances. Let me argue for my understanding of this passage that it indicates that Kant identifies substance with the sum total of mass. I shall argue by reductio: Suppose Kant identified substance with individuated mass in the above passage. Then, it would make no sense to think that the arising of new substance could make the representation of the unity of time impossible. For the arising of new substance in no sense affects the substance, i.e. the mass, of the original objects. Let me use an example to illustrate. Suppose there is a rock whose mass is 7 kilograms and there arises a new object out of nothing, whose mass is 5 kilograms. Insofar as the rock’s mass remains the same, whether or not there are new masses arising out of nothing does not affect the unity of the rock’s mass, which is 7 kilograms. Therefore, in this passage, Kant conceives of substance as the sum total of mass in the whole world of appearances.
So far I have shown that there are compelling reasons to identify substance with some mass or with the sum total of mass respectively. In the next section, I shall argue that there are also devastating reasons to each identification such that either way we go, we face unsolvable problems.


Section III. One Single Time and the Limit of Possible Experience

I now turn to the problems from which the each identification suffers. In this section, I shall argue that these problems make both identifications untenable. Let us first consider the identification of substance with individuated mass (i.e. some mass). I argue that the reason why individuated mass cannot be identified with substance is that individuated mass cannot represent the oneness of time. Recall Kant’s argument for the principle of the first Analogy: in order to have experiences of objects as temporal, we must identify a permanently persistent substance that can represent time in objects. While the states of the substance change, the substance persists so that the substance can represent time that persists. It is important to notice that time, which is supposed to be represented by substance in appearances, is one single time. But, individuated mass cannot represent one single time. For there are many individuated masses, for instance, the mass of a rock which is 7 kilograms, the mass of a cup which is 0.5 kilogram, and the mass of a table which is 3 kilograms, each of which is permanently persistent and undergoes changes. If one of them can represent time, any other also can. In that case, we do not have one single time. Rather, we have many times or time-series, each of which is persistent.
Let me explain in details why multiply individuated masses cannot represent on single time. If these individuated masses can represent one single time, there must be some one single thing that is shared by these individuated masses that serves to represent the singularity of time. Whatever this shared thing is, it is not any of these individuated masses. Therefore, individuated mass cannot present one single time. However, on the other hand, time has be to singular. Here is a passage in the first Analogy which explains why time has to be one single time rather than a plurality of times:
“Substances (in appearances) are the substrata of all time-determinations. The arising of some of them and the perishing of others would itself remove the sole condition of the empirical unity of time, and the appearances would then be related to two different times, in which existence flowed side by side, which is absurd. For there is only one time, in which all different times must not be placed simultaneously but only one after another.” (B 232/A189)
One might argue that it does not matter how many individuated masses can represent time, it only matters that there is an individuated mass that represents time. Insofar as there is such a substance, which is permanently persistent, it suffices to represent one single time. I reply that, in that case, we still do not know which individuated mass is suppose to be the representer of the one single time in appearances. For there is not reason to think that the mass of one object is more suitable to represent time than the mass of another object is, insofar as both of the individuated masses are permanently persistent. Any choice of one over the other is arbitrary. But the unity or singularity of time is not arbitrary, for there can only be one time-series which persists, and any other time-series or temporal relations are just temporal parts of this unique time-series. Thus, I conclude that individuated mass cannot be the representer of time in appearances.
I now turn to argue that the sum total of mass cannot represent time either. The idea of my argument is to make use of Kant’s solution to the Antinomies to show that the permanently persistent substance that represents time in the appearances cannot be the sum total of mass because the sum total of mass is not an object of possible experience. Let me lay out my argument in detail.
In “The Antinomy of Pure Reason” chapter, Kant presents four pairs of arguments concerning four cosmological ideas about the world-whole, namely, whether there is a beginning of time, whether there is indivisibly simple substance, whether there is a first cause, and whether there is a necessary existent. As Allen W. Wood argues, the four antinomies share a general form, namely, the thesis of each antinomy claims that there must be a first member of the conditioning-conditioned chain, while the antithesis of each antinomy claims that there is no first member of such a chain and that the chain goes back into infinity. Kant argues that there are valid arguments for each of the four theses as well as valid arguments for each of the four antitheses, so we need a solution to such contradictions.
Kant’s solution to the contradictions, as Wood argues, relies on his doctrine of transcendental idealism. As for the first two antinomies, Wood argues
The mathematical antinomies are generated by mathematical principles that apply to things only insofar as they are given in sensible intuition…But these [the first two] series of conditions are never given to intuition as a whole...The theses are false because the principles of possible experience make it impossible for objects corresponding to the cosmological ideas of a first event, a largest extent of the world or a simple substance, ever to be given to intuition.”
Thus, the reason why Kant thinks that the claims made by the theses of the first and second antinomies are false is that neither the beginning of time nor the spatial boundary of the world or an indivisible substance can ever be given to our sensible intuition. If something cannot be given to our sensible intuition, according to Kant, we cannot have experience of it. Let me call this principle the object-of-sensible-intuition principle, namely, if something cannot be given to our sensible intuitions, then it cannot be object of our possible experience. And we can apply this principle to an object to determine whether that object can be object of possible experience. That is, if the object in question can be given to our sensible intuition, then the object can be object of our possible experience, but if the object cannot be given to our sensible intuition, then it cannot be object of our possible experience.
Now, let me apply the object-of-sensible-intuition principle to the idea of the sum total of mass. We can see that the sum total of mass cannot be given to our sensible intuition, so, the sum total of mass cannot be object of our possible experience. For the world of appearances seems to mean the whole universe or cosmos (because everything in the universe stands in causal relations to each other), there is no way for all of the mass in the whole universe to be given to our sensible intuition. Actually, we do not even know whether there are spatial boundaries of the universe, so we do not even know whether the sum total of mass in the all universe is finite. Thus, the sum total of mass cannot be object of possible experience. So, the sum total of mass cannot be that which represents time in appearances. For the reason there must be a permanently persistent substance in appearances which represents time is to make our temporally connected representations of objects possible. But, if the sum total of mass cannot be object of experience, it cannot make our experience of object possible. Thus, the permanently persistent substance in appearances cannot be the sum total of mass.
One might object that in the antinomies, the cosmological ideas at issue are condition-condition series. (B 436/A410) But the sum total of mass is not a series. Rather, it is an aggregate about which the question of conditioning and conditioned does not arise at all. Thus, Kant’s remarks on the antinomies have no bearing on whether the idea of the sum total of mass has any objective validity or significance. Moreover, the first two antinomies concern whether the conditioning-conditioned series go on into infinities. And it seems that it is impossible for us to experience infinity, for no matter what we experience it is finite insofar as we have experienced it. But, the quantum of the sum total of mass seems to be a definite and finite amount. By virtues of what can we claim that the sum total of mass cannot be object of experience? Is this “cannot” an empirical cannot, or an In-Principle cannot? If the answer is the former, the empirical “cannot” does not seem to be strong enough to show that the sum total of mass cannot be experienced, because we cannot know or predict whether in the future empirical sciences and technologies will make the sum total of mass possible object of experience. If the answer is the latter, at least further explanations of why the sum total of mass, which is a finite and definite amount, cannot be object of possible experience in principle are needed.
To the first objection I have two replies. First, in the first antinomy, Kant also discusses whether there is boundary or the largest extent of space. It is not obvious that there is a spatial series in the sense that it is obvious that there is a temporal series in which one moment succeeds its previous moments. However, according to Kant, we can think of the space acquiring its quantum through repeatedly or successively adding spatial units to the previous spatial units. (A 428/B 456) That is, the way of conceiving of space as a spatial series depends on the way of conceiving of time as a temporal series, which is naturally serial. Then, by the same token, we can also think of the sum total of mass acquiring its quantum by successively adding massive units to previous massive units. Thus, if the object-of-sensible-intuition principle applies to the idea of the boundary of space, it should also apply to the idea of the sum total of mass of the whole world of appearances.
Second, the fact that Kant applies the object-of-sensible-intuition-principle to the first two (or three) cosmological ideas to solve the contradictions does not mean that the principle can only be employed to deal with the antinomies. If the principle is applicable to other ideas, we can also use the principle to deal with other ideas. Since the object-of-sensible-intuition principle is derived from transcendental idealism, which is an important element in the whole Critique, there is no reason why the principle cannot be applied to other ideas than cosmological ideas. Thus, it is legitimate to use the object-of-sensible-intuition principle to show that the sum total of mass of whole world of appearances cannot be object of possible experience. So, the sum total of mass cannot be what represents time in appearances.
My reply to the second objection has two steps. First, it needs to be clarified that, although the first two antinomies concern whether the conditioning-conditioned series are infinite, Kant’s solution by the object-of-sensible-intuition principle does not rely on the whether the series are infinite. The principle only concerns whether the things to which the cosmological ideas refer can be given to our sensible intuition. It does not concern whether the things are infinite. It seems true that infinity cannot be object of sensible intuition. But this does not mean that all finite things can be given to our sensible intuition. Actually Kant rejects the claim that all finite things can be given to our sensible intuition. For Kant thinks the thesis of the first antinomy is false, because the beginning of time or the boundary of space cannot be given to our sensible intuition so that it cannot be object of possible experience.
The second step of my reply is to spell out in which sense of “cannot,” the sum total of mass cannot be object of possible experience. It seems to me that the distinction between empirical “cannot” and In-Principle “cannot” is hard to cash out in the context of Critique. For, in the Critique, any legitimate claim to knowledge entails that the object of which the knowledge is can be experienced. Thus, it seems that the empiricality of the “cannot” entails the In-Principality of the “cannot”.
However, concerning the claim that we cannot predict whether in the future empirical sciences and technologies will make the sum total of mass possible object of experience, what would Kant say? Would Kant agree that future sciences and technologies might or could transform a transcendent idea into an idea which refers to object of possible experience? I do not think he would. For Kant thinks his Critique settles metaphysical questions once and for all by theoretical reason, which is static or a-historical. Future discoveries made by sciences and technologies should be able to do no damage to the doctrines in Critique. Moreover, it should be odd to Kant’s ear that progresses made by empirical sciences could have any bearings on the doctrines in the Critique, which he builds up from scratch employing only pure reason, which is absolutely a-historical.
Thus, I conclude that the above arguments show that identifying substance with the sum total of mass in the world of appearance is not tenable. Since I showed earlier in this section that identifying substance with individuated mass is not tenable either, I conclude that the general strategy of identifying substance with mass is untenable.


Section IV. Concluding Remarks

In this paper, I showed that a seemingly very promising way of understanding the permanently persistent substance discussed in the first Analogy, namely, conceiving of substance as Newtonian mass, is untenable. Then, I wonder whether there are other promising ways of providing a positive account of substance or actually it is the case that the notion of substance in the first Analogy is itself untenable. At this stage, maybe I could follow Kant’s stance on the things of themselves, namely, they exist, but we can have no knowledge about the way of their existence. But, at the same time, we need to have this minimal conviction that they exist. Similarly, concerning substance, we can have no knowledge about what the permanently persistent substance is, but we need to have the minimal conviction that it exists in the world of appearances and it serves to represent time.

这篇影评可能有剧透 【超超超严重剧透警示！请在看完电影后浏览此影评】 看过《犬之岛》的都知道，片中的日本政权分为了犬猫两派 时间线设置为20年后的日本 由猫派当道的小林市长执政 那么问题来了 为什么自古猫犬不合的猫派市长小林定人会送养子阿塔里一只护卫狗呢？ （此处闪回） 电影开头给我们...  (展开)

       血腥的题材不是我的偏好，也没对《沉默的羔羊》留下多深刻的印象，记不清当时是因为什么原因看了《汉尼拔》，也记不得当时有多么的惊疑和恐惧，只记得影片结束后有多么动容和感动。
    他嗜血，凶残，以玩弄世人于鼓掌之间为乐，她迟钝，严谨，将献身正义看做自己的天职。命运生而对立，情愫却蓦然而生。若非一个个鲜血淋漓的镜头，也不知他竟爱得如此深沉。
    仍记得汉尼拔将晕厥中的她抱起，背后是一群野猪疯狂的啃噬罪恶之人，那一刻的温柔竟让我忘记汉尼拔亦是有罪之人。
    她醒来，只见他已为她换上一身华服，在药物的作用下，她跌跌撞撞走下楼，只见他在生食活人的脑浆。如果说她对他仍有那么一点爱慕与感激，所有的好感都在那一刻化为泡影。然后，她对他只剩下绳之以法的使命感与憎恶之情。
    当她用手铐拴住了彼此，警笛由远及近，故事被推向了高潮。看过了这篇电影的全貌，观众如我已然希望这位亦邪亦正的男主角能够微微打动她的芳心。不期然她能尾随他的脚步，这样的故事太过滥情；若是他重又永不见天日，她又太不解风情毁了电影那阴郁朦胧的暧昧色彩。他让她打开手铐，一次又一次，然后挥刀，那一刻，不记得是否有泪滑过她的眼角，只记得她紧闭了双眼，不忍视。
    然后，他坐在了飞机上，依然优雅，只是永远失去了一只手臂；她望向远方，眼神忧伤而温柔。
    这样的结局或许是最好的，他不曾为她改变，嗜血是他的烙印，但他未曾说出许是：伤害是我的天性，但你却是我唯一的不忍。她亦未为他放弃信仰和原则，仍是石头一块的迟钝和决绝，但那一刻，她眼中的温柔已然道尽一切。

实在是充满了惊喜的一部电影，让我很后悔自己没有去电影院贡献票房，毕竟今年烂片这么多，难得一部好片子自己却没有支持，心里内疚得很。这些惊喜里，简单拆分的话大概可以分成四部分： 第一导演竟然是曾国祥，曾志伟的儿子，我根本不知道他会导戏，事实上他作为演员拿出手来...  (展开)

事实上，新海诚一直都不是我个人所喜欢的动画电影导演。他的动画总是充满绚烂多彩的画面，给人一种非常梦幻而不真实的感觉，唯美而忧伤，莫名其妙的哀愁。不过画面的美丽也算得上是新海诚的重要优势之一，但与之相对应的则是其在故事脚本上的弱势一直为人所诟病。

对于一部分影迷，包括我自己而言，一部电影的故事的重要程度要远超于其画面的美丽或者其他一切艺术手法。而新海诚导演的几部动画电影都有着同样的问题，过分重视画面的质感，而忽视了电影的故事性。比如《秒速5厘米》中漫天随风落下的樱花，《言叶之庭》中细腻真实的雨水。美则美矣，但故事总是让人接受无力。

不过这一问题被其最新作品《你的名字》所改变了。这部电影不仅仅有着新海诚标志性的美不胜收的画面，而且还在故事脚本上有了质的突破。画面与故事的尽善尽美，一起成就了这部电影。最终电影在日本上映两天拿下超过7亿日元的票房，被新海诚自称为他的最高杰作。

据新海诚自己介绍说，电影的故事来源于一首著名的日本和歌，歌词大意为：“梦里相逢人不见，若知是梦何须醒。纵然梦里常幽会，怎比真如见一回。”新海诚把这个梦中相见的故事更进一步地改编成为了一个两个人在梦中交换身体生活的故事，并加上了一个千年一遇的彗星重返地球的“末日背景”，这让整个故事变得有趣而吸引人了。

女主角三叶是一个生活在深山之中的乡村女孩，母亲早逝，父亲忙于竞选，自己与外婆和妹妹一起生活。小镇生活平淡无聊，三叶早已厌倦这里的一切，希望去往大城市东京生活；而男主角泷则是东京的一名高中生，与父亲生活，经常去餐厅打工，同样平淡而无聊的生活。

一切都从他们的梦中开始改变。

梦中的三叶进入了泷的身体，过上了她一直想要的东京生活；而梦中的泷则进入三叶的身体，变成了一个帅气的女生，勇敢地面对所有流言蜚语。就这样，他们不定期地在梦中交换身体，并给对方留下当天的日记，用文字互相交流。

电影中的这一部分非常有趣，同一个身体却是两个不同的人格，三叶变得时而内向胆怯时而勇敢帅气，泷也变得时而神经大条时而温柔体贴，这对他们各自的生活都产生了非常有趣的影响，更是让他们的朋友感到困惑。

在新海诚以往的电影中，男女主角总是沉浸在自己的世界中，与世隔绝般地孤独、思考、独自生活。而在这部《你的名字》中，男女主角终于一反常态，进入了像所有正常人一样的生活，他们也被赋予了朋友、家人、同事这样的社会关系网，让这一切都变得更广阔和大众，不再是孤芳自赏般的个人情绪的展现。

少年与少女在时空之间不断地穿越，互相交流也互相影响，但他们始终没能相遇。
 
这一设定已经足够吸引人了，但新海诚在此基础上还加入了彗星来临的“末日情绪”，更是让人大吃一惊。虽然电影的前半段，彗星的来临一直被作为是一种美丽的自然天象来展示的，直到最后才突然意识到彗星即将毁灭小镇的事实，这让整部电影的故事性更上一层，变得更加精彩了。

随着彗星的接近，故事不断发展，少年泷突然意识到好像在某一次之后再也没有类似的梦境了。他开始怀疑一切，怀疑这梦中的故事究竟是梦还是事实，梦中的那个少女到底存不存在。为此，他踏上了寻找那个梦中小镇的道路。

然而他所发现的事实不仅让他大吃一惊，更是让观众也同样惊讶。原来梦中的故事不仅仅是一个空间的穿越，还是一个时间的穿越。少女三叶是三年前的少女，而少年泷是现在的少年，他们共同做的这个梦的终极意义是试图拯救整个小镇的居民。

故事的最后，他们共同历经千辛万苦终于拯救了小镇。少女三叶终于在灾难之中活了下来，来到东京生活；少年泷也同样一直在东京继续生活。但是他们却互相遗忘了梦中的故事，忘记了那个不能忘，也不想忘的名字，只是隐隐记得一直在追寻的那个人。

要是以新海诚以往的调性，或许故事会就此结束，留下淡淡忧伤的结局，甚至会更催泪的让男女主角在人海中插肩而过却无法相识。但在这部电影中，新海诚竟然给出了一个Happy Ending，反而更加催泪更加动人。

冬去春来，地铁上的偶然一瞥，惊人的似曾相似的感觉，让他们互相寻找对方。可是见面之后，却又没有勇气说话，强忍着冲动，默默低头插肩而过，直教所有观众为他们着急。

直到少年泷一低头，一咬牙，大喊一声：请问，我在哪里见过你吗？

少女泪如雨下，微笑着说：我也是。

感动在这一瞬间达到极致，这种纯粹美好的爱情让人无比羡慕，中二病和少女心在这一刻都值得原谅，真是抵挡不住的美好。

人世间所有的相遇都是久别重复，即使没有真正的遇见过彼此，但或许是在梦中。毕竟梦这种东西，醒来之后就会消失的。

享受梦境吧，或者珍惜每一个相遇的人，或者告诉我你的名字吧。

本文首发于巴塞电影APP